MiG-23 Crash - Michigan - 13 Aug 23
Rather a bizarre view, I think. Apart from which, I think (ex squippers can comment) that the longer the cartridge has passed its expiration date, the greater the risks it poses as the chemical composition changes. These risks can include, but are not limited to, uncommanded ejection!
https://taskaero.com/ejection-seat-maintenance/
The constituents that make up the Energetic Materials (propellant, powder, etc.) of a CAD/PAD device are age-sensitive and are effected by temperature. These materials change properties and characteristics over time and temperature. Long-times and high-temperatures are the enemy of CAD/PAD items. It is important to store CAD/PAD items in cool storage magazines when not installed in the aircraft and to park airplanes under awnings or in hangars to minimize the effect of elevated temperatures resulting from sunlight exposure. Changes in CAD/PAD performance can range from slower performance to faster performance, to simply not functioning at all. The constituents are chemicals. Chemicals change over time and at different rates based on temperature. Materials change and may get more sensitive over time and exposure to temperatures. The change may result in the auto-ignition of the item.
In July of 2007 a PDRM (Parachute Deployment Rocket Motor) in the ejection seat of an aircraft sitting on the ramp at China Lake, California auto-ignited. The resulting explosion destroyed the canopy and severely damaged the ejection seat (photo below).
In July of 2007 a PDRM (Parachute Deployment Rocket Motor) in the ejection seat of an aircraft sitting on the ramp at China Lake, California auto-ignited. The resulting explosion destroyed the canopy and severely damaged the ejection seat (photo below).
The ejection seat manufacturer advised the AAIB that using time-expired cartridges could
increase the risk of an un-commanded ejection; or, when ejection is commanded, could result
in increased discharge time of cartridges affecting the ejection sequence, or uncontrolled
explosion of the cartridges.
increase the risk of an un-commanded ejection; or, when ejection is commanded, could result
in increased discharge time of cartridges affecting the ejection sequence, or uncontrolled
explosion of the cartridges.
Not bizarre at all. If the tail falls off would you rather be sat on a seat that MIGHT work or a seat that WON’T work
When approval was first given to operate ex mil jets in Oz it was on condition that the seats were disabled. Why? The authorities opinion was that it would prompt operators to give maintenance top billing. Don't know the state of affairs now. Friend and his passenger lost their lives in a MiG 15UTI due engine fire burning through elevator control and not having operable seats.
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Friend of 'megan' "CLUMP" was my A4G instructor back in 1970. Family and ex-A4Gers agitated for this amended report.
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications.../aair199300484 SUMMARY: "The MiG 15UTI, VH-LSN, took off from runway 12 at Canberra Airport with the pilot [CMDR Errol Kavanagh RAN rtd.} and one passenger on board. After becoming airborne, the aircraft entered a climbing left turn and levelled at about 1,200 ft above ground level. The pilot advised the tower controller that he was having a minor technical problem and requested a landing. After a short discussion, the aircraft was cleared to land on runway 35. When the aircraft was about 4 km from the threshold of runway 35, it was seen to enter a steep nose-down attitude. The aircraft subsequently impacted the ground and the pilot and passenger were killed."
AMENDED REPORT PUBLISHED 20 July 1994 [amended report URL below]
INVESTIGATION REPORT 9300484 Mikoyan & Gurevich MiG 15UTI, VH-LSN Canberra, ACT 13 March 1993
https://www.atsb.gov.au/sites/defaul...300484_001.pdf (0.3Mb)
"FOREWORD Having received additional factual information at the coronial inquest (Canberra, July 1995) into the deaths of the pilot and passenger of VH-LSN, and following representation by interested parties, the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation re-opened the investigation of this accident. As a result, the original investigation report (published July 1994) is withdrawn and is superseded by this present report."
