500N wrote

Because he is still thinks that none of the Vulcan bombs did any damage to the runway.

RAF News, April 26th 2002, has a piece from retired Air Commodore John Davis. Davis was the first commander of the operations wing at RAF Stanley. In relation to the runway crater from the first Black Buck mission Davis wrote "This rogue crater required a succession of repairs amid what soon became high intensity air operations."

TEEJ
Thanks, that's interesting.


I can still remember the highs and lows of the conflict from a civilian perspective
as the BBC News came on each night and the papers in the morning.

Considering the Vulcan was a Cold War Nuclear bomber, if it had been carrying its 'normal' cargo of instant sunshine, I don't think that not hitting the runway with 2 iron bombs would have made much difference to the destruction caused.

However, it was 1940's analogue driven technology, and even if it made no difference to the Argentine war effort, it certainly gave the British a lift.

And a bloody good beer call on the airfield when '607 returned.

ZH875 (see off crew for XM598 Black Buck 1)

Well, I think the bombs of BB1 were less important than the message (we could hit the mainland...)

On the other hand why, if the Harriers could do better, the best anti-runway mission of the whole war was carried on May 1st? What happened with all the subsequent SHARs and Gr3 antirunway missions?

No problem, 500N.

Some additional info.

From

Letters to The Daily Telegraph - Telegraph

It also makes you wonder why they pressed on with JP233 when the whole concept of low level runway denial was so flawed.

I think I differ only slightly from the above post.

The plan.

1. What the BB crews did was remarkable.
2. The plan, I believe was sound, why not demonstrate reach? It might show the enemy that his homeland was under threat. It might trick the enemy into thinking we actually planned to target the mainland.
3. The plan, I believe was sound, Woodward thought Stanley might operate jets - any way of denying the enemy this freedom of manoeuvre should be exploited.
3A. As part of a concerted Joint venture the bombs could deny the use of the airfield to slow movers and Tac AT. Good plan.
4. The plan, I believe was sound, no-one else really needed the gas or bombs.
5. The plan, I believe was sound, no-one likes being bombed and the raid was likely to result in a lowering of the morale of some Argentinian troops.
6. It would at least give the junta something to worry about and the Sun something to shout about.

Execution.

What the guys did was remarkable, be it co-ord, tanking or actually employing weapons.

Debrief.

Here's where I differ from some. I have been fed the effects of the raid for 30 years. My hobby is military history. I want to find out the truth. The truth simply cannot contain phrases like 'It must have.' what i have heard for 30 years has largely been supposition based on how we'd have felt if someone had done it to us. I am free to research and debate bomber command, Singapore, the many Afghan experiences the Uk has had. Why not cast an eye over BB in the cold light of day? How else do we learn?

So to take the points in order:
1. The crew did a magnificent job. Indisputable.
2. We definitely demonstrated reach to ourselves and there is evidence that a small number of AAF jets* were re-tasked to AD of the homeland vice attacking our chaps. This was a close run encounter, single sorties were important.
3. Evidence suggests that the enemy never did intend to use the runway for fast air. Oh well, how were we to know.
3A. We can claim a 'disrupt' here but no more. Oh well...thems the breaks.
4. Good plan, no-one ran out of gas or bombs.
5. In all probability it did lower the Argentine morale but maybe not amongst the frontline elements. We have no way of knowing because we are working off assumptions based on the observation of troops around Stanley.
6. I cannot speak for the junta as I can find no record of their discussions. The Sun definitely did shout.

* If we rule out the twin seaters, that couldn't get to the FI due fuel load, and the jets based at Tandil which is 200 nm south of BA (so suspect they were simply left there when Grupo 8 deployed) we have evidence to suggest 2/3 Dagger were based in BA that could have supported the war effort in the south. Probably enough to man a QRA pair. This is significant - every little helps - but not a game changer.

Summary. BB was a sound plan. To some it appears a poor investment, others have spent a long time claiming effects that don't necessarily stand up to scrutiny. No-one needed the assets it used and it did have some effect on the enemy. From an aircrew point of view (perhaps demonstrated by future aborts and low sortie rate) it is remarkable that the guys achieved what they did.

Marcantilan wrote

The points were highlighted in David Morgan's book 'Dangerous Skies'

Also see post by 'Edmund Spencer'.

