Tuc said:
"I wonder if the Build Standard reflected in the Boeing Safety Case in the US is the same as the proposed UK one? We are told they are the same, but I'm not so sure. "

I would be absolutely gob-smacked if the Safety Case in each Directorate was even remotely the same.
The UK and US spec's should reflect those nations individual expectations and standards. The differences are clearly stated as such in the MAA's declared aspiration to align with future US mil certification processes for Apache and F-35.

They only have to bend the current rules slightly to achieve that.

NO I DID NOT!

I very specifically and clearly used that word in reference to those who claim that the massive mountain of documentation provided by the USAF does not exist, as it had not been generated inside, and in accordance with the processes of, the UK!


You continue to deliberately and maliciously twist and falsely misrepresent my statements, and you have both been reported to the moderators and placed on my "block" list.

Green Knight


For Goodness sake, no need for a little paddy. I would not say your post is as clear as you imply, but if that is what you meant, so be it.


If I were MoD, I wouldn't pay too much attention to USAF paperwork, in the same way I wouldn't expect them to pay too much to ours. What I'd want to know is what work the company charged with stripping, inspecting, making good, rebuilding, testing, trialling our 3 aircraft has to do to achieve this; especially the making good bit. One assumes they weren't simply fueled up and flown as is.

Then, given the airframes are 50 years old, I'd want to know if the standards and materiel from 50 years ago are still applied (or CAN be applied) and, if not, what DIFFERENCES there are, how to record them, make sure they actually ARE recorded, and WHO will underwrite them. In other words, how many Production Permits and/or Concessions have been necessary, and who signs them? Because, those differences, even just one (and there are probably hundreds) constitute a major risk to a programme that was predicated upon buying the exact same standard as the US (which is what MoD announced in the beginning to allay these fears).

And, all the while and in parallel, this work is being plugged into the Safety Case update and reveiwed at each change, because if the audit trail is broken at any point then, by definition, MoD is going to have to be seen to ignore Haddon-Cave and the Secy of State.

And what does the original DA (Boeing?) have to say about this? Would you, in their shoes, be keen to put your name on the line for the sake of 3 resurrected airframes being flogged cheap to patch up a major cock-up? Indeed, have they a mechanism in place for approving such changes to a 50 year old design? If not, or if they are unwilling to sign up to the new Build Standard, or have doubts about the ability to maintain it, then who will?

I can't help wondering why such a risky programme was endorsed and approved in the first place. By MoD's own admission, they knew from the outset the airworthiness regulations could not be satisfied, but proceeded "at risk". I'd say DE&S/MAA don't have that authority. Was it a political over-rule, due to the embarrassment of no longer having ELINT? My guess here is DE&S are being blamed unfairly. I'd also want to know if the MAA had the authority to play the red card, and if they tried.

Shiny New MMA anyone ?

Exclusive: P-8 Poseidon Flies With Shadowy Radar System Attached

Add an Elint package and some geeks and we get 3 fleets for the price of one.

Was going to mention AEW but thought that might be too controversial.. Bugger !:ok:

The MoD will have collective coronaries just checking the spelling, all those 'izes, 'ors instead of 'ours, 'ibers instead of 'ibres, etc.

One wonders if the onboard safety equipment includes an ax? And is the aircraft painted gray or grey? Will the MoD 'metricate' everything, they managed to avoid it on the E-3 thank goodness...

Ah yes - the documentation provided...


If I remember for the entry of the E-3D into service....the US equivalent of the aircrew manuals arrived at Waddington some time after the aircraft and we (the aircrew) were asked to make observations. Sadly, all of the diagrams referred to an E-3C - there was not a picture that contained an E-3D with a refuelling probe and the engines were Pratt and Witneys and certainly not CFM-56s. We shortly realised that we would have to write our own manuals based upon the existing USAF manuals. Unfortunately, the classified documents did not arrive until a year later and were blatantly WRONG in several areas! The difficulty in correcting these documents was that we had no facilities for changing these documents and they went on for many years uncorrected - unfortunately, when teaching subjects such as radar, the students were often confused because their instructor (me) was telling them something different to the manuals (if they actually bothered to get them out).

