"A FADEC runaway would not itself have caused the Crash."

Cazatou,

Perhaps you would be so kind as to explain the procedure for dealing with a FADEC runaway up in a large helicopter, especially one involving marginal VMC.

Hi everyone.
Firstly my apologies for my prolonged absence. Those of you who know me may have guessed it already – I broke my computer (again!!). However, all is now fixed – with no trace of any problem! :ok:

Cazatou, Would you accept an element of doubt? The AAIB stated that they could not confirm whether or not the control pallet had detached prior to the accident or not. Agreed, it may not have caused the crash, but would certainly have constituted a distraction in the cockpit. Would you agree? How can anyone be certain that that did not take place, with absolutely no doubt whatsoever? Obviously, I don't offer this as the only example, and it is just that - an example.

Also, does anyone have an opinion on this particular puzzle:

Sir John Day, when speaking at the House of Lords Select Committee said, “ For example I remember saying to Wing Commander, as he was then, Pulford, Group Captain now, and his team when they briefed me, "Surely the crew could have started to climb, lost control of the aircraft in cloud as a result of spatial disorientation or just bad instrument flying, and then crashed from that?" But the answer was "No"

So, according to Air Marshal Day's statement, spatial disorientation was definately not implicated in the accident, despite Air Marshal Day perhaps looking for something to take the heat off the pilots.

Interestingly, the BoI concluded, "...therefore, that Spatial Disorientation may have been a contributory factor in the accident."

Now, I would call that an element of doubt.

As I have said many times before, I'm not interested in point scoring with individuals. The whole purpose of the campaign is that there were (well documented on this thread) rules in place to protect deceased aircrew.

There are elements of doubt, therefore the rules were broken.

That is what this whole thing is about.

It's good to be back!

My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

Brian
You asked for an opinion on the spatial disorientation “puzzle” – as I have put a view on this before I apologise for sounding like a stuck record but here goes:
From your post:
Sir John Day … saying … "Surely the crew could have started to climb, lost control of the aircraft in cloud as a result of spatial disorientation or just bad instrument flying, and then crashed from that?" But the answer was "No"
And:
Interestingly, the BoI concluded, "...therefore, that Spatial Disorientation may have been a contributory factor in the accident."
I put it to you that there were two degrees of spatial disorientation possible in this incident:
The first, as described by Sir John Day, would be the all round loss of references/ horizon, etc as a result in being fully immersed in cloud;
The second is, I believe, the loss of references in one direction (ahead/ right) which resulted in difficulty in judgment of distance off the Mull whose ground detail was obscured by ground hugging mist which merged into the cloud base – the horizon, sea surface, etc being clear to the left enabling level flight visually.
The former could be dismissed simply by considering the cloud base which, I believe, was above the crash level never mind their altitude in the final minutes of the approach.
The latter is a possible explanation for the crash – or a least a possible contributing factor in two scenarios:
1 If they had technical problems, they could have mistakenly thought that they still had some room to attend to the problem (as opposed to the immediacy of flying the a/c away from imminent danger – as discussed earlier on this thread – ie allowing distraction);
2 (Here I go again!) Had they been intending to get in close using some special reference that was wrong, their visual judgment may not have been good enough to alarm them to their actual proximity in time.

Brian,

Wondered where you were, welcome back.

Where to start?

Right: the BOI is an administrative tool acting on behalf of the relevant C in C to collect and analyse all possible data regarding an accident or, if deemed necessary, an incident. In cases involving death then it is mandatory that the President of the BOI is at least of Wg Cdr rank. The composition and administration of the BOI is delegated to the relevant AOC.

The 'findings' of the President and the Board members are not writ in stone nor brought down from on high. The BOI passes through the relevant Group HQ where it is analysed and commented on by the relevant Group Staff (ie Air/Admin/Engineering etc).
Specialist comment, such as Medical opinion, would come from outside agencies. At the end of this process the AOC will append his comments and the BOI will be delivered to the CinC.

The same procedure will be followed at Command level and the CinC
will then append his narrative and decisions which may be at variance with those of the AOC.