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications.../aair199300484 SUMMARY: "The MiG 15UTI, VH-LSN, took off from runway 12 at Canberra Airport with the pilot [CMDR Errol Kavanagh RAN rtd.} and one passenger on board. After becoming airborne, the aircraft entered a climbing left turn and levelled at about 1,200 ft above ground level. The pilot advised the tower controller that he was having a minor technical problem and requested a landing. After a short discussion, the aircraft was cleared to land on runway 35. When the aircraft was about 4 km from the threshold of runway 35, it was seen to enter a steep nose-down attitude. The aircraft subsequently impacted the ground and the pilot and passenger were killed."
AMENDED REPORT PUBLISHED 20 July 1994 [amended report URL below]
INVESTIGATION REPORT 9300484 Mikoyan & Gurevich MiG 15UTI, VH-LSN Canberra, ACT 13 March 1993
https://www.atsb.gov.au/sites/defaul...300484_001.pdf (0.3Mb)
"FOREWORD Having received additional factual information at the coronial inquest (Canberra, July 1995) into the deaths of the pilot and passenger of VH-LSN, and following representation by interested parties, the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation re-opened the investigation of this accident. As a result, the original investigation report (published July 1994) is withdrawn and is superseded by this present report."
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Bit of a disagreement about what happened between the crew there...
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Strange, works for me... here's the narrative:
On August 13, about 1515 eastern daylight time, a Mikoyan Gurevich Mig 23UB, N23UB, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Belleville, Michigan.
The pilot and pilot rated observer received minor injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 airshow exhibition flight. The flight was performing at the “Thunder over Michigan Airshow” held at the Willow Run Airport (YIP), Ypsilanti, Michigan. The accident flight was scheduled to be the second to last act. The accident airplane was a privately owned Russian designed military fighter airplane that employed variable geometry wings that allowed the wing sweep angle to be changed in-flight. The airplane was powered by a single turbojet engine with afterburner capability.
The pilot reported that the flight departed from runway 23 at YIP, followed by a right turn to a “banana pass” (a low-level knife edge pass) along runway 23. Following the pass, he started banking the airplane and noticed that the engine afterburner did not ignite, and the airspeed began to decrease. He brought the swing wings into the fully forward position (16° sweep) to increase lift and began troubleshooting the problem. He was actively troubleshooting when the rear seat observer stated that they needed to eject. The pilot reported that he was not ready to eject and was still troubleshooting the problem and maneuvering the airplane toward runway 27 at YIP when his ejection seat fired, and he was out of the airplane. He stated that if either occupant pulls the ejection handle, both seats eject.
The rear seat observer stated that the airplane made a pass along the runway and the plan was to go to the left for another pass followed by a landing. He stated that the engine was not accelerating. He and the pilot had a brief discussion and began to climb up and gain altitude. They determined that they had some type of engine problem and needed to get back on the ground. He stated that they determined they did not have sufficient altitude to make it to a runway at the airport. He said they were compressed for time and needed to get out. When asked if he had pulled the ejection seat handles, he stated that he could not specifically remember but thinks that he would have pulled them. Video evidence indicated that the airplane was in a left bank when the ejection seats fired. The airplane continued in the left bank and descended into the ground about 1 mile south of the approach end of runway 27 at YIP. The wreckage path was about 600 ft. long on a heading of about 35°. There was a postimpact explosion and fire. The fuselage section that contained the tail surfaces and engine came to rest adjacent to an apartment building. The remainder of the airplane was fragmented and distributed along the wreckage path. There were no reported injuries on the ground.
The pilot and pilot rated observer received minor injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 airshow exhibition flight. The flight was performing at the “Thunder over Michigan Airshow” held at the Willow Run Airport (YIP), Ypsilanti, Michigan. The accident flight was scheduled to be the second to last act. The accident airplane was a privately owned Russian designed military fighter airplane that employed variable geometry wings that allowed the wing sweep angle to be changed in-flight. The airplane was powered by a single turbojet engine with afterburner capability.
