JTO, I take your point and once felt as confident as you in the provision of Military Airworthiness in general, and in the RAF Flight Safety system in particular. Now I know better, that the first has been destroyed from within and the second thus rendered impotent as a result. Even if all the "bad people" have left (doubtful), their legacy remains and even more importantly what they did others can do again, because the Authority is in the hands of the Operator (as is its Accident Investigation).

That is why I "chuck spears", because such a system can be, and has been, suborned. Those who ignore the lessons of history are doomed to repeat it.

Self Regulation Doesn't Work and in Aviation it Kills!

Would you like to surmise which aircraft types aren't airworthy?

The MAA has direct access to other sources for such information, should they dare to “go there”; not least the raft of ART reports and direct access to Design Authorities and Custodians. They should be conducting their own independent assessment and comparing it with what the PTs offer them. Any discrepancy should be followed up.



They will not go there, because the ART reports (by the Inspector of Flight Safety) reveal the lie that is the H-C report, when he claimed the failings only commenced in 1998. The CHART report of August 1992 alone exposes this lie. (So when did the RAF stop using captured Argentinian pubs to maintain Chinook?)


Alcock and Graydon claimed that CHART had nothing to do with Chinook Mk2, yet it mentioned Mk2 383 (!!!) times. Dr Fox repeated this lie, which amply demonstrates who briefs him and how he was misled. The lie has been pointed out to the MAA, who refuse to comment; an abrogation unworthy of any "Authority".



You are correct in that PTs will withhold and mislead. For a start, they refuse to answer the above question. In one particular case, Sea King AsaC, they even deny an investigation took place and a report published, which requires a certain confidence (misplaced!) that all the evidence has been destroyed.


What is the MAA doing about this? Nothing.


Finally, did H-C criticise DE&S? He actually criticised DLO (Baber and Eagles from the IPT, and Cowan and Pledger as CDL) and that criticism has been revealed as utterly vindictive and designed to protect VSOs. To get to the truth, follow the lies. Who lied? (See above).

Well I haven't recycled your thinking SD, because I've no idea what it is. Do you endorse the issuing of illegal orders by VSOs? Do you think they should be named and brought to account for that or continue to be protected while deceased JOs names are besmirched? Should Military Air Accident Inquiry Reports still be liable to VSO "modification? What is your thinking SD?

Extensively, and regarding their self-licking modus:

...and:

...not forgetting:

...so have we moved on from:

…as from my position the same old senior individuals are up to the same old tricks.

Blah blah blah; same old same old.

Do we ground the aircraft or not?

What part of 'yes' escaped you?

I was looking at Tucumseh specifically.

You need to direct your repetitive question to your Airworthiness Authority ATG. That is presently the Military Aviation Authority. You will get lots of blah blah blah from them, because they will have little or no more idea than anyone else, but are probably trying to desperately get a feel for where the next "N****d" is or isn't. Politics come in here of course because they would have to explain why they are grounding yet another fleet. If they say that it is because it is unairworthy then they will have to explain why.
That is when the truth will emerge and the Star Chamber will have to surrender those that it has protected so long. It would be better for the Royal Air Force if it takes the initiative first before its honour is further sullied by the actions of these men. In other words we look to the leadership to provide....leadership.

JTO


Sorry, yes I'm familiar with what H-C wrote. My point was that, while he uses current terminology (DE&S), most of his criticism is actually aimed at failings that occurred just after AMSO took over certain MoD(PE) roles when it was reorganised in the early 90s. That coincided with AMSO being double hatted as RAF Chief Engineer. The following 3 years saw a conscious run-down of the airworthiness system. DE&S inherited those systemic and organisational failures. As the same people, or their acolytes, remain in charge, I don't see DE&S improving matters. But the important thing is that by dating the failures at 1998, and talking of DE&S, H-C knowingly diverted attention from the guilty


I would never claim MoD(PE) was perfect, but the record does show that PE railed against the CE's actions and were the only organisation to actively disregard his worst excesses. PE's most obvious act was to have commissioned a Director Internal Audit report into AMSO/CE's deliberate waste, which prompted his policy of “savings at the expense of safety”. That independent audit crucified every part of AMSO bar one – Tornado engines. It reported in June 1996, after 3.5 years deliberation, which makes a mockery of H-C's 1998 baseline. Unsurprisingly, H-C conveniently forgot to mention this report, among others.


This is why it is difficult to answer Alfred's question. Some aircraft and equipments were well-served in this period, due entirely to project managers completely ignoring the instruction to disregard major components of maintaining airworthiness.


By now, I think most people who read my posts will understand the direct link between Maintaining the Build Standard > a viable Safety Case > a compliant Release to Service. Under the CE (1991-96), the first was more or less scrapped (management oversight finished in June 1993), rendering the second and third PROGRESSIVELY invalid. To answer your question, to determine if a fleet should be grounded one has to assess that progress toward unairworthiness and whether it can be managed while maintaining some form of Operational Capability. Clearly, some can still fly, with extra limitations or restrictions; while others will be too far gone.


