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SLXOwft 14th May 2024 11:27

Navy Lookout is reporting 'The Defence Secretary will confirm in a speech today that the MRSS programme has been approved and the RN will receive up to 6 amphibious vessels'


Limited detail is available at this stage but 3 main issues need to be resolved. Firstly the RN must decide what form these ships will take, whether essentially just modern, lean-manned equivalents of today’s vessels or something more radical. As the Commando Force moves towards light, agile raiding operations and with its supporting shipping pushed much further away from the coast, the new amphibious vessels need to adapt. Navy sources describe the vessels as “non-complex warships” that will have hangars, a well dock, generous storage for containerised systems (PODS) and an emphasis on the ability to deploy uncrewed systems as well as troops.

Secondly, as the government is committed to construction in the UK, industry must work to build up adequate shipbuilding capacity. Finally and most urgently, the RN must grip personnel issues right now to ensure it can generate crews for new ships as they are completed in future.

A MoU signed with the RNLN in June 2023 to cooperate on MRSS design has not survived contact with reality. In keeping with past attempts to jointly develop naval platforms with European partners, political goodwill and some common needs could not be aligned with differing requirements, philosophies and funding. A Dutch navy spokesman said “The budget is different and the concept is different. That’s why we have diverged from the British and have come to the conclusion that we cannot build identical ships”. Some coordination on sub systems, landing craft and aviation compatibility are hoped for.
NL are positing a ship in the region of 20,000 tons so (assuming full load) slightly heavier than both Albion and Bay classes, lighter than Argus or Juan Carlos, roughly Mistral or Ocean.
Many questions come to mind, including:
  • How are they to be crewed? RFA, RN or RFA/RN split? Currently both would be a problem numbers wise,
  • Will they have C4 capability? If so will the kit be modular and only fitted on a role specific basis?
  • NL's contacts say hangars but how big a deck, full or behind super structure?
  • What defensive suite will they get, sensors, weapons, decoys, datalink etc?
One would think agile insertion requires flexibility to have a reasonably large mixed RW/RPAS force for troop insertion/retrieval, ISR, armed support, CSAR etc. Ideally one would want the possibility of organic FW are support but that's not going to happen is it?

As I have said before, IMHO the ideal would be a mix of LHD and LPD(A) which might be provided by a common hull and machinery with modular systems. The denizens of the House of Darkness, however, will be happy to trade potential lost lives for saving a few quid on the acquisition cost.

2.5% or preferably 3% of GDP might be a sustainable defence budget going forward, the problem is that no politician is going to handle the short-to-medium term requirement to address filling the asset gaps caused by 24 years of deluded underspend. Especially when snake oil salesmen are selling the illusion of cheap uncrewed and AI based solutions. Here endeth the rant.

ORAC 14th May 2024 12:31


Without wanting to appear to belittle him and acknowledging the fact that RFA Ts&Cs including salaries are clearly not attracting or retaining sufficient numbers, he is effectively a student who is being paid and not running up debts of £9k plus living costs per year.
May I suggest you read the thread I previous posted regarding his recruitment and his previous experience before, in fact, belittling him?

https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1...592631019.html

BACKGROUND

I’m a healthy 57 yr old, with previous RAF HMC&E maritime service back in the new romantic 80s.

I've just exited my own SIGINT company after 30 yrs, and handed this over to a colleague. We specialised in UK/NATO/RoW Government-only grade, niche SIGINT & processing technology; predominantly LEO/GEO satellites.

I’m not a hallowed graduate, as I was commissioned into the RAF when I was 19, without going to Uni.


I’m therefore predominantly self-taught, A Level educated, with the odd third-party cse here and there”…….

Asturias56 14th May 2024 15:58

"The denizens of the House of Darkness, however, be happy to trade potential lost lives for saving a few quid on the acquisition cost."

I doubt they'll finish up being low cost - a 20,000 ton Mistral equivalent - built in the UK as well........... and once again we can't seem to agree anything with the Europeans so its a one off design for our use only. That's not a good omen.

Your list of questions is a good one - only I doubt they have any real idea of what the answers might be




SLXOwft 14th May 2024 17:44

ORAC,
I should have been clearer that I was only responding to Compass Calls's comment about minimum wage.

