Falklands 40
Thanks so much for the recommendation to read Goose Green by Nigel Ely. I am staggered by the bravery and good fortune of 2 Para and those that supported them. So many stories, some of which made me laugh out load alongside some utter tragedy. The Gazelle incident is described in the book and was a night recce that was supposed to be flown by Sgt Kilinski of 656 Sqn AAC in a Scout.
Summary of the BOI below.
http://www.ukserials.com/pdflosses/m...0606_xx377.pdf
I wasn't there so don't feel qualified to comment, furthest south I got during the conflict was Daedalus. I had intended to repost this earlier today and have now overcome my hesitancy.
I also think I should repost cosmiccomet's comment.
(MAINJAFAD posted while constructing mine)
Volans et videns
39 years on - lest we forget
c. 060357Z Jun 82 Gazelle AH1 XX377 was destroyed with the loss of all onboard by a Sea Dart which had been fired from HMS Cardiff under the assumption friendlies would be using IFF. ROE permitted engagement 'without the constraint of visual identification if this was precluded by cloud or light conditions'
Crew
Staff Sergeant Christopher Griffin
Lance Corporal Simon Cockton
Passengers
Major Michael Forge R Sigs (OC 205 Signal Squadron)
Staff Sergeant John Baker R Sigs
Causes
I have no personal connection with the incident but have always thought Blue on Blue fatalities are the hardest for families to cope with.
BOI Report
39 years on - lest we forget
c. 060357Z Jun 82 Gazelle AH1 XX377 was destroyed with the loss of all onboard by a Sea Dart which had been fired from HMS Cardiff under the assumption friendlies would be using IFF. ROE permitted engagement 'without the constraint of visual identification if this was precluded by cloud or light conditions'
Crew
Staff Sergeant Christopher Griffin
Lance Corporal Simon Cockton
Passengers
Major Michael Forge R Sigs (OC 205 Signal Squadron)
Staff Sergeant John Baker R Sigs
Causes
- Poor Communication between Services
- IFF turned off because Rapier was not able to cope with IFF emissions (at that time)
- Assumption
I have no personal connection with the incident but have always thought Blue on Blue fatalities are the hardest for families to cope with.
BOI Report
Those tragedies have happened to both sides.
Argentine 35 mm Oerlikon GDF air defense shot down 2 Argentine Air Force aircraft.
The first one was on May 1st. A Mirage IIIEA was trying to land in Port Stanley/Puerto Argentino airport, but there was a red alert at that moment, and it was shot down. The pilot, Captain Gustavo Argentino Garcia Cuerva, couldn’t eject.
The second one was on May 12th, an MD A-4B flight was escaping after attacking British ships and overflew Goose Green/Pradera del Ganso, and First Lieutenant Fausto Gavazzi was taken by the air defenses, he couldn´t eject either.
He was shot down by an Argentine Army air defense, another 35 mm Oerlikon.
Argentine 35 mm Oerlikon GDF air defense shot down 2 Argentine Air Force aircraft.
The first one was on May 1st. A Mirage IIIEA was trying to land in Port Stanley/Puerto Argentino airport, but there was a red alert at that moment, and it was shot down. The pilot, Captain Gustavo Argentino Garcia Cuerva, couldn’t eject.
The second one was on May 12th, an MD A-4B flight was escaping after attacking British ships and overflew Goose Green/Pradera del Ganso, and First Lieutenant Fausto Gavazzi was taken by the air defenses, he couldn´t eject either.
He was shot down by an Argentine Army air defense, another 35 mm Oerlikon.
Last edited by SLXOwft; 6th Jun 2022 at 19:36. Reason: refresh link/crossed post/clarifying Rapier point
Thread Starter
The morning of the 8th was a slow start for me but turned into one of the most hectic days of my life. I was not on the flypro before lunch as I was programmed to complete my night qualification, with my first ever night deck landing. Instead, I jumped into the right-hand seat of one of the Wessex that survived the Conveyor sinking and had a very relaxing 2 1/2 hours delivering mail and spares around the fleet. At lunchtime, I flew an uneventful CAP mission but was unable to land at HMS Sheathbill because OC 1(F) had managed to spread a GR3 across the strip. Luckily, he walked away and the jet was soon stripped for spares.
