MSOCS,
I like your "real (land based tanker)" truism.:ok: What I see here is a mis-match of concept and reality. Basically, a multi-£billion weapon system (British STOVL Carrier group) that is capable of striking within about 300nm radius of its position! To go beyond that, requires the support of vulnerable land based tankers. :confused:

OAP

OAP it will do between 450 and 500nm radius depending on how much blower the stick monkey uses! That's not that bad. Every conflict I've flown in has had tanker support. We protect them for good reason!!!

MSOCS, thanks for your reply again. Can't help feeling the big UK carriers are another waste of UK £. BTW, you might feel that tankers are "protected" from some personal experience? I can argue that that protection has been less than comprehensive! But, that is all I will say! :eek:

OAP

Back in the dreamtime of 2013 I started a five page thread about:

V-22 Osprey Air Refuel F-35Bs for CVFs? + other stuff

http://www.pprune.org/military-aviat...ey#post7786940

I thought peeps had vented their spleen by the end. Anyhoo I think NavAvers and Crabs have different ideas about ARF for sure. For example the USAF head honcho in JPO PLEUS now has said that their tankers virtually drag other aircraft across vast oceans - constantly refuelling because 'that's the way they like it' for safety reasons for all concerned - tanker included.

USMC differ from that approach and have said so via bigwig LtGen Davis - so this ocean crossing with apparently the F-35B probe out at all times may change (but I could be RONG).

In any event the USMC find their V-22 concepts useful - whether crabs like it - I don't care.

ADDITION: With great sadness I regret to inform youse that I do not have a subscription to AvWEAK so:

http://aviationweek.com/defense/how-...e-corps-fights

This is all ye can get withoutit:

The introduction of the V-22 fundamentally changed the way the U.S. Marine Corps thinks about operating from the sea. Now, as the service begins to consider its next-generation rotorcraft fleet, the game-changing capabilities of the Osprey combined with the fifth-generation F-35 are driving new requirements.

The V-22 tiltrotor troop transport can take off and land like a helicopter, enabling it to operate from almost anywhere in the world. But it can also fly like a turboprop, cruising over both land and sea at 250 kt. These capabilities greatly expand the reach and speed of Marine Corps assault operations, but they also create a critical gap: The H-1s that provide armed escort for the Black Hawks and CH-53E heavy-lift helicopters cannot fly nearly fast enough to keep up with the V-22. So how can the Marine Corps protect its troops during transit from ship to shore? Right now, the service is using several workarounds, including deploying the H-1s ahead of the V-22s so the armed helicopters are in place to provide support once the troops arrive. To some extent, the F-35 can also provide detached escort from above during transit. However, neither solution is optimal.

For a more effective armed escort, the Marine Corps is eyeing the U.S. Army-lead Future Vertical Lift (FVL) program, says Col. John Barranco, head of Marine Corps rotorcraft requirements, referring to the Pentagon’s effort to develop a new family of helicopters. In a high-end fight, the Marine Corps envisions sending in the F-35 first to take out enemy air defenses—sophisticated radars and surface-to-air missiles that threaten U.S. forces. This clears the way for the V-22s, escorted by FVL, to move in ground forces from the ship. Meanwhile, the Marines’ future “MUX”—planned as a large, shipboard UAV—will fly overhead, providing persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and targeting data. Once air superiority is established, the F-35 transitions to a bomb-truck role, providing deep-air support with its external stores.

But to get to this future concept of operations, the Pentagon must first determine what FVL will look like. To this end, the Marine Corps, Army and U.S. Special Operations Command will kick off an analysis of alternatives for FVL in April. The Pentagon plans to develop five sizes of rotorcraft under the program, but the Marine Corps is most interested in the medium-lift variant, dubbed Capability Set 3. This aircraft will eventually replace the Marine Corps’ UH-1 Yankee utility and AH-1 Zulu attack helicopters as well as the Army’s UH-60 Black Hawks and AH-64 Apaches.

For the Marine Corps, speed and range are crucial, says Barranco. Given the Marines’ need for an FVL that can match the V-22, a next-generation tiltrotor might be the best fit. One option is Bell Helicopter’s and Lockheed Martin’s V-280 Valor, which builds on the tiltrotor technology of the Bell-Boeing V-22 to fly twice the range (up to 2,100 nm) at double the speed of existing helicopters (280 kt. cruising, 300 kt. maximum). Another advantage is the V-280’s aerial refueling capability, which allows it to self-deploy. Meanwhile, Karem Aircraft is also working on a design based on its optimum-speed tiltrotor concept, the TR36TD, with an eye toward FVL.

