Originally Posted by
MAINJAFAD
Main issue was lack of endurance over the Islands for Combat by the main fighter types (Mirage IIIEA and Dagger) due to the types not being equipped with IFR.
Second issue was capability of the AAM's in the Inventory.
All of the Mirage IIIEA's (Total fleet of 16) could carry a R530 SARH / IR homing missile on the centreline, but only 7 of the fleet (delivered in 1980) could carry the R550 Magic on wing pylons. The R530 was basically a bomber killer, not a dogfight missile. R550 was akin to a AIM-9G. According to Argentinian sources, neither type was fired when the Mirage III's tried to mix it with SHAR on 1st May 82 , The aircraft that did get home were very low on fuel and at the end of the day, the Magic capable fleet was down to 5 aircraft thanks to 801 NAS and the Argentinian Army.
The Daggers could carry 2 early model Shafrirs, which in the words of one senior officer of the Dagger Grupo were next to useless. Some high level CAP and escort missions were flown by the unit on 1st May 82 which resulted in one Dagger being shot down by 800 NAS
The Navy A-4's were AIM-9B Sidewinder capable, but the fleet were suffering from major problems due to US arms embargos, so they may have had nothing to shoot bar life ex missiles.
Super Etandards should have been R550 Magic capable, but like the Exocet, the Argentinians may have not got around to integrating them with aircraft when things kicked off.
Another Issue I do remember seeing mentioned somewhere was a lack of Drop Tanks for the Mirages and Daggers. Had they banged them off at the rate they did on 1st May 1982 for any length of time to try and mix it with the Sea Harriers, the force would have been unable to reach the Falklands after a few days of further action.
Thank you for both the original question and the detailed reply. The lack of engagement in taking on the Sea Harriers has always puzzled me, and that post clearly explains it.