Eject! Eject! - John Nichol
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The failure of the ejection seat to operate (as previously mentioned in this forum - because the canopy had not separated) was the same as in the Lightning incident I do cover which was the 1970 crash in which USAF Exchange Officer Bill Schaffner was killed. & which resulted in many years of bogus/ludicrous UFO stories being put forward.
His incident resulted in a fleet-wide check of Lightnings which revealed a number of jets had the same problem in the canopy release mechanism - meaning the seat would NEVER have fired on pulling the handle - which was rectified. There are a number of 'old & bold' pilots still kicking around today who subsequently ejected successfully because of that discovery.
John,
when I was on 92 as Lightning (F2A) groundcrew we had a couple of incidents when the pilot was unable to open the canopy after landing. As I recall the a/c were towed into the hangar and the riggers got to work to free the prisoner.I wonder if these incidents were in any connected to the canopy jettisioning problem. Perhaps an ex armourer could enlighten me.
when I was on 92 as Lightning (F2A) groundcrew we had a couple of incidents when the pilot was unable to open the canopy after landing. As I recall the a/c were towed into the hangar and the riggers got to work to free the prisoner.I wonder if these incidents were in any connected to the canopy jettisioning problem. Perhaps an ex armourer could enlighten me.
John,
when I was on 92 as Lightning (F2A) groundcrew we had a couple of incidents when the pilot was unable to open the canopy after landing. As I recall the a/c were towed into the hangar and the riggers got to work to free the prisoner.I wonder if these incidents were in any connected to the canopy jettisioning problem. Perhaps an ex armourer could enlighten me.
when I was on 92 as Lightning (F2A) groundcrew we had a couple of incidents when the pilot was unable to open the canopy after landing. As I recall the a/c were towed into the hangar and the riggers got to work to free the prisoner.I wonder if these incidents were in any connected to the canopy jettisioning problem. Perhaps an ex armourer could enlighten me.
superplum,
my apologies, 'retired armourer' it is ! I regard myself (Air Radar Fitter at the time) as an honorary armourer after many years on one of the winches in Hunter gun pack changes.
my apologies, 'retired armourer' it is ! I regard myself (Air Radar Fitter at the time) as an honorary armourer after many years on one of the winches in Hunter gun pack changes.
Thread Starter
As far as I recall, every time we shut the Lightning canopy at home with local groundcrew they did a visual inspection to ensure that the lanyard between the canopy and the seat was not kinked or obstructed in any way. The Thunder City Lightning crash was a horrible example of loss of corporate experience. IMO obviously.
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The topic of 'failed ejection' has arisen [pun intended] so this story may be helpful to some (I did not know the details highlighted until recently). Lieutenant Barry Evans - Edited by John Perryman
https://www.navy.gov.au/biography/li...nt-barry-evans
"On 8 November 1973 while the ship was on passage to Singapore, Barry was involved in an incident that saw the [A4G] Skyhawk he was piloting (889) ditch into the sea ahead of Melbourne following a failed catapult launch. Trapped in the aircraft after a failed ejection attempt he passed under the ship before freeing himself from the aircraft and surfacing about 100-150 yards astern of the carrier.
Barry takes up the story:
The subsequent investigation of the catapult revealed that a disconnected solenoid was responsible for the malfunction of the cat-shot. As a consequence, after approximately just 9 feet of travel down the catapult, all the steam pressure was dumped resulting in an end speed of only around 90 knots instead of the 120 that was required for the aircraft to take flight. (not certain of these speeds but I am certain of the result). I attempted to eject using the top handle but the seat failed to fire. The canopy came off as part of the sequence but as fate would have it a striker plate that should have turned as part of the ejection seat mechanism was frozen solid (determined by the fact that 4 of the remaining 7 aircraft on board had the same or similar problem) causing the seat not to fire. There are some who suggested that I was lucky that the seat didn’t fire believing that I would have been outside the ejection envelope but I would argue differently.