Shortly before dusk, two of us were scrambled to CAP over the area of Bluff Cove, where two LSTs had been badly hit by Skyhawks an hour or so earlier. Whilst there, I noticed a landing craft coming around from Choiseul Sound and kept a wary eye on it from 10,000' for some 45 mins, until we had a couple of minutes fuel left to Bingo. That is when I saw 4 Skyhawks running in to attack.
I rolled into a screaming dive, slammed to full power, tripped the limiters, pulled the flaps up and bunted to zero G in order to accelerate as quickly as possible. With the speed climbing through 650 kts, (30 kts above VNE!!) I watched helplessly as the landing craft was attacked by two of the formation of four A4s. I dropped in behind one of the rear aircraft and sent a Sidewinder straight up his jet pipe from min range. The result was spectacular and instantaneous but the launch of the missile caused me to roll uncontrollably and rapidly to the right, ending up nearly inverted at around 50' above the sea at around 670 kts.
I acquired the next A4 and launched the second AIM9L which hit him on the 90 and blew everything behind the cockpit to smithereens. The pilot ejected from the doomed cockpit and passed very close to my head as his 'chute opened. I then opened fire with 30mm at the next aircraft but my gunsight had dumped and I had no means of aiming at the guy who was heading west, only feet above the sea. He broke left and flew through my bullets but I didn't see any hits. (In 2019 I revisited the crash site and found a 30mm HE hole in the port flap!) At this stage my #2 got a visual on him and launched a max-range shot from behind me as I zoom climbed vertically out of his line of fire. The missile hit him after a very long flight-time and I saw the flash of the warhead hit its own reflection in the water. A second later the A4 impacted the dunes with a huge fireball.
This all took around 30 seconds and as I levelled at 40k above Stanley, I realised that I was now desperately short of gas - and faced with my first night deck landing! I called Hermes and told them we were returning on the bones of our arse for gas and they came up to 32 kts and steamed towards us. At 90 miles, I closed the throttle and started my descent from 42k with the ship still heading towards us. At 20K I entered thick, turbulent cloud and told the D not to bother with the glidepath as I would be arriving VERY high. At 5 miles, the ship reversed its course to the DFC. At 3 miles and 1500', I was still in thick cloud when the low-level lights started to flash, indication 500lbs of fuel remaining. At 2 miles, I saw a glimmer of lights ahead and at 800', I saw the ship - in heavy rain. I slammed the nozzles into the braking stop selected full power, dropped the gear and flap and heaved the nose up to come to the hover abeam the island before doing the swiftest sideways transition and vertical landing of my life.
On shut-down I had 300lbs of fuel on the gauges. This was enough for 90 seconds in the hover - but up to 300 can be unusable!! Luckily, they kept the bar open for us to celebrate what was the last engagement of the war - and the last time that an RAF pilot shot down an enemy aircraft.
Today, I received a WhatsApp message from the pilot of the 4th Skyhawk. We have been firm friends for years now and in constant touch. In 2019, we erected a small memorial at the site of the wreckage of the third Skyhawk.
Swing the lamp!
Mog
Shortly before dusk, two of us were scrambled to CAP over the area of Bluff Cove, where two LSTs had been badly hit by Skyhawks an hour or so earlier. Whilst there, I noticed a landing craft coming around from Choiseul Sound and kept a wary eye on it from 10,000' for some 45 mins, until we had a couple of minutes fuel left to Bingo. That is when I saw 4 Skyhawks running in to attack.
I rolled into a screaming dive, slammed to full power, tripped the limiters, pulled the flaps up and bunted to zero G in order to accelerate as quickly as possible. With the speed climbing through 650 kts, (30 kts above VNE!!) I watched helplessly as the landing craft was attacked by two of the formation of four A4s. I dropped in behind one of the rear aircraft and sent a Sidewinder straight up his jet pipe from min range. The result was spectacular and instantaneous but the launch of the missile caused me to roll uncontrollably and rapidly to the right, ending up nearly inverted at around 50' above the sea at around 670 kts.
I acquired the next A4 and launched the second AIM9L which hit him on the 90 and blew everything behind the cockpit to smithereens. The pilot ejected from the doomed cockpit and passed very close to my head as his 'chute opened. I then opened fire with 30mm at the next aircraft but my gunsight had dumped and I had no means of aiming at the guy who was heading west, only feet above the sea. He broke left and flew through my bullets but I didn't see any hits. (In 2019 I revisited the crash site and found a 30mm HE hole in the port flap!) At this stage my #2 got a visual on him and launched a max-range shot from behind me as I zoom climbed vertically out of his line of fire. The missile hit him after a very long flight-time and I saw the flash of the warhead hit its own reflection in the water. A second later the A4 impacted the dunes with a huge fireball.
