Keep in mind that the very characteristics you cited above make for a very difficult and complex system. A hyperspectral targetting system that can reliably function through the heat of reentry is very difficult to design and build. To put 7000m/s in perspective, the muzzle velocity of the high velocity kinetic penetrator of a 120mm tank gun is less than 1,700m/s, or less than one fourth the speed of your ballistic missile penetrator. Maximum effective range of the tank penetrator is 3000m. That's a function of loss of kinetic energy AND targeting precision with range. This means your hypothetical multispectral targetting system needs to be orders of magnitude more precise than the tank's targeting system while trying to see thru the heat of re entry and subsequent flight at 7000m/s, all while resisting defensive EW.

As for intercepting such a system, the point is to intercept the re-entry vehicle which contains the sensors, computer systems, and manuevering systems, not the (presumably inert) penetrator. The Aegis system and Block 3 SM missiles can do a midcourse intercept (exoatmospheric), but that would likely require an Aegis ship stationed along the flight path between the launcher and carrier. The Block 4 can do an intercept during re-entry.

As for the speed of the CVN, that is indeed negligible for the terminal phases of the intercept. But the missile's total flight time is measured in tens of minutes. A carrier moves at roughly 1km/minute. Thus it is 10 to 20 km from its position relative to when the missile was fired. That's a pretty large expanse of ocean to search (over 1200 sq km) in a very short time as it re-enters and will require very robust maneuvering of the re-entry vehicle to make the intercept. This is a very very different and much much more complex problem than the one the Pershing system designed and built to solve. After re-entering, the Pershing MARV did a 25G pull up and a 30nm glide to the vicinity of its target. There was not a lot of kinetic energy left after the glide and great precision was not required since it had a W85 "dial a yield" nuke warhead.

I'm not saying taking out a carrier using a ballistic missile is not possible. They are indeed a real threat. But it is a much more difficult and complex problem than most folks realize. And assuming a nation did that successfully, the US would remain very capable of a devastating retaliation without resorting to nukes. They are essentially an effective area denial weapon. But so are mines. The mines are much much cheaper, but have the disadvantage of denying friendly as well as enemy entry into the area.

You have linked high speed with a precision problem, when the reverse can be true. You also introduced a premise that the target position would only be known at launch and then lost over many minutes so requiring a new search. Modern targeting information can come from off-board sources and form part of the updated guidance solution.

The Pershing example from nearly 50 years ago was to demonstrate the controllability and the ability for sensors to survive re-entry. What was incredibly difficult all those years ago is considerably easier now - the hard miles have been done. The Soviet Union's own anti-ship ballistic missile was fielded in the late 70's and had a CEP of around 300m against a ship so relied on a nuclear tip to close the final margin of error. Given modern systems and suitable money they could do much better today; but for money and effort you have to look at the Chinese.

As for the politics of the US devastating a country that managed to hit a CVN during a conflict, well that's not my area of expertise. I would like to hope that the US could take and accept a hit on a CVN in harms way doing its job, without triggering total war - but you never know.

The USN has flexed its muscles with CVNs rather effectively for many decades in a rather one-sided use of firepower. It is understandable that potential adversaries have worked hard to provide a credible counter. Your point about them providing an effective area denial weapon is well-made and reflects current USN thinking. The countermeasure cycle is without end.

Your points are well made JTO.:ok: I tend to think that, the Flat Top Fanatics often miss the point that, despite the romantic allure of shipborne air power, it remains vulnerable to total negation due to its complete reliance upon the fickle support of bouyancy. :uhoh:

OAP

Current fj fleets have dehumidifiers fitted when in hangars / shelters

WEBF

Are you imitating something? I am flattered! :)

OAP

The sun shelters are open-sided and of a style similar to those you'd expect to see used by the USAF in the Middle East, therefore you'd be trying to dehumidifying the planet! As I tried to explain, the jet has been tested ad nauseum in conditions far exceeding darkest Norfolk, plus those of most overseas locations we can expect to operate in. Total non-issue; "fake news" etc.

For MAD DOGS & Englishmen to get out of the NOON DAY SUN: [they are smart Dutchies but...]

https://www.defensie.nl/binaries/lar...2/img_1211.jpg

https://www.defensie.nl/binaries/lar...2/img_1211.jpg

Who needs ballistic missiles?

Ken...Your 1200 km2 appears to be based on the assumption that the boat can do anything from carrying on straight ahead, to stopping dead and immediately proceeding at full speed in any direction. I have never seen an aircraft carrier do that.