Post #357

http://www.pprune.org/aviation-histo...ml#post4929686

Irrespective of the rights/wrongs success/failure debate as to whether the raids achieved anything, what everyone forgets is that we scored a spectacular own-goal with the first raid
Within days the UK press was full of detail as to how many tankers were required to mount the raid, thus making it clear to all that an attempt at anything more than a one-aircraft token (and probably suicidal) attack on the Argentine mainland was impossible
If their lordships had kept their mouths shut over the technicalities I'm sure the Argentines would have felt more restricted in their actions.

I wasn't going to say anything publicly but your mail box is full. That is some monumental thread drift.

Interesting post there, TEEEJ. The button that sat under the right thumb did pretty much all those things in lots of jets. Sorry to hear of so many switch pigs from the guys that claim to have won the war.

[Written with QWI hat on]

CM, nothing new there. Several years before at a fire power demo one F4 should have salvoed 6x1000lb HE. The other two aircraft dropped but he didn't.

As they didn't want to risk landing with 6 live 1000lb bombs and an unknown reason for a hangup they elected a safe jettison and cleared 3 dummy Sparrow, a strike camera, a SU pod (fully loaded), and 4 training SW.

It was not possible to determine the reason for the failure to drop but . . .

Then of course where the switches were indeed all in the correct positions - splash one Jag.

Or more recently when a Jag dropped all his practice bombs neatly package in the CBLS.

Happened all the time. Of course I never made a switch pigs much.

Neither did I, obviously. But doesn't make it any better.

Oh, and the middle one wasn't a switch pigs. Exactly the opposite. A kill's a kill.:cool:

I've always considered Ward's Sidewinder shot a little odd as there should have been a 9L growling away shouldn't there? I understand the thinking of getting your bomb pylon live and then having a winder up just in case, but from there on the excuse matrix is bare.

I believe I am right in saying that Leeming didn't know you had to select the missile master panel (low behind the stick) on to fire the 9L. I think he was new to the aeroplane.

Morgan's book also tells of Gordie Batt having a loft brief prior to launch at night IIRC.

(Respect and RIP to both of the above)

When did the camera on/off move from pickle button to the nose wheel steering paddle switch? Anyone know?

The min/max ranges of an AIM-9 at 300ft are very close. I suspect this was the issue. All the more reason for ASRAAM with a much longer range.

Navaleye - sorry, I was talking about the 'negligent discharge' one. Having thought a bit longer about it I think I'm right in saying that the 9L used to growl on selection but then cooled to a hiss and growled again at target acquisition.

Suspect what you are talking about is Finger Pigs due to fatigue. Happens a lot in combat conditions. Interesting that AIM-9 only got 28% in GW1. Suspect it was used wrong. Got 80%+ plus down south.

Back to the Vulkan, thought this might be of interest, Roy Ewans obituary in the Telegraph.

Roy Ewans - Telegraph

21x 1000Lb HE bombs going rapidly one after the other in the dead of night must have done wonders for the moral and nerves of a mostly conscript army living in cold & damp conditions.

LT, quite. It was quite spooky from 3 miles away in day time when we were expecting it. Worse than 8 or 9 salvoed IMHO.

On a point of historical accuracy ;), I should mention that Rodney would have been very unlikely to use a full 16" broadside for coastal bombardment, too much collateral damage to Rodney Would have a mess of the runway though.

PSA RUNWAY ATTACKS

Mainjafad

“On the other hand why, if the Harriers could do better, the best anti-runway mission of the whole war was carried on May 1st? What happened with all the subsequent SHARs and Gr3 antirunway missions?”

The full story of this is complicated.

PSA runway was attacked by GR3s and Seajets several times after May 1. The Seajet night raid (Toss Bombing) led to the sad loss of a FAA pilot in a takeoff accident, and was not repeated. No hits were achieved.

1(F) pilots carried out two GR3 raids on the airfield with Sea Harrier defence-suppression support, neither of which significantly damaged the runway. (On the first of these the KRETS were improperly fused by Navy armourers, thus reducing their cratering effect). 1(F) had little control over bomb fusing and weapon loads for most of the war.