I was already aware of Sean's posts and admired his willingess to consider entering the RFA as an apprentice with the concomitant remuneration. Beancounters will only pay the minimum they can get away with. The RFA isn't unique in failing to have the flexibility to allow entry at non-standard points in the hierarchy and recognise relevant experience (in his case specialism and sea time) by pay - rigidity in recruitment is widespread in the public sector and the more hidebound institutionalized private sector.

The ability to rely on high unemployment and a sense of public duty to recruit sufficient of the best candidates in the defence sector is long gone. Adherence to rigid pay scales and age restrictions don't help, we live in a world where Ts&Cs need to be negotiable to attract the best individuals. There needs to be an acceptance that training is a punt and expectations of ROS may be an inappropriate discincentive and service notice periods are unrealistic for those with considerable experience (ramble, ramble)

WE Branch Fanatic 14th May 2024 17:55


Originally Posted by langleybaston (Post 11653463)
The diagram suggests there is only one range ........... instantaneous ............ at which detection occurs.


Originally Posted by langleybaston (Post 11653463)

Whoever signed this off needs a new job.

OK so we know better, but people get paid for such nonsense.


What exactly does your first sentence mean?

It is a diagram that illustrates the lobe of the main beam from a warship's radar, and the radar horizon. It demonstrates why low flying prevents long range detection by surface radars - think of the Argentine tactics in the Falklands. The only answer is airborne radar. Just as airborne radar provides early detection, early engagement by fighters provides the best opportunity to defeat incoming raids, particularly if the enemy aircraft are armed with anti ship missiles that can be fired beyond the range of ship based defences.

All fundamental stuff really - as noted by a comment from a former US Navy flyer on thread about why carriers needed are in the Atlantic (and elsewhere of course) for Air Defence and ASW:

...the primary mission for the CV/CVN in the North Atlantic was not ASW (it was an additional role) but rather AAW to prevent the Backfire/Bears from attacking the convoys. The A-6/A-7s were the organic tankers to push the F-4/F-14 CAP stations out to a range to shoot the archer, not the arrows...

There is also the 1977 RN training film at the IWM Collections: Principles of Anti Air Warfare


Originally Posted by SLXOwft (Post 11654956)
Navy Lookout is reporting 'The Defence Secretary will confirm in a speech today that the MRSS programme has been approved and the RN will receive up to 6 amphibious vessels'



NL are positing a ship in the region of 20,000 tons so (assuming full load) slightly heavier than both Albion and Bay classes, lighter than Argus or Juan Carlos, roughly Mistral or Ocean.
Many questions come to mind, including:
  • How are they to be crewed? RFA, RN or RFA/RN split? Currently both would be a problem numbers wise,
  • Will they have C4 capability? If so will the kit be modular and only fitted on a role specific basis?
  • NL's contacts say hangars but how big a deck, full or behind super structure?
  • What defensive suite will they get, sensors, weapons, decoys, datalink etc?
One would think agile insertion requires flexibility to have a reasonably large mixed RW/RPAS force for troop insertion/retrieval, ISR, armed support, CSAR etc. Ideally one would want the possibility of organic FW are support but that's not going to happen is it?

As I have said before, IMHO the ideal would be a mix of LHD and LPD(A) which might be provided by a common hull and machinery with modular systems. The denizens of the House of Darkness, however, be happy to trade potential lost lives for saving a few quid on the acquisition cost.

2.5% or preferably 3% of GDP might be a sustainable defence budget going forward, the problem is that no politician is going to handle the short-to-medium term requirement to address filling the asset gaps caused by 24 years of deluded underspend. Especially when snake oil salesmen are selling the illusion of cheap uncrewed and AI based solutions. Here endeth the rant.


Meanwhile, as was feared - two of our dwindling number of frigates are to be axed. HMS Argyll has been reportedly in a poor state for years, but the loss of HMS Westminster means losing another Type 2087 fitted one. Neither ship is fully crewed or active at the moment, and the RN is still living with Cameron's decision to deny an uplift of around 1500 people to the RN (and a similar one to the RAF) at the time of SDSR 15, but still it seems painful.

There is some confusion between 'efficient' and 'effective' in the policies of successive Governments. The idea promulgated since the 1980s by politicians that business practice can be applied to military organisations is seriously misplaced.

