Oz Defence review
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Oz Defence review
Public doc has been released:
https://www.defence.gov.au/about/rev...rategic-review
Very intriguing - and all makes sense.
Much more integrated expeditionary capabilities.
Looked at the B-21 - but not suitable.
https://www.defence.gov.au/about/rev...rategic-review
Very intriguing - and all makes sense.
Much more integrated expeditionary capabilities.
Looked at the B-21 - but not suitable.
Have only read the commentary so far but the kicker is in the financing.
No increase in funding for ten years. New program to be achieved within existing budget but utilizing “savings” from slashing existing programs.
is that right?
No increase in funding for ten years. New program to be achieved within existing budget but utilizing “savings” from slashing existing programs.
is that right?
The full cost of the Review recommendations will not be able to be fully quantified until Defence has analysed the capability recommendations in the Review and costed them.
Recommendations:
• Defence funding should be increased to meet our strategic circumstances.
• Lower-priority projects and programs should be stopped or suspended to free essential resources which can be allocated to projects and programs that align with the priorities in the Review.
• Funding should be released through the rebuild and reprioritisation of the Integrated Investment Program (IIP) and reinvested into priority Defence projects, programs and activities consistent with the Review
Government response:
The Government agrees that Defence must have the requisite funding to deliver the agreed priorities and capabilities recommended in the Review.
The Government will increase Defence funding over the next decade above its current trajectory to implement the Review. This will include a rebuild of the IIP.
Recommendations:
• Defence funding should be increased to meet our strategic circumstances.
• Lower-priority projects and programs should be stopped or suspended to free essential resources which can be allocated to projects and programs that align with the priorities in the Review.
• Funding should be released through the rebuild and reprioritisation of the Integrated Investment Program (IIP) and reinvested into priority Defence projects, programs and activities consistent with the Review
Government response:
The Government agrees that Defence must have the requisite funding to deliver the agreed priorities and capabilities recommended in the Review.
The Government will increase Defence funding over the next decade above its current trajectory to implement the Review. This will include a rebuild of the IIP.
Finances and resources
Between the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and the commencement of this Review, measures were announced which resulted in excess of $42 billion in additional Defence spending over the planning decade, without the provision of any additional allocation in the Commonwealth Budget.
New capability requirements, coupled with sustainment demand for existing capabilities and the need to address severe workforce pressures, will require difficult decisions and trade-offs to manage the Defence Budget over the immediate period. This Review proposes reprioritisation of the Integrated Investment Program to enable new and accelerated capability acquisitions.
More funding will be required. Defence spending must reflect the strategic circumstances our nation faces
Between the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and the commencement of this Review, measures were announced which resulted in excess of $42 billion in additional Defence spending over the planning decade, without the provision of any additional allocation in the Commonwealth Budget.
New capability requirements, coupled with sustainment demand for existing capabilities and the need to address severe workforce pressures, will require difficult decisions and trade-offs to manage the Defence Budget over the immediate period. This Review proposes reprioritisation of the Integrated Investment Program to enable new and accelerated capability acquisitions.
More funding will be required. Defence spending must reflect the strategic circumstances our nation faces
At a quick glance the most interesting thing is
From a Balanced to a Focused Force
The current strategic circumstances, the net assessment approach to Defence planning and our finite human and financial resource base, dictate that the current balanced force structure and design must now change urgently.
Balanced Force
A balanced force is designed to be able to respond to a range of contingences when the strategic situation remains uncertain. This force design required that the ADF respond to low-level threats related to continental defence, regional operations in support of Australian interests and global support to our Alliance partner, the United States. In this approach, while the balance of the force was primarily designed for the Defence of Australia, the broader purpose of the ADF was for it to be structured to respond to a range of contingencies.
This conceptual approach to force structure planning, which has led to like-for-like replacements in military platforms in the ADF, is deeply ingrained in Defence’s culture.
8.4 The force structure of the ADF must now be framed around the concept of a focused force, based on the assumptions in the Review, and the critical capabilities required as a consequence.
From a Joint to an Integrated Force
Maximising the deterrent effect and response options from ADF capabilities is critical. To achieve the maximum benefits from our capability investments, the ADF force structure must become not only focused, but also integrated.
8.6 The current joint force, namely the combined effect of Navy, Army and Air Force working together, does not appropriately reflect the growth of domains. The evolution to five domains – maritime, land, air, space and cyber – demands a new approach.
8.7 The ADF must rapidly evolve into a genuine Integrated Force, which harnesses effects across all of the five domains. The Integrated Force must be optimised for
National Defence.