Next, on the suggestion of a 1(F) pilot, GR3s formated on Seajets in daylight Toss Attacks releasing 9 bombs per salvo. If this had been continued they would probably have achieved a deep-penetration hit eventually . However, RN Commanders refused to send more Seajets on Toss bombing raids. 1(F) were then tasked by the Navy to continue these alone, a pointless exercise as the GR3 had no Toss Bombing computer capability at all. (All weapon aiming throughout the war was fixed sighting)

Later on, as PW2 became available, 1(F) tried mutual designation in an extreme High Dive profile, using VIFF to stay out of the Roland/35mm envelope. No results were observed, and they were ordered to stop because HQ 18 GP advised them that their onboard LRMTS was ‘not compatible’ with the PW2s in use. (1(F) had been advised by CTTO several months before that they could, in emergency, use their own laser to designate.)

The full story is in RAF Harrier Ground Attack Falklands

Thank's Exmudmover, I've got Jerry Pook's book, just not to hand. One other thing noted by Sqn Ldr Pook is that 801's QWI told him that 801's average miss distance was 400 yards with a medium level drop, while Ward's account states that 800 NAS were literally missing the aim point by miles. He also states the daylight mixed formation attempt was in fact very close and would have most likely caused major damage to the runway had it been tried a few more times. I bet if you work out the CEP of every bomb dropped by the two Vulcan attacks at the start of May, their average miss distance is a lot less.

I suspect the hot middle east might have had a significant effect on the 9L success rate compared to the cold south atlantic among with a multitude of other factors :rolleyes:

Gentlemen,

I've deliberately stayed out of this thread to date, mainly to see what got said, and also to do some research with key participants (and I mean very senior key participants).

To start, Black Buck was a considerable feat of airmanship. To get a Vulcan over a target over that range was a brave and highly skilled piece of planning and flying. The RAF crews that took part deserve much credit for what they did. These are, I hope, indisputable conclusions.

However, it's my view (and by all means feel free to disagree) that these basic facts have become obscured by some regrettable attempts to overemphasise and overstate the effect and impact of the Black Buck raids. It's been claimed here and in other publications that the RN requested the raids, and that the RAF went along reluctantly. That's not true. The C4 trail asserts that Black Buck 'changed the outcome of the war' and that the safety of the Task Force 'depended on its success'. That's not true. Roland White's book makes similar claims that the missions 'achieved all their objectives' and goes on to claim that they directly led to the sinking of the Belgrano and the withdrawal of 'all Argentinian Mirage aircraft' to defend the mainland. To this day, the RAF's own website asserts that the raids 'placed a bomb in the centre of the runway'. It's not true.

Here's my conclusions, based on evidence from those in positions of command at the time, and in other positions of first hand observation. I'd also add that I was serving in 'Invincible' at the time.

Black Buck was an RAF initiative. The Task force Commander had, quite rightly, identified that any Argentinian move to base fast jets at Stanley would be a severe threat. Because of this, he decided that a combined operation was required at the outset of the war to deter any move to do so. The combined operation planned for 1st May against Port Stanley included a substantial Sea Harrier bombing effort, and also naval gunfire support. Very early on in the planning, the RAF (I understand, from witnesses, that it was Beetham) put forward the idea of adding a Vulcan raid from Ascension. The RN Task Force Commander accepted this offer with gratitude, and even defended it against some opposition from his own aviation advisers. To me, this appears to have been a sensible and realistic move - hit Stanley with as much 'stuff' as the UK could generate to stop any chance of fast jets getting based there.

So, the Black Buck raid on the 1st May was one part of a combined operation. There is no doubt that the aim was to hit the runway - no other aiming point makes sense given the bomb load. The fact (and it's indisputable from the first recce photographs) is that the stick (quite rightly aimed at cutting the runway at a 45 degree angle) essentially missed by about 500 yards. The first bomb in the stick hit the runway near the edge, the other 20 dropped well clear. The bomb did not hit 'in the centre', and it's unfortunate that some photos used since then (including the one on the RAF website) do not line up with the authoritative photos taken by the Task Force just after the raid.

The second bombing raid on 3rd/4th May was a complete failure, since the crew failed to arm the bombs before release and dropped 21 'duds'. This fact is omitted from 'Vulcan 607', which somewhat misleadingly limits its account to a single sentence saying that a crew 'got their chance on 3 May'.