I hit the water in an almost vertical attitude and as my canopy was missing, the cockpit immediately filled with water. At the same time my head hit the canopy bow and dislodged my oxygen mask so I had to hold my breath. I was braced for the impact with the water but had completely overlooked the fact that all 22,000 tons of HMAS Melbourne doing 22 knots was mere feet away. When the ship hit the aircraft it tumbled quite violently and I was temporarily disorientated. Realising I was starting to panic, I told myself to count to 10 and then find the manual seat harness release to free myself. (It wasn’t as calm as that sounds and counting to 10 consisted of 1, 10, but it achieved the necessary refocusing). On my first attempt to leave the cockpit I got stuck and had to pull myself back in to free whatever it was that was impeding my egress. While I was doing this I heard the very loud sound of the ships propellers passing over the top of me so obviously someone was looking out for me. I surfaced 100 – 150 yards astern of the ship with Pedro [the rescue helicopter] hovering over the top of me to the very surprised look of the winch man at the door of the Wessex...."
https://www.navy.gov.au/biography/li...nt-barry-evans
"On 8 November 1973 while the ship was on passage to Singapore, Barry was involved in an incident that saw the [A4G] Skyhawk he was piloting (889) ditch into the sea ahead of Melbourne following a failed catapult launch. Trapped in the aircraft after a failed ejection attempt he passed under the ship before freeing himself from the aircraft and surfacing about 100-150 yards astern of the carrier.
Barry takes up the story:
The subsequent investigation of the catapult revealed that a disconnected solenoid was responsible for the malfunction of the cat-shot. As a consequence, after approximately just 9 feet of travel down the catapult, all the steam pressure was dumped resulting in an end speed of only around 90 knots instead of the 120 that was required for the aircraft to take flight. (not certain of these speeds but I am certain of the result). I attempted to eject using the top handle but the seat failed to fire. The canopy came off as part of the sequence but as fate would have it a striker plate that should have turned as part of the ejection seat mechanism was frozen solid (determined by the fact that 4 of the remaining 7 aircraft on board had the same or similar problem) causing the seat not to fire. There are some who suggested that I was lucky that the seat didn’t fire believing that I would have been outside the ejection envelope but I would argue differently.
I hit the water in an almost vertical attitude and as my canopy was missing, the cockpit immediately filled with water. At the same time my head hit the canopy bow and dislodged my oxygen mask so I had to hold my breath. I was braced for the impact with the water but had completely overlooked the fact that all 22,000 tons of HMAS Melbourne doing 22 knots was mere feet away. When the ship hit the aircraft it tumbled quite violently and I was temporarily disorientated. Realising I was starting to panic, I told myself to count to 10 and then find the manual seat harness release to free myself. (It wasn’t as calm as that sounds and counting to 10 consisted of 1, 10, but it achieved the necessary refocusing). On my first attempt to leave the cockpit I got stuck and had to pull myself back in to free whatever it was that was impeding my egress. While I was doing this I heard the very loud sound of the ships propellers passing over the top of me so obviously someone was looking out for me. I surfaced 100 – 150 yards astern of the ship with Pedro [the rescue helicopter] hovering over the top of me to the very surprised look of the winch man at the door of the Wessex...."
Last edited by SpazSinbad; 24th Jul 2023 at 08:53.
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I think that whoever wrote the dialogue for the TV series World on Fire must have read John's book. Last night one Spitfire pilot shouted to his mate "Eject. Eject." How corny is that?
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John, I am very much enjoying the book, but here is a small quibble. In the chapter about the Heathrow Vulcan accident you describe ACM Broadhurst as the co pilot and the rear crew as “Two navigators the air electronics officer and a civilian advisor from Avro..” Isn’t it the case though that the real co pilot was in the back and died but Broadhurst pulled rank to be in the RHS for landing and lived even though he was not Vulcan qualified? This may or may not have had a bearing on the accident but certainly led to a lot of ill feeling in the Vulcan community for years and led to Broadhurst being heckled as “ murderer” at the infamous 1Gp Dining In Night about which a lot has been written here over the years.
TL ( tie club 4860)
TL ( tie club 4860)
John, I am very much enjoying the book, but here is a small quibble. In the chapter about the Heathrow Vulcan accident you describe ACM Broadhurst as the co pilot and the rear crew as “Two navigators the air electronics officer and a civilian advisor from Avro..” Isn’t it the case though that the real co pilot was in the back and died but Broadhurst pulled rank to be in the RHS for landing and lived even though he was not Vulcan qualified? This may or may not have had a bearing on the accident but certainly led to a lot of ill feeling in the Vulcan community for years and led to Broadhurst being heckled as “ murderer” at the infamous 1Gp Dining In Night about which a lot has been written here over the years.