The business notions of efficiency of production and operation are narrow concepts for single products/services which rarely put people's lives in jeopardy. The military does not, and cannot, work in the same way. Too much depends on the tools being provided to them working properly in situations not conceived of by anyone. In a combat operation, people's lives depend on the kit, weapons and tools working in extremis, and possibly not in their originally intended role. An office worker taking a delivery of the wrong sort of paper-clips does not seem to reach the same level of criticality...


From page 327 of British Defence Planning and Britain’s NATO commitment, 1979 – 1985 - a 2016 PhD thesis by Dr Kenton White.

SLXOwft 14th May 2024 21:31

SoS's statement as delivered can be found here https://www.gov.uk/government/speech...etarys-address

No mention of Westminster or the retention of Albion and Bulwark. Sugar coating the disposal of HMS Argyll (or Argyle as PlymouthLive would sa:)y)

The slithy tove had already told the BBC 'three ships would "definitely" be built and there were "plans to construct the next three".' :oh:

The RN website is more informative confirming the LPDs remain until 2023/2024 and Westminster is to decommission.
https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-an...nes-operations


MRSS will be extremely versatile warships, able to deploy on a wider variety of operations, and designed to carry vehicles, aircraft, insertion craft and a broad range of uncrewed systems for complicated missions. They will also be able to act as primary casualty receiving ships, providing urgent medical care to British forces wherever they are deployed.
The MOD has entered the first, or concept, phase of the MRSS Programme and will work with industry as part of early market engagement ahead of developing the vessel design.
MRSS Programme Director, Commander Alex Allen said: “As the son of a Royal Marine who fought in the Falklands War, I recognise the importance of this capability to a global navy.
“But these ships must be ready to meet a future threat where they will be required to exploit new technology and change roles quickly.
“Adaptability and flexibility will be central to the Multi Role Support Ship design, as will interoperability with our NATO allies.
“This announcement is a significant step in the programme bringing these ships into service and modernising the Royal Navy’s littoral strike capability.”
The First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Ben Key, said: “I am delighted that the Secretary of State has cemented the future of our Royal Marines by committing to this new class of up to six amphibious vessels.
“These will be the most capable amphibious warships the nation has ever owned, designed to be fully interchangeable with our closest allies in Europe, and in NATO.
P.S. Once Westminster's refit was delayed given she was the next ASW T23 due to go it was inevitable. Similarly Argyll was the next GP due to go an her crew members can be better used elsewhere. Looking at keeping the remainder in service as long as necessary, it is down to affordability an best use of the money; MoD and the Navy Board would ber wise not to be taken in by the sunk cost fallacy when resources are needed elsewhere, particulary in ensuring T26, T2531 and fingers crossed T2432 are in service asap.

ORAC 15th May 2024 05:24

Sir Humphrey not impressed…

​​​​​​​A 10% cut to the Royal Navy escort fleet was announced today, alongside not fully funded plans to deliver up to 6 'Multi Role Support Ships' to replace the LPD/LSD and ATS vessels. Is this really a 'golden age of shipbuilding'?

Thread+ Blog - https://tinyurl.com/bdzfrfuz

Asturias56 15th May 2024 07:21

Times POLITICAL SKETCH this morning

Grant Shapps provides our best proof that deepfakes are already here

The defence secretary was witness to the terrifying power of artificial intelligence on Good Morning Britain. Some viewers may have struggled to tell human and machine apart

Good morning Grant Shapps, we can be sure it’s you can’t we?” said Susanna Reid. It certainly looked like Grant Shapps, but it’s always wise to check. “Would you know how to spot a deepfake?” read the on-screen caption. Grant Shapps smiled gamely. The defence secretary knows better than most that deepfakes can actually be quite easy to spot.

And what happens after that? Could a deepfake become, I don’t know, the secretary of state for defence of an independent nuclear power? “There are some aspects of this that you’ll appreciate I can’t talk about,” said Shapps. This must have been one of them.

The main thing he couldn’t talk about though, was the “up to six new warships” he’d just announced he was going to provide for the Royal Marines. He couldn’t talk about it because in his five-minute-long interview, given shortly before a speech at some fancy naval defence conference, he wasn’t asked a single thing about it.

Others had done though. He’d been on Today on BBC Radio 4 just a few minutes before, where they’d wanted to know if these “up to six” warships were the same “up to six” warships that were announced two years ago. No. No they weren’t. But actually, erm, yes they were. “We have previously talked about replacing those ships,” he told Justin Webb. “Today we’ve been able to bring those plans to fruition.”

