Walter
 

Walter

Well done, your persistence on PRC112 has;

a. Finally received acknowledgement from the thread that the system exists.
b. Has highlighted that systems thinking is important to achieving understanding (in simple terms, because you have forced people to realise that there exist complementary ground and air components)
c. You have re-iterated the different methods by which these systems can be fitted/used by aircrew (DA Mod, SEM, Carry-on kit, unofficially, etc). And in doing so, reinforced the need to carefully phrase questions.

The above, especially b. and c., are well known weaknesses in the MoD. They simply do not want engineering issues, such as configuration control, safety and maintaining build standards, aired. They have proven time and again a willingness to lie through their back teeth on these matters, mainly because they cannot withstand scrutiny. Others, far more experienced that I on this subject (ZD576) have long sought to bring these engineering issues to the fore; without success. I sincerely hope they support this aspect of what you say. I certainly do.

But, my friend, I think that the other issues, such as references to sabotage, do little to further the aims of this thread. If it is merely theory, then it offers your detractors an excuse for not addressing the factual elements of what you say. For example, in engineering terms I can believe your hypothesis on the PRC112 issue, but unless there is proof it does not further the aims of this thread. If it was fitted to, or used by, ZD576, then in all probability there will be no safety audit trail, because of the above MoD deficiencies. But, it cannot be proven one way or another, so focus is lost.

However, you are right to inquire about engineering matters. The simple, easily proven fact, is that the MoD have serious weaknesses in the way they apply the processes and procedures which are designed to ensure the whole aircraft is safe. (And I know you understand that, just because an aircraft can take off and fly, does not mean it is safe or serviceable – which seems to be the thrust of the MoD’s latest argument. That they are resorting to such arrant nonsense indicates nervousness). You are 100% correct on other engineering matters. DECU. Inherent Nav errors after flying over water. Weighted algorithms. TANS. Bonding. It is a fact that the MoD acknowledge design defects in the Nav system (which cause faults and can give erroneous Nav information), but will not say what they did about them, or when they became apparent. A lawyer would call this weight of evidence, leading to reasonable doubt. Which is far more than the MoD rules require to overturn this verdict.

I am not a pilot so refrain from commenting on flying issues. I leave that to the experts. But, I implore you flyers, please listen to the experts when they say that there are serious engineering issues here which, unlike what happened in the final moments of ZD576, can be proven beyond any doubt; and collectively may serve to undermine the MoD’s position. I believe Walter is entitled to his view. If you don’t agree with it (or me) then fine; but go past the more sinister theories and you will find some very unpalatable facts beneath. The MoD’s failure to discuss or address them is far more sinister.

Oh, and Walter, thank you for not divulging the content of private corrspondence.

Patio - pool - 23 c

You know, catazou, some people can get right up my nose!

Still, I suppose we should be grateful for, albeit cloudy, a breezy 15 c!

FJJP

It would seem that the men in white coats haven't got them all locked up.

Tucumseh,

You were lucky. I replied to walter's PM and just about everything I said was qouted out of context in his next posting.

I feel sorry for the poor Air Commodore who had to listen to him at MOD. Walter said he "Stonewalled"; I tend to the view that the poor chap was in a state of stunned disbelief.

walter kennedy
 

I don't want to worry anyone, BUT I have this evening received a PM from walter dated 28 March at 2130!!!!

COMMENTS?

Tucumseh & others

Sorry, I should have realised W was fishing with the persistent uninformed references to PRC112.

Returning to business.

Given the Deepcut announcement today, and the line emerging from the Scottish F-15s BoI, is there any mileage in more general pressure on the military investigative processes?

Sven

Hi

I have just been reading the Parliamentary Questions concerning Hercules Safety thread (page 7) and was reminded of some comments which have been posted on this thread regarding John and Rick; “if they thought they weren’t familiar/confident in the aircraft they had a duty not to fly it”.

