There were two switch settings required. One activated the electro-magnetic fusing units (EMFU) and the other set an electrical impulse to arm the VT fuse. To achieve an airburst it was necessary to set the first to NOSE/TAIL (ie UP) and the second to VT (also UP).

If the first was set DOWN only the TAIL EMFU would be energised. If the VT was also set DOWN then no electrical impulse would be generated.

On return to base after a successful drop for ground burst - BB1 or BB2 - all 21 EMFU tail lanyards and fuse safety pins would be flaying around the bomb bay. The 21 nose lanyards would be in the EMFUs.

For a deliberate airburst attack - BB7 - then the nose lanyards would have been connected and the required switch setting would be Nose/Tail (UP) and VT (UP). If there was no need for a ground burst then the tail fuses may not have been fitted. If the Nose/Tail switch had been set to Tail (DOWN) as it would have been for BB1 and BB2 then there would have been no explosions.

glojo

30th Apr and 3rd May don't count on the diversion of tanker assets as the only British aircraft that could get to the Falklands and back from ASI were the Vulcan and Victor. (On April 2nd the only aircraft that could do it was the Victor) Hercules and Nimrod AAR fit trials programmes were still in progress. Also no delay was caused to the early long range Hercules air drops as they didn't use AAR, but were fitted with up to 4 ex Andover overload fuel tanks in the cargo area.

The Argie TPS-43F and TPS-44 radar's were priority targets as they not only gave raid warning against offensive attacks against the airfield at Stanley and other places, but they were able to monitor SHAR CAP stations and transits (which allowed the Argies to abort attack and transport missions), plus workout the general location of the CVBG from the SHAR's / GR3's climb out / decent points, thus providing targeting information for the later Super Etendard attacks. (Having done 3 tours of the radar sites down there over 25 years over every month in the year, I wouldn't be surprised if the Argie radars did get the odd primary/IFF return off the ships and low level aircraft of the CVGB as I've seen the coastline of South America on the scopes of the West Falkland radar sites on numerous occasions where theoretically, I shouldn't have seen anything below 25000 ft. Anaprop and atmospheric ducting down there is really bad at times).

Harrier GR3's with SEAD capability didn't get down south until the final days of the war, hence again the only aircraft we had that had the capability to lug ARM's down south was the Vulcan (Buccaneer couldn't do it due to the fact they couldn't carry enough engine oil to last the length of the mission). Hence the Vulcan ARM missions were a very credible and in fact the only responce to a major thorn in the side of our operations.

Not a veteran but went down there twice after. Anaprop was a big problem sometimes. I remember trying to explain to my management that the surface target we held at 200 miles could not be real. Coventry engaged similar anomalies with 4-5 during the event.

Navaleye

I've actually seen the QRA intercept over the horizon surface tracks down there, the first time was when the guard-ship (operating to the west of the islands) picked up a target using a radar on both its search radar and ESM systems well within the FIPZ. Both of the West Falklands radar sites picked it up as well and from what the computers were displaying on the scope it was at 2000 ft and seemed to be in an orbit. The Guard-ship ESM operator ID'ed the targets radar's as that of a C-130. Phantoms were scrambled, successfully locked on to the target with their radars which they thought was around 1000ft and called Judy. When they finally closed on the target they discovered it was in fact a fleet of Polish fishing trawlers!!!:eek::eek::eek:

Ha Ha, I can believe that. Rocks at 200 miles look like an enemy fleet, I never understood the physics of it but you get used to it.

Deviation but we used to observe anaprop all the time when I was at school. On the beach at St Bees we could see the Isle of Man up in the sky with the sea out to the horizon below it. All ducting. It is just refraction of light in the atmosphere and it was sort of possible to predict based on the weather conditions.