The last bombing raid, on 12th June, also missed the runway. The photograph on the RAF website actually crops out the craters from this stick. The RAF's website account of these three raids is unclear at best, misleading at worst.

I can't, in all honesty, see that 1 bomb in the target area (the runway) from 63 bombs dropped represents a military success, and one has to conclude that the Vulcans' bomb aiming systems were not up to the task.

The airstrip continued to be used by the Argentinians without any major issues. However, the combined operation of May 1st (of which Black Buck was a part) certainly deterred any Argentinian move to base fast jets at Stanley, if it existed at all.

Some of the subsequent speculation on the impact of 'Black Buck' is again, in my view, aimed at trying to justify the raids against the lack of direct success. There's some evidence of minor reallocation of Arg AD assets, but there was never any serious planning to hit the Argentinian mainland (and I remember the Op Corporate ROEs with some clarity on that point).

Yes, it helped dent Arg morale. First hand accounts from those on the islands confirm that, but place as much if not more emphasis on the naval gunfire which happened at Stanley on a fairly regular basis.

In sum, I stick by my conclusions, which are:

1. The RAF were desperate to be seen to contributing to a war in which, due to the basics of range and absence of land bases, they were unable to participate in a direct combat role.(I'd add that their C-130 resupply flights were extremely important to the operation)(I haven't forgotten 1 Sqn, but they weren't there on 1 May - see my other posts on their professionalism)

2. Black Buck gave the RAF a way to be seen to be contributing operationally.

3. Their inclusion in the raids of 1st May and afterwards by the Task Force Commander was militarily sensible - why turn down an asset?

4. In the end, the actual military value of Black Buck bombing missions was marginal, due to inaccurate bomb delivery and the risks inherent in long range missions depending on a number of AAR events. Many sorties were cancelled or aborted. Sadly, a number of people have since overstated their effect. So has the RAF, and they continue to do so to this day. They should stop doing so.

5. The indirect military effects of Black Buck are probably less than have been claimed. In the end, the only thing that really mattered was direct action around, on and above the Falklands. The biggest blows to Arg morale were most probably the sinking of the Belgrano and the overwhelming ascendancy of the Sea Harriers. However, this is open to conjecture. Others can differ, and will probably do so.

6. What is not open to conjecture (in my view) is that the 'Black Buck' crews were brave, skilled and daring in carrying out a series of very long range sorties. They certainly deserved recognition and congratulation, and still do so.

Best Regards as ever,

Engines

Engines

Ward is wrong about the 2nd Black Raid, as this photo which was taken by one of his own pilots from 801NAS in late May 82 proves!!!!! (He is right about a Vulcan dropping the bombs fused wrongly (they were armed however), however it didn't happen in May 82, which kind of cuts down the options on guessing which Black Buck raid it was).

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...ay_craters.jpg

The real strategic hit that the Vulcan could have put in would have been if that Shrike fired at the TPS-43F on the first Black Buck ARM mission hit that radar head on (just slightly damaged it apparently). That would have been a real game changer as it would blinded the Argentine to all of our air movements around the Islands for the later part of the war. The TPS-44 that the Argentine Army used on the Islands was U/S for most of the war after taking a near miss from a 4.5 inch shell on 11 May according to an Argentine operator of the equipment who posted his account of what happened to him in 82 on another froum.

Interesting last post. What was the issue with the bombs? Fused incorrectly by the armourers?

Engines, with respect, as one who has said on several occasions that Admirals Lewin, Leach and Fieldhouse were in favour of the raid and more so than MRAF Beetham who was very sanguine about the chances of success, let me be clear that does not equate to me suggesting that the RN requested the raid.

MRAF Beetham presented the Vulcan raid as an option, with a sober analysis of the difficulties of success. The three Admirals mentioned offered the view that despite this, attacking Stanley airfield was worth doing because of their perceptions of the possible effects on the Argentines, which were not guaranteed. Admiral Woodward came into the picture at this point, agreeing with the assessment that the wider possible effect of Blackbuck 1 made it worth doing, over-riding the objections of some of his aviators who failed to see the wider possibilities that might emanate from the attack.

