Thank you PN. The issue was always one of demonstrating "reach". The fact that we had a navy that could travel 8k miles and the RAF that could do the same which was a much harder achievement IMHO would have seriously upset their command. Creating uncertainty goes a long way to winning a war.

PN,

I agree that it was a statement of intent - I am not so keen to call it capability.

I believe it was a great effort and anything that could have been thrown at the enemy should have been.

That being said I don't think it demonstrated an ability to strike the mainland in strength.

So for me the jury remains out on the effect. Were the Argentinians so scared of our ability to get a single bomber that far that they significantly changed the game plan?

Why weren't the Vulcans for the later Black Buck Shrike raids fitted with the bomb bay fuel tanks from 27 Squadron's MRR Vulcans?
They must have been available as they were later used in the tanker conversion.
If a couple of airframes had been fitted with them, presumably things would have been rather easier

The Grupo 8 Mirages if my memory still serves me were based at Trelew in Northern Argentina they were subsequently moved to Rio Gallegos. The main problem was their Matra 530 missile which was not effective against small fast moving targets (think Phoenix) the other problem was that they had a very simple monopulse radar which when overland in a look down position could deliver nothing. Once they came down to play they were toast to the AIM-9L.

I can find documentation saying the Grupo 8 Mirage III EA were based in two locations, Comodoro Rivadavia and Rio Gallegos, both to the south of BA by quite a way. That's not to discount the earlier post saying three were based in BA itself - or your memory Navaleye. I think Rivadavia was actually their C2 node for the FAS so to defend it would make sense.

As far as I can work out there were 17 Mirage III EA originally but 2 were twin seaters. Of the 15 war goers 2 were splashed on day one. (One by Sea Jet the other damaged and then splashed by friendly AAA) So as of May 1 the FAA would be down to 13 total, does anyone have an idea as to their availability rate?

The other tactical consideration is that of OCA sweep when attacking ships. Ships have a MEZ around them, OCA has to sweep around or over the MEZ if it has no SEAD. Medium level sweep into a Sea Dart MEZ would be an incredibly silly idea (as demonstrated later by Learjet). Prior to the landings it made sense to try to attrit Sea Harriers outside the RN MEZ. This wasn't possible for the FAA chaps over San Carlos as their strikers had to penetrate the MEZ to deliver the weapons. Low level sweep through San Carlos would have been incredibly high risk.

The only platform it might have been worth sweeping for would be the Super-E, but that would have given away the element of surprise.

It seems to me that some Mirage III EA were fragged for DCA duties, I wonder if any Argentinian readers could expand on whether this was due to there being no point sweeping for the strikers, Blackbuck, attrition or fuel load?

No, I suggest 'intent' could have been demonstrated with 'show of force' by a flight across down town BA.

'Capability' did exactly what Navaleye said, it demonstrated 'reach'.

"It is not HMG's policy to confirm or deny . . . "

There was a similar issue in 1964-65 in Confrontation. Admittedly this was only 19 years after first use and by 1982 the world had moved on a little when it came to sabre rattling.

There is some evidence to believe that Indonesia did not discount the threat from nuclear armed V-bombers. Who would pit just 4 Vulcans against an archipeligo of some 3000 miles in extent.

Similarly could Argentina discount a tactical nuke? You cannot apply our logic and thought processes to another culture. Remember also that they were not privvy to the AAR Plan. Even in 1982 I suspect that many people would have credited the Vulcan with a far greater range capability than it actually possessed.

Regarding the hole on the edge of the runway, I read somewhere that the Arg 'removed' the bomb crater spoil at night and replaced it come the dawn thus preserving an appearance of a crippled runway.

I have just ordered a copy of Air War South Atlantic Price and Ethell specialise in presenting a balanced opponents view although I suspect they may not throw any light on this matter.

If I read your idea of 'sweeping' correctly it would have been no more than a vague chance of engagement in a very lean target environment.