A common cause of this phenomenon is an atmospheric event known as a temperature inversion, which occurs when a layer of warmer air forms above a layer of cooler air, reversing the normal altitudinal trend and interfering with the radar beam’s path. This often happens on calm, clear nights within areas of high-pressure; after sunset, the ground begins to lose heat quickly, cooling the near-surface air, while subsiding air aloft (associated with the high) warms as it sinks, eventually forming a relatively stable blanket atop the cooler air below.

The effect is not dissimilar to sub-surface convergence zone propagation.

As an observer in all of this, I am impressed by all the comments and knowledgeable inputs regarding the issue. Pontius has, it seems, hit the nail on the head on a number of occasions.:D
My conclusion then, as it is now, remains the same: This evolution was complex, demanding and dangerous. It was flown by competent crews in trying circumstances. Ultimately, though it was a PR 'stunt' by the hierarchy in the RAF to remain "engaged" in the action. From a strategic perspective it achieved the square root of nothing and it most certainly was NOT the most 'daring' raid of the war - far far from it.

I have a question for those in the know:

Why did the plan require the bombs to straddle the runway at almost 70 degrees? Surely a more acute angle to the runway direction would have resulted in a greater hit rate?

Good morning MAINJAFAD,
Thanks for that and I hope you do not think I was trying to give a distorted picture. I am using the words of an Air Marshal to avoid any Inter Service bickering that might take place if I simply made those claims. Fuel usage was a major issue as was the prioritising of the other numerous missions being flown.

If I were to ask any questions regarding those missions then perhaps I would ask why when flying SHRIKE missions did we not involve the Harriers? Get the Harriers to try and encourage the ground radar to light up but keep those valuable assets out of 'HARM's' way!! :sad::ok:

No ground radar switching on, then make hay... but lets try to take advantage of that weapon load that costs so much to fetch all the way down sarf and consider involving the Harriers to get the ground radar up and running.

If the radar does come on then introduce Mr Shrike to Mr Argie!!


Thomas Coupling has kindly asked the other question that I was going to ask regarding the angles of attack by the bombers.

I do accept that there were only a minimal number of pilots that could fly the Harrier at night but war is war or should that be 'conflict, is conflict and that could be a topic for another thread :)

Again I repeat.. Congratulations to every single member of the military and Merchant Marine that took part in that conflict.

John

One for the mud movers I know but AFAIK if you go for too acute an angle, e.g. in extremis trying to align the stick with the runway, if you hit you'll hit with every bomb :ok: but if you miss, and put the stick to one side, then you've miss with every bomb :uhoh:.

It's a compromise.

(I'm sure someone will be along with a better explanation and a diagram soon)

wiggy

That's a good, simple and clear explanation; it also illustrates that a single aeroplane will not be very effective in terms of causing damage sufficient for runway denial. Multiple cuts are required to deny use in the short term and to make repair a tedious task.

Unless you're recce, when you deliberatley aim to miss the target (but by a precise distance):ok:

Mister B

In Ref to ANTPS 44

We were able to se the general position of the Aircraftcarriers based on when Harriers apear and desapear from the screen .- We were able to track most airplanes within the range of 120 to 160 NM . ( it's max range was 200 NM ) .-
Ships were seen on the screen at about 15 to 18 NM and that allowed us to track and direct the fire of 155 mm over them .- We were tracking Glanmorgan the night it was hit and updating its position every 15 seconds when we got hit with naval artillery from another ship , which left only the Rasit ground base radar to do the last tracking before the exorcet was fired .-
How far away could we track airplanes flying at low altitude ? : We were able to see the C 130 coming in to land when they were between 12 and 15 NM away , and they were coming low , very low .-

I think the mood of the country at the time was engagement. Had the RAF not offered support then it would have appeared to be disengaged.

You have the right to draw that conclusion.

Look at my post 119 again. I made assumptions of width of 150 feet (adjacent) and bomb spacing of 200 feet (hypotenuse) which gave a maximum cut angle of 45 degrees to ensure at least one hit. Eyeballing the photo above I would guess the angle at nearer 30 degrees. That is calculated as I said on the actual width of the runway and bomb interval in the stick.