Yes. It’s not just words anymore. Now it’s action. No longer are we just saying we’re going to build up to six ships. Now we really are going to build up to six ships. We’re not sure exactly when, or exactly how many, but this is definitely a really big deal. Could he, possibly, give any more detail on what was meant by up to six? “Well we’ll definitely build the first three, then there are plans in place for the next three.” Whether those plans for the next three involve maybe just printing off some new name badges for the original three he did not say.

At one point the “up to six” magically became 28 but by that point no one was really listening. Something didn’t seem quite right. His lips were moving but the words that came out made no sense.

Davef68 15th May 2024 08:42


Originally Posted by Asturias56 (Post 11655468)
Times POLITICAL SKETCH this morning

“Well we’ll definitely build the first three, then there are plans in place for the next three.” .

Like the plans for twelve Type 45 destroyers, or thirteen Type 26 Frigates....

The six is a one for one replacement of Albion, Bulwark, Argus and the three remaining Bay class RFAs. Any bets on these being RFA flagged rather than White Ensign? With ensuing manning issues

ORAC 15th May 2024 14:27

https://archive.ph/2024.05.15-091123...ears-0kmk00q2p

Titanic shipyard could face closure after 160 years

British Navy ships could be built in Spain if chancellor blocks support package for historic Harland & Wolff shipbuilder in Belfast

ORAC 15th May 2024 15:59


Times POLITICAL SKETCH this morning
Daily cartoon from same issue.

https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....d8cdfcf85.jpeg

SLXOwft 15th May 2024 17:01

Ben Wallace has been laying the blame on the late Nick Hunt's boy's opposition to the National Shipbuilding Strategy. It strikes me there is a lot of brinkmanship involved.

The Times article includes:

“All 28 ships will be built in the UK,” the (Whitehall) source said. They added that in the worst-case scenario, if Harland & Wolff closed, the ships would still be built in the UK, but gave no further details.
The Belfast Telegraph is reporting H&W's response:

But in a statement, a spokesperson for Harland & Wolff said: “Our application for a UKEF Export Development Guarantee has not been rejected and the process is ongoing.

“We will not comment further on inaccurate speculation.”

DUP interim leader Gavin Robinson, the East Belfast MP, also said: “Today's headlines are wide of the mark. Strong support for the yard in London.”
Back to MRSS,
I'm marginally more hopeful than Sir Humphrey betting on 4/5, the comedian in my head says they will be RM crewed, in reality replacing both Warships (LPD) and Auxiliaries LSD(A) with a common platform raises questions about what roles require Naval rather than Auxiliary crew to perform. More importantly there is the restriction of Belligerant acts against state parties to vessels defined as warships not auxiliaries e.g. Royals can be sent to attack ISIS from Argus but an attack on IRG units from her may be a war crime. There is also the issue that RFAs can visit ports that are closed to commissioned warships. All new RFA members have had a compulsory Maritime Reserve membership for some time but it remains voluntary for those who were already in.

Then there is the 10k ton warship and 15k ton auxiliary limits for passage into the Black Sea:E.

I'm not sure what the implications on RN v RFA crewing is of Ben Key's statement as reported by The Times but he refers to the LPD crews of 400 being replaced by crews of c.100 but the Bay class core crew is 60-70 and Argus's is 80 RFA plus 50 RN aviation support.


Admiral Sir Ben Key, the first sea lord, said the advance of technology meant that machines could take on the roles traditionally performed by large numbers of navy personnel.
Instead of a crew of about 400, up to six new multi-role support ships coming into service from the 2030s could have a crew of about 100. This would also help to solve a recruitment crisis that has engulfed the armed forces and left ships short of sailors.
“If you look at the new MRSS (multi-role support ships), which clearly is a design still to settle, I would anticipate the crew of that will be much smaller than the crew of [HMS] Albion or Bulwark, which is around 400,” Key said in a briefing on the fringes of the First Sea Lord’s Sea Power Conference 2024, hosted by the Council on Geostrategy.
“There are good reasons for this, technology allows you to reduce the numbers. Why would you put into harm’s way more people than you need to?”
Key said there was a “sweet spot” somewhere between a crew size of 250 and 30. A navy source predicted the figure would be between 100 to 130, adding that a crew smaller than that would struggle to carry out the tasks expected of it.
By reducing the crew, sailors would no longer have to carry out “menial tasks that people don’t like doing”, such as painting the ship, Key said, adding that the navy could instead focus on recruiting those with specialist skills.
One better bit in the statement was (re-)confirmation that T26 and T31 will receive a land attack capability - FC/ASW aka SPEAR 5.