There is much in the history presented which is either confusing, open to debate, or just plain wrong. For instance, there is evidence from Argentine sources which contradicts the notion that Black Buck 2's bombs did not go off. There is evidence from Argentine sources (not Middlebrook, as I mis-remembered earlier, but Salvador Mafe Huertas) that Grupo 8's Mirages had their tasking rebalanced or altered. There is a claim that 'the secretary of state' (which one?) ruled out bombing the mainland, but given that Tony Benn and Tam Dayell can be found (via Hansard) warning of the gravest consequences of such an attack as late as 20th May - i.e. the day before Op SUTTON, it clearly hadn't been ruled out as categorically as some accounts suggest. We also have the problem that much of the running here has been made by Sharkey Ward and Roland White's accounts, both of which have.... shall we say 'issues'? I'd suggest that until we have full visibility of the documents - not long now - being able to interpret these events with something approaching certainty, or at least confidence, is difficult. The end result is that we end up attempting to interpret unclassified sources, or sources which have crept into the public domain, influenced by partial accounts and/or service allegience, or accounts which say, or repeat certain things (the clear rejection of an attack on the mainland) with confidence, when the evidence from the time, upon examination, suggests something a little different.

Archimedes,

Thanks for the response, and the very good points you make. I was not, I'd make clear, singling you out for the suggestion on RN/RAF 'push' for the raid.

However, I stick by my conclusion that the RAF devised the 'Black Buck' raid. I don't think anyone thought the RN devised it. If the RAF thought it would not have worked, I'd expect Beetham to say so. They thought it would, and the RN command (quite rightly in my view) took it into their planning. It was part of a combined assault on Stanley starting on the 1st, and in military/damage terms it was, to say the least, 'limited'. Once again, I will say that this does not detract from the bravery and skill of the crews and their feats of airmanship to get there.

On bombing the mainland, I recollect the ROEs quite clearly, and in my view while excitable MPs might have sounded of on the issue, the main focus of operations was on the Falklands and militarily defeating the Arg forces there. It's my view (honestly held, but as ever open to disagreement) that trying to assign a number of indirect 'morale' and 'reallocation' effects solely to Black Buck is a mistake.

Did it get a lot of coverage at the time? Yes, no doubt. UK papers jumped all over it. But, from the Arg comments I have seen, the 'Belgrano' sinking was the massive and singular 'hit' on the Arg public perception. Arg pilot morale was badly affected as SHAR kills climbed (thank you the US for 9 Lima). From my direct experience on the ground before the surrender, Arg soldier morale was crumbling from day one, especially among conscripts, more so after Goose Green, helped by poor leadership and inadequate logistics (including lack of food). We found emaciated remains of conscripts just a couple of miles from massive food dumps. A horrible sight.

On sources, yes, I agree that the full picture is not yet out. But there is one full picture that is, and that is the Task Force recce shot (yes, taken by a SHAR, but using an RAF camera) that clearly shows the bomb fall. It's the dissembling on that basic stuff that I find troubling, especially on an official RAF website.

Again (and sorry to repeat here) - my concern is that overstating the effect of Black Buck generates exactly this sort of exchange, which only serves to obscure and diminish the recognition the Black Buck crews deserve. An open and honest description of the raids, without trying to hype the results, would serve those brave people far better.

Best Regards as ever,

Engines

Downplayed ! I should think so ! the truth is to be found in Sharkey Ward's "Harrier over the falklands"
1 the jets couldn't use stanley runway, it was too short . At a cost of millions the runway is long enough now ! if the argies invade, they will have their Etendards there and we have no more harriers to take them on .
2 4 attempts one aborted because someone left the window open , one forgot to fuse the bombs , all for one hit at the very end of the runway, which did naff all.
at a cost of millions - yes millions of gallons of fuel
laughable, pathetic, another attempt by the raf pr machine to pretend it was involved.

Oh really !!! :}

orca, see PM.

Mike, you are probably right as coastal bombardment would have been late on in the war. I see she used to fire 4 or 5 gun salvoes in succession but she did against the Bismark.