Bomb spacing is determined by the release interval with 0.18 seconds being too short for the system, and 0.30 or 0.45 being more likely and the groundspeed of the aircraft. At the medium level bombing heights I guessed at 600 feet per second.

PS:

My sqn considered how it could become engaged. Deployment was ruled out not from a lack of a suitable base but because the distance between airfield friendly to UK was too great and we could not get there. The other option was out the box and we didn't fancy the idea of a limited number of one-way missions (I kid you not it was considered - briefly)

I would like to post what I saw that May 1st almost 30 years ago .-

The previous night we were told to expect the conflict to start early next morning , we were with the ANTPS 44 on top of Sapper Hill , we were having problems with it and the mechanics finish fixing it at about 0330 or 0400 Am on that May 1st .- A few minutes later a eco apears on the screen at about 70 NM aproaching from the NE , soon after some more splits on the screen show a total of between 5 and 6 .- Later knew it was the Vulcan with ECM .- I gave the alert to the Air Post Comand , they ask me to verifie and I did , from there on I tracked the Incoming Airplanes updating its position every minute until the Vulcan atacks the airport .- The Roland which was close to the Airpor and could have been in reach to target the Vulvan had been moved the previous day to the base of Sapper Hill to protect the Radar .- The alert was given to triple AAA but mainly because of lack of experience nobody shot at it .-

In straightforward terms of 'Daring' - Bold, Adventurous Then the raid was all of those. 'Most daring' ? Probably!
Militarily successful - in terms of its objective, most certainly not. Although I cant imagine it was a pleasant experience to have been billeted on the airfield when 21 bombs came down, or indeed thinking another 21 might be coming down the following night.

Reydel,

Fascinating post - many thanks.

How long did it take you to realise it was a single aircraft and not the five or six you saw? What was your view of the damage caused?

How did you get on with the other Blackbuck missions as regards getting Roland to target them? Did you change any procedures as the war went on?

Thanks again. orca.

Thank You Sir

There were two Radars in Islands the ANTPS Westighouse ( 3D ) that belong to the Air Force and resposible to guide our Aircrafts into combate and the ANTPS 44 ( 2D ) Cardion which belong to the Army and was part of the Triple AAA .- Information from both Radars was send directly to the Air Post Comand ( Joint Air Post Comand / Air Force/Army and Navy ) .-

The Air Force Radar was initialy installed at the Airport and then moved at the edge of the Town , the Army Radar was installed at Sapper Hill .-

That first Raid was a wake up call , without doubt and amaizing raid because of the distance , the amount of refueling required and surely never expected .- It was never in my mind the posibility of having to encounter a Vulcan , we had analized and study the Harrier , not the Vulcan .-

I realized it was a single aircraft , many years later when it was told to me by a British Harrier Pilot .-

The damage : Severe in terms of that from now on we had to add the Vulcan with all its capacity ( Bombs and Shrike missils ) as another threat .- It may have not caused all the damage expected to the Runway , but it was a blow to the moral .-

For what I have read the next Vulcn Missions were flown at hire altitudes , regarding the Shrikes , that was a head ache in its self .- It was able to hit a Triple AAA Skyguard , and we knew they were going to come after us .- The Vulcan misions oth shrike became more simple to detect , they flew in an oval patern waiting to engage its target .- In some cases we were advice of its approach in others the airplane in the oval patern was seen and inmidiatly you must turn off the Radar until the threat is gone .-

Remember the Cradion is ( 2D )

The Vulcan Missions had a heavy moral efect .-

The thread entitled "Falkland's Gamble" having been locked, for those interested, part 2 is being broadcast tonight on Ch5 starting at 2000 GMT.

Apologies all, it's a repeat.