Like Tuc, I would have no real interest in the supplied paperwork apart from referencing where it fitted into my own research and requirements.
In my past I have been 'told' to certify several airliners that I discovered didn't have "paperwork" going back the length of service and I failed to sign, much to the boss's obvious frustration. But without my signature on the dotted line they (three 757s) didn't go anywhere (not on my signature and not in that airline, anyway).

Wensleydale,
when we first got the 'one off' C130K we had exactly the similar problems, especially with the servicing manuals. We were fortunate to have regular contact (OK beer calls) with the Mildenhall Herc detachment who were able to point us in the right direction, and we the aircrew on 47 were very lucky to have an experienced C130 pilot as our exchange officer Add to this the introduction of the new stock computer at Hendon, as they tried to convert Lockheed part numbers, Federal Stock numbers and good old section and refs and you can see why we had a problem.

I'd imagine the issues with these would be even greater, as whilst the majority of USAF RC-135s have been under L-3 (and it's predecessors) control for a long time, the RAF's aircraft have spent most of their life as KC-135s (presumably under Boeing design control) - I may be wrong, but I don't think any of the USAF RC-135Ws spent any great time as tankers (if at all), most being 135B models originally.

I understand one of the stumbling blocks is in the maintenance - How can you guarantee that the replacement parts match the original items the safety case was drawn up against?

Say, for example, part of the fuselage needed changing and L3 swapped it with a part off the rest of the RJ fleet which had an incomplete history and completely different flying hours, then what happens.

As to the reason for going down the RJ/Airseeker route instead of the original Helix upgrade plan - I'd guess that when Helix became unaffordable (due to them realising that extending the R1 was not solely it's current running costs because of the infrastructure support it enjoyed from the maritime variant?). It looks like they revisited earlier, pre-Haddon-Cave, proposals without fully considering the implications.

Am I the only one that finds it amazing that someone would spend many millions for an airplane and them get into a huge argument with themselves over whether they can actually fly the airplane ?

Rick777

Assuming that's a typo and you mean "argument"..........:ok::ok::ok:

Ricky,

no, you're not. if the RAF has bought this aircraft and then decides its never going to be safe to fly i wouldn't bother wasting money on a 'happy 100th Birthday' card for the RAF...

nobody minds the RAF nut-stranglers sitting down and saying that an aircrafts history, or non-existant history, means it should never leave the ground again. they do however mind if the RAF has just bought it, and persuaded ministers to make public pronouncements on the cleverness of buying this particular aircraft.

would you go car shopping with a bloke who only last week had taken a car for a test drive, bought it, and then - upon getting home - decided to send it off for scrap as it would never pass an MOT? no, and neither will ministers.

Nimrod, RJ, F-35B/C/B - all these embarrassing episodes under one government and that government is going to start doubting the competance of the people supposedly managing those programmes...

Just a reminder that this situation didn't just suddenly happen. It is the inevitable and logical consequence of the actions of certain RAF VSOs almost 30 years ago and of the subsequent cover up of those actions since, let alone any serious effort by the RAF High Command to correct them.

As you say cokecan, hardly the setting for any celebration in 4 years time, unless of course it bites the bullet, admits what happened, and sets about putting things right, starting with calling for the MAA and MAAIB to be freed from the MOD and from each other.

Now, deep breath in and hold....

Rick777 and cokecan,

I realize that this thread is getting quite long, and 500+ posts is a lot to read. However, if you go back and read my post 433, and some of the replies, especially 434, you will see a partial explanation of the situation you refer to - i.e. buying an aircraft that your own procedures then won't let you operate.

Between the RJ being ordered, and it being delivered, things within the MOD/RAF changed, including the creation of the MAA and the procedure for accepting an aircraft into service. Thus the RJ was ordered under one set of "rules", but was delivered under a different set due to the passage of time.

While this doesn't excuse the situation, and the problem (risk) should have been seen coming and mitigated earlier, it does help explain how it occurred.