..."Really"...

of course as these basic models are due re manufacture shortly it wont really matter what happens to them..

However it's good to see some testing has been done on time and in budget then.....lol

What's due remanufacture shortly glad rag?

MSOCS,

Is Secretary James’ Block 3F full combat capability certification, as required by the Fiscal Year 2016 NDAA, still valid?
Answer by the DOT&E: For many reasons it is clear that Lot 10 aircraft that will begin delivery in 2018 will not initially have complete Block 3F capability.
- The program currently has 270 Block 3F unresolved high priority (Priority 1 & Priority 2 out of a 4 priority categorization) performance deficiencies, the majority of which cannot be addressed and verified prior to the Lot 1o aircraft deliveries.
- The program currently has 17 known and acknowledged failures to meet contract specification requirements, all of which the program is reportedly trying to get relief from the SDD contract due to lack of time and funding.

One of the items that must be redone for full Block 3F certification is retesting of the electronics in severe conditions within the flight envelope and operation theater. The new Block 3F electronics generate more heat requiring additional cooling to keep them within temperature operational limits. As time goes on, more deficiencies are bound to be discovered. All of the aircraft delivered without the full Block 3F capability will have to be reworked.

Turbine, aware. I'd still like to know what GR thinks needs to be rebuilt...

Possibly the F35B spars that have cracked under testing and need to be replaced, the ones that were once too heavy in Titanium, or has this situation been resolved?

Redesign incorporated in subsequent LRIP, but previous jets have been fixed.

Thanks for the update, I hope the weight penalty was not too high.

One can just imagine the rising outrage of the 'weight watchers' and their subsequent disappointment when it didn't noticeably affect aircraft performance.

For those concerned about their weight - here is some old news....

F-35B Variant Quotes from DOT&E 2016

First, please understand I enjoy technical discussions and am not arguing against the premise of ballistic anti-ship missiles.

You have linked high speed with a precision problem, when the reverse can be true.
That depends on the nature of the warhead. I got the impression that the warhead being discussed 1) is "dumb" (no sensors, etc) and 2) is hypersonic (7000 m/s!) and derives all its killing energy from its kinetics (no explosives). For the warhead to have retained that kind of velocity all the way to its target it would have to be released/ejected from the sensor section at very high altitude, and since it's inert it must fly a ballistic trajectory from then on. That means the sensor(s) must have long range while seeing thru the heat of re-entry and simultaneously have extraordinarily high precision to direct the ballistic warhead to the distant target with any hope of hitting it. Modern main battle tanks have very high precision sensors and yet they have an effective range on the order of a few kilometers. The system being described would require orders of magnitude greater precision.

You also introduced a premise that the target position would only be known at launch and then lost over many minutes so requiring a new search. Modern targeting information can come from off-board sources and form part of the updated guidance solution.
It would appear that if tensions had escalated to the point that a hostile nation would attempt to sink a CVN, that both sides would engage in extensive EW. Maintaining a datalink to the missile during its flight in such an environment would seem to be highly unlikely. Further, the survival of the "off-board" sensor system that is tracking the CVN would also seem to be highly unlikely.

The Pershing example from nearly 50 years ago was to demonstrate the controllability and the ability for sensors to survive re-entry.
Pershing had an ablative heat shield to protect the radar sensor from a mach 8 re-entry velocity (about one third the velocity of this system's claimed terminal velocity of 7000 m/s.) The entire re-entry system did a 25G pull up maneuver after reentry to bleed speed, followed by a 30nm controlled glide. The radar did not switch on until the final terminal phase of the flight at considerably lower altitude to update the inertials so as to provide a 100m CEP for that final terminal maneuver. That is totally different than the system being described.

What was incredibly difficult all those years ago is considerably easier now - the hard miles have been done.
Indeed. But the system being described operates totally differently than the Pershing system and the resulting problem is orders of magnitude more difficult than the Pershing problem. So basically, the "miles" of this new system are much longer and immensely more difficult than the "done" miles. And BTW, the "done" miles were done by the USA, which has not shared that technology with its allies, much less its adversaries.