TL ( tie club 4860)
TL ( tie club 4860)
Thanks for this TL - I constructed the narrative from details in a couple of other books which both had the same description of who was where, and various archived news reports from the time. I did try to get the Board of Inquiry via a FOI request but it wasn't available. Broadhurst is described as the co in all these documents.
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Sir Harry, for his part, insisted that he'd been ordered to land at Heathrow by the Air Ministry, presumably for publicity reasons following the round-the-world tour, despite the poor weather and the fact his preference was to have landed at Boscombe Down. However, a former RAF air signaller, Maurice Hamblin, came forward some years later claiming he had been ordered to contact the aircraft to abort the landing due to the weather, but the order had been ignored by Sir Harry; and he'd then been sworn to secrecy under auspices of the Official Secrets Act. And then, of course, there's the whole issue of the lack of ejection seats in the back of all 3 types of V-Bomber; both front seaters (Sir Harry, and Sqn Ldr 'Podge' Howard) successfully ejected but the four (yes, four!) in the back - James Stroud, Nav Plotter Sqn Ldr Edward Eames, AEOp/Signaller Sqn Ldr Alfred Gamble, and Avro rep Fred Bassett (squeezed in the sixth crew space), of course, were unable to escape at such low level and all perished.
Of note, and to link into JN's book further, apparently the call to leave was made by 'Podge' Howard - rather than "Eject! Eject!", he shouted 'Get Out! Get Out!'
Old news - RIP to all those now long gone.
Last edited by Squipdit Fashions; 25th Jul 2023 at 09:54. Reason: Name correction
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JN, if you are ever putting out a second edition and consider it worth the time /expense following the links on ASN entry for XA897 suggests the NRO has the documents. From what I have read the blame was put on the GCA controller whose last message regarding the glidepath was the a/c was 80' above and didn't communicate it was c.100' below the glidepath after correction but Howard corrected again and thought he was on the glidepath. This article Delta Disaster: Fatal RAF Vulcan Heathrow crash states after discussion with AM Broadhurst, Sqn Ldr Howard had decided to make one approach and if unsuccessful divert to Waddington (for which there was ample fuel) and had set his break off altitude as 300' and AM Broadhurst called 450' very close to impact. It also suggests the indicated altitude was too high:
Despite Howard's lack of instrument experience on the Vulcan, the RAF could not credit that he would have gone so far below his break-off height without realising it or that both he and Broadhurst would have misread their altimeters so wildly.
A scientific study of Vulcan altimeter errors was undertaken at Boscombe, which revealed the large delta wing area created its own atmospheric pressure error of between 70-130ft when close to the ground. Friction within the altimeter could add a further 70ft, making a total possible error of 200ft. Add this to Runway 10 Left’s elevation of 80ft above sea level and it becomes clear that with 300ft indicated on his altimeter, Howard was already among the weeds.
There need have been no sudden and unaccountable descent as postulated by Dr Touch. The Vulcan's gentle 3° descent on the GCA glidepath would soon have swallowed up the tiny safety margin remaining to the pilots of XA897. On all future Vulcan instrument approaches, pilots would be briefed to add an extra pressure error correction factor, but it was a pity it took the tragedy at London Airport to bring the lesson to everyone's attention in the first place.
The BOI president was ACM Sir Donald Hardman, Air Member for Supply and Organisation and previously CAS, RAAF.
Can any of our resident Vulcan aircrew confirm 'pilots would be briefed to add an extra pressure error correction factor'?
Error margin
As it turned out, a whole bevy of Master Greens on XA897’s flightdeck would have added little extra safety margin. Although the GCA at Heathrow was a first-generation system that was much cruder than modern landing aids, the full vindication of Howard and Broadhurst had to await the inquest on January 30, 1957.Despite Howard's lack of instrument experience on the Vulcan, the RAF could not credit that he would have gone so far below his break-off height without realising it or that both he and Broadhurst would have misread their altimeters so wildly.