I have used the phrase "rules" quite generally. tucumseh and others are far more knowledgeable on these issues and the many sins that appear to have been committed, and are still being committed, in this area for the past 25 odd years. Their posts are more enlightening about the situation in general.

oh absolutely, these problems are the result of actions/decisions decades old, but they are to the outsider (and i include the rest of the government in that..) all coming together at the same time.

it looks, again, to the outsider, like the RAF (collectively, regardless of how unfairly) couldn't find its arse with both hands.

while i've seen individuals blamed, it can only be the truth that a whole generation or more of senior RAF officers have conspired in this airworthiness abortion - as happened with Chinook ZD576 and the subsequent cover up, Nimrod XV230 etc...

on the evidence, you wouldn't trust the RAF to run a welk stall without killing the saturday girl.

Documentation
 

Wensleydale's post about documentation revived memories of the E-3D trial programme.

Apparently when the Boscombe Down team set about planning the E-3D trial programme it looked at the agreed contractual method of testing for the respective aircraft and mission systems.

Against some items it read "PV" meaning it had been previously verified and did not need to be tested. This had been agreed by the civil servants managing the project in the then MOD PE.

When the team asked for proof of how the systems had been tested the reply was that proof of verification was not part of the contract. I believe this led to a separate contract having to be set up for the documentation to be provided.

Cutting through this sorry saga to the chase - does anyone have the remotest idea when/if this aircraft will fly again?

"Cutting through this sorry saga to the chase - does anyone have the remotest idea when/if this aircraft will fly again?"

According to local television which has picked up on the story, the MOD has stated that the aircraft will be "operational" by the end of the year.

Are you 100% sure of this? Not arguing but I'm not convinced. Nimrod was scrapped after Haddon-Cave, who reported end 2009. The MAA is 4 years old this month. As tuc mentioned above, one of the main problems was probably the announcement that RJ was to be exactly the same as a US aircraft, then they realized the advice it couldn't be was correct all along. Over a year between delivering an "off the shelf" aircraft and entering service means something is wrong. Smells like someone just assumed the safety case would be a box tick and they parked it in a corner.

Not just in the UK. :{
Overhaul at the depot level which is combined with a conversion/reconfiguration requires massive documentation. I think what you refer to is in all of those boxes. If it isn't, trouble ahead.
I read this as "configuration changes made in the process of getting them over to the RAF customer." Did I understand you correctly?
So long as the configuration record is sound, I'd reckon on the MoD staff being able to reconcile. That, however, isn't always as simple as it sounds. :mad:
Access to the drawings, which can get tricky when one deals with vendors, subs, qualified vendors, and such. They either conform to print/spec or they don't. If access to the drawings and specs is not part of the package ... oh boy, a few more pounds (add zeroes to the right as necessary) will be needed to get that included. (I hear that the term "contract modification" causes some program managers to become apoplectic :p ).

Lonewolf

I agree with your assessment, except;

That would be a fair assumption if talking about an organisation that understands that CC is mandated and a fundamental pre-requisite to a valid Safety Case.

However, this is MoD we're talking about, and it is well over 20 years since our airworthiness leaders pulled the plug on funding and the need for staff to implement these regulations. In March 1999, our Chief of Defence Procurement (4 Star, Sir Robert Walmsley, retired Admiral) confirmed in evidence to the Public Accounts Committee that CC was lacking on whole aircraft fleets (the specific question was on Chinook) and then made his position on this quite clear by upholding disciplinary action against staffs who dared to insist it be carried out. This remains MoD's formal position.

Following the original 1991 policy, these issues became standing risks on any MoD aviation programme. That is, the policy meant you must assume you WILL hit problems. At first, perhaps minor; but as time progressed and gaps in CC increased, they would become major showstoppers. Regulations governing approvals require such risks to be mitigated. It is one reason why one cannot insert "100%" against the probability of occurrence in a risk register. If it is 100% you CANNOT seek approval to proceed. You MUST deal with it beforehand.