Asturias56 16th May 2024 06:40


Originally Posted by ORAC (Post 11655813)
https://archive.ph/2024.05.15-091123...ears-0kmk00q2p

Titanic shipyard could face closure after 160 years

British Navy ships could be built in Spain if chancellor blocks support package for historic Harland & Wolff shipbuilder in Belfast

Checkout the people (ex-Infrastrata) who are currently behind H&W - they have a long history of investing in small businesses and have a wonderful record of getting large amounts of tax payers cash in N ireland - check out their plans for a vast gas storage project a few years back.

ORAC 16th May 2024 07:13

Asturias56,

Just as a reminder this loan was on very shaky legal grounds when first suggested, if the official advice is to refuse it, I can understand the Treasury saying no - and the governmental would be in very thin ice to override them…

https://archive.ph/2024.03.11-003808...olff-8xtfmfdb8

Ministers accused of ‘backdoor bailout’ for Harland &Wolff

SLXOwft 16th May 2024 09:59

It isn't a loan, it's a guarantee which H&W are seeking to enable them to secure refinancing on more favourable terms. H&W are predicting EBITDA break-even in FY24 and increasing revenues going into the future. The preservation of the Belfast and Appledore yards surely meets the NSS aims of competition within the UK (especially beyond the cosy BAES/Babcock duopoly) particular for HMG funded vessels, and social benefit. As far as I can see the guarantee is to cover a loan which will be repaid to a large extent from revenues earned from HMG. To me there was a very strong argument for the exception to the 80% rule on national security grounds, as we have gone over ad nauseam the loss of naval shipbuilding capacity has been inflicted by a succession of UK governments putting off replacement of warships - which has also led to the T23s being knackered.

I also understand that some Spanish government export guarantees (not necessarily directly equivalent) are for up to 99%, which may (I'm only guessing) influence Navantia's thinking. Given Hunt's views on benefit recipients he probably thinks H&W should be condemned to the business equivalent of a Victorian workhouse.

H&W issued a statement for investors via the London Stock Market news service in response to the Times story.

ORAC 16th May 2024 10:20

https://www.navylookout.com/peregrin...he-royal-navy/

Peregrine rotary wing UAV to enter service with the Royal Navy

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....866186ec18.jpg

SLXOwft 16th May 2024 11:05


Originally Posted by ORAC (Post 11656412)
https://www.navylookout.com/peregrin...he-royal-navy/

Peregrine rotary wing UAV to enter service with the Royal Navy


Peregrine will fly in conjunction with the Wildcat helicopter but its data can be fed directly into the ship’s combat management system, (unlike the Wildcat which lacks a TDL), aiding situational awareness and rapid decision-making.
I thought the idiocy of procuring Wildcat without Link-16 was in the process of being corrected?

Mogwi 16th May 2024 11:52

Blimey, not much ground clearance!

Mog

Davef68 16th May 2024 15:01

Just happens to look like a shark I'm sure....

SLXOwft 17th May 2024 15:40

Navy Lookout is reporting 'sources' say Westminster's S2087 will be fitted to the Iron Duck, which would mean taking a ship that only emerged from a 49 month LIFEX last June out of service for several more months.

dctyke 18th May 2024 12:09

https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/brit...s-guns-fitted/

Asturias56 19th May 2024 06:47


Originally Posted by dctyke (Post 11657987)

Thanks for the link - interesting discussion/arguments about the necessity /desirability of carriers carrying any defensive armament at all following that article.

ORAC 21st May 2024 11:41

https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/brit...g-of-carriers/

Britain ‘assessing options’ to increase air wing of carriers

In response to a parliamentary question from Conservative MP Damien Moore, the Ministry of Defence has addressed the potential retrofitting of Queen Elizabeth Class (QEC) aircraft carriers.Moore inquired if the Department would evaluate the benefits of adding catapults, additional angled decks, and arresting wires to the carriers.