This all took around 30 seconds and as I levelled at 40k above Stanley, I realised that I was now desperately short of gas - and faced with my first night deck landing! I called Hermes and told them we were returning on the bones of our arse for gas and they came up to 32 kts and steamed towards us. At 90 miles, I closed the throttle and started my descent from 42k with the ship still heading towards us. At 20K I entered thick, turbulent cloud and told the D not to bother with the glidepath as I would be arriving VERY high. At 5 miles, the ship reversed its course to the DFC. At 3 miles and 1500', I was still in thick cloud when the low-level lights started to flash, indication 500lbs of fuel remaining. At 2 miles, I saw a glimmer of lights ahead and at 800', I saw the ship - in heavy rain. I slammed the nozzles into the braking stop selected full power, dropped the gear and flap and heaved the nose up to come to the hover abeam the island before doing the swiftest sideways transition and vertical landing of my life.
On shut-down I had 300lbs of fuel on the gauges. This was enough for 90 seconds in the hover - but up to 300 can be unusable!! Luckily, they kept the bar open for us to celebrate what was the last engagement of the war - and the last time that an RAF pilot shot down an enemy aircraft.
Today, I received a WhatsApp message from the pilot of the 4th Skyhawk. We have been firm friends for years now and in constant touch. In 2019, we erected a small memorial at the site of the wreckage of the third Skyhawk.
Swing the lamp!
Mog
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I’m quite breathless after reading that even though I knew the story from my your book! Awesome stuff Mog, it must bring you out in a cold sweat just to think about it!
Guest
I'm interested in why the Argentinian fighters were not very interested in engaging the Sea Harriers in a war of attrition? The Argentine bombers seemed to have no issues engaging our ships. Was a shame (for them) they didn't have better support.
Were there any reasons why?
Were there any reasons why?
The morning of the 8th was a slow start for me but turned into one of the most hectic days of my life. I was not on the flypro before lunch as I was programmed to complete my night qualification, with my first ever night deck landing. Instead, I jumped into the right-hand seat of one of the Wessex that survived the Conveyor sinking and had a very relaxing 2 1/2 hours delivering mail and spares around the fleet. At lunchtime, I flew an uneventful CAP mission but was unable to land at HMS Sheathbill because OC 1(F) had managed to spread a GR3 across the strip. Luckily, he walked away and the jet was soon stripped for spares.
Shortly before dusk, two of us were scrambled to CAP over the area of Bluff Cove, where two LSTs had been badly hit by Skyhawks an hour or so earlier. Whilst there, I noticed a landing craft coming around from Choiseul Sound and kept a wary eye on it from 10,000' for some 45 mins, until we had a couple of minutes fuel left to Bingo. That is when I saw 4 Skyhawks running in to attack.
I rolled into a screaming dive, slammed to full power, tripped the limiters, pulled the flaps up and bunted to zero G in order to accelerate as quickly as possible. With the speed climbing through 650 kts, (30 kts above VNE!!) I watched helplessly as the landing craft was attacked by two of the formation of four A4s. I dropped in behind one of the rear aircraft and sent a Sidewinder straight up his jet pipe from min range. The result was spectacular and instantaneous but the launch of the missile caused me to roll uncontrollably and rapidly to the right, ending up nearly inverted at around 50' above the sea at around 670 kts.
I acquired the next A4 and launched the second AIM9L which hit him on the 90 and blew everything behind the cockpit to smithereens. The pilot ejected from the doomed cockpit and passed very close to my head as his 'chute opened. I then opened fire with 30mm at the next aircraft but my gunsight had dumped and I had no means of aiming at the guy who was heading west, only feet above the sea. He broke left and flew through my bullets but I didn't see any hits. (In 2019 I revisited the crash site and found a 30mm HE hole in the port flap!) At this stage my #2 got a visual on him and launched a max-range shot from behind me as I zoom climbed vertically out of his line of fire. The missile hit him after a very long flight-time and I saw the flash of the warhead hit its own reflection in the water. A second later the A4 impacted the dunes with a huge fireball.
