75th Anniversary Operation Market Garden
Join Date: Oct 2004
Location: listening to the sound of aviation
Posts: 48
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A history of another Dakota. FZ626 of 271 Sqn
A bit of personal interest in this one.
A bit of personal interest in this one.
Thread Starter
Thanks for the link g3. Interesting that Lord had planned on becoming ordained before the war. The Rev. Lord would have had a quite a ring to it of course.
The bitter irony of the story is that the drop landed in German hands as they had already overrun the DZ. The crew of course had no way of knowing that.
A very nicely written piece of journalism, and a worthy reminder of those unsung heroes of supply dropping, the despatchers!
The bitter irony of the story is that the drop landed in German hands as they had already overrun the DZ. The crew of course had no way of knowing that.
A very nicely written piece of journalism, and a worthy reminder of those unsung heroes of supply dropping, the despatchers!
Going back to the PIAT, my dad, who was a tank driver, was taught about them during his training and said it was quite impressive, although I don’t know if he fired one. However he had nothing good to say about the PIAT’s predecessor, the Boys 0.55” Anti-Tank Rifle. He said he fired one once and that was quite enough!
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boys_anti-tank_rifle
I looked up the muzzle energy of the bullet. Depending which specific round was fired, it was about five to six times the muzzle energy of a 0.303 bullet! No wonder the recoil was hard to manage.
Despite its recoil slide and rubber-cushioned buttpad, the recoil of the weapon (along with noise and muzzle blast) was said to be painful, frequently causing neck strains and bruised shoulders. Consequently, the Boys was almost never fired as a free weapon (that is, not affixed to a support) except in emergencies.
I looked up the muzzle energy of the bullet. Depending which specific round was fired, it was about five to six times the muzzle energy of a 0.303 bullet! No wonder the recoil was hard to manage.
Does anyone have the actual specifications of the PIAT system? It seemed to me to be a reinvention of the rifle grenade, but with a dedicated launcher.
I don't think that it would have been impossible to attach a similar projectile to an SMLE and get a much more usable weapon.
Apologies if this is silly, I'm no ordnance specialist, but if it is, please tell us why.
I don't think that it would have been impossible to attach a similar projectile to an SMLE and get a much more usable weapon.
Apologies if this is silly, I'm no ordnance specialist, but if it is, please tell us why.
as a scruffy CCF cadet I fired a thing ISTR was called the Inerga - small mortar type projectile that was fired from a spigot fitted on the muzzle of a SMLE No4 Mk1, helped on its way by a super powerful blank round - recoil such that seem to remember heel of butt of rifle was placed on the ground
Thread Starter
Energa evidently Wanders:-
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ENERGA..._rifle_grenade
As to the PIAT it would seem to me to be an elegant (!) solution to the airborne troops dilemma, how to take into battle a lightweight (ish) weapon that could deal with tanks. OK it had its limitations, not the least of which was the suicidal short range of its effectiveness, but given the technology of the time it was as good as could be reasonably expected in my view.
Market Garden failed to outflank the Siegfried Line to the East or the German troops in the West bottling up Antwerp in the Scheldt Estuary. It also failed the population of the Netherlands who endured a winter of starvation that killed tens of thousands of them. If the co-ordinated effort that ensured the success of D-Day had been repeated in the planning and execution of this Operation it could have succeeded. As it was, XXX Corps got tantalisingly close to the southern approaches to the Arnhem Bridge. Was it really too far, or were we too slow?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ENERGA..._rifle_grenade
As to the PIAT it would seem to me to be an elegant (!) solution to the airborne troops dilemma, how to take into battle a lightweight (ish) weapon that could deal with tanks. OK it had its limitations, not the least of which was the suicidal short range of its effectiveness, but given the technology of the time it was as good as could be reasonably expected in my view.
Market Garden failed to outflank the Siegfried Line to the East or the German troops in the West bottling up Antwerp in the Scheldt Estuary. It also failed the population of the Netherlands who endured a winter of starvation that killed tens of thousands of them. If the co-ordinated effort that ensured the success of D-Day had been repeated in the planning and execution of this Operation it could have succeeded. As it was, XXX Corps got tantalisingly close to the southern approaches to the Arnhem Bridge. Was it really too far, or were we too slow?