The decision to apportion negligence in the final analysis is solely the prerogative of the CinC. It is he, and he alone, as the responsible Commander who makes the final decision.

The question of whether you, I or the "man in the Saloon Bar" believe the crew were negligent does not arise as far as these administrative procedures are concerned .

If, following a BOI, it is decided that Court Martial proceedings are justified then a Summary of Evidence will have to be taken. It is not permissable to utilise the evidence given on oath to a BOI as part of the Summary of Evidence.

Shy Torque

Yes, follow Rule No 1 - "In any emergency the first consideration is to fly the aircraft".

Then, in the case of a 2 pilot flight deck crew, get the co -pilot to deal with it under your supervision.

Brian, Welcome Back!

Cazatou. Your reply in both capitals and bold type leads me even more firmly to the conclusion that you do not fully understand the meaning of the phrase "absolutely no doubt whatsoever", or its implications.

Catazou
Neither is there conclusive evidence that a technical fault was not the cause of the crash and the FADEC theorists merely put it forward as a possibility, most of them are content that will never be provable. The whole point is that the evidence as to what actually transpired is very limited and speculation as to technical faults is no more, nor less speculative than Wratten and Day's speculation as to gross negligence.
The technical fault theorists to my recollection have never claimed that their theories are facts, merely doubts. Only Messrs Day and Wratten advance their speculation to the status of fact.
The only broken rule that matters in this case is the one which stated that deceased aircrew shall only be found grossly negligent in cases where there is no doubt whatsoever.

Je regret,

Obviously being here in France has adversely affected my Anglaze and the way wot it is writ.

I will try and spell it out again. The ONLY Authority for a finding of negligence for a STC Accident is the CinC STC.

The Board, Station Commander and the AOC will each express their own viewpoint in their findings and the AOC in C will, doubtless, take these into account in his own deliberations. For example; OC RAF Odiham concluded that there had been a failure in the duty of care.

In this particular case the views of the AOC and the CinC coincided and they were in "no doubt whatsover" that the 2 Pilots were "negligent to a gross degree". The final decision, however, rested solely with the C in C.

Most unusually, but not surprisingly in view of the high public profile of the accident, CAS also reviewed the BOI and the findings before it was released. He did not dissent from the views of the AOC and the AOC in C.

Neither of whose views were substantiated by evidence sufficient to support their verdict beyond any doubt whatsoever.

BEagle,

It would appear, however, that those three Very Senior Officers did not agree with your viewpoint.

Hi, caz

Er... where?

SALT for the next leg was 5900ft, way above the 2500ft the crew would have understood to be the 4 Deg C isotherm. Even more locally, the SALT was 2800 ft.

I have NEVER favoured ANY scenario. I am willing to accept any outcome based on evidence which can be proven beyond any doubt whatsoever. There is not, and never will be, such an outcome.

au contraire, mon ami

I am not adamant that there was no negligence at all, as any trawl of my past posts will show. I simply require the rules in force at the time to be followed, and that any negligence assumed, be proven to the required standard.

And your point is?

That three people with the most to hide, hide from the truth is no reason to find their judgement infallible.

Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. There is NO PROOF that these guys were negligent, and no matter what you, or I, or Wratten, or Day, or Reid, or Hoon, or old uncle Tom Cobbly believe matters not one jot.

Without proof beyond ANY DOUBT WHATSOEVER that there was negligence, the benefit of any doubt rests with the pilots.

I take it that your reference to me as is in some way supposed to diminish my credibility as a contributor to this debate.

Now, pray, tell me why I should hold you in any higher authority?

Cazatou,

I admire your tenacity, however, you are unlikely to change anyone's view on this thread no matter how tireless your efforts. Some people live in a black and white world, where absolute certainty is required.

People are motivated by many things: love, respect, professionalism, guilt.

BEAGLE,

Your Post 2020.

IN YOUR OPINION!!!

Your "OPINION" is not delivered in "HOLY WRIT" - it is your "OPINION"

I am sure that it may come as a surprise to you; BUT some people actually have the temerity to disagree with you.