It follows that the MAA has to fist accept this timeframe before any decision can be validated. To date, they have not, as they blindly follow H-C. Regression to H-C's 1998 is meaningless. In effect, they have not changed AMSO/CE's risk management policy. Don't mitigate, and cross your fingers that nothing happens before the ISD. Unfortunately, when something does happen, people die. The MAA have actually addressed this question in a formal reply to a Minister. They say it matters not if the baseline is 1998 or 1986 (first promulgation of AMSO's policy to waste money) because there is no financial impact. I'm afraid that answer says it all.

I think ATG and I (and a few others) feel all the passages and pages re process seems to miss the point of the question -that every aircraft currently flying with the RAF is safe by military standards

Everything I read in these posts is about process, paperwork and box ticking on a vast scale and even the box-tickers don't seem to think that it does much good
and the answer? Seems to be more box ticking, more "authorities" ...............

HH,

Very well put.

The positive side of the post H-C era is that we have had some objective DH reviews of the platforms 'as flown' and the safety cases 'as assumed'. This has led to some informed judgements that some of our platforms are excellent, in no small part to the PTs that have been looking after them for many years.

What it has also revealed is that some platforms are close to being the next Nimrod. The net result of this discovery is for DE&S VSOs to point at all the box-ticking that has been done and for the MAA to double-check that all the box-ticking has indeed been done.

Not quite the change we were looking for and the DHs are fearful that it would be career endex to ground a platform that has all the box-ticking complete, but appears to fall short of anything they would survive scrutiny post-accident.

The MAA needs to regulate based on the facts, not the optimistic box-ticking, and put clear water between the PTs that have done an outstanding job and those that have failed.

HH, the "process" and "box ticking" that you so disdainfully dismiss as immaterial to "Military Standards" are to avoid having aircraft spontaneously explode in mid air (14 killed), be capable of being brought down by as little as a single AK47 round (despite being used in a tactical environment) (10 killed), fitted with untested HISLs that were routinely switched off because they blinded their own pilots (7 killed), that had "positively dangerous" FADECs that caused uncommanded power ups, downs, and shutdowns, (29 killed), fitted with IFFs that did not warn pilots of failure in a tactical environment (2 killed), all subject to accident threads in this forum.
If "Military Standards" had applied to those aircraft, many if not all those lives might not have been so needlessly lost. It is to avoid yet more lives being needlessly lost that the "Military Standards" that were not applied to those cases should be applied in future. That may well require the grounding of yet more fleets, but that could only really be done by an independent "authority" and we know what you think about them...

Heathrow Harry

Please let us know which "box ticking" regulations you think we should do away with. I'm quite happy to agree some are superfluous.


For example, do you agree with the Nimrod MRA4 2 Star (DGAS2/XD1) that Functional Safety is superfluous and should be waived if it means meeting time and cost? (e.g. Tornado/Patriot shootdown, Sea King ASaC, Nimrod).

Should we maintain a Safety Case? The RAF Chief Engineer thought not, and that is the primary reason why MoD cannot demonstrate airworthiness in many fleets. And why Gp Capt Baber (MR2 IPTL) inherited a poor Safety Case with no means of maintaining it.

The expertise/corporate knowledge to resurrect it and make it viable is a mandated requirement. Do you agree with the policy to denude MoD of this expertise? (RAF Chief Engineer 1991, Chief of Defence Procurement 1996).

Do you agree with ACAS's November 1993 decision that an aircraft with Nav and Comms systems that the aircrew are not permitted to rely upon "in any way whatsoever" is fit for purpose? (Chinook HC Mk2 Release to Service, confirmed by Lord Philip). I'm not a pilot, but please show me one who agrees with ACAS.

Yes, "box-ticking" goes on. For example, when compiling the Master Airworthiness Reference there is a mandated list of regulations to comply with. On Chinook, the evidence to Lord Philip listed 65 of the more important ones. You know, risk of death or injury if non-compliant. All but TWO were non-compliant. The Compliance Matrix makes sad reading, not least because there aren't very many left in MoD who could begin to compile it. In my opinion, and that of those who lost close friends and relatives, a box-ticking exercise that, in retrospect, would have been worthwhile. But wait. It WAS carried out, and Boscombe Down categorically stated the aircraft was not airworthy. So the process worked up to that point, but disintegrated as soon as it reached ACAS and CAS. I hope that one example tells you where I think the problem lies.

I could go on, but you hopefully get my point. I actually agree with much of what you and JTO say - but it is one thing to criticise the regulations and quite another to have to sign to say you've complied with them. The former costs you nothing when someone else has to do the latter. When someone is under a legal obligation to conform, and has to make a written declaration he has done so, then one shouldn't criticise him if he does his job properly.