A scientific study of Vulcan altimeter errors was undertaken at Boscombe, which revealed the large delta wing area created its own atmospheric pressure error of between 70-130ft when close to the ground. Friction within the altimeter could add a further 70ft, making a total possible error of 200ft. Add this to Runway 10 Left’s elevation of 80ft above sea level and it becomes clear that with 300ft indicated on his altimeter, Howard was already among the weeds.
There need have been no sudden and unaccountable descent as postulated by Dr Touch. The Vulcan's gentle 3° descent on the GCA glidepath would soon have swallowed up the tiny safety margin remaining to the pilots of XA897. On all future Vulcan instrument approaches, pilots would be briefed to add an extra pressure error correction factor, but it was a pity it took the tragedy at London Airport to bring the lesson to everyone's attention in the first place.
Can any of our resident Vulcan aircrew confirm 'pilots would be briefed to add an extra pressure error correction factor'?
Didn`t the aircraft have a radar/radio altimeter fitted....?
XA897 was the first a/c delivered and as such didn't have Green Satin as it wasn't ready to be fitted to Vulcans (hence no nav radar on board), this may have applied to a radalt as well. (Crossed with Timelord)
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Bought the book half price at W.H. Smith in Cambridge this afternoon!!!. Only £10!!. Really looking forward to reading it. I was prepared to pay full price!!.
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Timelord, you're absolutely right. One of many controversies surrounding the crash; reportedly, the 'third' pilot, A/Sqn Ldr James George Woodgate Stroud, was even described as a navigator on his death certificate, and this supposed obfuscation was the cause of much speculation and bitterness from family and colleagues about why his status as a fully-qualified Vulcan pilot (he held a Master Green rating, which Air Mshl Sir Harry Broadhurst, occupying one of the front seats, did not) was seemingly hushed-up.
Sir Harry, for his part, insisted that he'd been ordered to land at Heathrow by the Air Ministry, presumably for publicity reasons following the round-the-world tour, despite the poor weather and the fact his preference was to have landed at Boscombe Down. However, a former RAF air signaller, Maurice Hamblin, came forward some years later claiming he had been ordered to contact the aircraft to abort the landing due to the weather, but the order had been ignored by Sir Harry; and he'd then been sworn to secrecy under auspices of the Official Secrets Act. And then, of course, there's the whole issue of the lack of ejection seats in the back of all 3 types of V-Bomber; both front seaters (Sir Harry, and Sqn Ldr 'Podge' Howard) successfully ejected but the four (yes, four!) in the back - James Stroud, Nav Plotter Sqn Ldr Edward Eames, AEOp/Signaller Sqn Ldr Alfred Gamble, and Avro rep Fred Bassett (squeezed in the sixth crew space), of course, were unable to escape at such low level and all perished.
Of note, and to link into JN's book further, apparently the call to leave was made by 'Podge' Howard - rather than "Eject! Eject!", he shouted 'Get Out! Get Out!'
Old news - RIP to all those now long gone.
Sir Harry, for his part, insisted that he'd been ordered to land at Heathrow by the Air Ministry, presumably for publicity reasons following the round-the-world tour, despite the poor weather and the fact his preference was to have landed at Boscombe Down. However, a former RAF air signaller, Maurice Hamblin, came forward some years later claiming he had been ordered to contact the aircraft to abort the landing due to the weather, but the order had been ignored by Sir Harry; and he'd then been sworn to secrecy under auspices of the Official Secrets Act. And then, of course, there's the whole issue of the lack of ejection seats in the back of all 3 types of V-Bomber; both front seaters (Sir Harry, and Sqn Ldr 'Podge' Howard) successfully ejected but the four (yes, four!) in the back - James Stroud, Nav Plotter Sqn Ldr Edward Eames, AEOp/Signaller Sqn Ldr Alfred Gamble, and Avro rep Fred Bassett (squeezed in the sixth crew space), of course, were unable to escape at such low level and all perished.
Of note, and to link into JN's book further, apparently the call to leave was made by 'Podge' Howard - rather than "Eject! Eject!", he shouted 'Get Out! Get Out!'
Old news - RIP to all those now long gone.
Now got my copy. Don't want to start it just yet........I've too much work to do! I did sneak a peek at the pictures though.......superb!
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