The only way to have engaged subsequent BB sorties successfully would have been either costly CAP or timely intelligence and some form of radar controlled intercept. The low and practically random sortie rate would have presented a very low chance of a successful engagement.

The islands are called the Falklands!

The real value of the BLACKBUCK raids was that it added another problem to the many the ARgie defenders had -

Keeping a load of people up all night, every night, looking for vulcans is probably as valuable as actually hitting the runway - and you have to keep the radar switched on - which makes identifying it for Harrier strikes all that much easier

Not to mention the effect on Morale it had on the Argentineans on the Islands.

I still maintain that they were fully aware of the aircraft we had on the ground at Ascension and feel it might be wishful thinking to assume there were lots of sleepless nights worrying about an alleged long range bomber attack.

If all the tanker force were observed lifting off then an estimated time of arrival could be assumed and would we then assume a suitable defensive action be taken. We might have contained their warships in their home ports but that does not stop them from using all their electronic equipment to help detect aircraft entering their airspace although some equipment might have got the local residents complaining! :sad::ok:
If only they did, then would the Shrike missions have been more successful?

The Mirage IIIEA were bought in two batches, the first one in 1971 and the second in 1978.

The first batch (10 aircraft) was capable of lunching the Matra 530 missile only.

The second batch (7 aircraft single seater) was also capable of lunching the Matra 550 Magic I, but those missiles were deliver just before the war in March 1982.

So the MIIIEA pilots didn't have any training in operating those missiles and only 7 aircraft were capable of lunching it.

The Argentine Air Force deployed its MIIIEA in two bases, Comodoro Rivadavia AFB and Rio Gallegos AFB.

But only the Rio Gallegos AFB was lunching MIIIEA missions to Malvinas.

Very few missions were flown armed with the MATRA 530 located in the center pylon.

The first mission on the May 1st, both MIIIEA were armed using a single MATRA 530, 2 MATRA 550 Magic I and the 2 DEFA 30 mm.
Both MIIIEA were radar vectored to a pair of SHR but the Cyrano IIbis couldn't lock any target flying below...so it was useless.

That's why the Argentine Air Force decided to retired the MATRA 530 because was causing drag and more fuel consuption without any real chance of hitting anything.

Regarding how to name the islands (about Lighting Mate post), the UN suggests that could be named Falklands/Malvinas if were named in an english language context and Malvinas/Falklands in spanish.

Moving forward from that (I think arguments regarding that are elsewhere here), Blackbuck raids (specially the first one) were more important than delivering bombs to the target.

With Vulcan capabilities on mind, Argentine defenses were re-deployed and time and resource consuming measures were taken to minimize the effects of a bombing mission in the mainland: From darkening cities to redeploying radars, to rehearsing scattering planes (and actually happening those some times due to false alarms) and, the more important thing, to maintain alert planes on the runway (the few Mirage IIIEAs)

In my humble opinion, Blackbuck missions had a very limited military value, but a tremendous effect on the strategic planning from the Argentine side.

On a side note, Argentine had timely intelligence about planes departing from Ascension Island and its payload (specially the Shrikes mission) I don´t know how it was obtained, but war diaries of the Argentine radar on island and defense positions in the mainlad reflects that.

Regards,

The Black Buck raids may have had little physical impact on the runway at Stanley which was rapidly repaired but they had a substantial impact on the morale of the Argentine troops based there.
As for the name of the place, they are the Falkland Islands!

PN,

No you completely misunderstand me. The point is that for Blackbuck to have had an effect we would have to demonstrate the fact that FAA jets supposed to be doing one thing were stopped and made to do another.

i.e. Fighters fragged for OCA sweep in support of the strikers would be re-tasked with DCA. The point is that if the fighters couldn't mount an effective sweep (looking for FRS 1 - nor Vulcan!) then there was no point sending them to do it. Thus they could be put on DCA. This is convenient - but it might not have been Blackbuck which forced their hand.