The situation on Rivet Joint would seem to be that MoD recognised the risk but did not do anything about it; at least not in a timely fashion or before seeking approval to proceed. This may sound like a simple case of deciding to deal with it in parallel with the main programme - in MoD's words, "proceed at risk". However, the dangers are obvious. MoD's risk management strategy has, for many years, been; By all means identify the risk, but wait to see if it becomes a problem before doing anything. This policy, enthusiastically implemented by many VSOs, has killed many. 7 on the Sea King ASaCs. 2 on Tornado ZG710. 29 on Chinook ZD576. And many more. The chances are that, once approval was granted, risk management was off-loaded onto some untrained junior; as it was on Nimrod MR2. On that programme, the hapless individual was named and shamed by the **** Haddon-Cave, but the VSOs who consciously denied him the training and resources to do the job were praised. That ethos has not yet changed for the better.

Thanks for that explanation. The old problem of "doing more with less" generally leads to crap outcomes in some way.

Hoping that the research into the condition of the aircraft proceeds apace and they get to serve their intended purpose. It's a great capability.

For consideration by the United Kingdom’s
Military Aviation Authority (MAA)

Rivet Joint Aircraft "Safety"
 

At the risk of "stirring the pot", all the questions about the C-135 airframes, conversions, records, etc. is what we call BxxxSxxT!

I have about 4000 hrs in both KCs and various RCs in ops; survived a KC mid-air collision with an F-4C that took our boom off, smashed the rear fuselage and dented/damaged the left horizontal and elevator; was Air Staff program manager for one of the RC versions (RC-135U, Combat Sent); and have remained familiar with new block versions, L-3 COMM operations at the Greenville, TX support facility and how the Big Safari office manages the program after retiring from USAF and moving to the space recce realm.

To say that there is anything "wrong" with the airframe, conversion to RJ standard, testing, understanding airframe problems or documentation is totally unacceptable. The particular KC airframes converted to RJs 18, 19, 20 come from the last block of KC-135s built, in the batch just before the RC-135Bs, from which the current RC-135Vs and Us are derived.
The Greenville facility (Majors Field) has had cognizance of the RC-135 program since the late '60s when the original aircraft were modified (then under E-Systems Corp). A very expert location, with a workforce dedicated to developing, integrating and supporting special missions aircraft. This same facility is responsible for many other modifications, including E-4 airborne command posts and others, Bundes Marine 'Peace Peak" SIGINT Atlantiques, and Saudi RE-3s. In fact, during my last visit a few years ago I glimpsed an RAF Canadair Sentinel on the ramp.

The RJs are modified and upgraded every three years in what is called Phase Depot Maintenance. PDM is a complete major parts removal inspection, repair, upgrade and re-wire of aircraft and mission systems. For example, I have even seen entire aft fuselage skin panels replaced due to urine corrosion from the aft loo due to poor crewmembers' "aim" during airborne ops. The process of converting a KC to RC configuration is even more detailed. Boeing work in the past decades has mostly been confined to wing skin replacement in the 1980's (entire C-135 fleet mod) and re-engining to the CFM F108-201 fanjets.

This is all to say that these aircraft are not safe due to some paperwork plans floated to correct MoD/RAF internal problems over the years is wrong. There is a very valid reason the MoD/RAF bought the jets "to the same standard" as the USAF. Interoperability is one, but more importantly, there are fewer problems when the jets are the same as the rest of the fleet. Fleet-wide maintenance, problem identification, upgrades all flow smoothly. The RAF RJs will become part of a fleet of 20 and enter the upgrade cycles in the same flow as the USAF jets, with the exception of UK life support (life rafts, etc,) and putting the galley water heaters back in for "brew ups".


I recently heard the Australian ambassador speak on defence issues "down under". The one thing he emphasized, when asked about the recent order for Boeing P-8A Poseidon patrol aircraft was, "You get the best equipped, lowest maintenance, highest operational rate from equipment bought from the U.S. IF you buy the exact same version the U.S. is also operating."
I would hope the U.K. has finally figured this out after the Spey-powered Phantoms (costing 3 times a regular F-4) turned out to be slower at a lower max altitude. The Aussies learned the lesson with the Collins boat fiasco.