Before I continue I must stress that I believe our AT fleet have no option other than to continue to operate with their aircraft as equipped, duty is duty. I also believe they will be trying to influence the system, however, and this will unintentionally sound cheap, they have to pay the mortgage.

I know John pushed the boundaries as far as could, without being removed from theatre, to delay the Mk II Chinook coming to Ireland. Why? Well we (4 pilots, 4 crewmen) were an isolated community. We had been at Odiham during the build up to the arrival of the Mk II and were party to all the doubts and fears of the time which were not relieved by our brief (3 hour?) conversion some six weeks earlier (no 'official'documents). This insecurity was compounded by the plethora of incident signals, rumours from Boscombe, calls to Sqn and finally Boscombes’ refusal/delay to fly.

One particularly poignant memory is sitting with John a couple of weeks prior to the crash, the pair of us planning out this very trip, so that we could use the fuel plot as an additional argument for a letter John was working on to delay introduction. If John ever sent that letter I will never know, it would appear the MOD are unsure of its existence.

The day the Mk II arrived in theatre John, Rick, mate and I literally crawled all over it with a set of GS screwdrivers following wires to see how it worked. 36 Hours later John and Rick where dead and I was at home having flown the MK I back.

Within 48 hours (possibly less, it was a long time ago) I was back in Ireland (possibly the next MK II sortie in theatre) and an engine ‘failed’ itself on start.

Black days, thank you all for your support.

W 5

Edited to change 'cooked' with 'failed'.

Whooper5

I am curious.

Did you give this information, as you have given it here, to the BOI?

Cazatou,

I was not interviewed or involved with the BOI. Please don’t think I would have had anything to add over and above those that were. I have nothing new to bring to this; other than to put across the atmosphere that was prevalent during the introduction of the Mk II.

There was no need to tell the Board about it, it impacted the whole force; although it was possibly worse in our isolation. I have thought about whether I should have asked to be interviewed by the Board for years and now realise that any feelings of guilt are fuelled by a hefty dose of hindsight. Nobody expected the reviewing officers’ comments. I believe we all expected the findings to be as they were; and for those findings to be endorsed by the reviewers.

You post well with balance and manners; I hope I have answered in kind

Regards

W 5

Whooper5

Thankyou for your most gracious comments.

I must confess that I am surprised that you were not interviewed by the BOI. I would have expected that all Chinook Aircrew who were in Theatre at that period would have been interviewed, as a matter of course, to ascertain their recollections of events surrounding the fatal sortie; even if this just involved confirmation of the testimony of others.

I think Whooper5 raises an excellent point, nobody really pushed the views about the aircraft because they didn't think this outcome would happen. In the earliest pages of this thread, I talked about how unhappy Jon was in accepting the Mk2 for the flight. All these years later, the important facts get diluted by the crazy conspiracy theories of sad deluded idiots from the other side of the planet. I just wish that contributors would consider the impact of their posts sometimes.

jayteeto and Whooper5,

You were clearly around at the time of the unfortunate accident. Clearly no-one expected the reviewing officers' conclusions.

However, can you recall whether there was a huge groundswell of opinion to ground the fleet as a result of the accident? Were people refusing to fly the aircraft?

It was a long time ago, but I think that the aircraft was recommended not to be flown unless operationally necessary (before the accident). Read back, TPs were not flying it. I will state with 100% certainty that Jon was unhappy to take this aircraft and felt their was no choice. Why 100%? He said so in plain language.
This is why the Seal theory breaks down, even if the Mk2 had walters kit fitted (it didnt), they would have used the Mk1 if it had become serviceable. Those poor seals would have had a wasted journey in their nuclear powered hover cars. Luckily the Starship Enterprise would have beamed them and their cars back to base and they could have continued plotting to rule the universe with Darth Vader.

Twinact

It is difficult to accurately describe the atmosphere within the Chinook force at the time.