Another point raised is important. No-one should have been looking for Vulcans. They would have been looking for Vulcan. Very important distinction in my mind. Reach I will grant you, but with a single bomber? I am not as convinced as some that we were demonstrating much. (My opinion is irrelevant, as is that of all British people. If the Argentinians thought we were demonstrating reach then BB was a success.)

Next genuine question. By 'forcing' the Argentinians to keep their radar switched on - how exactly was it made vulnerable to attack from VSTOL aircraft?

And lastly - the interesting bit.

Marcantile, this is exactly what I was hoping for. How many fighters were dispersed and kept on high readiness? Why were there blackouts but the jets seem to have been kept well to the south of Buenos Aires? Did the Argetinians think that more than one Vulcan would come? What targets did the Argentinians think it could hit? Which were actually defended? Were the Mirage III thought unsuitable to go to the islands after 1 May because they lost to the FRS1?

As I have said before it is the Argentinian point of view that matters - the British view of capability, reach, non-kinetic effect etc is purely supposition without proof of what actually changed in the Argentinian plan.

Thanks everyone, very interesting thread.

VP-F and Dan Winterland, both of you mention the impact on morale. What is your source? Being bombed is horrendous (if 107mm fire is anyting to go by) but BB only put two sticks of bombs into a limited amount of real estate. Are you speaking for all troops on the island or just those at the airport? I have read some accounts of the infantry fighting that would suggest the morale in some Argentinian units was very good. This is also very interesting - thank you.

Impact on morale......what is more likely to affect morale - a) an occasional bomb dropped from mega height which will probably miss or b) nightly pin-point air-burst 4.5" shells right over the tented camps, gun and radar positions etc???

Yes I probably did misunderstand and I think it hinges on the definition of DCA and OCA in this context.

I assume OCA to be the sweep as you say looking to take the air battle to the Navy who would have to deal with both sweep and strike. Am I right in assuming you mean DCA being tasked to cover the mainland?

I would agree that OCA, as an independent mission, would probably have had a low probability of success unless the SHAR went up to play. As escort/sweep then the OCA mission would have had a high probability of contact and probably essential for successful attack by the strikers.

I can now see where you are coming from if you consider AD assets over FI as exclusively OCA whereas I had considered AD assets over the FI to have a DCA mission.

The morale aspect is interesting, however may I proffer the following?

The British strategy for re-taking the Falklands was that of unopposed amphibious landing followed by advance to contact and infantry battle.

I have read that the Argetinians suspected (as a result of USMC thinking) that the Brits would mount an opposed landing ivo Stanley itself.

But I tend to think that the infantry battles fought mainly at night were the crux of the conflict. Whoever won those won the war. It is possible that the Argentinians could have stopped them by disrupting the British supply chain or by sinking the amphibious shipping prior to disembarkation. So to me Stanley becomes a bit of a side show. It would not have been a side show had we managed to close it (through bombing, NGS etc) but we didn't and our strategy was not that of 'laying seige' because we had a time pressure from the South Atlantic winter. Thus the Argentinians had to win the air-sea battle at San Carlos or the battles in the mountains. The British had to win both.

From what I have seen of the battlefields the Argentinian infantry had decent kit, were fed (although accounts vary as to how well) and certainly never ran out of ammunition.

Maybe our Argentinian sources could reflect on the effect the bombing of Stanley had on those in defensive positions elsewhere? Other than the C-130 kill by FRS 1 were any re-supply flights cancelled or turned back due to CAP, NGS or bombing?

This forum has rather lost its way and become a deep discussion on the point of the raid rather than the ‘daring’ of the raid and its execution. For the Vulcan , Martin Withers and his crew achieved all that was expected of them, or rather that which was expected from a Vulcan crew since they were only the secondary team, thrown in the hot spot after a failure. The night refuels, which were as new to them as to the Victors and the complex formation procedures required high concentration in the cirrus of the South Atlantic. Some of the crews had to navigate using upside down North Atlantic charts as there were not enough South Atlantic charts. The refuels had to be on time and with correct transfers in spite of some equipment unserviceability. Fuel consumption turned out to be greater than predicted in the Vulcan causing rapid replanning of the recovery phase. Overall nothing like this operation had ever been planned let alone executed before and 75 aircrew had to get it right first time. Truly a Most Daring Raid.