It was also told that the Vulcan Pick Up a Harrier which acompany him half the way to the Airport .-

Maintenance of Morale is one of the principles of war.

I think that post confirms strategic effect.

It certeinly did Sir , It acomplished it's mission .-

I was hit twice by Naval Bombardment , but I still fear more the Vulcan .-
There is no Fox Hole were to hide from a Vulcan .-

Reply to Mr MANJAFAD
 

Reply to Mr MANHAFAD on post # 122

I did have on primary the British Ships at about 15 MN and I did not have IFF Return from British Planes since we did not have the Nato Module for our Transponder .- Only modules 1/2 and 3 - It's correct what you have stated , we did know the aprox location of the fleet based on were the airplanes apear on the screen .- Note to this : Later on I found out that Airplanes flew low , beneath the Radra for some miles before landing on the carrier because they knew that we could track its location just by following the Airplanes .

the old tactic of locating valuable assets close to the civilian population to avoid it being attacked was indeed alive and well throughout the war. I did not realise this was the case with the radar but I know that it was the case with the surface launched exocets such as the one that hit HMS Glamorgan. They arrived on a hospital ship along with special forces (my Dad photographed it unloading in front of the house) and were only taken towards the airport area at night when it was safe to do so.

The MM38 launchers were transported by C-130H Hercules....I don't know what your dad was seeing but certenly it wasn't an MM38...

And by the way, Kelpers were traited much better than the Pirates did with the Argentine settlement in 1833...they were sent it by ship to the continent...

I believe that Martel was first considered for the ARM strikes but was considered too big once the radar had been moved to a more urban location. Shrike was asked for, given and used in order to localise damage.

I don't think there is a part 2 ? CH5 is now showing a repeat (started at 19:00 GMT) of last Tuesday's programme.

Thank You Cosmicomet

Regarding this First Raid I would like to post two things that were told to me by British Veterans :

1) On that first Raid a Harrier acompany the Vulcan from one of the Carriers to about 40/ 45 NM as a precaution

2) On this Firts Raid the Roland was not brought into consideration for the planing of the Atack because it was thought that it could not be transported by Airplane to the Island .- Which in fact did .- But was at the wrong location that first day of Combate .-

I have no direct knowledge of Shrike or Martel but a comparison suggests that there were good reasons for the selection of the Shrike.

It is true we had Martel and that would have solved the procurement problem however:

The Shrike weighed around 390lbs compared with 1200lbs for Martel. In comparison with a bomb load that may not have been significant.

The speed of the Shrike according to one source M2.0 compared with the Martel at around 0.9. The higher speed offers a significant advantage which coupled with its smaller size would reduce its vulnerability to AAA.

The range of Martel is given as up to 60km compared with 40km of the Shrike. While the increased range is attractive if used it would give a flight time in the order of 3 times that of Shrike. A shorter flash to bang time is better.

I would conclude that the Shrike offered a significant tactical advantage in this scenario.

of course they did Cosmicomet, it would not have been within the spirit of war had they been bought in on that ship now would it? :rolleyes: I notice by your age by the way that you were only 8 years old at the time so your information is clearly from other sources. I am going on what my Dad (and plenty of others) witnessed right in front of us.
As for the history prior to 1982 that is for another thread elsewhere and not for getting in the way of the real topic of this thread.

PN,

I think that we can confirm that Reydel's posts that the BB missions definitely did damage the morale of those Argentinian troops ivo Stanley - as we have all either suspected or supposed. This is of course logical as being bombed isn't nice. (Very interesting to hear from the receiving end and particulalry the comparison with NGS.)

I don't think we can state the effect was strategic because the reduction in morale might be geographically limited. Whilst maintenance of morale is a principle of war can it not be a tactical issue vice strategic?

What do you think?

We have to listen to what this gentleman says about the morale effect and if I was based anywhere near that airfield or radar installation then I would also be concerned, or worried.