I feel I must congratulate you BEagle.

Never before have I had anything to do with someone who is ABSOLUTELY certain that he knows better than 1*/2*/3*/4*/5* Officers who reviewed this BOI.

You, obviously, were there at the interviews with key personnel and were able to form your own judgement as to the veracity of their statements.

You were then able to carry out your own independant investigation into this matter and reach your own conclusions which were, naturally, at variance with the Official version of events.

Have I got something wrong here?

Probably



.

But which Bit?

There are, after all, so many aspects in which you are the aknowledged "EXPERT".

In the 40+ years since I joined the RAF I have never come across someone who is such an "Expert" as you are - (or claim to be).

See the disclaimer regarding posters claims as regards their qualifications.

Ark Royal,

Well, we have been in France for 4 years or so, I guess we have been telling you for 5 years.

I had a different handle then. Its a problem when you move Countries.

K 52

(Remember)?

Well, it looks as though I'm going to have to use the Walter button again...

BEagle,

Yes , guess you do.

After all, you wouldn't want an "A" cat Captain/Flight Instructor/Local Examiner/ Training Captain/ MG/IRE competing with you -- Would you?

Someone might notice some of the holes in your arguments.

Well, K52 - how about someone with equal qualifications - but on Support Helicopters and with NI theatre experience? Yes, I have flown the Chinook, albeit it not being my primary type.

So, with all your fixed wing experience, please explain HOW exactly would YOU have flown the aircraft suffering from an engine runaway up in that situation? I think you really have no idea what this emergency entails.

I have suffered this type of emergency for real in a FADEC equipped helicopter, fortunately in far more benign and less demanding circumstances. Even so, it was very unpleasant. I shudder to think how things might have gone if I had been faced with it in marginal VMC conditions such as these two pilots were required to fly in. I have also seen the vagaries of digital engine control computers and how in-flight faults can occur and be indicated to the pilot yet fail to recur or register for maintenance purposes once the aircraft has had all electrical power removed.

I was also responsible for a helicopter simulator project for the RAF, where such things can be practised - they CANNOT be practised on the real aircraft. The two pilots may have had the opportunity to experience this extremely dangerous scenario in the simulator (although there was no Mk2 simulator). I am willing to be shown otherwise but I don't think this was ever researched or considered.

And how exactly would you deal with a detached flying controls pallet, in flight, possibly rendering control of the aircraft impossible?

Either one of those emergencies is potentially the reason for the accident, based on the previous history of the Mk2. The detached control pallet is as likely as any other, after all it was found detached in the wreckage and no-one has proved if it was a cause or symptom of the accident.

Also, there may (or may not) have been a cross-cockpit communication problem, which may have contributed to the accident, based on EVIDENCE found in the wreckage that the co-pilot's intercom had been selected to "Emergency", along with EVIDENCE that there had been a possible attempt to set the IFF to 7700. None of us know the answers and never will, because the only two people who did have a chance of knowing are dead.

As I said to you at least once before under your old username, K52, there are some of us who are willing to support a gross negligence charge against deceased former colleagues based on inconclusive evidence and those who aren't.

I fall into the latter category. You appear to have made up your mind to do so.

Come on, guys, please don't let this thread descend into a slanging match. Your are too worthy to allow it to happen...

FJJP

CHINOOK
 

The emphasis in the last few posts on the need for evidence is very interesting in the light of the repeated sugestion that the aircraft suffered a control failure of some kind. If it did, then how come there was clear evidence that in the final couple of seconds or so of flight, the crew tried to pull up and turn left. I only ask because I would like to know. Regards to all courteous contributers. John Purdey.

Chinook Evidence
 

John Purdey

I hope I still qualify as a courteous contributor by your standards. I have been trying to stay away from some of the recent contributions on the site - too many of which seem to have lost sight of what it is about. I welcome ShyTorque's contribution since as an operator he confirms what I said might have happened in my engineering report of Oct 2003 - note might - I do not know either.