My personal assessment:

There was an enormous amount of pressure from ‘on high’ to get the MkII introduced, I have no idea why. The problem comes when you make personnel of the highest calibre, in all corners of the force, introduce a new aircraft type with scant information, no documentation, no UK military evidence of airworthiness and a confusing array of seemingly unrelated systems failures. If you are told “I hear what your saying but get on with it” no matter how hard you protest, you simply end up doing your best to help with the introduction.

This is not a failing of anyone who did their job, it is a failing of the system. What I believe then happened is a feeling of the system having prostituted peoples credibility through making them aid the introduction of an aircraft which was not ready for service. People were not about to go to the board and state they considered the aircraft they got into each day was unsafe, it would be one demeaning situation to far.

I say again; this is strictly my personal view and it must also be said that the MkII has turned out to be an amazing aircraft.

W 5

Twinact,

Purely curious.

You wouldn't be a Reporter after a story; would you?

I just asked because I assumed that any RAF Officer would realise that refusing a lawful command on active service was a Court Martial offence. In fact, in the past 2 World Wars, it was a Capital Offence.

Chinook
 

Twinact and others.
This is all rather strange. If there were such technical problems with the MkII, how come the aircraft were not all grounded, either as a result of this tragedy or as the result of other doubts about the aircraft?
Also, I understand that the supervisory chain held several very experienced helo people including the CinC. Are we saying that they forced the crews to press on with potentially dangerous machines? Why should they; it was not a wartime scenario?
And what was this about aircrews crawling over the Mk II with GS screwdrivers to see how it worked? Were there not engineers on the unit, and what did aircrew hope the uncover that the engineers had not?
I ask only because I am very curious about the engineering regime that it is alleged played so important a part in this very sad business.
Regards and best wishes to all others with an inquiring mind on this thread,
John Purdey.

John Purdey,

You are quite correct that there were many experienced SH operators in the chain of command.

At 1 Gp level there were Sqn Ldr Staff Officers for each aircraft type; there was also a Wg Cdr and a Gp Capt SH. The AOC himself had some 30+ years experience of helicopter operations.

These posts were replicated at HQ STC and, also, at MOD level. Let us not forget that the BOI was reviewed by CAS and his staff before its release.

The furore that erupted after release of the BOI owes much to a common misconception regarding the BOI system. Many believe that the panel assembled to investigate an accident is the ultimate authority on that accident. This simply is not true.

The authority for convening a BOI resides with the AOC in C who delegates that responsibility to the appropriate Group Commander; this Air Officer, in turn, nominates a President of the BOI and such other members as may be required by the circumstances of the "Accident". It is not unknown for a "President", or other Board members, to be replaced during an investigation if circumstances warrent such a move.

It is my belief that, due to the inordinate length of time that the BOI had taken (itself mainly due to the meticulous AAIB investigation), changes to the BOI were not an option. This despite the finding of the BOI that the cause of the accident was that the Pilots, whilst approaching high ground at a relatively high speed in poor weather, "selected an inappropriate rate of climb" to clear the Mull.

This is arrant nonsense. If you are approaching,at low level, high ground covered by poor weather in ANY type of aircraft the only appropriate rate of climb is the maximum attainable coupled with, if possible, a turn away from the obstacle. In a helicopter you have another option which is to slow down, stop, turn around and retrace your track. It is, of course, possible that the disparate altimeter sub-scale settings in the Chinook cockpit may have caused some confusion as to when it was safe to level out.

The laisser-faire attitude towards the regulations regarding the requirement to have breakfast before commencing flying operations, the maximum times between meals and permissable crew duty extensions (let alone the option of exceeding crew duty hours or nightstopping out of Theatre without approval):coupled with the disparate altimeter settings and navigation equipment tuned to a commercial radio station; do not, in my view, show a totally "professional" approach to the "job in hand".

Perhaps the proponants of the "FADEC runaway" theory could give us some idea of how many recorded occurrences there were before the accident and how many there have been since? It would also be useful to know how many of these occurrences resulted in accidents.