Well....for a start...ignoring the intelligence from multiple sources to include ULTRA and local resistance groups combined with RAF Recce photos that German Armor Units were present.....and banishing the Intelligence Officer who was trying his professional best to argue against that decision....there were a few other issues.
Boy Browning should have been hung for his conduct and Horrocks should have been hoisted under a big Oak Tree for halting his column for 18 Hours while brave Men were fighting and dying waiting for the Armor to arrive as promised.
The concept of running an attack of this magnitude up a single two lane road.....without being able to maneuver to the flanks...and then having to cross far too many bridges in the process.....lunacy when the truth is considered....that the Montgomery, Browning, and others KNEW they were ignoring the Intelligence Data.
Eisenhower had pursued the Broad Front Strategy right up until this Operation and for some reasons yet fully articulated elected to allow Montgomery to proceed.
One cannot defend Montgomery and Browning for their direct responsibility in the failure of the Operation....as they knowingly proceeded knowing the concept was fatally flawed.
One thing for sure is if it had been Patton instead of Horrocks....there would have been no halt ordered until the Tanks rolled into Arnhem and relieved the British Para's holding the other end of the Bridge.
Take note of his conduct during the Battle of the Bulge when he had already had his Ops Officers readying a plan to turn Third Army around from its advance in the south and ready it to turn 180 degrees and attack to relieve Bastogne.
He arrived at the meeting with Eisenhower with a plan in hand in anticipation of what would be needed.
Boy Browning should have been hung for his conduct and Horrocks should have been hoisted under a big Oak Tree for halting his column for 18 Hours while brave Men were fighting and dying waiting for the Armor to arrive as promised.
The concept of running an attack of this magnitude up a single two lane road.....without being able to maneuver to the flanks...and then having to cross far too many bridges in the process.....lunacy when the truth is considered....that the Montgomery, Browning, and others KNEW they were ignoring the Intelligence Data.
Eisenhower had pursued the Broad Front Strategy right up until this Operation and for some reasons yet fully articulated elected to allow Montgomery to proceed.
One cannot defend Montgomery and Browning for their direct responsibility in the failure of the Operation....as they knowingly proceeded knowing the concept was fatally flawed.
One thing for sure is if it had been Patton instead of Horrocks....there would have been no halt ordered until the Tanks rolled into Arnhem and relieved the British Para's holding the other end of the Bridge.
Take note of his conduct during the Battle of the Bulge when he had already had his Ops Officers readying a plan to turn Third Army around from its advance in the south and ready it to turn 180 degrees and attack to relieve Bastogne.
He arrived at the meeting with Eisenhower with a plan in hand in anticipation of what would be needed.
On the Allied side, intelligence reports, ULTRA radio intercepts and messages from the Dutch resistance indicated the German troop movements as well as mentioned the arrival of armored forces in the area. These caused concerns and Eisenhower dispatched his Chief of Staff, General Walter Bedell Smith, to speak with Montgomery. Despite these reports, Montgomery refused to alter the plan. At lower levels, Royal Air Force reconnaissance photos taken by No. 16 Squadron showed German armor around Arnhem. Major Brian Urquhart, the intelligence officer for the British 1st Airborne Division, showed these to Lieutenant General Frederick Browning, Brereton's deputy, but was dismissed and instead placed on medical leave for "nervous strain and exhaustion."
Energa evidently Wanders:-
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ENERGA..._rifle_grenade
As to the PIAT it would seem to me to be an elegant (!) solution to the airborne troops dilemma, how to take into battle a lightweight (ish) weapon that could deal with tanks. OK it had its limitations, not the least of which was the suicidal short range of its effectiveness, but given the technology of the time it was as good as could be reasonably expected in my view.