PN,

Sorry old chap, I was thinking of Mirage III in the OCA role sweeping for their strikers by taking on FRS 1 flying the DCA role over San Carlos.

The pickle for the OCA in this case is that they couldn't go in at medium level against the Sea Dart threat which would force them low, into the AAA and Sea Wolf MEZ, that those brave strikers were having such a hard time with.

Pheasant, it depends where it misses.

There is also a difference as the 1000lb ers were, I believe, forged rather than cast and thus less effective as anti-personnel weapons. The potential for a random damage swathe over a mile long and a quarter wide, delivered in 6 seconds is. I suggest, a different order of magnitude from a number of accurately laid 4.5s.

The Sea Slug OTOH in an anti-personnel role was not designed to sooth them to sleep either.

The most daring (or foolish?) raid nearly attempted was the one way C130 SF sortie to take out the Super Etendards on the ground. The crew and SF survivors would then attempt to make for the Chilean border where Sea King helicopters would pick them up.
The C130 got as far as engine start at ASI before the decision to call it off was made.
It turns out the airbase was heavily defended by Argentine regulars, so the mission would have been suicidal.

Hercules TC-63 was on a recon flight, and it was not a blockade runner, when shot down by Ward.

Besides that, most of the 33 resupply flights by C-130s had two or three attemps (and that means turning back to the mainland) before landing on the islands. Most flights were diverted due to frigates nearby, CAP or NGS. Same with the 16 resupply travels by F-28 and other Navy transport aircraft.

Regards!

the source was my parents as I was only six at the time and have little recollection of the war in general. My parents reaction to the Vulcan's bombs was "what the hell was that!" One of my memories though was the attack on the Stanley airport following the Vulcan raid, I remember watching the rockets being fired as the harriers went down Stanley harbour from my bedroom in Stanley. The raids gave the Islands residents a tremendous lift and had totally the opposite effect on the poorly trained, fed and led conscripts.

orca Ah, this is an intelligence issue.

The strikers have to penetrate the FEZ and MEZ but OCA does not need to penetrate the MEZ in order to achieve OCA. They can achieve this by engaging the enemy air within the FEZ.

The real issue is where is the MEZ/FEZ.

Clearly the shorad with Rapier and Sea Wolf was in the SC Waters but the position of the SD MEZ would be the unknown. Therein would lie the problem for the fighters.

Aside from Cdr Ward's efforts several long range pot shots were taken at C-130s with Sea Dart. The CO of Exeter was very keen to go west of the islands at night to bring a few down, although ROE applied to to flight approaching the islands not leaving them. Permission was not granted by staff.

Mirage IIIEA were not capable to hunt the Avro Vulcan due to several reasons.

The first one is the range without air refueling, those airplanes were limited to 10 min at station over Malvinas flying higher than FL260.

So when the Argentine's long range radars were detecting the bomber at around 150 NM from Puerto Argentino, the MIIIEA have to be scramble from Rio Gallegos at not less than 40 min flight time...no chance at all to get an interception.

On June 10th, the Argentine Air Force Boeing B707-320 flying long range recce detecting three airplanes flying to Malvinas.
Those airplanes were presumed as Avro Vulcan or Nimrod, so a mission of four MIIIEA were lunched for hunting them but they couldn't get any contact when arrived to the target area.

Following from cosmiccomet's post..
The Argentines presumably suffered as much as we did from the lack of an AEW platform
How much difference would a couple of Neptunes fitted with AN/APS-20 have made?

Marcantile and cosmiscomet - many thanks indeed.