Right now, the Valor is a technology demonstrator for the Joint Multi-Role Technology Demonstrator (JMR-TD), the FVL precursor that will gauge the art of the possible for future vertical lift capabilities. But the Valor flight demonstrator is designed to an Army model performance specification and its wings do not fold, which is a necessary capability for ship and air transportability. If it is chosen for FVL, the Valor will add manual wing folding and stowing to meet Marine Corps and SOCOM requirements, says Bell spokesman Andy Woodward. However, this could add cost and complexity, particularly if the services decide on different fold and stow requirements. Still, Bell insists that the same production line would be planned to accommodate all variants. “I do not anticipate multiple production lines,” Barranco agrees. “I do not anticipate a Capability Set 3 A, B and C.”

Boeing and Sikorsky are also participating in JMR-TD with their SB-1 Defiant, a coaxial helicopter that is planned to cruise at 230 kt. powered by two Honeywell T55 turboshaft engines. Until the Valor and Defiant fly for the first time in September, it will be hard to judge the capabilities of each, Barranco says, although he notes that a tiltrotor platform will likely have more range and speed.

But until the FVL program gets off the ground, the Marine Corps still has a capability gap in the armed escort mission. The service is hoping to accelerate the development of the planned Marine Air to Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Unmanned Expeditionary (MUX) to fill this gap in the short-term, Barranco says. MUX will be a Group 4 or 5 (above 1,300 lb.) long-range, long-endurance UAV that can operate both from ships and smaller-footprint, expeditionary locations. The Marines envision the new capability will be multimission, able to conduct surveillance, strike, electronic-warfare and cargo missions. “The beginning of the war is F-35 in fifth-generation mode, reducing the enemy’s capabilities. Now we’re ready to move troops forward with our assault aircraft escorted attached or detached by FVL Capability Set 3, our MUX out there persistent, looking at the zone, providing that real-time picture to all of our aircraft,” says Barranco. “Then our F-35s transition to a combination of fighters doing close-air support, the air-to-air picture [and] bringing huge payloads to bear, complemented by our attack variant of the FVL Capability Set 3.”

One potential problem for FVL is the program’s joint nature. The Pentagon likely wants to avoid repeating the F-35 scenario, in which an airframe envisioned to fit the needs of all three services is now just 20% common. Still, Barranco believes there are many advantages to a multiservice program, including cost savings and interoperability. To avoid the pitfalls of the Joint Strike Fighter, the FVL program will be led by the Army rather than a Joint Program Office (JPO), enabling a more streamlined acquisition process and chain of command once the capability is fielded, Barranco says.

Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan, F-35 JPO chief, had some words of wisdom for any future joint program: determine ahead of time which components are going to stay common and which are going to divert. “The notion that you could build three variants—one to operate on a carrier, one to take off and land vertically and one to land normally—and that you could do that with an airframe that is going to stay common for 40 plus years, is probably not the best assumption,” he says.

SpazSinbad,
Yes, the British and US concepts of AAR supported deployments have differed in that the Brit method revolves around the use of a detailed refuelling plan with the minimum number of refueling brackets, to reduce the risk of refueling failure, always keeping the receiver within fueled range of a usable alternate, with the plan managed by the Tanker. I believe the USAF method is more of a receiver managed plan, with the Tanker "contracted" to provide a certain amount of refueling at, or between, certain points. However, this is not the point I am making.
At the present time, UKGov has committed a huge part of the UK defence budget to an inappropriate and limited capability, ie the UK "Carrier group".
The limitations and poor cost/use/vulnerability of this UK political decision should be highlighted to minimise our future losses and, to force future UK political/defence policy back to value for money and appropriate capability.
Just my opinion.

OAP

So if all this new technology gives the US a longer reach why has the US Fleet apparently sailed a Carrier through Straits Of Hormuz and into the Gulf?

Why not stay in safer waters and make use of land based tankers in Qatar to hit IS in Iraq? Seems unwise, given it might only take one explosive packed rib getting through from the Republican Guard to knock a hole in it.

Just to try and put things on some sort of remotely factual - as opposed to hysterical - basis. NAO MPR 2015 (the last one with the useful individual project sheets), lists the totals for CAT A projects beyond MG as about £73.5Bn. Of that total, £18Bn on Typhoon, £11Bn on FSTA, £5Bn on F35, £6Bn on QEC, £0.5Bn on MARS tanker, £0.3Bn on Crowsnest, £5.4Bn on Ajax, £2.7Bn on A400M, £11Bn on Astute (inc the NPPT), Marshall £1.9Bn and Complex Weapons at £1.3Bn).


Downstream are about £18.5Bn of pre MG projects including AH64E (@£2.3Bn), Morpheus at £2.9BN, T26 (£8Bn) and Successor at £4.9Bn (just the assessment phase).


