I have been musing on the lessons of Cmnd 124, the 1957 UK Defence White Paper, which notoriously abolished the RNVR Air Branch and had some other less significant effects.
To quote the eighth report of the House of Commons Defence Committee
"The 1957 review was to some extent a response to the Suez debacle of the previous year which was a diplomatic disaster and had revealed the poor state of readiness of British forces and the obsolescence of much of their equipment. The resulting review (conducted over a two month period) placed the priorities on nuclear deterrence and missiles."
Its two main foci were:
1) Reacting to technical advances in nuclear weapons, and offensive and defensive 'rocket weapons'.
It has been clear for some time that these scientific advances must fundamentally alter the whole basis of military planning. But, it is only now that the future picture is becoming sufficiently clear to enable a comprehensive reshaping of policy to be undertaken with any degree of confidence.
2) Cost effective defence matched to needs.
The aim must be to provide well-equipped forces sufficient to carry out these duties, while making no greater demands than are absolutely necessary upon manpower, money and other national resources.
Plus ça change, though I think duties have been more often been matched to the minimum resources the government of the day could get away with.
I fear the UK is making the same mistakes with its obsession with adoption new technological answers and the mirage of cost saving, looking to phase out existing capability. Whereas the USN, at least, is with the MQ-25 looking to extend and enhance its capabilities.