New CDS
As post 35 suggests, our CVS / Harrier combo didn't have the legs to contribute meaningfully, although both Illustrious and Ocean supported Op Veritas in the early stages - not with f/w though.
It goes for back enough that even Kitty Hawk, Enterprise and JFK had a tour. Plus Vinson, Stennis, Charles de Gaulle, Reagan. I think most of the USN CVN had a period on line during the last couple of decades.
As post 35 suggests, our CVS / Harrier combo didn't have the legs to contribute meaningfully, although both Illustrious and Ocean supported Op Veritas in the early stages - not with f/w though.
As post 35 suggests, our CVS / Harrier combo didn't have the legs to contribute meaningfully, although both Illustrious and Ocean supported Op Veritas in the early stages - not with f/w though.
It goes for back enough that even Kitty Hawk, Enterprise and JFK had a tour. Plus Vinson, Stennis, Charles de Gaulle, Reagan. I think most of the USN CVN had a period on line during the last couple of decades.
As post 35 suggests, our CVS / Harrier combo didn't have the legs to contribute meaningfully, although both Illustrious and Ocean supported Op Veritas in the early stages - not with f/w though.
As post 35 suggests, our CVS / Harrier combo didn't have the legs to contribute meaningfully, although both Illustrious and Ocean supported Op Veritas in the early stages - not with f/w though.
It goes for back enough that even Kitty Hawk, Enterprise and JFK had a tour. Plus Vinson, Stennis, Charles de Gaulle, Reagan. I think most of the USN CVN had a period on line during the last couple of decades.
As post 35 suggests, our CVS / Harrier combo didn't have the legs to contribute meaningfully, although both Illustrious and Ocean supported Op Veritas in the early stages - not with f/w though.
As post 35 suggests, our CVS / Harrier combo didn't have the legs to contribute meaningfully, although both Illustrious and Ocean supported Op Veritas in the early stages - not with f/w though.
The carriers were originally mentioned in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review - as replacements for carriers and aircraft that had been busy in the Falklands, Cold War, Adriatic, and Gulf - and one of their intended roles was to defend amphibious forces from air or submarine attack. A quick search suggests that he did not get promoted to Flag Rank until 2014 in any case. I do know that when he became First Sea Lord he was told in black and white terms by the Secretary of State for Defence this his priorities were to to get more ships to sea, to get more people in ships, FAA squadrons, and RM units, and to deliver on the 'Future Navy' - of which the Future Commando Force is a key part.
I am not sure why you think amphibious capabilities have been cut. Two forward deployed 'Littoral Response Groups' - admittedly one of them UK based, but that is for a NATO role, a company of 42 Cdo based in/with the carrier, and smaller RM detachments..
..
Both the LRGs will, I believe, rotate companies from 40 Cdo and 45 Cdo.
The Royal Marines are part of all five pillars of the Future Navy - an increased commitment to the North Atlantic, Carrier Strike, Future Commando Force, Continuous At Sea Deterrence, and Forward Presence.
I find it nothing short of disgusting that some people who should know better a exploiting a tragedy to push the agenda of - well actually I am not sure, but it is smear campaign against the First Sea Lord. Understandably the RM community has closed ranks, but the question should not be about refusing to adapt, it should be about do senior (and other) personnel and former personnel get properly supported?
Please can you distinguish between the black, dark grey and pale grey ships? As presented without [I think} a legend or key, I find it impossible to understand.
Are these ships in early or advanced state of build?
Are these ships in early or advanced state of build?
Last edited by langleybaston; 14th Oct 2021 at 18:37. Reason: addendum
Not my graphic - but the black ships are the amphibious ones - in other words LPD or LSD(A). It appears that grey ones are the ones we would expect to be assigned as and when. I think the shading differentiates between types of ship, such the two Type 45 destroyers in dark grey and two Type 23 frigates in the Carrier Strike Group section.
All the ships shown are in service. The vessel outlined with the legend of 'Additional Logistic Vessels' looks like one of the RO-RO vessels operated on behalf of the MOD. As no amphibious assets have been cut since 2010, and the RN as fiercely resisted attempts to reduce the capability (which started to wither on the vine during the years when Afghanistan was the main defence effort), I fail to understand the claim of cuts to amphibious capabilities.
All the ships shown are in service. The vessel outlined with the legend of 'Additional Logistic Vessels' looks like one of the RO-RO vessels operated on behalf of the MOD. As no amphibious assets have been cut since 2010, and the RN as fiercely resisted attempts to reduce the capability (which started to wither on the vine during the years when Afghanistan was the main defence effort), I fail to understand the claim of cuts to amphibious capabilities.
[...Snip...]
I find it nothing short of disgusting that some people who should know better a exploiting a tragedy to push the agenda of - well actually I am not sure, but it is smear campaign against the First Sea Lord. Understandably the RM community has closed ranks, but the question should not be about refusing to adapt, it should be about do senior (and other) personnel and former personnel get properly supported?
