Blame culture
 

Until the RAF resolves the two conflicting matters of military discipline and a blame free culture for honest mistakes ( not negligence ) it's flight safety culture will be unable to move forward.

A senior ex- RAF officer and airline post holder once said to me that if the RAF was an airline it's flight safety culture would result in the CAA removing its Air Operators Certificate .

"Or is there an "acceptable" level of risk based on experience (e.g the chances of being struck by lightning) AND the need to get the job done??"


Sadly, since the abolition of Crown Immunity then ambulance chasing lawyers combined with the modern vengeance culture will encourage claims against an individual. To protect themselves, the seniors of any company introduce "Health and Safety" regulations which are, in reality, anti litigation measures designed to protect said managers. If anything happens then someone somewhere must have broken the rules - preferably someone quite junior, who will carry the can and face the consequences. Under such conditions then higher management will NOT accept any risk to either their pensions or their freedom.

I saw this adorning the walls of an MAA building the other week...

...if only they practiced it!

LJ

When asking such a question it is necessary to acknowledge one simple fact. The aircraft were not airworthy due to quite deliberate policy. This was not an oversight. The failures were notified well in advance and a conscious decision made to make false declarations that the regulations had been followed.


One cannot compare these illegal acts with the accidental loss of servicemen in road traffic accidents. There are exceptions of course. Snatch is one. Declared unfit for purpose in Northern Ireland in the 90s, and a replacement fully endorsed and funded (then cancelled), this was conveniently ignored by politicians and VSOs when declaring it fit for purpose in the, one assumes, infinitely more benign environments of Iraq and, especially, Afghanistan. Funny how that fact is never mentioned. MoD worked hard to hide that one as well.

So what was the fully funded and then cancelled replacement for Snatch, out of interest?

It is not only the MOD/MAA that 'doesn't get it' it seems. Certain PPRuNe members too share that affliction, given comments posted here.

This is a canker lurking within the fighting ability of the UK Armed Forces' ability to wield Air Power. If the airworthiness of UK Military Airworthiness cannot be relied upon then, merely to take examples from airworthiness related fatal military air accidents posted in this forum, our aircraft can self destruct with the loss of 63 (becoming 65?) lives instead of being able to take the fight to our enemies. In such a manner are wars lost...

This was not the result of oversight or honest mistake, it was deliberate planned sabotage of UK Military Air Safety by RAF VSOs. That it continues to blight UK Military Air Safety is because those RAF VSOs are protected by a cover up perpetrated by succeeding RAF VSOs. Time perhaps for today's Royal Air Force to put a stop to such corruption and look to its very survival instead? Or don't we do leadership anymore?

Heathrow Harry - to add my own take to the intervening posts -

There will always be risk with military activity. However - I think the point generally being made here (very well IMHO) is that the deaths involved in this particular group of accidents were in part or in whole caused by or contributed to by certain improper decisions or other failings at the top – going back 25 + years. Those decisions seem to have had little to do with airworthiness, safety, honesty or fitness for purpose and much to do with cost saving, incompetence, negligence, siloing and politicking – followed up by lying, concealment and ass-covering after the probably inevitable or predictable accidents. In other words, if a proper system was in place, and it worked properly, many of those deaths might have been avoided.

LFH

Err, can anyone prove that (lack of) airworthiness caused the Mull crash? Thought not.

The argument we (and I was part of it) presented about the Mull was that it couldn't be proved that John and Rick were grossly negligent. From that tortuous battle it was demonstrated that the aircraft was not airworthy and there should have been some very important lessons learnt. However, we should be careful not to assert that airworthiness issues directly, or indeed indirectly, caused the crash.

Nimrod is a different story.

Vector (Pinzgauer).

Let us remind ourselves of a couple of statements made by Haddon-Cave in his Nimrod Review report

(1) Like a case in law, the Safety Case is a body of evidence presented as a reasoned argument. Unlike most areas of the law, the activities are not presumed innocent until proven guilty: the Safety Case must prove that a system is safe.

(2) The concept of an“implicit Safety Case” does not comply with Lord Cullen’s concept of a “thorough assessment” of the risks posed by a platform. This is because, in effect, the notion assumes that a legacy aircraft is safe merely because it was built to design and has been operating without mishap for a number of years.

"It seems to have function safely for the last x years", is not acceptable

DV

The same ones we operate now? How was it cancelled then? Did we go back and re-order it later or something....:confused:

Cgb:-
No, and AFAIK no-one has ever claimed that because no-one has ever proved what caused the Mull crash, least of all of course the RO's. What has been proved was that whatever caused the crash it was an Airworthiness Related Accident because the aircraft, along with all its sister Mk2's at the time, was released into RAF service in a knowingly Grossly Unairworthy Condition under an illegal RTS.

If airworthiness had been accorded a higher priority, indeed any priority, by those fighting the RO's Grossly Unjust Finding then not only might it have been reversed years earlier but the malevolent attack by VSOs on UK Military Air Safety might also have been revealed years earlier.

