Well....for a start...ignoring the intelligence from multiple sources to include ULTRA and local resistance groups combined with RAF Recce photos that German Armor Units were present.....and banishing the Intelligence Officer who was trying his professional best to argue against that decision....there were a few other issues.
Boy Browning should have been hung for his conduct and Horrocks should have been hoisted under a big Oak Tree for halting his column for 18 Hours while brave Men were fighting and dying waiting for the Armor to arrive as promised.
The concept of running an attack of this magnitude up a single two lane road.....without being able to maneuver to the flanks...and then having to cross far too many bridges in the process.....lunacy when the truth is considered....that the Montgomery, Browning, and others KNEW they were ignoring the Intelligence Data.
Eisenhower had pursued the Broad Front Strategy right up until this Operation and for some reasons yet fully articulated elected to allow Montgomery to proceed.
One cannot defend Montgomery and Browning for their direct responsibility in the failure of the Operation....as they knowingly proceeded knowing the concept was fatally flawed.
One thing for sure is if it had been Patton instead of Horrocks....there would have been no halt ordered until the Tanks rolled into Arnhem and relieved the British Para's holding the other end of the Bridge.
Take note of his conduct during the Battle of the Bulge when he had already had his Ops Officers readying a plan to turn Third Army around from its advance in the south and ready it to turn 180 degrees and attack to relieve Bastogne.
He arrived at the meeting with Eisenhower with a plan in hand in anticipation of what would be needed.
On the Allied side, intelligence reports, ULTRA radio intercepts and messages from the Dutch resistance indicated the German troop movements as well as mentioned the arrival of armored forces in the area. These caused concerns and Eisenhower dispatched his Chief of Staff, General Walter Bedell Smith, to speak with Montgomery. Despite these reports, Montgomery refused to alter the plan. At lower levels, Royal Air Force reconnaissance photos taken by No. 16 Squadron showed German armor around Arnhem. Major Brian Urquhart, the intelligence officer for the British 1st Airborne Division, showed these to Lieutenant General Frederick Browning, Brereton's deputy, but was dismissed and instead placed on medical leave for "nervous strain and exhaustion."
Originally Posted by
Chugalug2
Energa evidently Wanders:-
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ENERGA..._rifle_grenade
As to the PIAT it would seem to me to be an elegant (!) solution to the airborne troops dilemma, how to take into battle a lightweight (ish) weapon that could deal with tanks. OK it had its limitations, not the least of which was the suicidal short range of its effectiveness, but given the technology of the time it was as good as could be reasonably expected in my view.
Market Garden failed to outflank the Siegfried Line to the East or the German troops in the West bottling up Antwerp in the Scheldt Estuary. It also failed the population of the Netherlands who endured a winter of starvation that killed tens of thousands of them. If the co-ordinated effort that ensured the success of D-Day had been repeated in the planning and execution of this Operation it could have succeeded. As it was, XXX Corps got tantalisingly close to the southern approaches to the Arnhem Bridge. Was it really too far, or were we too slow?