<<At 09:44 Rodney now desperately short of fuel but determined to finish off the German ship, had closed to almost point blank range and was firing full nine gun broadsides into her.>>

But

<<After the battle Rodney Most of the damage was self inflicted;

· Inside smashed light fittings and sheared electric cables were everywhere, sanitary piping was ruptured, toilet bowls and urinal ceramics shattered, and various rivets and bolts in her structure sheared - probably during the firing of nine gun broadsides.>>

I recall reading one book where an army unit was pinned down in a hedge row by German machine guns in a wood across the field. A NGSO suddenly turned up and asked if they needed any help. A couple of minutes later it was like express trains going overhead and the woods erupted.

Even a 5 round salvo would have delivered around 10,000lbs in one bang!

Your post is risable.

Right

No it isn't. Once Mount Pleasant was operational the Stanley runway was shortened again.

Harriers! Maybe but the Typhoon is rather more capable in that respect.

Must be an Irish runway. The bomb was in the mid-point of the runway but admittedly off the centreline.

ExMudmover: Thanks for your explanation! :ok:

Orca

Last Vulcan attack in mid June dropped bombs fitted with VT fuses which should have been set to air-burst over the airfield. I got the chance to read the official RAF history (the secret one) in 89 and it stated that the fuze settings had been incorrectly set in the cockpit and this had lead to a unit inquiry. According to the wiki entry on the Black Buck raids, one of the sources at the bottom of the page states that an official history published in 2005 states that the fuze's had been set to impact and the stick had missed the airfield by a wide margin.

I asked the question about how many days it would take to get all available tankers ready to support these BLACK BUCK missions and the answer according to Air Marshal Sir John Curtis was three to four days…

He also makes it quite clear that the greatest concern at Warrior was the vulnerability of the Battle Group to air attacks. We are then told that the RAF could offer long range Nimrod surveillance but according to this Air Marshal that required a minimum of seven tankers.

So what he is saying is that the biggest concern of our most senior flag officers from all three services was the vulnerability of the battle group however during the four days prior to these missions there would be no surveillance missions. He also states that whilst these missions were being configured, other aircraft had to be redeployed away from Ascension to either the UK, Gibraltar or any other suitable location.

When the missions were being organised I would like to think the meteorological department would be consulted to offer an input as to suitable dates where the weather might stop air operations against our battle group?

He then goes on to talk about what these missions achieved

Please forgive me for marking a few words with a blue font but I thought it was the politest way to highlight just a few of the points raised by the Air Marshal.

Point One
At the time of this conflict I am quite sure the bombing of the mainland was not a significant worry to that nation, they knew and we knew that having bombers hitting the mainland of Argentina would be political madness? However they KNEW beyond ANY doubt that we had submarines just off their coastline and I would suggest that was a far more significant threat? A threat to any ship that dared to sneak out of their ports or maybe we had special forces embarked on one of our boats? :suspect:

They knew the exact number of Vulcan aircraft we had at Ascension and also when they were taking off on their missions. They would have ample time to put up a reception committee without the fear of loosing those fighters, plus of course they would have early warning of their approach, so in the grand scheme of everything that was happening I ask myself how significant was that 'worry' about an attack on the mainland.

They had NO idea of how many submarines we had deployed off their coast, but they knew submarines were somewhere off their coast, they had no idea how close, or how far away those submarines were or what they may or may not do, and that to me would be a FAR, far greater 'worry' than the minuscule risk of their mainland being bombed by Dr Strangelove.

I would therefore very respectfully suggest the submarine 'worry' trumps the possibility that a bomber MIGHT attempt to get close to their mainland??

Point 2
orca has carried out some very in depth research into the number of Mirage jets that were moved and were capable of acting as escort to the offensive missions against our fleet. I am under the impression that this number might not be as 'significant' as it is alleged, BUT that may very well be me misunderstanding the posts from that highly qualified gentleman ?? (Question for orca to clarify)

What a significant number of posters seem to be unable to take on-board is the FACT that we are all commending those that took part in the BLACK BUCK missions… every single man jack of us.

We all recognise what went into the planning and implementation of these missions but are we still meant to accept they were the MOST DARING missions of that conflict… Note the words 'most daring'

The point keeps getting mentioned of how our flag officers did not object to these missions or even welcomed them, no one here disagrees with that. No one denies that our Admirals did not object to these missions taking place and we all agree that dropping bombs on the bad guys is good… Doing nothing is bad.