I was, though, surprised to see your claim that there is "clear evidence that in the final couple of seconds or so of flight, the crew tried to pull up and turn left".

I have not seen this clear evidence anywhere, indeed perhaps I could remind you of Robert Burke's evidence to the HofL - evidence that is also supported by the AAIB investigator. Perhaps you would be kind enough to give us the source of your comment


Evidence of Squadron Leader Robert Burke
107. Squadron Leader Burke had extensive experience in flying helicopters including Chinooks Mks 1 and 2 and was described by his unit commander in April 1993 as having air-testing skills on the Puma and Chinook which were unique. He was able to provide us with useful information about the problems which he had experienced when testing Chinooks. At the outset of the investigation into the accident he was contacted by Mr Cable and had two or three telephone discussions with him in relation to control positions (QQ 658, 662). Thereafter he had nothing further to do with the Board of Inquiry.
108. After Squadron Leader Burke gave evidence, Group Captain Pulford submitted a statement to us (p 68 of HL Paper 25(ii)) in which he sought to explain why Squadron Leader Burke had not been asked to give evidence to the investigating board. He stated that as the Chinook maintenance test pilot "his flying was conducted in accordance with limited and pre-determined flight test schedules and he therefore lacked the operational currency to provide relevant evidence to the inquiry". This reasoning seems to assume that problems which Squadron Leader Burke might have encountered on test would not or could not occur in operational flying - an assumption whose justification we feel to be in doubt.
109. Squadron Leader Burke spoke to having experienced two engine run ups on the ground at the Boeing factory in Philadelphia while flying with an American Army test pilot (Q 655) and similar run ups when testing the overspeed limiter on the ground at Odiham (Q 680). He also spoke to problems with the multi-point connectors which went from the engines into the DECU. These were of bad design and liable to be displaced by vibration which then produced a power interruption. Although there was a back-up system this did not always work and on two or three occasions pilots had lost control of the engine condition lever. As a result squadrons introduced a procedure whereby crewmen every quarter of an hour checked that the connections had not been displaced in flight (QQ 677-9).
110. At the time of the accident DECUs still presented recurring problems. They were removed from the aircraft when something had gone wrong and returned to the makers who on many occasions could find no fault (QQ 698-9).
111. In relation to possible jams Squadron Leader Burke explained that, due to the complexity of the Chinook control system, a jam caused by a loose article such as the balance spring in the broom cupboard in one of the three axes, pitch, yaw or roll, could lead to quite random results in all three axes sometimes and certainly in two of them. He had personal experience while lifting off from the ground of a jam in one axis affecting the other two (Q 935). He also referred to the problems of DASH runaways in Chinooks of both marks causing temporary loss of control of aircraft (Q 929).
112. Finally, Squadron Leader Burke commented on the rudder input of 77 per cent left yaw found in the wreck of ZD 576:
"That is an enormous rudder input. It is unthinkable to put that in at high speed. As I may have explained, particularly in the Chinook but in any helicopter, the helicopter does not use the yaw input for control once you have gone over 20 knots. It puts an enormous strain on the aircraft because you obtain yawing control in the simplest way by tilting the rotors one left, one right. You are spinning the aircraft about its middle. It is quite difficult to do. The rudder is quite heavy on a Chinook. You have to make a real effort to put that amount of control in. The only conceivable reason that I can think of for putting that voluntarily in as a pilot is if you have partially lost control coming out and you are trying to counteract a yaw one way or the other" (Q 719).
113. Mr Cable told us that, though it was possible that this rudder input was applied before impact, it was also possible that it was due to the force of the impact itself (Q 999).

Can I also remind you that there were two entries on the Supplementary Flight Servicing Register that had potential relevance as a cause of, or a contributory factor to, the accident. These were: Serial 2, SI/CHK 57 relating to the security of the DECU connectors and which applied to the HC2 version only, and Serial 4, a special check on the security of the Collective Balance Spring Bracket Mount called for by S Eng O 7 Sqn following an incident [where the bracket became detached as found in the wreckage of ZD 576] on ZD576 on 10 May 1994. Although the Board included the Supplementary Flight Servicing Register in Annex AK “Extracts from ZD576 F700 and MWO”, they did not include the Supplementary Flight Servicing Certificate (which was eventually supplied by MOD in 2001) and they did not question whether these checks had been carried out and whether the people who did them were trained and competent/authorised to do so.