We have heard how aircraft leaving Ascension were identified and their course logged so did this information get to the radar operators at Stanley?

I see one of the posts answers that query:

I have asked elsewhere a question regarding the altitude of the first BLACK BUCK missions and it looks to a degree that this has been halfway answered by the statement that the SHRIKE missions were flown at a higher altitude but reading that reply it really hammers home my observation about team work regarding those latter missions. With hindsight is it a possibility that the radar would have remained switched off because they knew the weaponry being carried aboard those bombers. was this an opportunity missed for the Harriers to come in whilst our enemy was blind? (polite, inquisitive question and NOT a statement)

Did Commander Air have pre warning of these missions and was the group ever asked to join in? I accept there was overhead night fighter support but I am thinking more along the lines of taking advantage of that radar equipment being switched off, or.... If the SHRIKE attacks had been successful, then instead of self congratulations, would it have been better for Harriers to have mopped up?? When a man is down, far better to hit him rather than wait for that person to get back up onto their feet! :sad:


For the information of reydelcastillo
Regarding being shelled on the night Glamorgan got hit, the chances are that this was compliments of the Yarmouth. On that specific night she was in the same area as Glamorgan carrying out NGS and that ship fired over 260 rounds of 4.5" calibre ordinance just on that one specific night!!! I have no idea how much Glamorgan fired, she had the same type weapons although slightly larger magazines\shellrooms, or indeed the third ship on station. Bottom line however was that there was an awful lot of high explosive raining down on those unfortunate soldiers. The third ship had to retire during the night due to a mechanical breakdown but she may have fired the relevant rounds.

Incidentally the British were aware of the approximate location of that Exocet launcher and Glamorgan should NOT have put herself in harm's way :O:O

Groups of warships would take turns going onto the gun line which would always mean going close in-shore and exposing themselves to enemy gunfire which regularly would exchange rounds with our ships so I would suggest this was also somewhat daring\risky. Especially as there was always the added risks of the area having been mined.

Two days prior to that specific shoot, Yarmouth had fired off 174 rounds and on that occasion she had come under fire from at least one shore based battery..

I have mentioned this just to let folks know that this naval gunfire support role was real, it was a nightly occurrence unless there were hurricane force winds which would rule out this nightly excursion. I cannot begin to imagine what the effects of multiple warships continually firing high explosive ordinance night after night for hours on end must have been, but to face that EVERY night and then during the day be on alert for incoming Harrier attacks must have been nerve shattering and quite literally soul destroying! ...

orca, strategic - tactical - moot point I wouldn't try to argue either way.

glojo

Interesting post.

So the Vulkans leaving Ascension were "were identified and their course logged"

Visually or by Radar and if so, by whom.

MkI eyeball ..

Merchant flagged vessels

If I've read the comments correctly, I get the impression the Argentines had prior knowledge of the availability of Shrikes - something which wasn't made public until the diversion on BB6

So
Who spilled the beans about the Shrikes?

Does anyone have any idea what effort the British put into taking down these radars other than BB? It seems the BB crews went to great lengths to attack the radars but I haven't heard of anyone else doing it directly.

I can't remember it being mentioned in Ward or Woodward's book, although Jerry Pook does describe being tasked against a triangulated position for a radar - although not in Stanley I think. (Currently 2400 miles from my bookshelf so no quick reference available)

As for the air defences I remember in Morgan's book he had a Roland launched at him and obviously Mortimer was splashed by one, Pook saw one launched at Morrell's section during a Joint loft attack.

So the operators weren't exactly trigger shy - but it sounds like Vulcan was causing them to reactively shut off.

I know a feature of Pook's book is his frustration at the RN tasking of FW assets, particularly the poor (or non-existent) use of recce prior to a raid. Would it have been possible to find these systems from medium level or was the idea simply never floated?

Mk 1 eyeball ?


Did they not fly one way first and then change course
or just unlucky ?

Am just asking.