I have tried to answer the excellent point raised by Pontious when he states:

I could say, All we have to do is look at what happened four days prior to each of these missions onwards to see whether they were indeed good value. BUT to me that is so wrong as I hate with a vengeance those that use hind sight to try and justify their cause. The fact was that there would be NO long range air support from Ascension for 'X' number of days all based around the actual mission dates. I hope you can accept that as an answer as it all depends on how much importance we place on:

Those missions did succeed in getting a few Mirage jets redeployed but the 9L missile had an ability of a different class that also redeployed those assets and would those few Mirage have altered that very one sided kill ratio?

Hopefully the RAF consulted with the Battle Group and explained that for the four days prior to each mission and until all relevant aircraft were bought back to Ascension there would be no long range surveillance missions, and no chance of any emergency flights to bring down stores or equipment.

Once those missions were completed it would be back to playing ‘Musical chairs' with all the aircraft that were removed to the UK, Gibraltar or elsewhere and get back to those supporting duties of trying to have some type of very much needed surveillance cover, plus the ferrying of desperately needed spare parts and equipment. We can only assume that this was explained in great detail because if a vital item of equipment was required then the relevant party was up the creek as the aircraft that was capable of bringing that item down south had in all probability been deployed 'up north' and would not be back until the other aircraft had all been redeployed away from Wideawake!!

Engines.
If an aircraft were to attack that runway at a 45 or maybe 35 degree angle of approach then how many bombs would we expect to actually hit the strip?

The RAF are the bombing experts and if they decided to hit that location those types of angle then I would like to believe a lot of thought went into that decision. I for one am NOT qualified to even dare disagree and I say that with the greatest of respect. To a lay person hitting that lump of concrete at an angle of either 35 or 45 degrees was pretty darn good.

In answer to a query relating to the amount of aviation fuel that was used then I have already stated that in weight but I would guess it would be about 1.7million imperial gallons and I wonder how much that would cost in pounds shillings and pence, or perhaps just in £'s :8 .

This was an RAF mission, they were happy with the cost vs effect and that is all that matters, we all know where I stand...

We won they lost

BUT............I will always maintain this was NOT the most daring mission.

Congratulations to all those that took part and I am NOT criticising their efforts, not now, not yesterday, nor tomorrow.

Let's PLEASE not get personal and start mentioning names of individual pilots, it is annoying, frustrating and unhelpful. In times of war we have all seen that pressing the wrong button is not uncommon, it should not happen, we train for it not to happen, but the reality is that button 'A' often gets pressed instead of button 'B' and we loose our money!! (old wrinklies will no doubt know where I am coming from) :*:O:O

As a Falkland Islander who at six years old lived through the conflict dare I suggest that the most daring raid as such was the total job done in ensuring that my Islands remained British.

Given that the Argies had taken the Falklands logic would suggest that they should have held onto them given the logistics involved to attempt what then took place.

There seems to be a lot of bitching over who's service was best but then I guess there always will be and each war that comes along provides commentators fresh chance to talk about the inevitable cockups that will happen.

As a kid who was fast asleep less than four miles from the impact point of the Vulcan's bombs and used to collect shrapnel that had fallen off his roof after the previous nights shelling could I just say how thankful I am to all that were involved (whatever service you were from) for enabling me to grow up being proudly British. :ok:

It was simple maths.

Assume that the runway is 120 feet wide and the bombs are dropped at an interval of 0.24 seconds which equates to 144 feet. If attacking at 90 degrees it would be possible with a perfect attack not to hit the runway at all.

By attacking at an angle of 30 degrees the line over the runway would be 240 feet and you would guarantee at least one hit. Had the stick been dropped only a quarter second earlier then there would have been two hits.

:ok: Gets my vote

Tongue in cheek

Some might go for s*** or bust and at 10,000ft do a dump where it might make a real mess or stink.. but clearly owt is better than nowt.

Like I said Pontius this was an RAF mission, they are indeed the experts and they did EXACTLY what they predicted.

The problem with the written word is that its meaning can so easily be misinterpreted. I am NOT being cheeky, sarcastic, or dare I say ... rude. The plan went for the safest option of hitting the runway. :D:ok::ok: