Biggus, quite. On one operation that you will be familiar with we had a number of submariners on board. They were foisted on us and not invited and OC OSS was furious when he found out but . . .

We observed a particular manoevre by our target followed by a particular acoustic event which then ceased and the target manoeuvre ceased too.

Our passengers told us exactly what we had heard, what the target did about it, and why it had happened. As you say, priceless.

"Many (most?) countries which have MPA have them operated by their navy, there is a certain inescapable logic to it."

That will be, from memory, not including, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Norway, Spain, Portugal.

The big exception is of course the US Navy - where unfortunately, a career as a professional MPA operator isn't possible as a "full career" is necessary for promotion and they don't have a Spec aircrew type of scheme. For example one USN Exchange Officer went from Kinloss to a carrier as a deck landing officer - that doesn't exactly strike me as inescapable logic.

N L H,

I believe the air forces of Australia and New Zealand, and possibly Canada were historically modeled on the RAF, hence no doubt the reason they operate MPA.

I said many (with most followed by a question mark) countries have navies which operate MPA, using your "from memory" approach, I could quote, in addition to the USN:

JMSDF - a mere 80 odd P-3s which no doubt exceeds the combined MPA fleets of Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Norway, Spain, and Portugal.

France
Germany
Italy
India
Pakistan
South Korea
(the Dutch used to)


Hopefully that's enough to at least prove my use of "many", if not "most"... :ok:

Italy is actually Air Force, as is Portugal, Spain, Greece, Taiwan, Brazil, Iran...

But enough of the pi$$ing contest - it doesn't matter who operates it as long as we have the expertise and suitable airframe to protect our SSBNs, SLOCs, provide real long range SAR, long endurance MCT, etc, etc, etc... After all we ARE an island nation that depends heavily (almost entirely?) on trade via the sea (both in and out of the country) and have vital maritime assets to protect. :eek:

NLH - that's because you don't understand the USN's career system. Their P-3 COs are (nearly)* all P-3 prior background.

*I've no doubt there are one or two who aren't, but they don't disprove the rule!

I think PN sums it up really. The attitude appeared to be one of little cross-pol between Services - with the consequent lack of in depth knowledge of what the hunted were actually doing. I have seen the same thing with the Canadians in both the MPA and maritime helicopter world (now both air force run) where there is an inbred lack of deep interest in the Naval aspects of their trade. I suppose the same could be said with the attitude to embarked fixed wing....we go there under sufferance.

Biggus.

No p*ssing competition seen or starting from this callsign either!

All I was pointing out was that we need only a few WSOs in the future, in general terms for the whole RAF. The numbers required are sustainable from within the ranks of the NCA, we don't need to reopen ab-initio WSO training at all. It is far less risky to commission from a known manpower pool than from the outside world for the numbers required.

It will be little more than a change to a nicer hat, clippy cloppy shoes and a chance to take the dog into work on future postings for those who are deemed the most suitable for filling the posts.

We need to reinforce our understanding of the WSO role. It is that - not Navigator...... that branch is, indeed, dead. No need for WSO training schools etc. to reopen. The training will take place on OCUs all over the country. Or at least on the 2 stations that are left.

Therefore the numbers and demographic makeup of the existing WSOs in service are an irrelevance. They will just be the first tranche of a future fleet, that's all.

Scuttled,

I think you are smoking something rather special. In the timeframe under consideration - up to 10 years - the RAF are out of the MPA capability, period. IF MOD decide to return to fund such a requirement then part of the argument will have to be "who is best fitted to re-establish this additional ASW capability?". The answer may not be "the RAF". In fact, all things being equal, the RN will be in a far better position to integrate it into their ongoing ASW orbat. Indeed they will probably piggy-back with the USN in the build up to the first Sqn IOC, As they are doing with JSF.

Pheasant.

No, just making a minor point reference manning, but not negating the other wider and larger points being made at all.

None taken.

Edit

And agree with the RN taking the strain also, I made the same point earlier in the thread. I'd go dark blue if required to man a future MPRA.

Scuttled,

So would I, me hearty!

Duncs:ok:

Personally if we argue about airworthiness of the MRA4 then surely the same issues will come up for the intro of the Rivet Joint. Sorry I just cracked a little joke there ;)

But remember that Rivet Joint is from the USA so will not be challenged by our leaders.

One of the primary factors behind the MRA4 decision-making was the undisputed fact that both MoD and Ministers had been given detailed, prior warning of the systemic failings that Haddon-Cave simply collated and reiterated. In MoD these warnings went unheeded for nigh on 20 years.



