HMS Sheffield -Declassified Report
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The new released files are here: Operation Corporate (Falkland Conflict): Board of Inquiry into the loss of HMS... | The National Archives
The "old" files are elsewhere. I don´t know what all the fuss is about. The "old" files, even redacted, were very critic.
Regards,
The "old" files are elsewhere. I don´t know what all the fuss is about. The "old" files, even redacted, were very critic.
Regards,
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I would advise at least a marching pace’s introspection before criticising anyone’s actions or omissions when looking at a set of circumstances you haven’t personally been in. Whilst I find some of the actions/ omissions of those at the scene surprising I’ve no idea how I would have reacted.
I clearly remember the first time I was shot at and it wouldn’t be too much of a stretch to describe the tracer as having a mesmerising quality.
Naturally I’m sure plenty of pprune lurkers have more than earnt an opinion on this - but I do find it a little objectionable when journalists take a disparaging view of those in combat when replacing the toner is as dangerous as it gets.
Don’t get me wrong - if you draw the Queen’s shilling certain things are expected of you and we do need to hold those who do to account. Just be sure you’re on solid ground before you cast the first stone.
The credit belongs to the man in the arena...of which there were many ‘down south’ of course.
I clearly remember the first time I was shot at and it wouldn’t be too much of a stretch to describe the tracer as having a mesmerising quality.
Naturally I’m sure plenty of pprune lurkers have more than earnt an opinion on this - but I do find it a little objectionable when journalists take a disparaging view of those in combat when replacing the toner is as dangerous as it gets.
Don’t get me wrong - if you draw the Queen’s shilling certain things are expected of you and we do need to hold those who do to account. Just be sure you’re on solid ground before you cast the first stone.
The credit belongs to the man in the arena...of which there were many ‘down south’ of course.
Remember reports are written for an intended audience of people who understand the tactical, technical, and human aspects.
This is why others might have pointed out that the report needs to be seen in the wider context of a task group 8000 miles from home, operating in a part of the World where false radar returns due to atmospherics are an issue. Additionally, the intelligence on whether or not the Argentines had got the Super Eterndard/Exocet combination working was unclear.
I have my copy of One Hundred Days with me, Admiral Woodward comments that there had been a number of false alarms that day and the FAAWC was reluctant to expend chaff without good reason.
Somewhere in the BOI there is a note that the Exocet was not seen as it was lost the reflected ground wave from the 965 radar, this was due to the beamwidth. 965 was an old radar that was not fitted to later Type 42s. Likewise detecting the Exocet's own radar (apart from the problem of SCOT transmitting on I band) was that the Exocet would be silent until the last phase of flight. The sequence of the attacks was something like:
1. Aircraft take off from Argentina, and are refuelled in flight.
2. Aircraft approach task force at very low altitude to avoid radar detection. Exercises against Argentine Type 42s have been used to refine the tactics.
3. Aircraft pop up, briefly exposing themselves to detection by radar. They briefly turned on Agave radar to look for targets before returning to low level.
4. Aircraft pop up again, turn on their radars, and the heading/range information is fed to the Exocet, which is then fired. The aircraft return to the safety of low level for the flight home.
5. The Exocet heads towards the target in radar silence, until popping up and looking where it expects to find a target. The radar has a limited arc of view, and aims for the largest target it can see.
The point with chaff is that it has to present a larger target (Radar Cross Section) than the ship that fired it - that takes a finite time as the cloud blooms, and demands precise ship handling by the OOW, lest you steam into your own chaff cloud. If you see the incoming missile with the mark one eyeball - is there enough time?
I have no idea at what range the Exocet was seen, but lets assume it was 1 nm. The speed of Exocet is widely given as Mach 0.9, so if we assume Mach 1 is 720 kts that is approximately 650 kts. This suggests it would only have been seen in the last 5.5 seconds. Enough time to fire a full pattern and for it to bloom? With the missile that close, would the chaff cloud be within the Exocet radar's limited arc of view?
Also some of the comments seem to the think the OOW watched the missile from the time it was launched. Clearly not, and I think I read somewhere the slightly obvious conclusion that if the OOW had called Action Stations it would have resulted in people moving about and doors being open at the time of impact and the subsequent blast/fireball. This would have increased the damage sustained and the number of casualties.
The following occasions when chaff was used successfully differed in that the task group knew it was under attack and fired chaff in good time.
Another particularly nasty allegation is that members of the ship's company were calling home via satellite, which transmitted on I band, blanking out the radar from aircraft and missile. I believe that back in 1982, RN personnel aboard ship did not have telephone communications with home, and certainly not in a war zone. However, ships in a task group do need to communicate. One of the BOI reports includes a comment that Sheffield should have used a HF Task Group RATT circuit instead of SCOT.
However, HF was problematic in the South Atlantic, and the proceedings report from HMS Antrim mentions the difficulties with HF.
I think you might find all the posts on Page Seven of that thread to be educational.