From a Balanced to a Focused Force
The current strategic circumstances, the net assessment approach to Defence planning and our finite human and financial resource base, dictate that the current balanced force structure and design must now change urgently.
Balanced Force
A balanced force is designed to be able to respond to a range of contingences when the strategic situation remains uncertain. This force design required that the ADF respond to low-level threats related to continental defence, regional operations in support of Australian interests and global support to our Alliance partner, the United States. In this approach, while the balance of the force was primarily designed for the Defence of Australia, the broader purpose of the ADF was for it to be structured to respond to a range of contingencies.
This conceptual approach to force structure planning, which has led to like-for-like replacements in military platforms in the ADF, is deeply ingrained in Defence’s culture.
8.4 The force structure of the ADF must now be framed around the concept of a focused force, based on the assumptions in the Review, and the critical capabilities required as a consequence.
From a Joint to an Integrated Force
Maximising the deterrent effect and response options from ADF capabilities is critical. To achieve the maximum benefits from our capability investments, the ADF force structure must become not only focused, but also integrated.
8.6 The current joint force, namely the combined effect of Navy, Army and Air Force working together, does not appropriately reflect the growth of domains. The evolution to five domains – maritime, land, air, space and cyber – demands a new approach.
8.7 The ADF must rapidly evolve into a genuine Integrated Force, which harnesses effects across all of the five domains. The Integrated Force must be optimised for
National Defence.
Lots of motherhood and apple pie in the Force Integration stuff. The hard part is doing it, with the funds to exercise it and keep the skills current.
What exactly is the meaning of Focussed and Balanced? If Balanced means "can give anyone that we get into a fight with a bloody nose or worse" and Focused means "we have picked out a threat scenario and are able to defend against that", what happens if your enemy does not do what you planned for? What happens if your enemies can rapidly change their threat suite?
What exactly is the meaning of Focussed and Balanced? If Balanced means "can give anyone that we get into a fight with a bloody nose or worse" and Focused means "we have picked out a threat scenario and are able to defend against that", what happens if your enemy does not do what you planned for? What happens if your enemies can rapidly change their threat suite?
They defined Balanced Force as above in post #5
Focused they define as
Focused Force
This conceptual approach to force structure planning will lead to a force designed to address the nation’s most significant military risks.
The capabilities required to address identified threats will also provide latent capability to deal with lower-level contingencies and crises.
Which seem "on the one hand and on the other hand" to me but it looks as if some decisions have already been taken see 8:14 below
"Defence infrastructure, the five domains, and enabling logistics and other systems – the Integrated Force – must be focused on achieving the critical
capabilities.
8.10 Given the strategic circumstances and limited resource base we face, investing in the critical capabilities will require divesting, delaying, or re-scoping other activities that do not advance the attributes of the Integrated Force.
8.11 Changes in the Integrated Investment Program (IIP) to realise the Integrated Force will require immediate decisions to realise time, resource (both workforce and financial) and cultural change.
8.12 This will include rescheduling delivery, reducing in scale, or divesting programs and previously envisaged core projects not suited for the strategic circumstances outlined in the Review.
8.13 During the conduct of the Review, Defence conducted a preliminary reprioritisation of the IIP.
8.14 This identified a range of acquisitions determined to be of lower priority in our strategic circumstances that could be considered for delay or cancellation.
8.15 Defence must further reprioritise the IIP in line with the force structure priorities ,force design guidance and the strategic assessments in the Review.
Focused they define as
Focused Force
This conceptual approach to force structure planning will lead to a force designed to address the nation’s most significant military risks.
The capabilities required to address identified threats will also provide latent capability to deal with lower-level contingencies and crises.
Which seem "on the one hand and on the other hand" to me but it looks as if some decisions have already been taken see 8:14 below
"Defence infrastructure, the five domains, and enabling logistics and other systems – the Integrated Force – must be focused on achieving the critical
capabilities.
8.10 Given the strategic circumstances and limited resource base we face, investing in the critical capabilities will require divesting, delaying, or re-scoping other activities that do not advance the attributes of the Integrated Force.
8.11 Changes in the Integrated Investment Program (IIP) to realise the Integrated Force will require immediate decisions to realise time, resource (both workforce and financial) and cultural change.
8.12 This will include rescheduling delivery, reducing in scale, or divesting programs and previously envisaged core projects not suited for the strategic circumstances outlined in the Review.
8.13 During the conduct of the Review, Defence conducted a preliminary reprioritisation of the IIP.
8.14 This identified a range of acquisitions determined to be of lower priority in our strategic circumstances that could be considered for delay or cancellation.