After the decades-long tail of the Comet-derivatives, Comet, Nimrod, Nimrod AEW (a 'good' one there) and finally the MRA.4 total waste, I believe the RAF is getting the best bank for the buck in the -135. After all, Boeing designed and built it to '50s standards ("overbuilt" I'd say) and it has been modified, humps added, trailed 5-mile long aerials, had more sections cut-out for sensors, added B-47 wing racks for jammer pods, long noses, bulbous noses, round noses, extended fuselage tails, more than four different engines, chin bulges and just about every other external indignity added. "Flying" through the flak of UK bogus paperwork will be, as you say from the BoB book, "A Piece of Cake"!

This long post is to attempt to set the record straight, Having engaged in long, enjoyable nights debating aircraft with many Brit friends, I am under no illusion that this will end the petty back and forth. I do enjoy the blather. Additionally, I would discount the previous post as from someone with a very bad personal ax to grind about 55th maintenance. Usually individuals on this track have many other personal issues.

Bill

Two very interesting posts there by cpants and NoVANav.

The former goes much further than MoD has been prepared to admit. Please do post a link. If such information was presented to Congress in 2008, before the RJ contract was let, then I think MoD's commercial director will be very interested if it wasn't disclosed as part of negotiations. If it WAS disclosed, MoD are in the clag - again.


And MoD have actually admitted what NoVANav says is wrong. (It isn't a rumour started here on pprune; we are simply discussing the issues MoD have revealed). That doesn't mean NoVANav is wrong. Far from it. The problem could be MoD doesn't understand the information provided from the US. Perhaps the breakdown is in the link between Boeing and L3(?). Immaturity of understanding is itself a good reason not to release the aircraft. In fact, it is mandated.


The one thing I'd say is I wouldn't be so dismissive of something that, at face value, is utterly outrageous. MoD claimed the Chinook and Nimrod were airworthy. Independent Reviews accepted the fact they were not, known not to be by senior officers and this fact covered up. No one would believe these senior officers would lie about this to the bitter end, but they did. And no one would believe the MAA would continue this deceit, but they do.

A lot of people - the Great British Public, the press, MP's, the Treasury..... - are going to have a lot of questions if the RAF ground Rivet Joint on the basis it "is not airworthy" when dozens of the damn things are swanning around the sky and have been for years without serious problems

No doubt people of the "Common Sense party" & "Health & Safety gone mad" views will also be heard

From the outside it seems that the MoD is saddled (or saddled itself) with a Safety system that impedes the acquisition of anything but new aircraft documented to UK Standards

I leave it to wiser men and women to decide whether this is a good thing or not.........................

:confused::confused:

Indeed. Sometimes it is easier to present reasons for saying 'no' than finding ways of saying 'yes'.

I'll go back a few years when I was presented with a particular task where we needed to paint a nice Red Cross on the side of one of the RAF's finest support helicopters. The helicopter det EngO decided to ring Hels back in the UK to get approval; the answer was no. A quiet, 'offline' chat with EngO resulted in a nice pair of red crosses, a completed task and no dead puppies (or even pilots).

Tucumseh - pm sent.

Anyone else want the book link mentioned above ? - please pm me.

LFH

I presume Cpants is actually referring to airframe 62-4137

.......RC-135E "Rivet Amber" was at that time the most sophisticated reconnaissance plane of the US Air Force. It was converted to this configuration in 1963 to fly reconnaissance missions against the Soviet re-entry range off the Kamchatka Peninsula. On June 5, 1969, Rivet Amber departed Shemya for a flight to Fairbanks for routine maintenance. About thirty minutes after departing Shemya, Rivet Amber (callsign Irene 92) transmitted the following message to Elmendorf AFB: "Elmendorf Airways, Irene 92 experiencing vibration in flight. Not certain of the emergency. We have the aircraft under control, Irene 92." This was the last radio contact with the flight. Unidentified microphone keying clicks continued until 10:22. The aircraft crashed at sea.

After more than three weeks of intensive search and rescue operations, the efforts were called off. Neither a single piece of wreckage nor any personnel were ever found.

A Report on the RC-135E "River Amber" (62-4137) Lost Over The Bering Sea - June 5 1969

Answer; leave them on USAF register and dry hire them in...

Worked in WW2 and early Cold War . B-29, Neptune , Sabre eg ...

Pardon this mere civvy joining in.