I would like to hope that the US could take and accept a hit on a CVN in harms way doing its job, without triggering total war - but you never know.
I believe you are correct and "hits" on various US ships over the past decades tends to confirm that. However, the system being described is of a "carrier killer", specifically designed and used not just to "hit" a carrier, but to sink it outright. Assuming it is successful, that to me is quite a different kettle of fish that will result in a rather devastating counter blow even if that blow is "proportional." For perspective, use of 59 Tomahawk missiles to destroy an air base was considered "proportional" for the use of a few chemical weapons against civilians. It would seem (but cannot be confirmed) that a "proportional" strike for the sinking of a CVN would be considerably more devastating.

The USN has flexed its muscles with CVNs rather effectively for many for peresepdecades in a rather one-sided use of firepower. It is understandable that potential adversaries have worked hard to provide a credible counter. Your point about them providing an effective area denial weapon is well-made and reflects current USN thinking.
During the cold war, the entire Soviet fleet was a sea denial system specifically designed to deny access to US carrier battle groups. In my opinion, anti ship ballistic missiles are a land based version of the same thing. They would be great for example to place CVNs in jeopardy in any kind of operation to retake Taiwan. But to prevent US projection of military power anywhere else? In my opinion, not so useful.

I wonder if there is a reason the USN (and allies including the RN) are interested in theatre ballistic missile defence?

Another Stemming SRVL / CVF/ Warty Sim Story with good pitchas: (see duck legs thrashing about - is it a bird - is it a plane - is it a STEMulator?)

F-35 fighter jet simulator training begins for pilots

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/content/d...ator-large.jpg

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/content/d...ator-large.jpg

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/content/d...ator-large.jpg
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/content/d...ator-large.jpg

On the topic of simulation and training - there are other things to be considered. Such as:

Royal Navy Carrier Strike Group put to the test (January 2017)

The Commander UK Carrier Strike Group (COMUKCSG) battle staff has been conducting transatlantic exercises ahead of the arrival in Portsmouth later this year of HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH.

RN personnel have been taking part in Fleet Synthetic Training exercises used to put US Navy carrier strike groups through their paces.

Working from the Maritime Composite Training System site at HMS COLLINGWOOD, US carrier strike groups, including the USS HARRY S. TRUMAN, have worked with ops room personnel from HMS DRAGON and HMS RICHMOND, both of which played the vital protection role for the carrier.

Regular and reserve personnel from across the Naval Service, as well as colleagues from the RAF and defence experts from the US have also been involved in the role-playing.

The latest exercise saw COMUKCSG tested in warfighting techniques involving HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH and 36 F-35B strike fighter jets.

The recent deployment of HMS Ocean

As reported here, HMS Ocean returned not so long ago from a deployment which included command of the CTF 50 task group.

Captain Pedre said the patrol was historic for the length of the deployment and because of the command role of the ship for Commander Task Force 50 in the Gulf - the first Royal Navy warship to take on this role with the American fleet which usually takes this lead role from one of their carriers.

He said their spell in charge of the force has served as a vital stepping stone when it comes to operating the UK’s new aircraft carriers in the region in the future.

Later...

The final confirmation of the RN’s ability to direct aircraft carrier strike operations – looking forward to the new QUEEN ELIZABETH ships joining the Royal Navy fleet - was a three-day exercise in the central Gulf involving four navies, 19 ships and ten helicopters.

“We have pushed the boundaries of what we can operate,” says Capt Pedre. “This deployment will stand us in good stead with the QUEEN ELIZABETH.”

So what of this exercise - Unified Trident? It does get a mention here:

The ship has operated with 12 different planes, including a number of surveillance aircraft.

Does that mean twelve different types, or just twelve aircraft?

Yes - ship/aircraft integration matters

On this thread, and others most notably throughout the post SDSR 10 Decision to axe Harrier thread, many have persisted on describing carriers simply as floating airfields, and ignoring the role the ship plays in enabling flying.

I am reminded of this (from an RN Pilot) from a 2006 PPRuNe thread:

....if we want to tell MPs that we have a carrier ready to go that means getting the whole ship working to recover and throw off jets. That means the MCO getting the ATO, the stokers getting the donks up to ramming speed, the briefo's being ready on time, the tractor drivers getting the strike ready at the back having seen them all taxy into the grave yard......

...and from 2013 (and getting ready for QEC - including the use of simulation):

The bigger issue is getting everyone else to be ready for a large, busy flight deck. At least there is a team of people looking into this issue and both deckcrew, aircrew and engineers are being appropriately positioned to give them some exposure to this dangerous environment prior to QEC.