So much water, so many bridges...

The Snatch replacement programme was called Future Northern Ireland Patrol Vehicle (FNIPV). Its ISD was, from memory, mid-00s. It was an endorsed programme in the late 90s. To achieve such a timescale it would have been staffed in the mid-90s. The Pinzgauer was already in service in, for example, 2002, before FNIPV selection had taken place. (Perhaps before, I'm only going from personal experience). I don't know if it was actually selected, or shortlisted, as the programme died a death. As of 2003 it was not part of FRES.

My point is that it is another example of MoD misleading by omission and commission when challenged over deaths, and similarly of them misleading/lying in Ministerial briefs. When Ministers of the day said Snatch was fit for purpose, effectively what they were saying was Iraq/Afg were more benign environments than NI.

The links to, for example, C130 XV179 are clear. Threat and Vulnerability Assessments would have immediately flagged Snatch was due for replacement, and why. This would, or should, have immediately brought forward the replacement programme, with an updated spec due to the T&VAs. This didn't happen until after many deaths and adverse publicity. In the same way the T&VAs for C130 showed she did not meet the design and airworthiness requirements for the use to which she was being put. Similarly, Nimrod and Chinook. The latter was deemed vulnerable to SAMs, but on 2.6.94 the status of any self protection kit was "not to be relied upon in any way whatsoever".

The common denominator is senior staffs in MoD knowingly took the decision to conceal these risks. One cannot say "Accept" because the facts were withheld and attempts made to conceal them from subsequent inquiries.

Saxon
 

Not sure if this is the same, but it's what we ended up with; dreadful vehicle!

"Cowardice in Leadership" Link
 

I cannot say what happened after 2003, but at that time Saxon was a separate "legacy" programme, albeit both Snatch and Saxon were designated Rural, whereas Tavern was Urban. Saxon's main attribute (officially) was battlefield mobility. There were many Saxon variants; ambulance, REME recovery, Internal Security, Command; so I guess it is entirely possible some were re-roled to Snatch replacement. I think there was a subtlety in the designation APV (e.g. Snatch) and APC (e.g. Saxon), because an APV could not carry a section, but I stand to be corrected.

Cowardice in Leadership: A lesson in Harassment, Intimidation and Reprisals
 

cpants, thanks for the link to your ebook re the harassment you have experienced, following your revelations of RC-135 airworthiness to Congress. Those who have followed the painful and tortuous threads on this Forum, re the demolition of UK Military Airworthiness, will immediately pickup on a similar process visited upon one of our members on this side of the pond. Another aspect no doubt of our 'special relationship'!

For those of us who do frequent this region, your book may be found in Kindle form here:-



I would beg the mods to let this stay, for this is hardly a premium priced article, and is completely in accordance with the OP. It is also a matter of vital importance to the RAF, a matter literally of life and death!

Wow,

An interesting read. How many other stones need to be turned over.

JIV

This Book
 

CPants you are one angry dude. I hope in writing your book you have cast aside some demons. I wish you a long and happy retirement. Spend time maintaining the Warbirds at your Commemorative Air Force or what ever you call it. I am sure that is more rewarding than the 55th and your skills will not be wasted. I do have some empathy for your situation.


WRT these three airplanes we have acquired I hope they have not been through the facility at Offurt you describe. Out of date rubbers, no inspections on high pressure cylinders. misplaced spacers, incorrectly routed cables chaffing through fairleads etc. As I understand, these three aircraft which may have been subject to blue fluid leaks and urine have been completely rebuilt by L3 at Greenville. You state that the TOs (APs in English) have been updated to reflect the latest build standard. I am sure our representatives will have validated the publications and maintenance schedules by crawling all over the aircraft at Greenville and over here. I know when I bought some US kit that was subject to ITAR we were forbidden from taking the lid off the box. This was the first thing we did and found out why! not all us Brits are that gullible.


I hope the MAA the Royal Air Force and the Air Seeker IPT can find a way to understand and mitigate the "known unknowns", demonstrate that the safety target is achieved etc.


Not sure if it is down to Tuc to send them a copy of your book.

Harry

Excellent post.


As dragartist says, the aircraft have been stripped and rebuilt by L-3. The problem you have to contend with is how to reconcile the differences between the new standard (rebuilt to different standards) and what has "operated for many years without mishap".

If the differences are minor, then the MAA may choose to give more weight to this historical evidence.

However, if the cumulative differences are great, there is no supporting evidence to plug gaps in knowledge and the Aircraft DA is reluctant to sign up to changes, then the MAA may play the red card. The evidence suggests something like this has occurred.

It boils down to "engineering judgement". As MoD admits it lacks this expertise, Philip Hammond will presumably bring his to bear. :}

There is, of course, another less worrying possibility... maybe the full documentation, including the performance figures, is quite expensive and therefore delivery (and hence the payment for this) has been slipped to the next financial year to save costs? (not an unknown state of affairs). If this is the case then the aircraft will certainly be up and operating by the end of the year as stated by the MOD to local TV.