My point isn't that the Mirage III EA would be of any use against a Vulcan strike on the Falklands having scrambled from the mainland. That would be a little daft.

The standard UK line is that the Vulcan caused assets that would otherwise have been used against the task force to be used to defend the homeland. From what we think so far the only unit to receive a change in orders was Grupo 8. Our Argentine sources are saying though that the Mirage III EA of Grupo 8 could only get to the FI at medium level and even then for a very short time. They had new and untried weapons and a radar that didn't look down. They lost two of their comrades on day one.

I cannot rule out BB as a factor in the decision to re-task a part of Grupo 8. But the Mirage III EA appears to have ruled itself out of offensive ops as well.

Marcantile - do you know what fighters went to Buenos Aires? The ones from Rivadavia or Gallegos? Did they operate out of Tandil? I make it about 900 miles from Rivadavia to Buenos Ares. Of the 15 single seaters left do you knwo what split there was between the three locations?

As far as I remembered is that the AAF left only two or three single seat MIIIEA plus the single 2 seater MIIIDA at Mariano Moreno AFB where the Grupo VIII was located at that moment in peace times.

The same happened in Tandil AFB where 3 two seats IA Dagger B and 2 or three single seat IA Dagger A remained at war time for Buenos Aires Air Defence role.

I was involved at the time and I distinctly remember us all looking at each other when the news broke describing what had been organised with all the pre planning, endurance flying, number of refuels, only to be completely astounded that they.................................missed the bloody runway!
Incredible waste of time and effort. A massive PR blunder if you ask me. Time has cooled things now, but I can't see the programme doing anyone any favours, stirring it all back up again. I suppose it depends on how the director/producer bias the programme.:rolleyes:

The question that should be asked is "Given the assets in the direct theatre of operations, why was the raid proposed in the first place, particularly given its complexity (in terms of assets required to execute)?" The raid would only ever have had a miniscule effect on the battle (due to the remote likelihood of weapon on target) and thus should have been discarded at HQ level.

I think that is the point. The Vulcans and Victors were not in the direct theatre of operations. I think it was already mentioned that an essential C130 resupply mission would have kicked the BB mission in to touch.

The long range RAF effort added an additional indirect pressure in support of the task force. Can you come up with a better opening gambit of the crack of doom just before dawn broke?

The only thing better would have been a 9x16 round broadside from the Rodney. They would have arrived at the same time, no rolling thunder

Yes, but as noted earlier, it was raised at War Cabinet level and Admirals Lewin, Leach and Fieldhouse - later joined by Admiral Woodward who invited his aviators 'to shut up' (when they expressed opposition to the raid) - were in favour. Given that CDS, 1SL and CinC Fleet thought it a good thing in terms of possible psychological effect, discarding the idea at HQ level was a tad unlikely.

The problem, I fear, is that the kabourophobic argument concentrates entirely upon the hackneyed old, tactical level perspective that the raid was a massive, ineffective waste of fuel and effort because of RAF insecurity and a desire to 'play a part' (which, of course, the RAF was doing through a variety of assets).

This approach resolutely refuses to consider other factors largely because of service parochialism. Even if you rule out strategic effect, then as part of what would now be called [Buzzwords]'the Influence piece' [\Buzzwords] it makes sense. The irony is that those in dark blue who damn the raids' premise run the risk of blissfully ignoring the breadth of thought, perhaps even strategic vision, of the three admirals mentioned earlier. They didn't care whether a bomb hit the runway or not, because CAS had told them how damned difficult that was to achieve. What they cared about was the possible effect on the junta, world opinion and possibly the tactical dispositions of the one Argentine AF fighter unit that was a dedicated air-to-air squadron.

and of course, we must not forget that the cold war was still in swing at the time and it probably impressed upon other persons as well!

Archimedes,
I think we all agree that those flag officers supported those missions, do you seriously believe they would say anything other than that? This was a joint operation and NO ONE should be trying to score points at the expense of the maximum effort against the common foe.