As for getting the right ship's head and Wind Over Deck for aircraft launch and recovery, see this from the ARRSE CVF thread:

At the end of the day it is the OOW who decides Green or Red. FLYCO can jump up and down all they like but they do not have Charge of the ship It is all in those words "I have the ship". However when conducting flying operations a CVF or LPH will have the FLYCO request flying course to meet the flying programme. The OOW will give a approval to commence operations but can always cancel that authorisation if they need to manoeuvre etc. At the end of the day a 23 year old junior officer has a lot of power on a warship and only the CO, XO or other delegated officer (say Spec N) can override them and then only by taking Charge with the word 'I have the ship" or issuing a conning order.

The above account seems to confirm the wisdom of requiring only Naval Aviators to captain aircraft carriers in the USN. In the "black shoe" world vs "brown shoe" world of a USN aircraft carrier (black shoe are ship's company officers, brown shoe are carrier airwing officers) the captain of a USN aircraft carrier ALWAYS wears wings of gold and brown shoes. This ensures that the airboss has the influence and clout he needs to get the aviation job done.

KenV,

That wisdom resonates with me also. It is archaic, dis-Joint and frankly ridiculous to view the aircraft onboard as purely weapon systems of the ship, to be used solely at the behest and whim of the Captain and his team. The Captain is the head of the ship (or MTG if roled as Cdre) and responsible for the 600+ souls on board; he directs and empowers his people to carry out their duties. Such duties are ensuring flying operations can be conducted safely. Without those on duty, not a wheel would turn. The same could be argued for an airfield, quite easily. The difference is the environment - at sea everything is trying to kill you as an aviator, and when you least expect it, but I know you know this only too well (this is to try and help those that don't!)

PersonalIy, I don't subscribe wholly to the simplistic 'floating airfield' derisory remark but there undeniable similarities: The role of the carrier is to get the aircraft where required, able to conduct their missions (which might well be to protect the MTG!); it's why they carry the aircraft - but ultimately those aircraft are at the end of a line of enablers. The jets and helicopters do it all at higher speeds, and, when needed, with a large bang at the end. The critical bit is to in no way stymie the aircraft's capabilities and role through misuse, poor understanding and appreciation, ignorance or Service pettiness. That helps nobody, weakens the end product, and puts everyone backwards not forwards.

Instead it just needs to get done. Together. Jointly. Ignoring the dinosaurs of the past (even the recent past), because those dinosaurs clearly demonstrate zero understanding of the capability at all, especially when one reads some of the spiteful tosh they complain about to the various Ministers and News columns.

So, rant off (sorry!) and let's get cracking. It'll be what we make it.

From my reading there are many stories about the USN carriers turning off wind whilst an aircraft is approaching (usually at night). Thankfully the aircrew survive - usually humourously. At least one RAN FAA S2E/G was on finals to see MELBOURNE moving one way or t'uther. An A4G was lost overboard because the Bridge ordered a turn during a storm when the A4G was being moved - the black shoe excuse - the aircraft in FlyOne not visible from bridge, view blocked by an S2. The A4G brakeman in a float coat survived his ordeal, being rescued by a nearby destroyer rescue swimmer. Sadly not many - if any - RAN Carrier Captains had FAA experience, sometimes aircrew under blackshoe instruction may have been on the bridge to impart some wisdom. :}

Steve George has written a great article 'why a carrier is not an airfield' in 2012; however it may have a different title online: It used to be here & here: (I'll attempt to upload a PDF of it - SUCCESS! - it is PRN - reprinted)

http://www.phoenixthinktank.org/wp-c...fcaropsPTT.pdf
&
http://www.phoenixthinktank.org/2012...erations-work/

IIRC, before they reorganised in the 1990s, the USAF worked the same way and had a base commander/wing commander airbase command structure. Base commander ran and defended the base but was not in the command chain for air operations, wing commander was of equal or greater rank and ran air operations.

Found it.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stru...ir_Force#Group

Sorry for the delay in replying - the last few days have been a bit hectic.

Is the Captain's background really a factor, or the fact that the USN takes it very seriously, with carrier qualification, work ups, constant training, and integration of ship and air wing? Practice make perfect!

I am pretty certain that aboard a (RN) carrier/LPH it is FLYCO that gives 'Yes' or 'No' to both launch or take off - either the Cdr (Air) or the Lt Cdr (Flying), both of whom are aviators. So they (or the LSO) will request a flying course/speed from the OOW - who also has to maintain situational awareness of things such as other aircraft, navigational hazards, or ship defects.

