written in large letters on every wall

If you keep the budget relatively static and then add two very large, complex ships, which require escorts, to the mix then something has to give. And that has been the rest of the navy. Sure , if Governments had added cash and resources to cover the extra cost it would have been fine but they didn't and so.

Just look and what has been disposed of, laid up and not replaced - and there aren't even plans to replace most of the lost capability and flexibility. What's left is stretched thinner and thinner.

And we can't even protect the carriers ourselves - we have to borrow escorts form everyone else

Except its not though, is it?
RFA pay and conditions? Nope.
Failure to order T23 replacements? Nope. Also, if you track the spend on the carrier build, the vast majority peaked pre-2017. T26 and T31 spend has only ramped up post 2020, so not there.
Amphibiosity? The fact that Future Commando Force is not coherent with current amphibious shipping seems to be passing you by.

So why are they still cutting things pray?

and I don't think everyone has signed up to the idea that cutting amphibious support is a Good Thing

Not so many weeks ago we were involved with the Netherlands in designing the landing platforms of the future, but I think that our participation went South due to founding issues.

There is an another issue - even with lots of frigates (and destroyers) protecting amphibious forces and reinforcement shipping without carriers and their aircraft is going to be a very hard nut to crack. You cannot replicate the long range, ability to visually identify unidentified aircraft, or defence in depth with shipborne radars and missiles.

The possibility of creating a viable fleet without carriers had been examined in 1962 for comparison with the arguments in favour of CVA-01. The study group had reported that such a fleet would be very expensive to create and very limited in capability. Without AEW aircraft, the fleet’s antiaircraft missiles would be limited to engagements within the ships’ radar ‘line of sight’, making them particularly vulnerable to pop-up low-level attacks under the radar horizon. The fleet would have no defence against shadowing aircraft that remained outside missile range, and would be unable to destroy missile-firing aircraft before they launched their weapons. Sea search and probe missions like those that initiated the Beira Patrol would no longer be possible beyond the helicopters’ radius of action. A surface-to-surface missile (SSM) would have to be developed or procured to replace strike aircraft in the anti-surface-vessel role, but even this would be of limited value without AEW aircraft to provide targeting information.

From British Aircraft Carrier - Design, Development and Service Histories by Cdr David Hobbs RN (Rtd) - a PDF version is here.

Similarly you need a lot of frigates to support the same number of ASW helicopters as a carrier will operate - and even if the frigates and sailors to man them existed there are difficulties in coordinating aircraft based aboard different frigates, and you cannot centralise things like maintenance and logistics.

These are the reasons that carriers are so important to NATO, are important in dealing with anti ship attacks in the Red Sea, and the major navies with a main role of Sea Control seek to either have them or at least operate with allied ones.

Over on the thread I started about the how and why carriers needed are in the Atlantic (and elsewhere of course) for Air Defence and ASW on another site, I posed a question before the recent Exercise Steadfast Defender 24 - could anyone suggest a better alternative to what HMS Prince of Wales did?

Constant protection of the amphibious force? No - that is a carrier role. The carrier provides presence and proximity.

Timely interception of simulated hostile aircraft, such as launching jets from inside the fjord? No - speed/time/distance considerations favour having your aircraft nearer both the attacking aircraft and the force to be defended.

Constant ASW? No - you would need a lot of frigates (or other warships/auxiliaries) to operate the same number of ASW helicopters as a carrier, and support and coordination would be difficult.

Define "they". Then look up DNO if you want to know where the majority of the Maritime budget is ending up.

With Amphibiosity as usual you've managed to misunderstand what's going on. Future Commando Force is policy and doctrine. If that policy and doctrine moves you away from traditional landing over a beach and restructures your force to match, why have a traditional amphibious shipping force?

(I forgot to click post on the 17th after being interrupted) but here's my two penn'orth anyway.

N_a_b Future Commando Force confuses the hell out of me, but my understanding is that LRG(N) should be composed of a LPD (or similar), an LSS(currently legacy RFA), escort(s) and any additional RFA SSs required, LRG(S) has an small scale anti-terrorist focus so doesn't need an LPD, so Argus and a Bay are appropriate (and Escort(s) if the operational scenario requires) troops to be drawn from Forty or Four Five as required and RW assets as appropriate. Where an LSG fits in I am not sure. Is FCF not a flexibility doctrine? In other words allowing the use of small teams for Grey Zone ops up to a full Commando plus supporting arms amphib/helo op? I also can't quite reconcile FCF with the Rangers as the SF-lite roles seem to overlap to a very large extent.

Asturias et al,
The complement of the QEs is slightly smaller than the Invincibles, the next generation of escorts will wave substantially smaller complements than the legacy ones so the increased capability didn't require increased sailors. I would think having some units that have a proper fighting role is more likely to attract potential recruits. The problem also lies in recruiting in times of high employment from a pool of individuals who have very different expectations as to Ts & Cs of employment to previous generations and with diminishing contact with, and visibility of the armed forces.