This all took around 30 seconds and as I levelled at 40k above Stanley, I realised that I was now desperately short of gas - and faced with my first night deck landing! I called Hermes and told them we were returning on the bones of our arse for gas and they came up to 32 kts and steamed towards us. At 90 miles, I closed the throttle and started my descent from 42k with the ship still heading towards us. At 20K I entered thick, turbulent cloud and told the D not to bother with the glidepath as I would be arriving VERY high. At 5 miles, the ship reversed its course to the DFC. At 3 miles and 1500', I was still in thick cloud when the low-level lights started to flash, indication 500lbs of fuel remaining. At 2 miles, I saw a glimmer of lights ahead and at 800', I saw the ship - in heavy rain. I slammed the nozzles into the braking stop selected full power, dropped the gear and flap and heaved the nose up to come to the hover abeam the island before doing the swiftest sideways transition and vertical landing of my life.
On shut-down I had 300lbs of fuel on the gauges. This was enough for 90 seconds in the hover - but up to 300 can be unusable!! Luckily, they kept the bar open for us to celebrate what was the last engagement of the war - and the last time that an RAF pilot shot down an enemy aircraft.
Today, I received a WhatsApp message from the pilot of the 4th Skyhawk. We have been firm friends for years now and in constant touch. In 2019, we erected a small memorial at the site of the wreckage of the third Skyhawk.
Swing the lamp!
Mog
Shortly before dusk, two of us were scrambled to CAP over the area of Bluff Cove, where two LSTs had been badly hit by Skyhawks an hour or so earlier. Whilst there, I noticed a landing craft coming around from Choiseul Sound and kept a wary eye on it from 10,000' for some 45 mins, until we had a couple of minutes fuel left to Bingo. That is when I saw 4 Skyhawks running in to attack.
I rolled into a screaming dive, slammed to full power, tripped the limiters, pulled the flaps up and bunted to zero G in order to accelerate as quickly as possible. With the speed climbing through 650 kts, (30 kts above VNE!!) I watched helplessly as the landing craft was attacked by two of the formation of four A4s. I dropped in behind one of the rear aircraft and sent a Sidewinder straight up his jet pipe from min range. The result was spectacular and instantaneous but the launch of the missile caused me to roll uncontrollably and rapidly to the right, ending up nearly inverted at around 50' above the sea at around 670 kts.
I acquired the next A4 and launched the second AIM9L which hit him on the 90 and blew everything behind the cockpit to smithereens. The pilot ejected from the doomed cockpit and passed very close to my head as his 'chute opened. I then opened fire with 30mm at the next aircraft but my gunsight had dumped and I had no means of aiming at the guy who was heading west, only feet above the sea. He broke left and flew through my bullets but I didn't see any hits. (In 2019 I revisited the crash site and found a 30mm HE hole in the port flap!) At this stage my #2 got a visual on him and launched a max-range shot from behind me as I zoom climbed vertically out of his line of fire. The missile hit him after a very long flight-time and I saw the flash of the warhead hit its own reflection in the water. A second later the A4 impacted the dunes with a huge fireball.
This all took around 30 seconds and as I levelled at 40k above Stanley, I realised that I was now desperately short of gas - and faced with my first night deck landing! I called Hermes and told them we were returning on the bones of our arse for gas and they came up to 32 kts and steamed towards us. At 90 miles, I closed the throttle and started my descent from 42k with the ship still heading towards us. At 20K I entered thick, turbulent cloud and told the D not to bother with the glidepath as I would be arriving VERY high. At 5 miles, the ship reversed its course to the DFC. At 3 miles and 1500', I was still in thick cloud when the low-level lights started to flash, indication 500lbs of fuel remaining. At 2 miles, I saw a glimmer of lights ahead and at 800', I saw the ship - in heavy rain. I slammed the nozzles into the braking stop selected full power, dropped the gear and flap and heaved the nose up to come to the hover abeam the island before doing the swiftest sideways transition and vertical landing of my life.
On shut-down I had 300lbs of fuel on the gauges. This was enough for 90 seconds in the hover - but up to 300 can be unusable!! Luckily, they kept the bar open for us to celebrate what was the last engagement of the war - and the last time that an RAF pilot shot down an enemy aircraft.
Today, I received a WhatsApp message from the pilot of the 4th Skyhawk. We have been firm friends for years now and in constant touch. In 2019, we erected a small memorial at the site of the wreckage of the third Skyhawk.
Swing the lamp!
Mog
I'm interested in why the Argentinian fighters were not very interested in engaging the Sea Harriers in a war of attrition? The Argentine bombers seemed to have no issues engaging our ships. Was a shame (for them) they didn't have better support.