What is wrong with seeing the aircraft as the ship's weapons (and sensors)? Why does this imply they are solely to be used at the Captain's behest? A Minehunter's weapons are her sonar, mine disposal system, and divers. Would you say they are for her Captain's whim? Of course not, all the ships in the task group are there to perform a role as part of a task group/joint force.

The reason referring to a carrier as a 'floating airfield' alarms me is that it misses the point - a carrier is completely different with both advantages and complexities.

Minister says that aircraft carrier... 06 May 2017

"Will soon arrive for scrapping. It is a costly capability the UK cannot afford, there are far greater needs now and, I might lose my job!" :D

OAP

Still wonder what will comprise the "UK Carrier Strike Group"

If it's anything like the USN version it would just be easier to call it "the whole RN Surface Fleet"

Depends if it ever intends to deploy to an area where there is a threat without being in a TF including a US carrier and its escorts.

I remember all too well an afternoon 35 years ago when I was recovering in 50' cloudbase and <1/4 mile vis and the ship turned hard to stbd when I was about 1/4 mile out. I called visual with the wake and headed for it - but it turned out to be the bow-wave! Ended up flying under the bows at 30', executing a scoshy, jet-borne 270 turn to hover alongside the fwd lift before climbing into cloud to land. When asked by the Captain (an ex-aviator!) what I was doing, Cdr (air) replied "I think he is crashing, Sir!"

Ah, happy days. Swing the lamp!

OAP

You are aware they are mostly bought and paid for?

As for our needs - well it might have escaped your attention but the RN recently commanded CTF 50 (normally commanded from a US flat top) for several months. Surely being able to do it and hit the terrorists ashore ourselves would have made much more sense?

Also being able to deal with over flights, and carry out long range ASW with multiple helicopters based aboard the carrier might be useful in facing up to Russia.

HH

As I understand it, QE and POW will routinely deploy with a Type 45 destroyer, one or two frigates, an SSN, and a couple of RFAs. This is strangely similar to a USN carrier deploying with a cruiser and a couple of destroyers. See here for an example.

Remember:

1. The number of ships devoted to protecting the carrier is actually quite low.
2. The carrier provides C3 for other ships in theatre.
3. Ships in a task group can move and be retasked.

WEBF - it's not that I think we can't form a small CBG - we can as you detail

BUT what else will we have left?

We have had serious problems keeping a single T45 in active service over the last two years - and we normaly appear to have only 2 SSN's on patrol at any one time.. we have 2 Fast Fleet tankers and by 2019 4 Tidesprings - supporting the CBG will probably require two out of the 6 available tankers. We're getting "up to 12 " T26's - let's hope for 10 - so maybe 3 on active sduty at one time to replace the T23's - which we kept 4-5 on duty.

A CBG has to train together to be effective and so these ships will be committed for quite a long period

I foresee that a substantial proportion of the Navy - which is already stretched to breaking point - will be tied up around the Carrier and not available for the tasks which are cuurently considered to be required. Something will have to give I'm afraid

Harry - the T45 availability has been seriously overplayed in the press. Don't believe all you read.

6 Tankers is a very high number indeed - far greater than all other NATO (or most other navies) other than the USN. The need for tankers isn't as great as some make it out to be for individual escorts, so 6 is plenty to give availability. You'll only need one hull anyway due to the different operating routines of RFA vessels.

Thank you fanatic.
As usual, for a fanatic, your points are simplistic and bear no weight. There is no doubt; the second canoe is already waiting for the scrap man and the first will be going there, just as soon as there is a suitable political opportunity. :hmm:
The spending on UK carrier capability is totally inappropriate. Other aspects of UK Forces and capability are far more deserving than a big floating gin-palace.:ugh:

OAP

Jimlad - I 'm sure that the T45 situation is (relatively) short term due to resolvable technical issues (and maybe some short term cash shortage?) but I still worry that we're ADDING roles when we clearly don't have enough vessels to do what we currently want to do.

If we had a couple more 45's, maybe 16 26s and a couple more Astutes coming as well as the manpower to man them I'd say we could do it - but today's papers are full of another SDR after the election with a 60day mini-Review underway now at No.10 and no-one seems to think there'll be more $$$

Harry - RN has been stopping roles for some time. The last 1SL went to PM and made clear what was at risk if it wasnt allowed to stop doing stuff. Cost him hos shot at CDS but he was listened to.

Sad isn't it?

But I still don't see the Body Politic wising up to just how bad it really is... the drumbeat is still cuts, cuts cuts