James Cartlidge, the Minister of State for Defence, provided insight into the ongoing plans for these state-of-the-art vessels. According to Cartlidge, the aircraft carriers were constructed with the flexibility to accommodate future capability enhancements throughout their operational lives.

“The Queen Elizabeth Class Aircraft Carriers (QEC) were built to allow for capability changes over the lifetime of these ships. The Royal Navy is committed to developing capabilities that will allow it to build combat mass, whilst remaining at the forefront of technology, and this includes a strong focus on uncrewed air systems,” Cartlidge stated.

He further explained that the aviation capabilities of the QEC carriers are set to evolve in the coming years. A detailed analysis is currently underway to explore and assess various options for operating a broader range of aircraft. This includes a review of the launch and recovery systems, spurred by the recent successful trials of the Mojave and Windracer systems.

“As such, the aviation capabilities of the QEC aircraft carriers will continue to evolve in the coming years and the operation of a wider variety of aircraft is being considered as part of a detailed analysis to scope and assess options. The launch and recovery systems for these new capabilities is currently under review, following the recent successful trials of Mojave and Windracer,” Cartlidge added.

What are those plans?

At the ‘Combined Naval Event 2023’ conference held in Farnborough in May, Colonel Phil Kelly, the Head of Carrier Strike and Maritime Aviation within the Royal Navy’s Develop Directorate, presented an ambitious vision for the Royal Navy’s future in maritime aviation.

This vision, part of the broader Future Maritime Aviation Force (FMAF) initiative, includes ‘Project Ark Royal’.

Colonel Kelly’s presentation highlighted several pivotal challenges and objectives:
  1. F-35 Deployment Limitations: The colonel pointed out the current constraints, stating, “Lack of Mass – F35 mass will not reach level required to resource both QEC with full Combat Air potential.
  2. Urgency for Uncrewed Platforms: Emphasising the inevitability of adopting these platforms, he noted, “The question is not ‘if’ the Naval force will prioritise and leverage un-crewed platforms and systems, but how quickly and efficiently, in resource constrained environments.
  3. Automation for Increased Capacity: Colonel Kelly underscored the importance of automation, “We must free up warfighter capabilities for critical operations, by automating routine/repetitive tasks.
  4. Operational Complexities: The focus is on “operating in complex and contested areas all the while reducing the risk to life, force, and mission.
  5. Enhancing Operational Reach: The presentation highlighted the need to “increase our range, endurance, and persistence in order to build advantage.
As part of the FMAF vision, the Royal Navy aims to retrofit arrestor gear and assisted launch equipment to the Queen Elizabeth class, you can read more on this here.

https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....b1ff2ac1ee.jpg

WE Branch Fanatic 21st May 2024 21:01

That looks like an old article. Combined Naval Event 2023?

Here is a far more recent story: Aircraft Carriers Underpin Royal Navy Plans To Use UAS To Help Build Maritime Mass - Naval News

Three key programmes are:
  • a fixed-wing UAS to replace the carrier-borne, Merlin helicopter-based Crowsnest airborne early warning (AEW) system, which is due to retire at the end of the decade;
  • the Future Crewed Maritime Air System (FCMAS), which will assess longer-term capability options, beyond the in-service Merlin and Wildcat helicopters, for various tasks including search-and-rescue, joint personnel recovery, and maritime counter-terrorism;
  • the Vertical Take-Off/Landing Autonomous Collaborative Platforms (VTOL ACP), which aims to develop – in collaboration with crewed aircraft and surface ships – future intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance (ISR), logistics, and strike capabilities, post-Merlin and Wildcat.
Removing Crowsnest from Merlin will have the effect of increasing the number of ASW Merlins, as those aircraft will be able to return to their original role, which is desperately needed - remember ASW is a carrier role. Some of you may have noted that the main conclusions over on the 1977 US Congress Report: The US Sea Control Mission (carriers needed in the Atlantic for Air Defence and ASW - due to Maths/Physics/Geography) discussion have been refined to better explain things:

A. Sea Control (ASW, air defence/AAW, and anti surface warfare) is a critically important mission for the carrier and the carrier group. It was during the Second World War and the Cold War, and it is again now in a renewed era of peer adversaries and contested seas.