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Orca
Good point but taken literally would mean you could never comment on anything you've never experienced
We all expect bus drivers to be able to drive the bus, surgeons to operate sucessfully, teachers to teach........ the modern world depends on lots of people doing things properly even tho you have no idea that they are doing it or what it entails
I can't see any reason why we should exempt the military - tho appreciating that everyone can fail and that it was never deliberate or malicous
Good point but taken literally would mean you could never comment on anything you've never experienced
We all expect bus drivers to be able to drive the bus, surgeons to operate sucessfully, teachers to teach........ the modern world depends on lots of people doing things properly even tho you have no idea that they are doing it or what it entails
I can't see any reason why we should exempt the military - tho appreciating that everyone can fail and that it was never deliberate or malicous
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"Another particularly nasty allegation is that members of the ship's company were calling home via satellite,"- a
I 've always understood it the comms problem that MAY have interfered with the radar was possibly from a nearby ship or by London calling it - that allegation sounds very nasty (CMA time at the Admiralty??) and probably wrong
I 've always understood it the comms problem that MAY have interfered with the radar was possibly from a nearby ship or by London calling it - that allegation sounds very nasty (CMA time at the Admiralty??) and probably wrong
Harry
The allegation that a private phone call was being was originally made by a tabloid (Mirror?) against the Captain in the 1980s. Someone else made it on the linked ARRSE thread.
The BOI report refers to Sheffield transmitting on SCOT (using I band), which blotted out I band for the ESM recievers. Both the Agave radar of the Eterndards and the Exocet's own radar transmitted on I band. Although the ESM system would have been outside of the SCOT main beam, they would have been subject to interference from sidelobes. This would have been at a reduced power level, but still would have presented a signal that would have swamped that from a distant radar.
Recieving SATCOMM signals would not have caused this problem - and the use of SCOT was a serious failing. There were filters that should have been fitted to reduce interence, but she never got them.
The problem of the 965 radar being vulnerable to clutter was an entirely different problem, but due to the physical construction of the antenna and sea conditions, which made detecting low altitude targets difficult.
Additionally the false alarms meant the initial calls from HMS Glasgow were dismissed, although if she (Sheffield) had detected them using ESM..... However the Super Enterdards were fleeting targets, and the Exocet a very small one just above sea level, and she had no weapon likely to be able to shoot it down.
The allegation that a private phone call was being was originally made by a tabloid (Mirror?) against the Captain in the 1980s. Someone else made it on the linked ARRSE thread.
The BOI report refers to Sheffield transmitting on SCOT (using I band), which blotted out I band for the ESM recievers. Both the Agave radar of the Eterndards and the Exocet's own radar transmitted on I band. Although the ESM system would have been outside of the SCOT main beam, they would have been subject to interference from sidelobes. This would have been at a reduced power level, but still would have presented a signal that would have swamped that from a distant radar.
Recieving SATCOMM signals would not have caused this problem - and the use of SCOT was a serious failing. There were filters that should have been fitted to reduce interence, but she never got them.
The problem of the 965 radar being vulnerable to clutter was an entirely different problem, but due to the physical construction of the antenna and sea conditions, which made detecting low altitude targets difficult.
Additionally the false alarms meant the initial calls from HMS Glasgow were dismissed, although if she (Sheffield) had detected them using ESM..... However the Super Enterdards were fleeting targets, and the Exocet a very small one just above sea level, and she had no weapon likely to be able to shoot it down.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 24th Oct 2017 at 21:58.
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WEBF,
So much of what you post will resonate with people that served in the maritime environment and know their subject, as opposed to those that did not and do not.
I applaud your diligence and your perseverance.
I chuckled at this masterpiece of understatement...
It was indeed, as it was in the med...and pretty much anywhere but the North Atlantic and even there it was sh1te twice a fkn day...
P1ss P00r comms...screwing the military since pontius was a pilot.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3JEUChn0Jq8
So much of what you post will resonate with people that served in the maritime environment and know their subject, as opposed to those that did not and do not.
I applaud your diligence and your perseverance.
I chuckled at this masterpiece of understatement...
HF was problematic in the South Atlantic
P1ss P00r comms...screwing the military since pontius was a pilot.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3JEUChn0Jq8
The May 4th attack was a textbook attack. The Argentine Navy fliers made few mistakes (really, just one, thinking HMS Sheffield was really an aircraft carrier) and the Royal Navy a lot of them.
In the second attack, the Argentine Navy fliers made very few mistakes, and the Royal Navy also few mistakes. A couple of Exocets, aimed to HMS Hermes, hit finally Atlantic Conveyor.
In the final Exocet attack, the Argentine Navy / Argentine Air Force made a good planned attack against the CVGB and missed HMS Avenger. The Royal Navy behaved very well in defense, hitting 2 A4 Skyhawks.
My point is the Royal Navy learnt the hard way. But learnt really very quickly.
In the second attack, the Argentine Navy fliers made very few mistakes, and the Royal Navy also few mistakes. A couple of Exocets, aimed to HMS Hermes, hit finally Atlantic Conveyor.