Were there any reasons why?
Were there any reasons why?
Second issue was capability of the AAM's in the Inventory.
All of the Mirage IIIEA's (Total fleet of 16) could carry a R530 SARH / IR homing missile on the centreline, but only 7 of the fleet (delivered in 1980) could carry the R550 Magic on wing pylons. The R530 was basically a bomber killer, not a dogfight missile. R550 was akin to a AIM-9G. According to Argentinian sources, neither type was fired when the Mirage III's tried to mix it with SHAR on 1st May 82 , The aircraft that did get home were very low on fuel and at the end of the day, the Magic capable fleet was down to 5 aircraft thanks to 801 NAS and the Argentinian Army.
The Daggers could carry 2 early model Shafrirs, which in the words of one senior officer of the Dagger Grupo were next to useless. Some high level CAP and escort missions were flown by the unit on 1st May 82 which resulted in one Dagger being shot down by 800 NAS
The Navy A-4's were AIM-9B Sidewinder capable, but the fleet were suffering from major problems due to US arms embargos, so they may have had nothing to shoot bar life ex missiles.
Super Etandards should have been R550 Magic capable, but like the Exocet, the Argentinians may have not got around to integrating them with aircraft when things kicked off.
Another Issue I do remember seeing mentioned somewhere was a lack of Drop Tanks for the Mirages and Daggers. Had they banged them off at the rate they did on 1st May 1982 for any length of time to try and mix it with the Sea Harriers, the force would have been unable to reach the Falklands after a few days of further action.
Last edited by MAINJAFAD; 9th Jun 2022 at 12:01.
The SAAF certainly had less than perfect service from the R550. Lack of ‘G’ tolerance and premature detonation in the jet plume were the most significant.
Last edited by KiloB; 9th Jun 2022 at 12:53.
The morning of the 8th was a slow start for me but turned into one of the most hectic days of my life. I was not on the flypro before lunch as I was programmed to complete my night qualification, with my first ever night deck landing. Instead, I jumped into the right-hand seat of one of the Wessex that survived the Conveyor sinking and had a very relaxing 2 1/2 hours delivering mail and spares around the fleet. At lunchtime,
Mog
Mog
Sorry for the drift ....but just a question from a curious observer!
Thread Starter
The quailed pilot was certainly there all the time but I was handling the aircraft - in fact I think he had a pretty good kip during the flight. He had been flying non-stop since the loss of Conveyor and was completely knackered. I was pretty tired but at least I had had a good night’s sleep (in the captains cabin!). If the captain had known about either my flying the Wessex or sleeping in his cabin, he would have had an epileptic fit. (Other seizures are available).
I had not flown a Wessex full time for 9 years but I had a couple of trips in 1978, so I could remember how to open the cockpit door. The briefing went something like “You sit in the right seat and if you manage to get it airborne OK, I’ll go to sleep”. I had to keep,my smoked visor down though, so that Wings and the captain couldn’t ID me.
Mog
The answer to your question is that it was a) unique and b) barely legal!
The quailed pilot was certainly there all the time but I was handling the aircraft - in fact I think he had a pretty good kip during the flight. He had been flying non-stop since the loss of Conveyor and was completely knackered. I was pretty tired but at least I had had a good night’s sleep (in the captains cabin!). If the captain had known about either my flying the Wessex or sleeping in his cabin, he would have had an epileptic fit. (Other seizures are available).
I had not flown a Wessex full time for 9 years but I had a couple of trips in 1978, so I could remember how to open the cockpit door. The briefing went something like “You sit in the right seat and if you manage to get it airborne OK, I’ll go to sleep”. I had to keep,my smoked visor down though, so that Wings and the captain couldn’t ID me.
Mog
The quailed pilot was certainly there all the time but I was handling the aircraft - in fact I think he had a pretty good kip during the flight. He had been flying non-stop since the loss of Conveyor and was completely knackered. I was pretty tired but at least I had had a good night’s sleep (in the captains cabin!). If the captain had known about either my flying the Wessex or sleeping in his cabin, he would have had an epileptic fit. (Other seizures are available).
I had not flown a Wessex full time for 9 years but I had a couple of trips in 1978, so I could remember how to open the cockpit door. The briefing went something like “You sit in the right seat and if you manage to get it airborne OK, I’ll go to sleep”. I had to keep,my smoked visor down though, so that Wings and the captain couldn’t ID me.