Of the £73bn, only QEC and Crowsnest can be described as directly CV-group. MARS tanker is wider than that but even included gets you to just over £7Bn. The £5Bn for F35 isn't all CV-group, but even assuming it was, you're now at £12Bn from £73Bn. About the same as FSTA (albeit on a different basis).


It is simply untenable to suggest that the "carrier group" is a "huge part" of the EP - particularly when the primary expenditure on the ships stretched from 2008 to about now) - ie £6bn spread over nigh-on 10 years. Put another way - if you assume that the EP has been running at about £8Bn a year over the last 10 years, the "carrier" part of the budget has been running at 7% at best. Leaving another 93% buying other equipment.


But don't let facts get in the way of a good bit of prejudice eh?

George Bush sent to the Gulf by Donald Trump. Oh Dear, rather undiplomatic.

First US Carrier Returns to Gulf Since Trump Inauguration

I think Boffin is correct - the latest "Overspend" (see other thread) reckons it 's the Sucessor programme and the whole F-35 purchase that are the real worries

Just how we support a Carrier Group with the limited number of men and ships we'll have is another question TBH

Actually, the problem is structural underfunding, rather than Successor/F35 or anything else.


That structural underfunding has led to inordinate effort being made to defer procurements / balance - which never ends well and also leads to disruption in other programmes.


The cause of the underfunding has been a fundamental refusal by HMT, FCO and MoD to understand that the world is not full of fluffy bunnies that can be defeated by sending a bunch of wimmins rights activists (sorry, DFiD international aid) and a point-blank denial that the nice Mr Putin was noting of the sort. All dealt with by the idea that if we hoped hard enough and ignored it, it would all go away and we could go on spending on diversity and skools n'ospiculs without consequences.


The annoying thing is that for the sake of about £3Bn/yr "extra" over the last ten (about 0.5% of overall govt spend on average), much of the current grief would not exist.


People are at least making noises that the 2% GDP is a minimum to avoid opprobrium, rather than a badge of honour, but I'm not holding my breath....

agree - what is needed is a multi-year FINANCIAL commitment - not this ridiculous year by year funding that always seems to end in tears

Mr Boffin,

I think it's a stretch to call the 48 currently funded F-35Bs (which are certainly all you'll get for £5 billion) anything other than "directly CV group" assets. Any sustained diversion to doing anything else will put the objective CEPP capability out of reach.

Were that the case, then I'm sure that the current project owner would surrender them in a heartbeat. How strange that they don't.......


Incidentally, the budget refers to the initial project tranche including SDD. I deliberately didn't refer to 48 for that reason. Either way, you'd have to spend another £11bn to on top to match what has been spent on Typhoon. A capability I hasten to add that is highly necessary, but one that took north of £1.5Bn pa out of the budget and still hasn't got the full suite of weapons integrated. Somehow doesn't seem to elicit the same vitriol (apart from retired pongoes) - why could that be.....?

Actually the most important part of Sir John Parkers National Shipbuilding Strategy paper which was almost universally overlooked in favour of "BAE bad, evil defence prime scum ripping off poor innocent MoD. spend money with nice other people instead" headlines.

Sorry, Not A boffin
I will not start trading "lies and statistics". :rolleyes: It does not matter how the spreadsheet is frigged, the "UK Carrier group" is not appropriate to the UK political/financial/defence realities in a post brexit world. So, please don't start telling me how little it costs, it was only ever a sop to Scottish voters and retired Admirals. Believe me, as soon as Madam May realises that she needs EVERY PENNY in the BOE to keep her job, those boats are scrap. :ouch:
We are not talking " I like boats" here, we are talking UK financial reality 2020!

OAP

First of the four new RFA tankers (A136 "Tidespring" ) due in Falmouth from S Korea in next couple of hours for fitting "sensitive equipment" so we'll be able to refuel the Carrier Group I guess

Tidespring has been sat off Lands End all day.


We could refuel a carrier group now using the Waves. The Tides are not CVBG-specific. They replace the six smaller non-MARPOL compliant tankers we've gradually got rid of over the last seven years.


But you knew that anyway.

There has never been a SHIP based re-fueler that had anywhere close to 100 thousand pounds of gas to give. Ship based/capable tankers will always have much less than large land based tankers.


Even 4K pounds could provide useful in certain scenarios. I can imagine a Sea Harrier pair in 1982 would have loved an extra 2K pounds of gas each....


As for all the talk about a US Carrier in the Gulf, I think it likely there has been a carrier (sometimes 2) in or very near the Gulf much more often in the past 16 years than there has not been a carrier there....

Carriers in the Gulf are more a statement than a necessity.

But when it comes to AAR IIRC then USN relied almostly totally on the RAF in Bahrain in GWI, and the numerous sorties over Afghanistan wouldn't have happened without all the AAR sorties flown by the RAF and USAF from various Gulf bases.