US Navy Drone Tanker
Back in 2000 during the pre-Christmas 'visits season' at Mount Pleasant, some MP turned up to wander about, look at the penguins, visit the odd radar site etc. At some dinner, the topic of the future carriers came up and he was interested in our opinions. We tried to make him realise that a well-designed 'conventional' carrier could operate V/STOL aircraft and conventional aircraft, but a carrier without catapults and arrestor cables could only operate V/STOL....
If the QE2 class had been built with an angled deck and a STO ski jump, the RN could have operated a mix of F-35B and F-35C as well as drones. But to retrofit some launch and recovery system only for drones will be a very expensive programme, especially as the ships still won't be able to cross-deck with F/A-18, F-35C etc......
If the QE2 class had been built with an angled deck and a STO ski jump, the RN could have operated a mix of F-35B and F-35C as well as drones. But to retrofit some launch and recovery system only for drones will be a very expensive programme, especially as the ships still won't be able to cross-deck with F/A-18, F-35C etc......
They panicked as the cost of the QE's shot up and cancelled the Cat & Trap option. They said it could be retrofitted later but the builders hadn't been consulted IIRC
1. CVF Variant D (what became QEC) was designed with adequate space, weight, power provision for installation of catapults and arrester gear. Worst case of EMALS/AAR or the old BS6 steam, plus DA2 used to size this. This included provision in the arrangement (primarily 2 deck, but some spaces on 8/9 decks) for the relevant kit, the electrical distribution system sized to accommodate EMALS and the overall structural arrangement set up to accommodate this. But only at basic design level (ie you know you've got the ability to fit it, but there has to be a lot of detailed design work conducted to sort out the relevant seatings, cable routes, fire protection etc etc). The detailed design work to do so was never contracted because the CTOL option was only for use in the event that the B was horrifically short or its KPP, or got canned. The working assumption was that STOVL would be the operating mode using the B.
2. Despite many issues the B continued to progress - even when on probation - and so the button on detailed design (which is heavy on design resource) was never pressed. The ships were (finally) contracted after years of prevarication by one G Brown Esq (contrary to popular myth - and only at the last minute when he desperately needed a bit of popularity) and once detailed design and production was underway that was BVT and Babcock resource committed. Because the B was looking better, no-one thought the CTOL detailed design effort was necessary.
3. By the time Cameron came along, fabrication was well underway and it would have taken a significant amount of time and resource to stop the job and start re-doing the detailed design. Time during which, a lot of the ACA production staff would have had nothing productive to do, while they waited for the new set of design info - all of which would have been chargeable to the contract. That additional cost and time taken was significant - sufficiently significant that it would have increased the overall cost significantly, delayed in-service date with a number of other knock-ons too. There were also one or two ITAR issues in getting access to sufficiently detailed EMALS/AAR information as well AIUI.
4. As it transpired EMALS itself was undergoing some development issues at the time, increasing the overall risk calculation.
All the above resulted in the risk balance remaining in favour of STOVL and the B. It will be interesting to see what responses come back to the RFI exercise. Much of this I suspect is being driven by two factors :
a) Perception of Crowsnest programme risk vs benefit (and potential need for a follow-on Merlin order to generate enough frames for all demands)
b) Desire to get some form of UCAV able to operate from QEC to increase mass and dovetail with Tempest (including not forcing a STOVL version thereof)
One other thing to note. If you're going to use CTOL mode, do it for the whole air wing. A mix of STOVL and CTOL (which is in effect what STOBAR is) really does complicate your deck operations and is probably teh worst of both worlds. Deck length and clearance for an arrested landing, coupled with the take off run required for STO really eats into your safe parking area, which means either fewer aircraft parked and hence less sorties - or more chockheads to respot more frequently. That's in addition to the badgers and shooters that you'd need to run the cats and arrester systems..
Although some of what I say below is covered by Not_a_Boffin's reasoned and much better informed post; I am still going to inflict you with my bank holiday musings.