Putting those three airframes on a US military register may well be a solution to this particular issue. However, what remains to be solved is a deep systemic problem in the MOD/RAF. It is probably the case that those three aircraft are airworthy and suitable for the intended purpose, but they are haunted by a series of disgraceful and deliberate lapses in proper airworthiness maintenance.

I wonder if the powers that be in Whitehall would be willing to admit our shortcomings, accept that we have lost a degree of expertise and accept help to restore a meaningful airworthiness certification capability.

In the meantime, whilst admiring the truly gallant efforts of all military personnel at the sharp end, they deserve better. I have lost all faith in the top table.

Just out of interest. If MOD/RAF are having such problems with crossover of US to UK acceptance/standards/airworthiness/documentation etc with Rivet joint that has been flying all these years what will be the situation with the F35.

Daily Mail Article from 12 April
 

This article is so totally wrong as to be unbelievable!


"U.S. Army Air Force", "gathering dust in a boneyard for retired planes...", buying to replace a Nimrod spy plane that crashed in Afghan...(that jet was a patrol aircraft). "RAF has completed a refit" (actually done by L-3 COMM not the RAF) are all totally wrong statements by a clueless reporter.


The only accurate statement in the whole article was: 'The fact it is a re-engineered older aircraft doesn’t affect the capability on board; it just means that a different safety case has to be presented.'

Wonderful 'Fleet Street' reporting. Guess is should have not expected anything better.

None!
 

Mickj3 asked about problems with the F-35. If MOD/RAF are having such problems with crossover of US to UK acceptance/standards/airworthiness/documentation etc with Rivet joint that has been flying all these years what will be the situation with the F35

Won't be any as it is a new aircraft and RAF are participating from the start. If the MAA has problems with those circumstances then the RAF had better decide never to buy any new aircraft.

Mickj3:-
Would that were all there was to this shambles. It's not so much the problem as you describe, more a problem with the MOD/MAA, which doesn't 'do' airworthiness. It doesn't do airworthiness because it rid itself of anyone who could and, just for good measure, binned all the Regs.

Of course, none of that happened according to the Haddon-Cave Report, which now has the status of the Holy Grail, so instead new Regs are made on the hoof as and when required. That is no way to run a whelk stall, let alone Military Airworthiness and it's all now coming to a head, with RJ just this week's item on an ever lengthening list that no amount of stove-piping can conceal.

For those who are of a mind that if someone else is happy then so should we be, I would remind them that others were happy with the airworthiness of the Chinook Mk2 and the Nimrod Mk2, which together killed 43 people in just two airworthiness related accidents alone.

UK Military Airworthiness Provision and Military Air Accident Investigation are both in dire need of reform. To achieve that they must be freed from the MOD and from each other.

Only then can the rebuilding of UK Military Air Safety commence.

Only then can we have confidence in being told that any UK Military aircraft is airworthy or not.

Self Regulation Doesn't Work and in Aviation it Kills!

To ORAC
 

Bit Twiddler said:
"Say, for example, part of the fuselage needed changing and L3 swapped it with a part off the rest of the RJ fleet which had an incomplete history and completely different flying hours, then what happens."

This "exchange process" is actually quite common throughout the world's aviation regulations. However, it is (in 99% of all the requirements I've dealt with) based upon confirmed knowledge of the status of the replacement part prior to installation.

This works well where you have properly logged and documented parts removed, preserved and stored, from airframes withdrawn from service for economic reasons or even some that have been designated BER.

To use parts that have no known history or documented record of usage is just playing with fire. They may have the look and feel of OEM parts but they are no better than Bogus Parts.

Novanav


Agree about the Daily Wail. The point contributors are making is this is the bit MoD just don't get!



This doesn't necessarily follow!

The desperately sad deaths caused in the Chinook & Nimrod crashes was made much worse by the rush for VCO's and the MoD to shift the blame

We have to ask though if these two incidents should drive the whole policy of RAF equipment purchase and use.

The RAF has loses between 12 and 20 people every year in simple accidents, many of them related to vehicles. Are we saying that we shouldn't allow anyone to drive or ride in a vehicle?? Or is there an "acceptable" level of risk based on experience (e.g the chances of being struck by lightning) AND the need to get the job done??