W. (clutching at straws).

Knowing the raf the font used for the 'ROYAL AIR FORCE' lettering is probably causing sleepless nights, as is the shade of gray paint.

"If this is the case then the aircraft will certainly be up and operating by the end of the year as stated by the MOD to local TV."

'Operating' may be a mute point that will continue to fuel the debate, but 'up' is more tangible. With Waddington's runway due for major work from early July if its not 'up' by then it won't be for some considerable time.

Part of the plan - we would fly it but unfortunately can't because of the runway repairs.....??

CAEBr

Tut tut, such cynicism CAEBr!

CPants Comments and Book: Nothing to do with Rivet Joint!
 

The aircraft and incidents CPants writes about concern RC-135E Rivet Amber, which disappeared over the Bering Sea in Jun 1969. This WAS NOT a Rivet Joint aircraft!

My error in reading very similiar tail numbers. The aircraft in question was a TC-135, converted into an aerodynamic Rivet Joint configuration as a "bounce bird". It does not carry mission equipment.

CPants made the local news with his claims for about one day. Not a factor in fully-configured Rivet Joint aircraft.

For the record, two Cobra Ball RC-135s have crashed at Shemya AFB and one RC-135 trainer near Valdez, Alaska, in addition to the Rivet Amber. All except Rivet Amber were the result of pilot error.

No Rivet Joints or Combat Sents, current operational RC-135V, W, and Us, have ever crashed or caused an airborne loss of life.

Just to clarify, does this mean the book is completely irrelevant to Rivet Joint? I wouldn't want to waste my couple of quid!

The book I have is RJ not RA.

I refer you to post 510 (Orac's question) and cpants reply at post 517

I understand Rivet Amber was the name given to a single aircraft which was lost in 1969. Plenty of learned stuff readily available. LFH

Thank you guys.

Harry you ask;

I believe that the safety case must include an a assessment of all known and potential hazards, all of which should be managed to ALARP. Potential hazards are identified through experience and brainstorming. Just because it hasn't happened does not mean it will not happen. A fire in Dry Bay No 7 of XV230 had not happened in 35 years of Nimrod flying but it did on 2nd Sept 2006. The coroner's verdict was that the aircraft had never been airworthy.

DV

I read C pants $3 book. The incidents he refers to were all in the 2000 era long after Rivet Amber.


I do have some sympathy for his plight but I don't think I would have gone about it that way.


I do not believe for one minute that the conditions he describes will prevail on our 3 aircraft.


the summary he makes at the end of his book, having been allowed back into the hangar, suggest that corrective actions are in place.


Keep raising the F765s, F760s and all the ASIMs (or what ever they call them now)

With 35 years of successful operations, I'd call that assessment risible on the basis of that one incident.

Lonewolf
With over 2000 hrs on type and a friend on 230, so would I. :ok: Just for pedantry the MR1/MR2 combo made 40 years of service.

Lonewolf and RP

I am afraid you like many others confuse serviceability with airworthiness. On the day of XV230's accident the aircraft was serviceable, it just wasn't airworthy. Whilst MoD did not agree with the coroner's findings, initially, the aircraft was "prematurely" withdrawn from service less than two years later, despite an extensive replacement programme of fuel and hot air pipe couplings.

DV

DV,

Agreed but I thought this was purely as a cost saving measure rather than any aircraft safety issues being a factor.

Well DV, that is where you and I disagree. I think I understand the difference between serviceability and airworthiness thanks. A combination of unforseen events may, or may not, have caused the accident. Hundreds, if not thousands of similar AAR events happened without incident, so for a coroner to say that the aircraft was unairworthy was somewhat disingenous. What was deemed safe engineering practice in the 1960s or evene the 1980s might not be deemed safe today, but it might just as equally not be unsafe.

The MR2 was taken early, as a savings measure, by the previous government. Most of the people I know who were flying the aircraft at the end were not concerned about the airworthiness and would have been happy to continue flying the jet.

RP:-
Were the events not 'foreseen' by the Airworthiness Regulations? Did they not forbid the passing of fuel lines joined by couplings through a dry bay that included a source of ignition? Wasn't that the situation with XV230? Wasn't it therefore unairworthy? So how was the coroner being disingenuous?

Pot calling kettle black?

Chug

You will have to forgive me but I do not have a copy of the accident report to hand, but my (somewhat faded) memory seems to remember the fuel came from elsewhere leaking into the dry bay not from any couplings within the dry bay. Am I wrong? I thought the fuel came from one of the centre tanks. Back to you.

As to airworthiness regulations, when were they written; before or after the aircraft was designed and built?

"What was deemed safe engineering practice in the 1960s or even the 1980s might not be deemed safe today"

And getting back to the RJ isn't this the problem being faced today. Even ignoring all the excellent points being made about build standard, eng records, availability of documentation etc.

Is an aircraft designed tested and built to standards of the 60s/70s/80s (even if we assume that it was tested to, and fully met these standards) acceptably safe to bring into the inventory?