If I recall correctly a hybrid arrangement was 'briefly considered' but dropped on cost grounds in 2000. One of the arguments for the increased size of the ships (over the original plan) is flexibility for future 'enhancements' on the 'steel is cheap and air is free' principle, but as in most projects it's way cheaper to do things up front. Add to that no serious contingency planning and not having a contractual requirement, even though the convertibility allegedly contributed most of the extra cost of the Delta option chosen. During the SDR 2010 dalliance with CATOBAR and F-35C the delivery date was said to be 2023. EMALS, however, is still not meeting the required level of reliability for the USN,so I assume that means two cats are going to have to be fitted that plus a probable angled approach is going to eat a large proportion of currently available deck parking (or can UAV bolters be assumed to avoid striking the ramp?). I do wonder if a STOVL/F-35B combo was partly required to justify continued UK F-35 participation, An all C buy would never make sense but a split A/C (or A/B) purchase would have brought diversity costs - CATOBAR from the start would have probably led to a cheaper less capable aircraft e.g. F/A-18, Rafale M or Typhoon M when the financial screws were tightened. That would have brought all the problems associated with a small RN only fleet e.g. getting enough pilots.
One thing I don't think has been mentioned is the MQ-25's (extended) wing span, at 23 metres it is more than double that of an F-35, 25% more that a Merlin's rotor diameter, and almost a third of the QA's overall beam. The more I think about it, the less likely I believe it will be the UK UAV AAR solution. My concern is whatever comes out of Project Vixen will be a Jack of all trades and ...
I assume the Osprey RoRo refueling pod rules out the US DoD having any undisclosed plans to operate UAV tankers from LHAs. It seems to me to make sense to supplement or replace AAR from Ospreys but the assumptions are probably: a CVN will always be in range to supply AAR if needed; littoral ops do not require a dedicated resource to provide the additional range/endurance. If they do have, it would be in the RN's interest as the LHAs' decks are c. 20m shorter than the QEs'. Though I believe the realistic solution is to find the money for some Ospreys for COD and podded AAR. It is clear, however that the UK MoD message is, 'if it CAN be done by a UAV it WILL be' i.e. 'FMAF, the rapid transformation of crewed aviation roles (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Communications, Lift and Strike) to uncrewed'. RN aircrew are an endangered species.
Asturias - 'twasn't ever thus; I was musing on the Walrus at the weekend (MTOW c. 3.6 tonnes), which could be catapulted off a light cruiser, in those pre-RW piston-engined days recovery by landing on the oggin and crane was the only option; even in these days of autonomous UAVs that's almost certainly out of scope for a jet-powered fw aircraft. 
If I recall correctly a hybrid arrangement was 'briefly considered' but dropped on cost grounds in 2000. One of the arguments for the increased size of the ships (over the original plan) is flexibility for future 'enhancements' on the 'steel is cheap and air is free' principle, but as in most projects it's way cheaper to do things up front. Add to that no serious contingency planning and not having a contractual requirement, even though the convertibility allegedly contributed most of the extra cost of the Delta option chosen. During the SDR 2010 dalliance with CATOBAR and F-35C the delivery date was said to be 2023. EMALS, however, is still not meeting the required level of reliability for the USN,so I assume that means two cats are going to have to be fitted that plus a probable angled approach is going to eat a large proportion of currently available deck parking (or can UAV bolters be assumed to avoid striking the ramp?). I do wonder if a STOVL/F-35B combo was partly required to justify continued UK F-35 participation, An all C buy would never make sense but a split A/C (or A/B) purchase would have brought diversity costs - CATOBAR from the start would have probably led to a cheaper less capable aircraft e.g. F/A-18, Rafale M or Typhoon M when the financial screws were tightened. That would have brought all the problems associated with a small RN only fleet e.g. getting enough pilots.
One thing I don't think has been mentioned is the MQ-25's (extended) wing span, at 23 metres it is more than double that of an F-35, 25% more that a Merlin's rotor diameter, and almost a third of the QA's overall beam. The more I think about it, the less likely I believe it will be the UK UAV AAR solution. My concern is whatever comes out of Project Vixen will be a Jack of all trades and ...
I assume the Osprey RoRo refueling pod rules out the US DoD having any undisclosed plans to operate UAV tankers from LHAs. It seems to me to make sense to supplement or replace AAR from Ospreys but the assumptions are probably: a CVN will always be in range to supply AAR if needed; littoral ops do not require a dedicated resource to provide the additional range/endurance. If they do have, it would be in the RN's interest as the LHAs' decks are c. 20m shorter than the QEs'. Though I believe the realistic solution is to find the money for some Ospreys for COD and podded AAR. It is clear, however that the UK MoD message is, 'if it CAN be done by a UAV it WILL be' i.e. 'FMAF, the rapid transformation of crewed aviation roles (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Communications, Lift and Strike) to uncrewed'. RN aircrew are an endangered species.