In the final Exocet attack, the Argentine Navy / Argentine Air Force made a good planned attack against the CVGB and missed HMS Avenger. The Royal Navy behaved very well in defense, hitting 2 A4 Skyhawks.
My point is the Royal Navy learnt the hard way. But learnt really very quickly.
"Mildly" Eccentric Stardriver
I think one of the big mistakes was the assessment (by the Foreign Office?) of the Argentine military before the conflict began. Someone assessed the Army as ineffective, owing to the number of conscripts (probably correct), the Navy likewise (difficult to say, since they saw little action), and the same for the Air Force. Sadly for the UK forces, the assessment of the Air Force was wrong. They were good, a lot better than expected, and it took time to realise this and activate proper countermeasures.
Caveat. I had retired from the military at that time, so have no insider information.
Caveat. I had retired from the military at that time, so have no insider information.
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Herod - you're correct
The problem was there was really no proper knowledge of Argentinian capabilities - we were scraping up bits from our American friends. Intelligence had no interest or sources in S America generally (it was 1982 nad they had a lot of other worries)
The assesment was correct as far as it went - but it didn't address the possibility that, poor as the Argentinean Army was, it was good enough to stage a smash-and-grab raid before we woke up............ The Argentinean Army itself knew its limitations only too well but went along with the Navy in the belief that once they had the FI the British wouldn't respond.
Someone in BA really should have mentioned Pearl Harbour
The problem was there was really no proper knowledge of Argentinian capabilities - we were scraping up bits from our American friends. Intelligence had no interest or sources in S America generally (it was 1982 nad they had a lot of other worries)
The assesment was correct as far as it went - but it didn't address the possibility that, poor as the Argentinean Army was, it was good enough to stage a smash-and-grab raid before we woke up............ The Argentinean Army itself knew its limitations only too well but went along with the Navy in the belief that once they had the FI the British wouldn't respond.
Someone in BA really should have mentioned Pearl Harbour
Herod wrote:
Indeed. I recall the JARIC recce guide for Argentine aircraft issued at the time - it included gems such as the Catalina and Huanquero...
Sadly for the UK forces, the assessment of the Air Force was wrong. They were good, a lot better than expected, and it took time to realise this and activate proper countermeasures.
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there is still a lot of very old kit in S America - Paraguay is probably the worst
the Navy has 4 River defence vessels that are minesweeper /corvette size.
Captain Cabral commisioned 1908 - yes 109 years old "still in excellent condition"
Paraguay commisioned 1931
Teniente Farina commissioned July 1939
Itiapu commisioned 1985
The Army still runs Shermans & Stewart tanks from 1945
The Airforce is the most modern with a small force of Tucanos
the Navy has 4 River defence vessels that are minesweeper /corvette size.
Captain Cabral commisioned 1908 - yes 109 years old "still in excellent condition"
Paraguay commisioned 1931
Teniente Farina commissioned July 1939
Itiapu commisioned 1985
The Army still runs Shermans & Stewart tanks from 1945
The Airforce is the most modern with a small force of Tucanos
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WEBF, your previous was a clear and consise record of what HAPPENED, but not WHY.
IE why were the filters not fitted, why were there no close range active defence, why was such interference of critical systems habitually sanctioned?
IE why were the filters not fitted, why were there no close range active defence, why was such interference of critical systems habitually sanctioned?
IE why were the filters not fitted, why were there no close range active defence, why was such interference of critical systems habitually sanctioned?
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I'd have thought we should be grateful that the Argentinian Naval Air Arm was so small, because it was bloody effective.
5 Super Etendards using 5 missiles sank HMS Sheffield and Atlantic Conveyor.
10 A-4Bs in service sank HMS Ardent and put an UXB on HMS Antelope ( not the one that sank her, it was an AF UXB which exploded as it was being dealt with ).
All for the cost of 3 planes shot down and 2 pilots killed. A very professional force.
A good job they didn't have the full complement of 14 Exocets on order when it all kicked off.
5 Super Etendards using 5 missiles sank HMS Sheffield and Atlantic Conveyor.
10 A-4Bs in service sank HMS Ardent and put an UXB on HMS Antelope ( not the one that sank her, it was an AF UXB which exploded as it was being dealt with ).
All for the cost of 3 planes shot down and 2 pilots killed. A very professional force.
A good job they didn't have the full complement of 14 Exocets on order when it all kicked off.
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For me (being a USN guy rather an RN guy) it's interesting to compare the outcomes of the Sheffield Exocet incident (while in an active war) with the Stark Exocet incident (while not at war). Not only were the outcomes for the ships quite different (Stark was hit by two Exocets but made it to Bahrain under her own power and after temporary repairs there, made it to her home port in Mayport, Florida), but the outcomes for their officers was very different. Captain Brindel (CO of Stark) was relieved and forced to retire. Lt Moncrief (Tactical Action Officer of Stark) was forced to resign.
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So the CO and Tactical Action Officer of Stark were completely innocent of any errors and were "scapegoats" and the real fault lay with higher ups not on board. Got it.