BEFORE the XV230 crash, Ministers were lied to by MoD and refuted these facts, in writing (esp. Lewis Moonie in 2003 and Adam Ingram in 2005/2006). Even AFTER the event (May 2007), Ingram issued denials, as did his successor, Ainsworth (August 2007) the Air Staffs (December 2007). They ALL were proven 100% wrong.



It would be wrong to say it took this tragedy to open their eyes. MoD remained in full denial mode. What forced them to accept the facts was the adverse publicity and, dare I say it, the integrity of certain MPs. Also, key evidence MoD had denied the existence of had been made available, yet still they denied it; at one point (April 2003) even implying such documents were a fabrication. That this misleading of Parliament was a deliberate, conscious and illegal act, is beyond any doubt. The Government’s acceptance of the H-C Report, for all its flaws, was actually a scathing indictment of MoD’s behaviour.



But the mistake MoD and Government made was to continue to protect the guilty, while encouraging the scapegoating of those named by Haddon-Cave. The party line was; these people are no longer in post, so by definition there is no longer an airworthiness problem. A 5-year-old would be embarrassed at that argument. Undoubtedly, there was incompetence on a grand scale, but that is not an offence; rather it is a product of policies which relegated airworthiness to something that should be waived if Time and Cost were at risk. (The main point in Haddon-Cave’s report, but which he attributed to his own investigations, omitting to say he was given written evidence dating the policy to 1991). Yet it was the incompetent (to different degrees) who were blamed, while those who knowingly compromised safety and directed that false declarations be made, the minority, who were rewarded.



It is against this background that one should view MRA4, especially the nervousness and the unwillingness to sign off on airworthiness in the certain knowledge that you will be scapegoated if something goes wrong. This remains one of the biggest hurdles. The MAA can regurgitate perfectly good regulations all they want, but it is lack of leadership and management practices that need addressing.



To the best of my knowledge, Rivet Joint’s audit trail is not as irredeemably tainted as Nimrod’s. Yet.

tuc:
Not only the MOD it would appear tuc. The truculent and insouciant attitude still displayed by some who presumably consider themselves aviation professionals is one of the most depressing aspects of this national scandal. The Airworthiness of the MR2, the MRA4, the HC2, or whatever, is not the story, it is that of the UK Military System of Airworthiness Provision as a whole. Those who set about destroying it have achieved what no enemy of this country ever could, the emasculation of its military aviation. That can only be attended to by those who are professionally able and free to do so. At the moment they, the MAA, are neither. This 1000 mile march must begin with that very first step, the independence of the MAA and MAAIB from the MOD and from each other. Only then can this enormous calamity begin to be addressed.
no you didn't RP, not even a little one.

Forgive me for dragging this thread back but I didn't want to divert the UAV thread.

What exactly cause the MRA4 to be cancelled twelve years after Nimrod 2000?

The wings? The wheels? The engines? The kit? Or simplistically the wiring?

I know we like to blame BAE but was the MODs little hand in there too?

This could take some time..... :(

From sources close to the project the intial cancellation was possibly down to the concerns in the wing design and the lifing issue , no evidence ever came to this but this was just word of mouth on the shop floor with people in the know at Woodford.
The other one was a meeting between the PM and head of BAE the Friday before the decision , again just words mentioned at the time but so many more, its irrelevant now

Its gone :bored:

RP, the meeting between the PM and BAE is clearly a red herring - that hare had been running for 12 years.

A wing design problem would appear to be a more realistic issue but if true a damning indictment of BAE's design skills.

Biggus, and the short version? I know the Eurofighter 2000 was a similar can of worms. I recall a meeting that concerned the video map display, in particular the TAP display which was to be limited to 16 colours and the difficulty of getting the text right way up with the map track orientated. Of course 25 years on my cheap as chips Satnav, indeed any Satnav, does this and more.

Were they chasing a will o the wisp? Perhaps what made the Mk 1 such a success was the kit was all off the shelf.

PN

I think your question should be answered by an independent inquiry.

I like the approach taken here because it adopts the same forensic line of questioning you'd expect from such an inquiry. It "follows the lies" and asks "Who benefits?" which is a simple but effective technique.

https://sites.google.com/site/militaryairworthiness/

I particularly admire the way the strands of apparently unrelated events are brought together. It doesn't set out to answer your MRA4 question but it does point to "Who?"

dervish, thank you. A stack up of risk against benefit until there is only risk and no benefit.

When I first flew I knew aircraft crashed but I had an absolute faith that I had the best of everything to reduce the risk.

I recall at ISK, I think it was Win Harris, who said before that fatal bird strike, 'we should have lost a Nimrod by now'.