B. Sea Control is difficult to achieve without carrier aviation if operating any distance from friendly air bases.

The carrier puts fighters in close proximity to the assets or area to be defended without needing an excessive number of aircraft, and Geography, Mathematics, and Physics show that attacking aircraft carrying anti ship missiles are best dealt with using fighters to kill the archers, not the arrows. Airborne radar can see far beyond the radar horizon of shipborne ones and can detect low altitude targets at range, and fighters provide the means for interception and visual identification beyond the horizon, and engagement far beyond the range of shipborne missile systems.

Constant ASW helicopter operations are best supported by a large deck with multiple helicopters, as collocating them simplifies coordination, communications, and maintenance and support. Physics also shows that modern long range sonars fitted to ASW warships need to be used in conjunction with dipping sonar to achieve their potential - andvice versa. As with all such detection systems (radar/sonar/optical) there is trade off between range and resolution. The long range sonar provides long range detection, and the dipping sonar provides pinpoint accuracy.

Perhaps things were best described by the late Cdr Sharkey Ward in a few paragraphs in Sea Harrier Over The Falklands:


There were essentially three elements of naval warfare which had to be controlled and directed from the Ops Room: Above the Surface (Air), On the Surface, and Under the Surface (Anti submarine). These were very much interbred and interdependent, thanks to the variety of modem weapons available to the fleet and the sophistication of the modern threat. It was therefore no easy task to collect and collate the information from all the ship's sensor (including aircraft sensors and information from other platforms) and present them to the Command in an easily digestible fashion. All friendly units in each element had to be continuously plotted and information from the separate levels of defence recorded, so that in extremitis the Command could judge priority and take the appropriate action.

Defence in depth had become the war fighting philosophy of the day. Against the air threat, the outer layer of defence could be air to air and surface to air systems provided by a third party and deployed some point between the source of the threat and the fleet at sea. In the South Atlantic there was no such layer available and the Task Group had to rely on its organic defensive weapon platforms.

The outer layer of air and surface defence was the Sea Harrier on Combat Air Patrol. Whenever the threat assessment made air attack highly possible, or probable, then CAP aircraft would be stationed up threat to deter and/or engage the attackers. (Should a surface attack be predicted then the SHAR would be dispatched over the horizon to search for the enemy units.) Air defence radar pickets (warships fitted with suitable sensors and weapon systems) would also be stationed up threat, but inside the CAP stations, to provide information to the CAP and the Carrier Group itself. These pickets would be armed with a variety of surface to air weapons and represented a second line of defence. The next layer of defence was the the medium or long range surface to air ship borne missile system. Sea Dart fulfilled this role for the Group. Attackers or their air to surface missiles that managed to penetrate through the outer layers of defence would then face the next designer system - the Short Range or Point Defence Missile Systems such as Sea Wolf. And, as a last ditch defence (on the hard kill side), high rate of fire, radar directed guns such as Phalanx fitted bill. Soft kill options, such as jamming and chaff were also an important integral part of the air defence in depth scenario.

If one analyses the probabilities of engagement and kill of each of the layers of defence, and calculates the overall probabilities of engagement and kill of the cumulative system, it is easy to demonstrate mathematically and in practice that money spent on defence in depth is far better than spending the same amount on a single 'all singing, all dancing' weapon system. The latter can never be perfect or 100% efficient and if it has weaknesses, which it surely will, the threat will be certain to capitalise on these deficiencies and circumvent the system. The separate layers of defence in depth each act as a deterrent to an enemy, and each are capable of causing attrition to attacking forces.

It is the Commander Task Group's job to ensure that where possible he does not place his force in a position that denies that force the full benefit of its defence in depth systems, whether by geographical location or by misuse of a particular asset or layer.

The under surface threat had to be approached in the same manner as the air threat, using third party resources, long range sensors such as Towed Array Sonar, ASW frigates as a screen between the threat and the group, anti submarine helicopters on the screen and at other locations around the group, and last but not least sonars fitted to the ships in the main body. Each of the anti submarine platforms must be capable of not only locating the threat submarine but also of prosecuting it with appropriate weapons. And with the submarine threat being ever present and very difficult to detect, the various level of defence have to be working at 100 per cent efficiency for twenty four hours a day when in a threat zone.*

There were, of course, no third parties of any description providing defence for the Task Force in the South Atlantic; no Nimrods, no air defence fighter barriers, and no shore based Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft.#


*Technological developments since 1982 have changed things and increased the range at which submarines can be detected, with the advent of things such as low frequency active sonar. The longer range comes at the expense of resolution, which is where the helicopter with dipping sonar comes into its own.