8.15 Defence must further reprioritise the IIP in line with the force structure priorities ,force design guidance and the strategic assessments in the Review.
Recommendations:
• An independent analysis of Navy’s surface combatant fleet capability should be conducted in Q3 2023 to ensure its size, structure and composition complement the capabilities provided by the forthcoming conventionally-armed, nuclearpowered submarines. The analysis must assess: the capability requirements to meet our current strategic circumstances as outlined in the Review, as well as the cost, schedule, risks and the continuous shipbuilding potential of each option.
• The acquisition of a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability in the shortest possible timeframe should be prioritised as part of AUKUS Pillar I.Recommendations:
• Army should be structured and postured in accordance with the land domain force structure design priorities outlined in the Review.
• LAND 8710 Phases 1-2 – Army Littoral Manoeuvre Vessels (Landing Craft Medium and Heavy) should be accelerated and expanded.
• LAND 8113 Phases 2-4 – Long-Range Fires (HIMARS) and
LAND 4100 Phase 2 – Land-Based Maritime Strike should be accelerated and expanded.
• LAND 400 Phase 3 – Land Combat Vehicle System (Infantry Fighting Vehicle) acquisition should be reduced to 129 vehicles to provide one mechanised battalion.
• LAND 8116 Phase 2 – Protected Mobile Fires (second regiment of Army self-propelled howitzers) should be immediately cancelled.
• The delivery of landing craft, long-range fires, and infantry fighting vehicles should be synchronised.
• Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile should be integrated onto the F-35A and the F/A-18F platforms. Joint Strike Missile should also be integrated onto the F-35A.
• Options should be developed for collaboration and technology sharing with the United States in the development of MQ-28A Ghost Bat.
• Space Command should be moved into Joint Capabilities Group from 1 July 2023.
• A centralised space domain capability development and management function should be established.
• A method should be established for building and sustaining a trained Defence space workforce, including a defined career path for space professionals.
• An independent analysis of Navy’s surface combatant fleet capability should be conducted in Q3 2023 to ensure its size, structure and composition complement the capabilities provided by the forthcoming conventionally-armed, nuclearpowered submarines. The analysis must assess: the capability requirements to meet our current strategic circumstances as outlined in the Review, as well as the cost, schedule, risks and the continuous shipbuilding potential of each option.
• The acquisition of a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability in the shortest possible timeframe should be prioritised as part of AUKUS Pillar I.Recommendations:
• Army should be structured and postured in accordance with the land domain force structure design priorities outlined in the Review.
• LAND 8710 Phases 1-2 – Army Littoral Manoeuvre Vessels (Landing Craft Medium and Heavy) should be accelerated and expanded.
• LAND 8113 Phases 2-4 – Long-Range Fires (HIMARS) and
LAND 4100 Phase 2 – Land-Based Maritime Strike should be accelerated and expanded.
• LAND 400 Phase 3 – Land Combat Vehicle System (Infantry Fighting Vehicle) acquisition should be reduced to 129 vehicles to provide one mechanised battalion.
• LAND 8116 Phase 2 – Protected Mobile Fires (second regiment of Army self-propelled howitzers) should be immediately cancelled.
• The delivery of landing craft, long-range fires, and infantry fighting vehicles should be synchronised.
• Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile should be integrated onto the F-35A and the F/A-18F platforms. Joint Strike Missile should also be integrated onto the F-35A.
• Options should be developed for collaboration and technology sharing with the United States in the development of MQ-28A Ghost Bat.
• Space Command should be moved into Joint Capabilities Group from 1 July 2023.
• A centralised space domain capability development and management function should be established.
• A method should be established for building and sustaining a trained Defence space workforce, including a defined career path for space professionals.
Brilliant! Build a load of new landing craft, we now have the fatships plus 1... All we need is a force to actually use these assets. Cutting the MICV's numbers to only provide for 1 battalion is very short sighted. Our government has correctly identified a growing threat to the North - that justifies an increase in spending.
they clearly feel they want to meet that threat a long forward of any serious infantry/armour battle
Australian govt has announced they buying CEA technologies, guess its the first step of the a SDR bringing technologies in house
https://www.theguardian.com/australi...or-nearly-500m
https://www.theguardian.com/australi...or-nearly-500m
Unlike UK defense reviews which are thinly disguised cost cutting measures , the Oz seem to actually looking at world politics and what is happening to military counteract it, China in particular has the Australians worried and they seem to be planning for it.