Yes, they have subsidiary police, humanitarian, ASW and showing the flag roles but Type 45 destroyers primary role is to provide the Fleet with air defence.
The 23s were primarily built for an ASW role, the end of the Soviet VMF submarine threat partly left them in search of a role - whether they are being used as oversized OPVs or under armed peacetime Cruisers is moot. What worries me is if Op Corporate had been using escorts of similar vintage they would have been Lochs/Bays and the 1944 Daring Class.:E

The City Class (T26) ships have been specifically designed to hunt for enemy submarines.
The Type 31 general purpose frigate will undertake missions such as interception and disruption of those using the sea for unlawful purposes, intelligence gathering, defence engagement and providing humanitarian support.
Although not finalized the T32s are clearly intended to use AVs in ASW, ASuW and MCM roles

We can't change history but a the potential T26s for Norway issue is a result of the failure to preserve warship building capacity, presumably in part a side effect of failing to build replacement escorts when due and the reduction in fleet size due to the mythical peace dividend. In the not too distant past Cammells would have been building whole T26s not supplying sections for HMS Birmingham (granted ship building techniques have changed). Although the bulk of T22s (10) were built by Yarrow, Swan Hunters built 3 and Cammell Laird 1, simiilarly T23s Marconi Marine (ex-Yarrow) 12 , Swan Hunter 4. I am not sure the move to competitive bidding (with an aim of cost reduction) replacing DCNC + Primary Contractor and a sharing out the hulls wast he best thing from a defence manufacturing sustainability perspective. Where the six cancelled T45s would have been built is pure speculation.

I think the point is that the various units of the Bde (and their enablers like 29Cdo RA, the RE and the CLR) and are now so disparate in role, that the days of "assault" as a formed Bde are long gone, which is why the amphibious ships are no longer as important as they were.

I get your point about 3 Commando Brigade, as it appears only (the undermanned) Forty and Four Five Commandos still have a 'traditional role' to any extent, Four Two has a dog's breakfast of roles:
(RN website).

Mind you none of them seem to have a dedicated role, 40 & 45:
To my (old fashioned) way of thinking an LPD is still an essential piece of kit for landing and moving a RM force in support of the NATO Northern Flank as they and their kit and supporting arms may need to go somewhere away from landing sites or in conditions that preclude delivery by air in sufficient numbers. It appears to me, but I may be wrong, that The Royals are still a major part of the UK's purple commitment to the High North, assuming my reading of this document (The UK’s Defence Contribution in the High North) published under Ben Wallace in March 2022 is correct and the policy still valid. In such a case the LPD Command facilities also come in to play, not something I believe the current RFAs can provide, and we can't afford (or man) a dedicated LCC style dedicated C4 ship.

Defence Minister @jcartlidgemp refuses to confirm if HMS Westminster and HMS Argyll will ever go back to sea @LukePollard

"I am committed to looking at the future of the Surface Fleet in the round and making tough but necessary decisions to ensure this transition is a success."

​​​​​​​https://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans...rans#g21265.r0

A few short months after the announcement of a £500 million upgrade programme to provide T45s with Sea Ceptor anti-ballistic missile capability with a first capable ship in 2026, HMS Diamond has taken out an anti-ship ballistic missile using Aster

Half? That seems generous.

NATO naval forces continue to work hard to keep the peace, with French, Italian, Spanish, and Turkish flattops carriers deployed in the Mediterranean.

Two Major NATO Exercises Underway - USNI News

NATO is currently conducting two major naval activities – Dynamic Mongoose 24 in the North Atlantic and Neptune Strike 24-1, which involves four large-deck strike groups and spans both the Mediterranean Sea and Adriatic Sea as well as parts of the Baltic Sea.

NATO classes the Neptune Strike series of drills, usually held twice a year, as “enhanced vigilance activity” intended to demonstrate NATO’s capabilities and strength and enhance Allied connectivity. “Ranging from the Central Mediterranean to the Black Sea region and all the way up to the Baltic Sea, STRIKFORNATO’s execution will blanket three Joint Operations Areas and assert NATO’s capability to protect every inch of Allied territory with the naval resources that are organic to the theatre,” stated the command’s release on the exercise.

Neptune Strike 24-1 began on Friday and ends on 10 May, and involves Albania, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, Turkey, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States. According to a release by NATO’s Allied Joint Force Command Naples, this will be Sweden’s first time participating in the Neptune Strike series since it joined NATO on Mar. 7. The release also stated that as part of the exercise, NATO will control units operating across the entire Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas, along with air units flying across Europe via air-to-air refueling and carrying out live-firing missions in the Baltic Sea and on firing ranges in Poland and Romania

Two carrier strike groups and two expeditionary strike groups are taking part in the exercise along with other NATO ships and submarines. The CSGs are the French CSG and the Cavour CSG of Italy, while the ESGs are the Spanish “Dedalo 24” ESG and the Turkish Anadolu ESG, with the Anadolu ESG operating under Turkish national command rather than NATO command. The French CSG comprises of carrier FS Charles De Gaulle (R91), French frigates FS Chevalier Paul (D621) and FS Provence (D652), Portuguese frigate NRP Bartolomeu Dias (F333), Italian frigate ITS Carabiniere (F593), a Greek frigate, a Spanish frigate, French fleet oiler BRF Jacques Chevallier (A725) and a French attack submarine. The Cavour CSG comprises carrier ITS Cavour (550) and escorting Italian Navy surface ships.

The “Dedalo 24” ESG comprising of amphibious assault ship ESPS Juan Carlos I (L-61) with embarked AV-8B Harrier II strike aircraft, amphibious transport dock ESPS Galicia (L-51) and frigates ESPS Blas de Lezo (F-103) and ESPS Reina Sofía (F-84). A Spanish Marine Infantry battalion is embarked on the two amphibious ships. The Anadolu ESG consists of amphibious assault ship TCG Anadolu (L-400), frigate TCG Salihreis (F-246) and corvette TCG Buyukada (F-512), along with an embarked Amphibious Marine Brigade force...