#The Sea Harrier, and the CVS, was expected to operate in the GIUK Gap and Norwegian Sea, with Tomcats from USN carriers and two squadrons of RAF Phantoms (dedicated to maritime air defence) providing the bulk of the air defence, supported by AEW. The Nimrods sent South in 1982 were mostly used in ASuW roles.

That description of defence in depth puts his credibility far above many other frequently quoted defence 'experts' - such as those who insist that warships with anti air missiles make having fighters aboard the carrier unnecessary, or that the Navy only needs carriers. Similarly his brief mention of ASW puts him far above those who insist that you either can do without frigates or that you can easily do ASW without a carrier - where do all the helicopters go? This was the argument that eventually got us the Invincible class, along with what might be considered the killer argument:


To put fighter cover over the fleet at just a few hundred miles would take up all the tanker resources of the RAF and most of the fighters.

Without going into what that means exactly in too much depth, a few simple speed/time/distance calculations prove the value of having your fighters near to the area or assets to be protected - see post #7376.

Quoting his Sea Harrier Over The Falklands once more, and the final paragraph of Appendix II (A Layman's Guide to Fighter Combat):

Perhaps there is one disadvantage to the present generation of V/STOL jets and this invokes the first question, 'What more could one ask for?' The Harrier family of jets are versatile and capable - but they need the best pilots to fly them. That is why the cream of RAF pilot capability gets channelled into the Harrier world. One might therefore ask for a V/STOL jet (with the Sea Harrier's unique combat performance) that can be flown successfully by 'an average pilot' rather than just the best pilots.

I think that it was unfortunate that he did not get to visit the F-35B test team to learn about the value of 5Gen and low observability (as suggested here by WhiteOvies) or to see the F-35B Lightning at sea - where he might be impressed by how smoothly and accurately it lands on deck, how it can both launch and recover in heavy seas with high wind speeds, and how efficient the STOVL deck is.

I hope that these quotes serve as a tribute to Cdr Ward.

Today is of course the anniversary of the main landings in the Falklands. These were only possible because in the preceding three weeks the carrier group had been establishing sea and air (as far as possible) control around the islands, and moved closer to land on the day to defend the amphibious group and forces being put ashore.

ORAC 28th May 2024 21:45

Sounds familiar...

🇳🇱Netherlands Navy has laid up frigate HNLMS Van Speijk and assault ship HNMLS Rotterdam due to a shortage of sailors.

https://marineschepen.nl/nieuws/Pers...nt-280524.html

SLXOwft 29th May 2024 18:19

As the Dutch article says Zr.Ms. Van Speijk has been laid up for 3 years, the article implies that the crew freed up from the Rotterdam may enable Van Speijk to resume operations with manning priority shifting to frigates.

What is familiar is that the replacement of the M-Frigates (Van Speijk and Van Amstel) and the LCF-Frigates (De Zeven Provinciën class) have both been pushed back, in the case of the Ms twice and they will now be around 40 years old when they are replaced.

ORAC 31st May 2024 11:19

So, period in dry dock extended into autumn - and then back in dry dock for a planned refit next year.

Presumably she will get some productive time at sea in the period in between?

https://www.navylookout.com/hms-quee...syth-extended/

HMS Queen Elizabeth dry docking period in Rosyth extended

Asturias56 31st May 2024 16:13

"It was decided that the corrosion presented enough risk of shaft failure that the ship had to be withdrawn from operations."

I'll bet the warranty ran out after 8 years...................

SASless 1st Jun 2024 00:59

ORAC,

Is that publication you linked the old "Onion" gone Dark Blue?

How does a ship stay "in service" while out of service for inspection and repairs of a known fault that keeps it from going to sea on Ops?


Asturias56 1st Jun 2024 07:27

It's clear that the prop shafts area serious worry - both replaced on the PoW and now the same on the QE.

ORAC 1st Jun 2024 15:56

Cdr. Claire Thompson to become the first female captain of a Royal Navy aircraft carrier.

She will take over command of @HMSQNLZ from Capt. Will King in January next year.

https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/-/media...41c50a94a850a1

https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....c87978941.jpeg


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