I get very tired of those that try to drive a wedge between the different services it is uncalled for and plain wrong. We should all pull together and perhaps try to find nice things to say instead of petty bickering. Those missions were RAF missions and unless they DIRECTLY interfered with the Navy side of the operation then of course the Admirals would say what they did.

What is being suggested by some folks is that just under 14,000,000Ibs of aviation fuel might have been an expensive price for the grand total of one dumb iron bomb hitting a concrete runway! (7 x 1.94million) If the RAF were happy with that then fine, but we could not supply enough aviation fuel to Wideawake and were acquiring it from our allies. Don't forget that those operations were taking up every single tanker in theatre which meant no other long range mission could be flown from that location until those tankers and their crews became available. No important crucial spare parts or equipment, no extended Nimrod surveillance flights. All these things had to wait until all those aircraft had returned and had all the necessary servicing carried out before getting these urgent items down to the fleet.

As I keep saying, if the RAF were happy with this and no valuable supplies or equipment were delayed getting down south then fine but I will tactfully suggest that the issue of resupplying the battle group may well have been an operational game stopper and perhaps a quiet word 'might' have been whispered in the higher corridors of that concrete frigate HMS Warrior. A quiet word in private whilst publicly toeing the quite correct party line. that is the way to conduct a war and I for one will suggest this is the way to conduct business.

There were numerous 'Daring' air missions by all three services and my own thoughts are this specific one was an amazing administrative exercise but I cannot get my head around its drain on valuable resources and how anyone can rate this specific operation as being the MOST 'daring' of them all, it just seems so wrong. (In my personal opinion)

We have seen how close air support missions flown by the Harriers might have been a far far greater morale killer and who knows the effects of the naval gunfire that kept the occupying force awake at night. The locals at Stanley were allegedly just curious about the Vulcan bombs thumping into the grass... at night, with nothing to see where they were from, they could have been weaponry from air, land or sea??? There was also lots of large guns keeping the locals awake and amongst those bangs we are asked to accept that a few extra exploding dumb bombs were going to have a significant effect on morale?? How does that compare with a daylight raid by Harriers that come screaming in at a great rate of knots at low level with rockets flying through the air. The noise of those aircraft is enough to get some soldiers messing their pants, the exploding rockets will perhaps just add to their fear.

I personally would suggest the latter will have a far greater effect on those poor souls on the receiving end?

Note
I am not for one millisecond suggesting any one specific service was flying those low flying Harriers, this was a joint operation flown by some VERY brave pilots from all of our armed services.

Apologies if I am not that coherent but hopefully folks can struggle through my witterings.

But that would have exposed the aircraft & their pilots to substantial ground fire and potentially heavy losses which have could have had a negative effect on our morale & a positive one on theirs. Black Buck demonstrated a long reach & a relative measure of invulnerability that had a very positive effect on British morale, certainly at home as I remember it. The effect on Argentine public opinion would have been the opposite I'm sure.

glojo, I think you answered your own question both here and in your earlier posting.

The Admiral had to decide - not the RAF.

You would have to show that spares were delayed reaching the task force or that essential Nimrod reconnaissance missions were missed. Even if spares were delayed or sorties missed I think we can assume that the BB missions were accorded the proper priority at the time.

Just to refresh, actual BB missions were flown on 30 Apr, 3 May, 31 May 3 Jun and 12 Jun. Two others were planned with one scrubbed and one recalled. Hardly intensive operations that could interfere with the Task Force. The first two raids predated the Pebble Island raid by at least 10 days and the 3rd was after Goose Green. The 5th was on Stanley just before the surrender and "bombs were supposed to detonate in mid-air, not to explode at impact" which would have exerted even more pressure as the land forces pressed in on Stanley - certainly combined ops.

Ken Scott

"that had a very positive effect on British morale, certainly at home as I remember it. The effect on Argentine public opinion would have been the opposite I'm sure."