Are you still sure that a loss of engine or flight control functions could not have caused or contributed to this tragic accident? Nobody else who has made full and proper assessment of all of the available evidence is!

CHINOOK
 

John.
We really should stop going around the same bouy, but in answer to your post I recall (I do not have the documents in front of me) Cable's evidence was that at impact the aircraft was in a dynamic maneouvre; it had less than 10 degrees yaw, was banked 5 to 10 degrees to port and pitched up 30 degrees. The Boeing simulation broadly agreed with that. Are you suggesting that it was in a routine steady climb?
And just by the way, you very well know my view about the whole flight path, which is that in those weather conditions, marginal at best, the aircraft should not have been where it was, ie at low level, at speed, heading for hills covered or parially covered in cloud, technical fault or no technical fault. With all good wishes, JP

Brian,

Apologies, I have been out all day as my Wife wanted to go to the Artists Emporium at Brive La Gaillarde.

I do not know the answer to your question off the top of my head, but I will make a couple of phone calls and will PM you as soon as I can. Life is hard here. We have reached the time of year when the wines all change price as a new years vintage is added at the lower end of the price range. Trouble is that the new vintage is 2003 which was a totally disastrous year for winegrowers.

A decent bottle of Cahors is now about £3 a bottle.SCANDALOUS!!

I would like to make a few things clear at this point because I believe one or two people posting here, with little or no helicopter experience and no real idea of the implications of certain engine emergencies, don't seem to have grasped some highly relevant points.

Firstly, helicopters do not follow the same aerodynamic laws as fixed wing. Because of the complexities of control and stability (lack of natural stability, cross-coupling etc), a small movement of any flight control can result in a very large aircraft flight path change. Similarly, to keep a helicopter on a steady flight path, depending on the regime of flight, a surprisingly large flying control input (or small one) may be required when compared to a fixed wing aircraft.

The term "rudder" is misleading because helicopters do not have a rudder. The correct term for the flying controls affecting yaw is "yaw pedals". The way they cause yaw is NOT the same as FW rudder pedal input, especially on the Chinook.

A helicopter with a mechanical flying control problem / failure may be affected in all axes, not just the one axis that might be expected by trying to relate to the fixed wing scenario of elevator/aileron/rudder. In this situation it may appear that the helicopter had responded to a pilot input in a conventional ("fixed wing") fashion, but it may not have done at all. The pilot may have operated one flying control in a particular way but the aircraft may have responded in an unexpected way. Alternatively, the aircraft may have "done its own thing" in one or more, or all axes, when it may have appeared that the pilot was flying the aircraft under control.

Captain Nick Lappos can undoubtedly talk at great length about this. For example on the S-76, in certain situations how yaw / collective interaction can cause the collective to rise and fall significantly when yaw pedal is applied. A pilot input on the yaw pedals can drive the collective up or down, resulting in the aircraft climbing or descending. An input of collective may drive the yaw pedals, resulting in a large yawing action. Use of one control may jam the other. There is a procedure for this in the Emergencies Checklist.

This is by no means unique in the helicopter world. There is currently an ongoing investigation into a fatal accident involving an S-76 where the aircraft may (or may not) have responded incorrectly to pilot inputs and spiralled rapidly downwards into the sea. Not a usual flight regime. A mystery, even with a CVR.

John Purdey, regarding your last paragraph; like it or not, flying in marginal VMC is how SH often gets the job done, especially if there is no IFR contingency, as in this case. To go over old ground yet again; Mr. Holbrook, the yachtsman who was an eye-witness to the aircraft, gave evidence that the helicopter was flying slowly enough over the sea for him to initially think it was carrying out a search in his vicinity. This indicates that the handling pilot had slowed the aircraft down in marginal weather conditions. This is completely normal - that is how the SH job gets done.