Whilst what you say might be true, cazatou, neither you nor Wratten, Day nor anyone else bar the deceased crew can be certain beyond any doubt whatsoever.

And that is the crux of the whole issue.

BEagle,

Much as I dislike the idea, I regret that I must disagree with you.

IF everything had happened in exactly the same way and the helicopter had forced landed without any casualties then; given the discrepancies in procedures, compliance with ASI's, basic Airmanship such as altimeter settings; the usage of nav aids and the total disregard of crew duty limitations; crew meal requirements, outbriefing etc - then what would have been the finding of the BOI?

I would respectfully suggest that it would have been "Negligence"
and that if the BOI had not so found; then the AOC would have!!

John Purdey
<< … to see how it worked? Were there not engineers on the unit, and what did aircrew hope the uncover that the engineers had not? >>
But there were changes from the Mk1 and would it not be expected for aircrew to be as knowledgeable as possible about their a/c, especially systems (eg nav) that directly affect their job?
That said, I agree that the emphasis on the a/c’s airworthiness is strange given that it got them there (past where they changed from waypoint A which, if anyone can be bothered plotting it on a map, was already dangerously close in those conditions).
That is to say, they were already so close in (in those conditions) that their navigation and intentions would already be of concern before the narrow window of opportunity occurred for control problems to manifest themselves – and the final control positions and a/c attitude were consistent with an evasive manouvre which was being responded to appropriately by the a/c.
And 47Ds hadn’t exactly been dropping out of the sky before this tragic event nor have HC2s since.
Perhaps the misgivings expressed by aircrew involved were more to do with pressure and arrangements to use a Mk2 for this trip? Perhaps there was a real desire to give this team a demonstration of the Mk2’s capabilities beyond just ferrying them around? Perhaps it just had to be a Mk2 for whatever reason, eh jayteeto?
Then again, pointing at hypothetical transient technical problems in such a complex machine without clear evidence would no doubt keep interested parties running around harmlessly in ever decreasing circles for decades, would it not?

!!!!!!!
I made the mistake of viewing the last posting and once again it is rubbish. Instead of repeating myself again, Walter, read my earlier posts why they took this aircraft. Jon told me about his reasons for not wanting the Mk2, I posted them on this site, more than once. What bit of this do you not understand??? Do you want me to forget what he said to me and the others in the crewroom, then lie, so that your views can be correct??
My words are not speculation like yours, They are real.
PS, Cazatou, I still use the ADF to listen to Radio5Live if we are flying when a football match is on. It doesn't distract me from the job in hand and if things get busy, I turn it off. I listen to the radio when I drive my car as well.

I read Whooper5's comment about 'crawling all over it with a screwdriver' as being figurative. Of course aircrew don't disassemble an aircraft, but they often go through the engineering manuals to learn and understand the systems. Often with an engineer.

There were no manuals for the MkII at the time. We got the GS screwdrivers and opened every panel we could to locate major components and see where items such as magnetic plugs and temperature bulbs were located. We had the task of understanding where the indications in the cockpit originated. I wholly understand how you can find this hard to believe; it is just outrageous. However it is what happened.

W 5

Aircraft Documentation
 

"There were no manuals for the MkII at the time".


This fact has been pointed out many times before. It calls into question the completeness of the safety audit trail. No documentation = no "pass" on the Configuration Audits. So on what basis was the CA Release signed?

Whooper 5,


I'm sorry but this urban myth is simply untrue. I accept that you were there at the time and this sort of scaremongering helps the case of this thread, however, to claim that there were no manuals is very far wide of the mark. There was certainly an aircrew manual, which you would have had access to. I'm sure you would have crawled all over the aircraft to locate components, everyone did to improve their familiarity, but you paint a picture of having never been shown where these items were or had any other way of finding them.

It was all a long time ago and memories of events in and around the accident may fade, but I submit that your claims are misleading.

jayteeto,

I am sure that we have all used the ADF to listen to the radio. In my case it was often at the request of the Lady in the armchair down the back; to get the latest news bulletins. If, however, we required the ADF for navigation purposes she was so informed.