+1


Not too sure why Thomas said the following.
"Incredible waste of time and effort. A massive PR blunder if you ask me."

.

Hi Pontious
I certainly do not disagree with any of your points, the BB raids would as we all accept take a huge degree of planning and as you rightly point out there were not many of them, but can we just say those raids took place on that one specific date and the tankers would be available for operations for all the other periods? (question NOT a statement)

Getting every single tanker asset available for a raid on the 33rd day of the month will require all those aircraft to be fully operational, fuelled up and ready to roll on that date, so how long would that take to ensure they were all on the ground, all serviceable and all ready to roll on the 33rd?? What are the ramifications for any long range missions for the preceding days of those missions?

Hopefully you can understand those questions as all tankers were required for these missions and to get them all available on the apron ready to roll on one specific date may well take time? I am just trying to get a grasp of the mechanics to organise what I personally call an amazingly complex operation. Apologies to orca for not developing his interesting part of the question and a thousand apologies to any of the crews that took part in these BB missions, I have TOTAL respect for what you did and hopefully we all accept I am NOT suggesting anything other than that these were pushing the realms of capability to the very edges of our expertise? :ok:

Apologies for being a bit slow Pontious but are you confirming what I have said or are you querying it?
That is what I said :ok::O and fingers crossed we are all in agreement with that point.

I am NOT against these missions, never have been, never will be. They demonstrated a capability and I keep saying my only issue is with the 'Most Daring' suggestion.

Ken Scott
Yes those low fling missions did expose those brave pilots to small arms fire and and the very real risk of being shot down...., That is sadly what did happen to a few unlucky pilots. Hence you will NEVER hear me criticise the bravery, professionalism and courage of all aircrew and again I repeat that is why I query the title of this thread. I am NOT belittling the Vulcan raid, I am simply in the corner that states they feel other raids\missions may have been more daring!

Hopefully I have clarified my position and I wonder if the senior officer in command of organising these BB missions was getting Green Shield stamps for every gallon of aviation fuel or did they collect the Esso World Cup coins....

http://cdn.uploads-preloved.com/uplo...18368-832m.jpg

Right I am not usually a poster on this forum but some of the attacks on the success of this raid are starting to irritate especially as they appear to be more born out of Dark Blue vs Light Blue service rivalry! All the old hackneyed reasons for why it shouldn't be seen as a success have come out:

They missed the runway (they didn't)

They only got one bomb on the runway (As planned getting NO BOMBS on the runway could still be a success)

The Harriers could of done better (it would of required all of them to fly low over the base and they didn't have the payload or fuel for the same effect)

In the context of how the raid was planned it was an utter success, people seem to think the Vulcan was somehow meant to fly down the runway and drop the whole stick along its length...that just isn't how the mission was planned! As planned the aircraft dropped the stick at a 35 degree angle to the runway the intention being to actually straddle it as close to the middle as possible (thats how no bombs hitting can still be classed as a success). The whole point is for the bombs to come in steep and bury themselves in the ground before exploding...this will then cause subsidence making the runway unsafe for fast jet operations. This is EXACTLY what happened with Black Buck 1, they came in and managed to clip the runway almost bang on the centre as planned.

In the end we can conclude after the event that the Argies didn't plan to operate jets off the runway but at the time we didn't know that. Whilst the Mirages and Daggers couldn't safely operate off the runway at Stanley the Skyhawks of the Airforce and the Navy might of, operating off the Falklands they could of been far more dangerous! Considering that unknown it was entirely reasonable having a stab at the runway and the taskforce commander was all up for if it added further confusion to the Argentine defenders! The Vulcan was the best way to effect that, all the Harriers of the task force would of had to fly directly over the airfield at lower level to drop the same tonnage of bombs and with less effect then the stick dropped at higher altitude by the Vulcan.

Black Buck got one bomb on the runway...yes but considering that falls exactly within the mission plan they should be given a bit more praise then unfair stick!