Gp Capt. Peter Crawford, like many of us, could not, at the the time of giving his evidence, understand how the aircraft had rapidly accelerated and climbed until it hit the hillside. However, an engine runaway up would require immediate rapid pilot intervention to contain the Rotor(s) RPM (usually known as NR). The only way to do this is to apply a large amount of collective pitch. This WOULD result in a climb and/or a rapid acceleration of the aircraft, no doubt about that. RAF helicopter pilots are trained, in the event of engine malfunctions (notice I didn't say failures) to concentrate on NR and contain it. Only then can the crew diagnose the problem and take the necessary further actions to control or shut down the faulty engine (handling pilot flies, non-handling pilot operates engine controls, having consulted the emergency checklist and confirmed his actions in advance with the handling pilot). In a twin engined helicopter it is critical to carry out these actions correctly and in the correct order to safeguard the NR, the transmission system and the integrity of the airframe.

IF an engine runaway up occurred in this particular case, (I'm not saying it did, but it was possible) at this critical time, causing the aircraft to enter IMC, coupled with the crew not being able to speak across the cockpit efficiently, because of a faulty intercom, a few seconds of miscommunication could easily have resulted in the accident.

Brian Dixon

Could you please empty your PM box.

John Purdey and John Blakeley
JP, you wrote:
<< …how come there was clear evidence that in the final couple of seconds or so of flight, the crew tried to pull up and turn left.>>
More correctly, (in addition to pull up and turn) tried to slew hard left to present broadside which is a recognized way of rapidly slowing down a large twin rotor a/c like a Chinook as described sometime by Sqn Ldr Robert Burke, if I recall correctly, in response to someone saying that it was an unsuitable manoeuvre. That is to say, the final control positions were indeed compatible with an urgent evasive manoeuvre, say, on realization of proximity to the ground and so should not be only regarded as evidence of a prior control problem.
I cannot find the quote (and its context) just now but will dig it out when I have time.
This is notwithstanding the statements quoting Sqn Ldr Burke that John Blakeley has posted.
I am surprised that others have not mentioned this manoeuvre or at least Sqn Ldr Burke’s alternative comments.

Final manoeuvre


Oh! Here’s another reference to the manoeuvre to be going on with:

From
Select Committee on Chinook ZD 576
Supplementary memoranda following October Hearings

Question 590
Captain Hadlow said that he considered that the position in which the rudder was found by the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (a 77 degree left pedal 1.7 inches forward) was a last ditch effort to turn the aircraft.
Small yaw pedal inputs are used with cyclic to maintain balanced flight when performing a turn at low speeds but at higher forward speeds little or no yaw input is required to turn the aircraft. But large yaw pedal inputs are made, with cyclic and collective, during "hover" turns and when also performing "fast stops". This technique uses all the flying control inputs to turn the aircraft into a sideways position whilst in forward flight, in order to use its large surface area to act as an air brake and assist in the rapid reduction of speed.

Cazatou,
my apologies. Please try again.

Thank you.
Brian

"Question 590
Captain Hadlow said that he considered that the position in which the rudder was found by the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (a 77 degree left pedal 1.7 inches forward) was a last ditch effort to turn the aircraft."

Can someone please remind me who Captain Hadlow is - and is he a helicopter pilot? What "rudder" was he referring to? The Chinook, in common with every other helicopter in common use, does not have a rudder.

Shy,
he was one of the authors of the Three Fellows (of the RAeS) Report.

The report says that he is a retired airline captain and Armed Forces Helicopter pilot.

Hope that helps.

Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

CHINOOK
 

ShyTorque
Very interesting, many thanks. As to the yachtsman, he thought he was looking at a small helicopter at low speed as I recall. So was it in fact a small helicopter, fairly close in and at slow speed, or a large helicopter rather further away and at high speed? If he was looking at the Chinook, then surely the second case fits the bill? Regards JP

Hi Mr Purdey,
I regret to point out that your recollection of Mr Holbrook's recollection is inaccurate. What he actually said, (in respect to your claim), was this:

Seven years have now passed since the accident however, and therefore in order to refresh my memory I have had to now review the papers sent to me by Mr Makower, and in that review I have been surprised and distressed to understand from the evidence to this inquiry from Air Chief Marshal Sir William Wratten that the nub of the issue as far as the finding of Gross Negligence on the part of the two pilots turns on the flight rule regime that the aircraft was in at the time that I, as the last eyewitness, saw it.

The reason I am surprised, my Lord Chairman, is that throughout the last seven years I have always felt that my evidence was nothing other than corrobatory - confirming what had already been gleaned from other witnesses and events. It now seems to me however, if I have understood Sir William's evidence correctly, that the direction, altitude, attitude, speed and visibility that the aircraft was experiencing at the time of the last sighting is central to a determination if the crew had an option available to them to continue under visual flight rules or alternatively had to make a transition to instrument flight rules.

Against that yardstick of relevance to the finding of Gross Negligence on the part of the aircrew, my Lord Chairman, I have to tell you and your Committee that I feel my evidence was not collected with either the diligence or professionalism that the aircrew or their families have a right, from my perspective as a layman, to expect.

There are a number of issues that I have with the way that I have been debriefed which, my Lord Chairman, you may wish to question me about, however the chief amongst these is that my sighting of the aircraft was limited to a five-second view since I was involved in a difficult situation on my boat at the time. I am by training however a research worker, I have been trained to observe a situation which in itself may very well be outwith my ken.

I had, at the time, a vivid mental picture of the aircraft which if I had been debriefed fully would surely have yielded more information about those fateful last minutes than you have in front of you today. To this day, My Lord, despite having asked repeatedly, I have never seen photographs of the aircraft at different heights and ranger, never mind had the opportunity of seeing one of the aircraft flying at differing speeds or climbing.

As you will appreciate, when I saw the aircraft it subtended a particular angle, it occupied a portion of my field of view, if you will, and my interpretation of range and height is therefore totally reliant on my knowledge - or lack of it- of the size of the aircraft itself.

So, as you see, Mr Holbrook, himself is unclear as he feels he was never properly debriefed. He made comment that the helicopter was, by his estimation (and he stressed that it was just that - an estimation), of between 200-400 feet. He gave an estimated speed of 60-80 knots, butpointedout that it would have been useful to have had the opportunity to observe an aircraft flying at those speeds. He further commented:

The aircraft was travelling sufficiently slowly that I remarked to my crewman that "here's an aircraft come down here to have a look at us" and we had thought it may have been involved in a search and rescue operation, it was travelling that slowly, and in fact I asked my crewman to go and listen to the radio to pick up signals about there being any activity of that type.

I hope that clears up to all, what Mr Holbrook said in his evidence to the HoL Select Committee.

My best, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

CHINOOK
 

Brian. Not sure what your point is. The yachtsman says that he thought the helicopter was flying at 60-80kts. Please read again the two possible interpretations of what he saw, ie slow/near/small or large/distant/fast. Reagards as always JP

JP

Doesn't that leave just a little doubt??

Best wishes

XM147

Chinook
 

XM147
No. Because we know it was large, therefore it must have been distant and fast. Check you logic! All good wishes. JP

Having read what Mr Holbrook said it does appear to me to be a rather damning indictment of the way in which the members of the BOI collected, and presented, the evidence given to them by members of the Public.

A tradition that has been maintained through to the F15 enquiry too, it seems.

JP

Mr Holbrook: The aircraft was travelling sufficiently slowly that I remarked to my crewman that "here's an aircraft come down here to have a look at us" and we had thought it may have been involved in a search and rescue operation, it was travelling that slowly, and in fact I asked my crewman to go and listen to the radio to pick up signals about there being any activity of that type.

This does not and never will, to me, suggest 'distant and fast'. In fact quite the reverse.

My doubt remains!

Best wishes, XM147