Last edited by SLXOwft; 31st Aug 2021 at 13:54.
Thanks guys - very informative - and shows just how tough its going to be to get anything of any size to do the job.
Maybe get a couple of old cross channel ferries, cut them down and turn them into Escort Carriers a la 1944...............
Maybe get a couple of old cross channel ferries, cut them down and turn them into Escort Carriers a la 1944...............
I would add - as a designer - "provisions" during the design/build phase are only as good as the knowledge of what you're provisioning for. If what you're provisioning for is well understood and basically already designed, provisions can be done rather effectively and cost effective. OTOH, when the system you're attempting to provision for is still under development, you end up with so many unknowns that the provisions become basically worthless. You end up spending a bunch of time and money designing provisions that don't work and would need to be torn out and re-done if the 'provisioned for' system is ever actually implemented.
Been there, done that...
Been there, done that...
I know the feeling................................... 
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Reference possibilities for possible suppliers and launch and recovery of the Vuxen UCAV from the carriers - and other platforms - interesting to see the latest Skyborg trials using USN markings, ZELL (zero length launch) and parachute recovery…..
That works but a very expensive piece of kit like an MQ25 parachuting into the ocean on a regular basis is unlikely to be a great idea TBH
Good God man!
the have to operate off ships - the RN won't buy them otherwise........
the have to operate off ships - the RN won't buy them otherwise........
Looks like they will be building them in Saint Louis.
https://www.military.com/daily-news/...vy-a_210922.nl
https://www.military.com/daily-news/...vy-a_210922.nl
18 Sep 2021
Associated Press | By JOHN O'CONNORSPRINGFIELD, Ill. (AP) — Chicago-based aerospace giant Boeing Co. will invest $200 million to begin manufacturing the U.S. Navy's latest unmanned aircraft at MidAmerica St. Louis Airport in a project that could add at least 150 jobs on the company's southwest Illinois campus, officials said Friday.
Boeing will build the MQ-25 Stingray, the Navy's first carrier-based unmanned aircraft in a state-of-the-art plant of about 300,000 square feet. The company has been under contract developing and testing the craft since 2018
Associated Press | By JOHN O'CONNORSPRINGFIELD, Ill. (AP) — Chicago-based aerospace giant Boeing Co. will invest $200 million to begin manufacturing the U.S. Navy's latest unmanned aircraft at MidAmerica St. Louis Airport in a project that could add at least 150 jobs on the company's southwest Illinois campus, officials said Friday.
Boeing will build the MQ-25 Stingray, the Navy's first carrier-based unmanned aircraft in a state-of-the-art plant of about 300,000 square feet. The company has been under contract developing and testing the craft since 2018
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Now they have a radar to fit
.
https://www.raytheonintelligenceands...r-any-platform
EL SEGUNDO, Calif., (September 21, 2021) Raytheon Intelligence & Space, a Raytheon Technologies business, introduced today an affordable, lightweight and compact Active Electronically Scanned Array, or AESA, radar. It harnesses the capability of a heavyweight AESA fire control radar in its lightest form factor ever at a fraction of the cost. .
At just over 100 pounds, the new compact radar is a third of the weight of most modern AESA radars and costs about half as much as typical fire control radars. It combines the power of Gallium Nitride, or GaN, technology with an innovative packaging of its digital receiver/exciter and processor called CHIRP, and a unique air-cooled design to deliver Gen 4-plus performance. .
https://www.raytheonintelligenceands...r-any-platform
EL SEGUNDO, Calif., (September 21, 2021) Raytheon Intelligence & Space, a Raytheon Technologies business, introduced today an affordable, lightweight and compact Active Electronically Scanned Array, or AESA, radar. It harnesses the capability of a heavyweight AESA fire control radar in its lightest form factor ever at a fraction of the cost. .