In the case of the Chinook accident I would suggest that it would have been more appropriate to have the ADF tuned to a suitable Airfield beacon, to which the aircraft could have homed to seek a radar letdown, in the highly likely event of the aircaft being forced to climb by the forecast poor weather. An appropriate subscale setting on the Captains altimeter would not have gone amiss either.

FJJP

It didn't work:-

Walter is still here!!

Yeah, I know....

Twinact

Perhaps you can provide evidence of a freely available, aircrew manual at the time of the crash however my recollection was very much working off photocopies of various documents and publications many of which contradicted each other.

I also believe I have said that there was a short conversion course (three days?) however we were then isolated in NI with no means to consolidate this training.

I have no desire to mislead anyone or slant my writing to any hidden agenda.

Thank you for your reply

W 5

FJJP

Guess its the ignore button then.

Bye walter

Chinook
 

I for one, am looking forward to informed replies to cazatous post number 1988 on 5th April. JP

John Purdey

Thankyou.


I am looking forward to a reply from BEagle to my post 1990.

That, I think, goes to the heart of the matter!!

It may be that BEagle does not consider my post worthy of reply. I would therefore humbly point out that, in the 4414 flying hours that I accummulated whilst in Post as an Aircraft Captain on what is now No 32 (Royal) Sqn, I accept that I never progressed further than being an 'A' Category Captain, Flight Instructor/ Local Examiner/ MG/ IRE.

I realise that this limited experience reduces the usefulness of any contribution I make.

What you asked for was speculation....

As a fellow ex-A Cat, A2QFI, MG, IRE, TAARI, EWO, Full Flight Test Capt, Examiner, FSO, blah blan blah, I trust you will agree with me that fact is the only consideration.

"Rule books are only paper, they will not cushion impacts between metal and stone"

We don't know the true facts. Neither did Wratten or Day. Everything else was informed hearsay and/or speculation. Certainly not enough to bring the unjust verdict which they did.

BEagle

I totally agree. Fact is everything. The major discrepancy in the altimeter subscale settings of the two Pilots; the ADF set to a Commercial Radio station; the lack of "outbrief" as required by ASI's, insufficient crew duty time to complete the task. Then let us add in the requirements for crew meals, allowable crew duty time etc.

We could then add a little spice by mentioning that one would require the approval of SRAFONI to have a further extension of Crew Duty (with its associated "hats on" interview) or the approval of HQNI to nightstop out of theatre; even more "gold braid" behind the desk at the "hats on" interview.

Then, of course, is the fact that the planning they were using had been done by the RN Captain of the other crew. How familiar were they with the planning and the route? (This is not in any way intended to question the integrity or professionalism of Lt K)

We then have to consider that they still had a major problem with crew duty time. Despite having been granted all the allowable crew duty extensions; there remained a very real possibility that they would not be able to complete the task within those parameters.

The only alternative to the "hats on interview" was to try to complete the task as quickly as possible.

Have I got something wrong here? (That was asked with my FSO hat on)

And all that risk just to take some people to play Golf.