Market Garden failed to outflank the Siegfried Line to the East or the German troops in the West bottling up Antwerp in the Scheldt Estuary. It also failed the population of the Netherlands who endured a winter of starvation that killed tens of thousands of them. If the co-ordinated effort that ensured the success of D-Day had been repeated in the planning and execution of this Operation it could have succeeded. As it was, XXX Corps got tantalisingly close to the southern approaches to the Arnhem Bridge. Was it really too far, or were we too slow?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ENERGA..._rifle_grenade
As to the PIAT it would seem to me to be an elegant (!) solution to the airborne troops dilemma, how to take into battle a lightweight (ish) weapon that could deal with tanks. OK it had its limitations, not the least of which was the suicidal short range of its effectiveness, but given the technology of the time it was as good as could be reasonably expected in my view.
Market Garden failed to outflank the Siegfried Line to the East or the German troops in the West bottling up Antwerp in the Scheldt Estuary. It also failed the population of the Netherlands who endured a winter of starvation that killed tens of thousands of them. If the co-ordinated effort that ensured the success of D-Day had been repeated in the planning and execution of this Operation it could have succeeded. As it was, XXX Corps got tantalisingly close to the southern approaches to the Arnhem Bridge. Was it really too far, or were we too slow?
Join Date: Apr 2010
Location: Sneaking up on the Runway and leaping out to grab it unawares
Age: 61
Posts: 684
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The warhead fired by the early Bazooka M1 of 1942 and M1A1 of 1943 had a lower armour penetration than did that of PIAT (3" as opposed to 4"). It wasn't until the advent of the M9 in October 1943 that the warhead became equivalent in effect to that of PIAT. Additionally the warheads fired by the M1 and M1A1, owing to their pointed shape, had a nasty habit of bouncing off the target at low impact angles; this was addressed on the M9 by having a much blunter shaped projectile.
The advantage of the bazooka was that the munition was rocket propelled so it had a slightly better DF range than PIAT (150yd as opposed to 115yd). However the bazooka had a noticeable backblast which would immediately give away the firer's position. Additionally said backblast made the weapon almost useless for FIBUA.
Bazookas were supplied to UK troops under the lend-lease program.
The advantage of the bazooka was that the munition was rocket propelled so it had a slightly better DF range than PIAT (150yd as opposed to 115yd). However the bazooka had a noticeable backblast which would immediately give away the firer's position. Additionally said backblast made the weapon almost useless for FIBUA.
Bazookas were supplied to UK troops under the lend-lease program.
Join Date: Apr 2010
Location: Sneaking up on the Runway and leaping out to grab it unawares
Age: 61
Posts: 684
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Does anyone have the actual specifications of the PIAT system? It seemed to me to be a reinvention of the rifle grenade, but with a dedicated launcher.
I don't think that it would have been impossible to attach a similar projectile to an SMLE and get a much more usable weapon.
I don't think that it would have been impossible to attach a similar projectile to an SMLE and get a much more usable weapon.
It utilised the 'Spigot Mortar' principle, but using a sprung loaded moving spigot as opposed to a fixed spigot, thereby cutting down the recoil and also making the weapon lighter than a conventional mortar tube of the same calibre; if a fixed spigot had been used it would not have been possible to fire it from the shoulder.
The limitations were range (115yd Direct Fire / 350yd Indirect Fire), weight, and the fact that the sprung loaded spigot was difficult to cock (although my late Father who was a Glider Pilot and a mere 5'6" used the PIAT in anger on the Rhine Crossing with no problems).
The British rifle grenade of WWII was the No 68 AT. It was a shaped charge munition (likely the first ever shaped charge / HEAT munition) that had an effective range of upto 100yd with a maximum penetration of 2" of armour. So significantly worse than PIAT and with far less accuracy.
PIAT replaced the Boys Anti Tank Rifle in 1943. The Boys fired a .55" round capable of penetrating just under 1" of armour at 100yd (based on a 90 degree strike) and about 3/4" at 500yd. It weighed more than the PIAT at 39lbs with no 5 rnd magazine fitted and had a far more fearsome recoil (and muzzle blast) than did PIAT, leading to its use as mainly vehicle mounted.