The regulations are very robust. It is the implementation that is lacking. Or do you agree with aforesaid DGAS2/XD1, Chief of Defence Procurement and RAF Chief Engineer when they ruled that staff with this responsibility should be disciplined for refusing to obey an order to make a false written declaration and declare the regulations have been met, when they have not? Had we not stood up, even more would have died.

That is practical airworthiness (mis)management in MoD. I know the MAA's view on the last point. They side with their MoD masters.



Best wishes

Tuc

I thought your excellent post and questions deserved a reply, as none seem forthcoming from your detractors.

No, I don't agree with the policy decisions made by your 2, 3 and 4 stars. And having read your submissions to Hadden-Cave and Phillip I know you submitted copies of the actual papers proving what you say. IIRC you asked these questions a long time ago of Ingram or perhaps Ainsworth and were told "too difficult." I hope the MoD people who told the Minister this don't work in MAA. :rolleyes:

MC

One thing that strikes me is that the whole system resembles the oil business pre-Piper Alpha (I lost a colleague there) - loads of paperwork , committees, guidelines etc. etc but missing the main point which was to manage things safely and ensure a clear LINE responsibility for safety

Presentations - Oil & Gas UK

has a lot from last weeks conference in ABZ

slide 10 of Haddon-Cave's paper is a shocker................

The line of responsibility is clearly set out in the regulations, HH. An RTS into RAF Service could only be issued by ACAS upon receipt of a Controller Aircraft clearance that the aircraft is airworthy. In the case of the Chinook Mk2 that clearance was qualified as "Switch On" clearance only, meaning that Nav and Comms were not to be used in flight, essentially making the aircraft inoperable other than for ground training purposes. The RTS was issued anyway, but crews were not made aware of the "switch on only" restriction.

Can you see the flaw in your demand for a "Clear Line"? No one has been interviewed, let alone charged for dereliction of duty, either by the Service or the Civilian Police.

Self Regulation Doesn't Work, and in Aviation it Kills.

Surely what is a "shocker" is his slide that says "2002-2005 Safety Case drawn up"


Why doesn't H-C ask why the safety case was only drawn up in 2002-5? I think I prefer tuc's way, pointing out there is a question to ask and providing the answer. H-C was given the answer and refused to publish it.


HH, still no answer to tuc's simple question he asked you?

Here's one of Haddon-Cave's slides from HH's link. Anyone spot the problem?



http://i214.photobucket.com/albums/c...psb7e62ce7.jpg


See "DGSM"? In 1991-3 that was a supplier and hence didn't have airworthiness delegation. Haddon-Cave was supplied with the evidence the chain was 3 Star > 1 Star. In December 1992 DGSM came down to London to threaten civilian staffs with dismissal if they refused to stop highlighting serial waste of money and savings being made at the cost of safety. He would not have done that without top cover from the Chief Engineer (Alcock).

Who issued these policies? The guy above him in the chain - Chief Engineer.

In 2001 the guy above that, CDP (missing from the diagram), upheld disciplinary action against civilians who refused to commit the very same "offences" - that is, it was (and remains) a disciplinary offence to refuse to obey an order to make a false declaration on financial probity or airworthiness, but it is not an offence to issue that order.

Nor does Haddon-Cave point out that these remains serious offences in MoD, confirmed in writing over the past 6 months by AbbeyWood (under MAA advisement), Minister for the Armed Forces and the Head of the Civil Service.


What, I ask, is the greater problem? A few boxes to tick, or this management culture? The committees you complain of comprised these people. What is the problem? The committee itself, or the people?



Dervish - Thanks. What MoD found "too difficult" (it was Ingram in 2005) was a simple question about maintaining airworthiness. He didn't write to me but to my MP. Part of my letter to him was to advise him of "systemic failures" to implement airworthiness regulations. This, over a year before XV230 crashed. Haddon-Cave did not mention this either, but it is where he got the term "savings at the expense of safety".

However, it has to be said MoD were at least being consistent, because 2 years earlier, in April 2003, they had briefed Minister that I was the only person in MoD who believed the regulations should be implemented. I have a copy of that briefing. It was written by the same Director of Personnel, Resources and Development who, the previous year, had advised CDP to uphold his earlier decision that what I describe were offences.

If, in 2003, I was the only one, and Minister (Robothan) has in the last few months again referenced this briefing thus showing his continued support for the claim, then I'm entitled to ask what on earth the MAA think of this. And yes, the MAA DG knows what is being said in his name.

Back again to the Swiss Cheese slices. Organisational Fault, Preconditions, Line Management Failures.

Well that tops and tails things clear enough for me, tuc. Thank you.

So what do you say, Heathrow Harry? Is the problem really endless Regulations and bureaucratic Committees? Or is it the issuing of illegal orders by VSOs to subvert the Regulations, to persecute those who would not comply, and to maintain a cover up of that alleged illegality over three decades?

Is the problem in short that Airworthiness is not safe in the hands of the MOD, or its subsidiaries, and that its provision should be Regulated from without? What clues does Aberdeen come up with for that?