The pilot reported that the flight departed from runway 23 at YIP, followed by a right turn to a “banana pass” (a low-level knife edge pass) along runway 23. Following the pass, he started banking the airplane and noticed that the engine afterburner did not ignite, and the airspeed began to decrease. He brought the swing wings into the fully forward position (16° sweep) to increase lift and began troubleshooting the problem. He was actively troubleshooting when the rear seat observer stated that they needed to eject. The pilot reported that he was not ready to eject and was still troubleshooting the problem and maneuvering the airplane toward runway 27 at YIP when his ejection seat fired, and he was out of the airplane. He stated that if either occupant pulls the ejection handle, both seats eject.
The rear seat observer stated that the airplane made a pass along the runway and the plan was to go to the left for another pass followed by a landing. He stated that the engine was not accelerating. He and the pilot had a brief discussion and began to climb up and gain altitude. They determined that they had some type of engine problem and needed to get back on the ground. He stated that they determined they did not have sufficient altitude to make it to a runway at the airport. He said they were compressed for time and needed to get out. When asked if he had pulled the ejection seat handles, he stated that he could not specifically remember but thinks that he would have pulled them. Video evidence indicated that the airplane was in a left bank when the ejection seats fired. The airplane continued in the left bank and descended into the ground about 1 mile south of the approach end of runway 27 at YIP. The wreckage path was about 600 ft. long on a heading of about 35°. There was a postimpact explosion and fire. The fuselage section that contained the tail surfaces and engine came to rest adjacent to an apartment building. The remainder of the airplane was fragmented and distributed along the wreckage path. There were no reported injuries on the ground.
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Rocket based systems don't go unstable with age.
One could imagine a scenario where everything went like the pilot said, except old pyrotechnics failed to propel the seats clear of the aircraft. (I recognize you could also imagine the observer living to tell exactly the same tale, except with a different date stamped on the charges.)
If you allowed live seats with old pyrotechnics, would it be unlimited age? And how would you draw a line with (I assume) no data.
If you allowed live seats with old pyrotechnics, would it be unlimited age? And how would you draw a line with (I assume) no data.
One could imagine a scenario where everything went like the pilot said, except old pyrotechnics failed to propel the seats clear of the aircraft. (I recognize you could also imagine the observer living to tell exactly the same tale, except with a different date stamped on the charges.)
If you allowed live seats with old pyrotechnics, would it be unlimited age? And how would you draw a line with (I assume) no data.
If you allowed live seats with old pyrotechnics, would it be unlimited age? And how would you draw a line with (I assume) no data.
Which would you rather have if you needed to eject - a rocket propelled seat that might not have enough thrust to get you clear of the aircraft, or a seat that was disabled because it might not work?
BTW, there is tons of data on the aging characteristics of AP based rocket propellants - it's in pretty much any rocket propelled weapon - from anti-tank missiles to ICBMs.
Thread Starter
Cdr Ward Carroll USN (Ret) - former F-14 RIO - video and analysis of the NTSB Preliminary Report:
Guy In Back (GIB) was a MiG-23 rated pilot who owned a MiG-23 as well.
Problem was afterburner not lighting - not bird strike.
GIB was telling Pilot they needed to eject - Pilot said he was not ready to eject still trying to handle the problem - put wings fully forward and started trouble shooting.
GIB ejected them both anyway - it is assumed he had full set of instruments in back as it was a UB version trainer - but wasn't able to positively state to NTSB that he did so.
Guy In Back (GIB) was a MiG-23 rated pilot who owned a MiG-23 as well.
Problem was afterburner not lighting - not bird strike.
GIB was telling Pilot they needed to eject - Pilot said he was not ready to eject still trying to handle the problem - put wings fully forward and started trouble shooting.
GIB ejected them both anyway - it is assumed he had full set of instruments in back as it was a UB version trainer - but wasn't able to positively state to NTSB that he did so.
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At 9:50 on the interview, the PNF states that the afterburner was out, the engine wound back to idle, essentially zero thrust.
That airplane stayed in the air as long as it could, and there was no way they were going to make it back to any runway. They definitely left it until the last second to eject safely.
That airplane stayed in the air as long as it could, and there was no way they were going to make it back to any runway. They definitely left it until the last second to eject safely.