BTW SMLE refers to the Short Magazine Lee Enfield rifle of WWI. During WW2 we were using the Lee Enfield No 4 rifle, a descendent of, but a somewhat different beast to the SMLE.
Thread Starter
SASless, the rather purple language about hanging Generals doesn't help the discussion much. I notice that they are British. This was an Allied Operation that went wrong, no doubt thanks to poor leadership, but that leadership was Allied. The Bridge too far/late wasn't at Arnhem but at Nijmegen. It should have been taken by the 82nd on Day 1. It wasn't, which allowed the Wehrmacht to occupy it and the town of Nijmegen instead. It wasn't until XXX Corps tanks got there that it was fully in Allied hands, despite the Little Omaha bloody sacrifices of the 504th. Tanks need infantry to advance, and Horrocks's infantry were now in Nijmegen town clearing out German troops that needn't have been there in the first place. To leave them there would have allowed them to sever XXX Corps advance in two.
Of course it was a gamble, but it was a gamble that required a non-stop advance by XXX Corps straight to Arnhem. Nijmegen stymied that and cost the Operation's success more than anything else in my view. Yes about Ultra, Resistance, and Photo Recon evidence of Panzers but those Panzers needed time to react to stop the advance. They got it thanks to Nijmegen.
There is a tendency to judge outcomes in black and white terms. Eisenhower carried a letter around on D-Day to take full responsibility should it fail. He might well have had to do so were it not for Fortitude and Allied Air Power. Even so, it was a damn close run thing!
Of course it was a gamble, but it was a gamble that required a non-stop advance by XXX Corps straight to Arnhem. Nijmegen stymied that and cost the Operation's success more than anything else in my view. Yes about Ultra, Resistance, and Photo Recon evidence of Panzers but those Panzers needed time to react to stop the advance. They got it thanks to Nijmegen.
There is a tendency to judge outcomes in black and white terms. Eisenhower carried a letter around on D-Day to take full responsibility should it fail. He might well have had to do so were it not for Fortitude and Allied Air Power. Even so, it was a damn close run thing!
Thank you for the link to the Eastern Daily Press story. My dad joined on 7 Dec 1941 as a volunteer and went to Canada on the training scheme, then stayed on as what we later called a creamie. His time in Canada came to an end after Market Garden, when 271 and other squadrons urgently needed Battle Casualty Replacements. Dad joined them in time for the crossing-of-the-Rhine ops, which were far better-managed than those of the previous year - still good for a story or 2, though.
Thanks for the link g3. Interesting that Lord had planned on becoming ordained before the war. The Rev. Lord would have had a quite a ring to it of course.
The bitter irony of the story is that the drop landed in German hands as they had already overrun the DZ. The crew of course had no way of knowing that.
A very nicely written piece of journalism, and a worthy reminder of those unsung heroes of supply dropping, the despatchers!
The bitter irony of the story is that the drop landed in German hands as they had already overrun the DZ. The crew of course had no way of knowing that.
A very nicely written piece of journalism, and a worthy reminder of those unsung heroes of supply dropping, the despatchers!
After acting as GOC 1ABN's bodyguard for a while following the virtual annihilation of 1st Para Bde, Lord remained in the perimeter and was captured by the Germans. He was sent, along with other members of the Division to a PoW camp near Fallingbostel. The camp was poorly run, overcrowded, morale was poor and contained many OR's who had been captured in 1940 ( remember that Officers and OR's were kept in separate camps). Lord immediately took command, demanded (and got) regular meetings with the Commandant who was calling him Mr Lord within a few weeks. He improved the organisation, introduced parades, PT and other 'activities' and it was known for him to pull up the guards for slovenly dress.
The end result being that when the 8th Hussars arrived to liberate the camp in 1945 they were greeted on arrival by Lord, presiding over an immaculate Guardroom at the camp entrance, complete with Orderly Sgt, Corporal of the Guard and full Guard, all correctly turned out in battledress, blanco'd webbing and bulled boots.