Cazatou
<<The only alternative to the "hats on interview" was to try to complete the task as quickly as possible.>>
Again, the suggestion that they were going to fast – but their air speed (calculated average over the leg) was the norm for cruising at their altitude in that air temp even with a full load – a point I have made before and asked for comment here. I suggest, therefore, that your point may only be relevant in regard to route planning (eg. cutting corners, etc) as opposed to suggesting undue haste. Further, as (IMHO) they were not going to overfly the Mull but rather turn up the coast, they in fact overshot a corner rather than cut it – therefore one can remove pressure to take shortcuts in route planning from the equation also.
I have said before that, as covered in the FAI, they were within crew duty hours (even for the op area) when they crashed – so however overstretched/ fatigued they may have been later on in their journey, duty hours should not be a consideration of their ability to function by the time of the crash.
Just for information regarding the security of the site immediately after the crash, you had posted (1941):
<<The first people at the site were the Lighthouse Keeper and his Deputy. They secured the site until the Civil Police and Fire Services, as well as Medical Personnel, arrived from Campbeltown to assist. Later RAF Personnel from RAF Kinloss took over as Crash Guard. Nobody else was allowed on the site until the search for any possible survivors was completed.>>
This gives readers the impression that the site was well secure BUT I have been informed that the first (single) policeman arrived on the scene 40 minutes after the crash and who, from his comments, would have been the first other than the lighthouse keepers and tourists – that’s FORTY minutes; further, assuming the lighthouse keeper raised the alarm with a conventional ‘phone, there would have been a period in that 40 minutes when only a couple of individuals were known to be around the site. Trying to be positive – perhaps a lesson for future high risk vip flights would be to keep in regular contact throughout so that response could be quicker rather than rely upon a distress call …

cazatou,

Your list of quals is impressive, but I suspect gained some distance from the world of SH, and so not as relevant as they might be.

You say:The Mk 2 Chinook had NO icing clearance below +4 Deg C, which meant that a climb to MSA was never an option. The flight was planned and flown VFR in marginal VMC, which the BoI agreed was suitable for the mission.

What subsequently happened will never be known to the standard of proof required to find dead man guilty of gross negligence.

I frequently operated in that theatre without partaking of Aldergrove's grease mountain. I do not consider it relevant, or any way proof of youe assumed slap-dash approach to the job. The flght could have returned them to theatre within crew duty time, or permission later sought to remain in Scotland. We simply do not have the facts, which must give the benefit of the doubt to Jon and Rick.

To ex-Naval Sea King Pilot AKA Ark Royal
 

Ark Royal,

Long time no joust!!

I have lost count of how many times people who have actually flown the Chinook have pointed out to you that the BOI were correct that the forecast weather conditions would have permitted a climb to Safety Altitude; as stated in the BOI whose Aircrew members, you will recall, were a Wg Cdr and a Sqn Ldr; both of whom were current Pilots on the Chinook Mk 2.

What you, and all those who favour the "FADEC runaway" scenario, fail to take on board is that (if the scenario is correct) we are then dealing with a TRIPLE failure.

IF there was a FADEC runaway then the crew should have either climbed to above S Alt to avoid the high ground they knew was in front of them or, alternatively, to have turned away from the high ground. Failure to do so means either negligence or an inability to either climb or turn to avoid the imminent danger.

As you are adamant that there was no negligence then we are left with TWO more failures which miraculously disappeared without leaving any trace whatsoever: ie they were unable to either climb or turn.

I have a great deal of difficulty with a failure which left no trace as the cause of the accident - BUT THREE !!

All of which are possibilities, albeit somewhat remote if considered together. And that's all....

Neither you, I , Wratten or Day know what actually happened - beyond any doubt whatsoever.

Which is the whole point.

Incidentally, it's been a long time since I was promised a further response from John Reid, so perhaps it's time to do some more stirring....

RAF rules in force at the time provided that the deceased air crew could be found negligent only where there was "absolutely no doubt whatsoever".

Cazatou. Do you understand this phrase?

YES I UNDERSTAND


I also understand the blatent disregard for ASI's shown by the Pilots in respect of crew duty time, nightstops out of Theatre, crew meals, outbriefs etc.

I ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER THAT ANY FORM OF TECHNICAL FAULT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRASH.

No contributor to this thread has been able to PROVEa technical defect which contributed to, let alone caused, the Crash. A FADEC runaway would not itself have caused the Crash. The Pilots should have been able to climb to Safety Altitude or turn away from the Mull. The failure to do so would mean,if the "technical defect" theory is correct, that there was actually a triple defect preventing this which suddenly disappeared without trace in the mille-seconds before impact.

I find that "an untraceable defect" too far!

PS How many ASI's are you allowed to ignore before it ceases to be forgetfulness and becomes negligence?