Mog
It wasn't just MOG who did some extra helo flying..........
All Harrier pilots have some helo training in their pre-Harrier training. And good fun it was too!!
I had that, and I had also spent 3 years on exchange with the USN 78-81, and I had flown the UH-1 and the AH-1 during my time with them. Before the pedants climb aboard, they were USMC helos, not USN.
I didn't have any formal helo qualifications at that time, but during the convoy transit from Ascension to the Falklands, we spent many boring days at sea.
The loggies - bless them - had philosophised that it was better to get things afloat and heading south, and worry about whether they were in the right place later, rather than try to delay things to get everything where it should be.
So we had a young Wessex pilot who spent every day while we floated south flying all the daylight hours available with underslung loads moving stuff from A to B to C - and probably back to A again!
To relieve my boredom, I asked if I could fly with him - he gratefully accepted as it gave him someone to chat to to relieve his boredom - but he was well happy when he discovered that I knew how to fly helos, even though I had no formal qualifications.
So I spent many happy hours between Ascension and the Falklands flying his Wessex, while he relaxed and had some unofficial time off.
All Harrier pilots have some helo training in their pre-Harrier training. And good fun it was too!!
I had that, and I had also spent 3 years on exchange with the USN 78-81, and I had flown the UH-1 and the AH-1 during my time with them. Before the pedants climb aboard, they were USMC helos, not USN.
I didn't have any formal helo qualifications at that time, but during the convoy transit from Ascension to the Falklands, we spent many boring days at sea.
The loggies - bless them - had philosophised that it was better to get things afloat and heading south, and worry about whether they were in the right place later, rather than try to delay things to get everything where it should be.
So we had a young Wessex pilot who spent every day while we floated south flying all the daylight hours available with underslung loads moving stuff from A to B to C - and probably back to A again!
To relieve my boredom, I asked if I could fly with him - he gratefully accepted as it gave him someone to chat to to relieve his boredom - but he was well happy when he discovered that I knew how to fly helos, even though I had no formal qualifications.
So I spent many happy hours between Ascension and the Falklands flying his Wessex, while he relaxed and had some unofficial time off.
I plan to visit IWM Duxford soon and expect to find some interesting Falklands War displays there.
1) Your mentioning Pipi Sánchez got me thinking, first thankfully his guns jammed, and second it is a shame we can't get some contributions to this thread from the 'other side'. I have been reading some accounts in Spanish including about the OC 3 Esc. de Caza y Ataque, Rodolfo Castro Fox, who insisted on flying missions with his men even though he was official grounded due to injuries sustained in an ejection, he couldn't open or close the canopy without assistance and had to use his wrong hand to operate the undercarriage lever, Pablo Carballo who, although his aircraft been damaged by a Sea Cat, decided not to eject and made it home safely, and José 'Cacha' Arca who, having ejected from his A-4Q (which had been hit 10 times by SHAR cannon fire after attacking Ardent) as he couldn't lower his undercart to land at Stanley, was fished out of the sea using a skid by a Huey pilot.
2) Was it clear to you at the time that the Argentinian TPS-43 radar operators were directing raids away from any SHARs (and presubably GR3s) they detected?
Was it clear to you at the time that the Argentinian TPS-43 radar operators were directing raids away from any SHARs (and presubably GR3s) they detected?
Trust me - they were not ignoring us GR3s operating at low level, unlike the SHARs who were mostly above the threat level..
They locked onto us which was not good for us.
Our Radar warning was pretty basic - but it told us when they had us.
Didn't like it.
Trust me - they were not ignoring us GR3s operating at low level, unlike the SHARs who were mostly above the threat level..
They locked onto us which was not good for us.
Our Radar warning was pretty basic - but it told us when they had us.
Didn't like it.
Thread Starter
Mog,
1) Your mentioning Pipi Sánchez got me thinking, first thankfully his guns jammed, and second it is a shame we can't get some contributions to this thread from the 'other side'. I have been reading some accounts in Spanish including about the OC 3 Esc. de Caza y Ataque, Rodolfo Castro Fox, who insisted on flying missions with his men even though he was official grounded due to injuries sustained in an ejection, he couldn't open or close the canopy without assistance and had to use his wrong hand to operate the undercarriage lever, Pablo Carballo who, although his aircraft been damaged by a Sea Cat, decided not to eject and made it home safely, and José 'Cacha' Arca who, having ejected from his A-4Q (which had been hit 10 times by SHAR cannon fire after attacking Ardent) as he couldn't lower his undercart to land at Stanley, was fished out of the sea using a skid by a Huey pilot.