At just over 100 pounds, the new compact radar is a third of the weight of most modern AESA radars and costs about half as much as typical fire control radars. It combines the power of Gallium Nitride, or GaN, technology with an innovative packaging of its digital receiver/exciter and processor called CHIRP, and a unique air-cooled design to deliver Gen 4-plus performance. .
Now they have a radar to fit
.
https://www.raytheonintelligenceands...r-any-platform
EL SEGUNDO, Calif., (September 21, 2021) Raytheon Intelligence & Space, a Raytheon Technologies business, introduced today an affordable, lightweight and compact Active Electronically Scanned Array, or AESA, radar. It harnesses the capability of a heavyweight AESA fire control radar in its lightest form factor ever at a fraction of the cost. .
At just over 100 pounds, the new compact radar is a third of the weight of most modern AESA radars and costs about half as much as typical fire control radars. It combines the power of Gallium Nitride, or GaN, technology with an innovative packaging of its digital receiver/exciter and processor called CHIRP, and a unique air-cooled design to deliver Gen 4-plus performance. .
https://www.raytheonintelligenceands...r-any-platform
EL SEGUNDO, Calif., (September 21, 2021) Raytheon Intelligence & Space, a Raytheon Technologies business, introduced today an affordable, lightweight and compact Active Electronically Scanned Array, or AESA, radar. It harnesses the capability of a heavyweight AESA fire control radar in its lightest form factor ever at a fraction of the cost. .
At just over 100 pounds, the new compact radar is a third of the weight of most modern AESA radars and costs about half as much as typical fire control radars. It combines the power of Gallium Nitride, or GaN, technology with an innovative packaging of its digital receiver/exciter and processor called CHIRP, and a unique air-cooled design to deliver Gen 4-plus performance. .
"For many years, about 20, I've never got around to writing a novel about how I saw the future air war. I planned to cal it "The Swarm". The idea was of a stealthy aircraft with minimal sensors of it's own, but a UWB datalink talking to a swarm of drones of the same RCS/signature around it - up to 30-50nm ahead, behind etc. Some drones would be weapons of various types, others radars, ECM platforms, refuelling pods etc. More could launched from LRLS types trucks near the FEBA to RV; those needing recovery such as the radar & ECM would recover for net capture."
Not bad for 2012 ORAC-
you should have got a patent on it................
Not bad for 2012 ORAC-
you should have got a patent on it................
I have been musing on the lessons of Cmnd 124, the 1957 UK Defence White Paper, which notoriously abolished the RNVR Air Branch and had some other less significant effects.
To quote the eighth report of the House of Commons Defence Committee
"The 1957 review was to some extent a response to the Suez debacle of the previous year which was a diplomatic disaster and had revealed the poor state of readiness of British forces and the obsolescence of much of their equipment. The resulting review (conducted over a two month period) placed the priorities on nuclear deterrence and missiles."
Its two main foci were:
1) Reacting to technical advances in nuclear weapons, and offensive and defensive 'rocket weapons'.
2) Cost effective defence matched to needs.
Plus ηa change, though I think duties have been more often been matched to the minimum resources the government of the day could get away with.
I fear the UK is making the same mistakes with its obsession with adoption new technological answers and the mirage of cost saving, looking to phase out existing capability. Whereas the USN, at least, is with the MQ-25 looking to extend and enhance its capabilities.
To quote the eighth report of the House of Commons Defence Committee
"The 1957 review was to some extent a response to the Suez debacle of the previous year which was a diplomatic disaster and had revealed the poor state of readiness of British forces and the obsolescence of much of their equipment. The resulting review (conducted over a two month period) placed the priorities on nuclear deterrence and missiles."
Its two main foci were:
1) Reacting to technical advances in nuclear weapons, and offensive and defensive 'rocket weapons'.
It has been clear for some time that these scientific advances must fundamentally alter the whole basis of military planning. But, it is only now that the future picture is becoming sufficiently clear to enable a comprehensive reshaping of policy to be undertaken with any degree of confidence.
The aim must be to provide well-equipped forces sufficient to carry out these duties, while making no greater demands than are absolutely necessary upon manpower, money and other national resources.
I fear the UK is making the same mistakes with its obsession with adoption new technological answers and the mirage of cost saving, looking to phase out existing capability. Whereas the USN, at least, is with the MQ-25 looking to extend and enhance its capabilities.