Originally Posted by
Navaleye
The Falklands was a classic example of that. The ideal person to lead that was Radm Derek Reffell. Former COMAW and Carrier Captain and FOF3 so perfectly qualified and positioned for the job. Instead we got a submariner who through no fault of his own knew nothing about amphibious warfare and next to nothing about carrier warfare.
However - Woodward did win and his experience as a Submariner may well have contributed to defeating the Argentine submarine threat. If the ARA
Santa Fe had not been engaged during the South Georgia operation, then the Argentine plan was to use her to interdict supply runs between the area of Ascension Island and the task group. - and a couple of torpedoes in one of those STUFT liners full of troops would have ended the war. ASW is just just about sinking enemy submarines, it is more about stopping your own units from being sunk. Additionally Woodward was a former Type 42 destroyer CO and would have known about Sea Dart and how to use it - and of course Fighter Control was one of the missions of the Type 42. The learning point from the Falklands was that because of the run down of carrier aviation in the seventies, task group operations and
using a carrier based fighter as a task group weapon had not been rehearsed, hence we had to learn and improvise very quickly. He of course had various aviators on his staff.
If we had not carried out amphibious exercises regularly then I doubt that the San Carlos landings could take place. The mechanics of using landing craft and helicopters to get troops and equipment ashore is complex.
Anyway - let me expand on my comments about the two Gentlemen I referred to....
Lt Cdr A was a normal Warfare Officer. After initial roles including Officer Of the Watch, and some interesting shore jobs such as in Bosnia, he qualified as a PWO(A). Unusually he became HOD aboard one of the LPDs - which put him at a disadvantage compared to this serving as PWO in frigates/destroyers/carriers(?) He was also a PWO(C) - which suited the LPD. However, as his ship handling was a bit weak compared with his peers, and he was unable to get a command or promoted to Cdr - even though he was exceptionally well qualified in the PWO(C) role and also had enough amphibious expertise to go on exchange in an amphibious job in another NATO nation.
Major B RM was an Officer who came into the Royal Marines by a non standard route - this later contributed to his later problems. He was a member of the Landing Craft specialisation which was not the flavour of the month during the long years of the commitment to Afghanistan - although he deployed there at least twice, both as a member of an RM unit as an advisor to the Afghan National Army., but his LC background did not help his promotion prospects during the
Herrick years.