I find it nothing short of disgusting that some people who should know better a exploiting a tragedy to push the agenda of - well actually I am not sure, but it is smear campaign against the First Sea Lord. Understandably the RM community has closed ranks, but the question should not be about refusing to adapt, it should be about do senior (and other) personnel and former personnel get properly supported?
You are mistaken. Not my smear words, but the words from CGRM himself, outlining how he was treated. All the fantasy accounting you can trot out still can't explain the shocking approach taken to managing the Corps by 1SL and his staff.
2. As has been pointed out to you by others, the RM is a military organisation within the Naval Service. CGRM works for 1SL and ultimately has two choices if he doesn't agree with him. Salute and crack on, or resign. Seems he did neither.
The blokes in the ground, can we leave it now please?
I have no idea whether Ben Key can do this or not, but to me he will have been successful if he succeeds on restoring some balance to the surface fleet whilst maintains or increasing both mass and sustainment capability. The current PM appears to see the need for Global Britain to be supported by more ships, but that has not yet got beyond fine words.
N
Skills needed in peacetime are very different from those need in wartime - hence the casualty rate in VSO's of all armed services everywhere in the first 12 months of a shooting war
Sadly the system seems to screw over people who do amphibious things - maybe the FCF concept will help? I know of a (now retired) Lt Cdr PWO and Major RM (from the LC specialisation) who got career fouled for it.
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I guess getting all of that experience must be so much more challenging with such a small fleet (is it still big enough to be called a fleet?), and so much of it being stuck in harbour for so long because it’s U/S.
Lovely graphics by the way, whatever the shade of grey!
Lovely graphics by the way, whatever the shade of grey!
1. Linking to a Daily Fail article is not evidence. It's one side of a story.
2. As has been pointed out to you by others, the RM is a military organisation within the Naval Service. CGRM works for 1SL and ultimately has two choices if he doesn't agree with him. Salute and crack on, or resign. Seems he did neither.
The blokes in the ground, can we leave it now please?
2. As has been pointed out to you by others, the RM is a military organisation within the Naval Service. CGRM works for 1SL and ultimately has two choices if he doesn't agree with him. Salute and crack on, or resign. Seems he did neither.
The blokes in the ground, can we leave it now please?
2. Thanks for pointing out the finer points of military hierarchy to me. Luckily we don't have to follow your directives and act like sheep. People like Matt Holmes use their initiative and challenge toxic leadership. Nobody needs a lesson from the likes of you on how to serve.
"the system seems to screw over people who do amphibious things"
I have to agree with WEBF (not my default setting ) - certainly seems to be the case in the RN. Probably because they are called upon to do it so rarely - how many times since '45 for example? Read the runup to San Carlos and it's clear they were very short of hands on experience - a few specialists, mainly relatively low rank, trying to beat some sense into the upper echelons as to what could and could not be done across a beach.
I have to agree with WEBF (not my default setting ) - certainly seems to be the case in the RN. Probably because they are called upon to do it so rarely - how many times since '45 for example? Read the runup to San Carlos and it's clear they were very short of hands on experience - a few specialists, mainly relatively low rank, trying to beat some sense into the upper echelons as to what could and could not be done across a beach.
Suspicion breeds confidence
Thread Starter
The Falklands was a classic example of that. The ideal person to lead that was Radm Derek Reffell. Former COMAW and Carrier Captain and FOF3 so perfectly qualified and positioned for the job. Instead we got a submariner who through no fault of his own knew nothing about amphibious warfare and next to nothing about carrier warfare.
The Falklands was a classic example of that. The ideal person to lead that was Radm Derek Reffell. Former COMAW and Carrier Captain and FOF3 so perfectly qualified and positioned for the job. Instead we got a submariner who through no fault of his own knew nothing about amphibious warfare and next to nothing about carrier warfare.
If we had not carried out amphibious exercises regularly then I doubt that the San Carlos landings could take place. The mechanics of using landing craft and helicopters to get troops and equipment ashore is complex.
Anyway - let me expand on my comments about the two Gentlemen I referred to....
Lt Cdr A was a normal Warfare Officer. After initial roles including Officer Of the Watch, and some interesting shore jobs such as in Bosnia, he qualified as a PWO(A). Unusually he became HOD aboard one of the LPDs - which put him at a disadvantage compared to this serving as PWO in frigates/destroyers/carriers(?) He was also a PWO(C) - which suited the LPD. However, as his ship handling was a bit weak compared with his peers, and he was unable to get a command or promoted to Cdr - even though he was exceptionally well qualified in the PWO(C) role and also had enough amphibious expertise to go on exchange in an amphibious job in another NATO nation.
Major B RM was an Officer who came into the Royal Marines by a non standard route - this later contributed to his later problems. He was a member of the Landing Craft specialisation which was not the flavour of the month during the long years of the commitment to Afghanistan - although he deployed there at least twice, both as a member of an RM unit as an advisor to the Afghan National Army., but his LC background did not help his promotion prospects during the Herrick years.