2) Was it clear to you at the time that the Argentinian TPS-43 radar operators were directing raids away from any SHARs (and presubably GR3s) they detected?
1) Your mentioning Pipi Sánchez got me thinking, first thankfully his guns jammed, and second it is a shame we can't get some contributions to this thread from the 'other side'. I have been reading some accounts in Spanish including about the OC 3 Esc. de Caza y Ataque, Rodolfo Castro Fox, who insisted on flying missions with his men even though he was official grounded due to injuries sustained in an ejection, he couldn't open or close the canopy without assistance and had to use his wrong hand to operate the undercarriage lever, Pablo Carballo who, although his aircraft been damaged by a Sea Cat, decided not to eject and made it home safely, and José 'Cacha' Arca who, having ejected from his A-4Q (which had been hit 10 times by SHAR cannon fire after attacking Ardent) as he couldn't lower his undercart to land at Stanley, was fished out of the sea using a skid by a Huey pilot.
2) Was it clear to you at the time that the Argentinian TPS-43 radar operators were directing raids away from any SHARs (and presubably GR3s) they detected?
Mog
Main issue was lack of endurance over the Islands for Combat by the main fighter types (Mirage IIIEA and Dagger) due to the types not being equipped with IFR.
Second issue was capability of the AAM's in the Inventory.
All of the Mirage IIIEA's (Total fleet of 16) could carry a R530 SARH / IR homing missile on the centreline, but only 7 of the fleet (delivered in 1980) could carry the R550 Magic on wing pylons. The R530 was basically a bomber killer, not a dogfight missile. R550 was akin to a AIM-9G. According to Argentinian sources, neither type was fired when the Mirage III's tried to mix it with SHAR on 1st May 82 , The aircraft that did get home were very low on fuel and at the end of the day, the Magic capable fleet was down to 5 aircraft thanks to 801 NAS and the Argentinian Army.
The Daggers could carry 2 early model Shafrirs, which in the words of one senior officer of the Dagger Grupo were next to useless. Some high level CAP and escort missions were flown by the unit on 1st May 82 which resulted in one Dagger being shot down by 800 NAS
The Navy A-4's were AIM-9B Sidewinder capable, but the fleet were suffering from major problems due to US arms embargos, so they may have had nothing to shoot bar life ex missiles.
Super Etandards should have been R550 Magic capable, but like the Exocet, the Argentinians may have not got around to integrating them with aircraft when things kicked off.
Another Issue I do remember seeing mentioned somewhere was a lack of Drop Tanks for the Mirages and Daggers. Had they banged them off at the rate they did on 1st May 1982 for any length of time to try and mix it with the Sea Harriers, the force would have been unable to reach the Falklands after a few days of further action.
Second issue was capability of the AAM's in the Inventory.
All of the Mirage IIIEA's (Total fleet of 16) could carry a R530 SARH / IR homing missile on the centreline, but only 7 of the fleet (delivered in 1980) could carry the R550 Magic on wing pylons. The R530 was basically a bomber killer, not a dogfight missile. R550 was akin to a AIM-9G. According to Argentinian sources, neither type was fired when the Mirage III's tried to mix it with SHAR on 1st May 82 , The aircraft that did get home were very low on fuel and at the end of the day, the Magic capable fleet was down to 5 aircraft thanks to 801 NAS and the Argentinian Army.
The Daggers could carry 2 early model Shafrirs, which in the words of one senior officer of the Dagger Grupo were next to useless. Some high level CAP and escort missions were flown by the unit on 1st May 82 which resulted in one Dagger being shot down by 800 NAS
The Navy A-4's were AIM-9B Sidewinder capable, but the fleet were suffering from major problems due to US arms embargos, so they may have had nothing to shoot bar life ex missiles.
Super Etandards should have been R550 Magic capable, but like the Exocet, the Argentinians may have not got around to integrating them with aircraft when things kicked off.
Another Issue I do remember seeing mentioned somewhere was a lack of Drop Tanks for the Mirages and Daggers. Had they banged them off at the rate they did on 1st May 1982 for any length of time to try and mix it with the Sea Harriers, the force would have been unable to reach the Falklands after a few days of further action.
