HMS Sheffield -Declassified Report
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HMS Sheffield -Declassified Report
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/...-hms-sheffield
Declassified report into disaster reveals officers ‘mesmerised’ by sight of incoming missiles failed to raise alarm
Ian Cobain
Sunday 15 October 2017 22.00 BST Last modified on Sunday 15 October 2017 22.29 BST
The catalogue of errors and failings that ended in the sinking of a Royal Navy destroyer during the Falklands war has been disclosed after being covered up for 35 years.
Twenty people died and 26 were injured when HMS Sheffield was hit by an Argentinian Exocet missile during the early days of the 1982 conflict. It was the first Royal Navy warship to have been lost since the second world war.
The report of the board of inquiry into the loss of the Sheffield, which has finally been declassified, reveals the full reasons why the ship was completely unprepared for the attack.
The board found that two officers were guilty of negligence, but they escaped courts martial and did not face disciplinary action, apparently in order to avoid undermining the euphoria that gripped much of the UK at the end of the war.
A heavily censored summary of the board’s findings was released by the Ministry of Defence in 2006, but the redaction concealed all the board’s key conclusions and criticisms, including the findings of negligence. Also hidden was the board’s warning that there were “critical deficiencies” in the firefighting equipment then aboard type 42 destroyers such as the Sheffield.
Marked “Secret – UK Eyes Bravo”, the full, uncensored report shows:
While the ship’s company were aware of the threat posed by Exocet missiles, some appear to have thought the Sheffield was beyond the range of the Super Étendard aircraft, because they were unaware the planes could refuel in mid-air. The board also concluded it was “unfortunate” that the Sheffield’s captain, the submariner Sam Salt, and his second-in-command, a helicopter officer, had “little or no relevant recent surface ship experience”.
In the event, nobody called the captain. His ship did not go to “action stations”, did not fire off any clouds of chaff in an attempt to deflect the Exocets, and did not turn towards the incoming missiles in order to narrow the Sheffield’s profile. Moreover, some of the ship’s weapons were unloaded and unmanned, and no attempt was made to shoot down the incoming missiles.
One of the Exocets slammed into the Sheffield’s starboard side about 8ft (2.4 metres) above the waterline, ripping a hole 4ft high and 15ft long. It penetrated as far as the ship’s galley, where eight cooks are thought to have been killed instantly. Fire erupted within seconds and the ship filled with smoke. Twelve people were thought to have been overcome by fumes, including five who remained on duty in the Sheffield’s computer room until it was too late for them to attempt escape. Some of the wounded suffered serious burns.
The report says the firefighting efforts “lacked cohesion” and were “uncoordinated”, and that although the crew attempted to tackle the blazes, “it was not clear where the command of the ship was located”. The main pipe through which water was pumped for firefighting had been ruptured, while several pumps failed and forward escape hatches were found to be too narrow for people wearing breathing apparatus. The ship’s company were unable to bring the blaze under control and Salt gave the order to abandon it.
The Guardian understands that at the time the board’s findings were suppressed, the British government was attempting to sell type 42 destroyers.
In London on the evening of the attack, 4 May 1982, the defence secretary, John Nott, told the Commons that the Argentinian fighter had probably flown in under the navy’s radar. The next day, the French manufacturer of the Exocets, Aérospatiale, issued a statement describing its missile as infallible. Fleet Street newspapers informed their readers about this “awesome, space-age weapon”, and described it as “a missile that couldn’t miss”. In fact, it appears that later in the Falklands war, some were successfully deflected with chaff.
The fire on board the Sheffield burned for two days. Six days after the attack, according to the official account, the ship sank while being towed. The Guardian has learned that it may have been scuttled. Only one body was recovered from the vessel.
Reporting in July 1982 to the navy’s commander-in-chief, Adm John Fieldhouse, the board of inquiry said it had concluded that the Sheffield’s on-watch principal warfare officer in the ops room had been negligent for failing to react in line with standard doctrine and training. The board also found the anti-air warfare officer had been negligent because his “lengthy absence” from the ops room meant an important air-defence facility was not manned. The report notes that 12 minutes after impact, this officer was still insisting the ship had not been struck by a missile. However, Fieldhouse ruled that the two officers would not face any sanction. In September 1982 he informed the MoD – in a letter that has also been declassified – that although both men had “prima facie demonstrated negligence”, they would not face courts martial, disciplinary action or any form of formal administrative proceedings.
Instead, Fieldhouse decided, he or one of his staff officers would speak to each officer, to “ensure that each fully understands the situation”. The Guardian understands that one was subsequently promoted, reaching the rank of captain, and served in the Royal Navy for a further 20 years.
Woodward added that Fieldhouse had decided there should be no courts martial, “to avoid, he told me, the more doubtful cases creating the wrong atmosphere in the press and souring the general euphoria”.
Even two months after the attack, the board of inquiry was uncertain whether the Exocet’s warhead had detonated. Although crew members were convinced it had detonated, the board’s five members eventually concluded that it had not, and reported that the fire had been caused by the missile’s propellant, only 40% of which had been used during its flight. A fresh MoD reassessment made public in 2015 concluded that the warhead had exploded.
The officers and crew of the Sheffield were always aware there had been serious errors and failings before the sinking of the ship. In 2001, facing accusations of a cover-up, the MoD issued a statement confirming that the anti-air warfare officer had not been in the ops room before the attack warning, but insisted this was because he was not required and was “attending duties elsewhere”. Five years later, after a campaign by ex-service personnel, the MoD released the heavily redacted summary of the board’s report.
The full and unredacted report was cleared for release in 2012, but the MoD delayed its declassification until now.
Declassified report into disaster reveals officers ‘mesmerised’ by sight of incoming missiles failed to raise alarm
Ian Cobain
Sunday 15 October 2017 22.00 BST Last modified on Sunday 15 October 2017 22.29 BST
The catalogue of errors and failings that ended in the sinking of a Royal Navy destroyer during the Falklands war has been disclosed after being covered up for 35 years.
Twenty people died and 26 were injured when HMS Sheffield was hit by an Argentinian Exocet missile during the early days of the 1982 conflict. It was the first Royal Navy warship to have been lost since the second world war.
The report of the board of inquiry into the loss of the Sheffield, which has finally been declassified, reveals the full reasons why the ship was completely unprepared for the attack.
The board found that two officers were guilty of negligence, but they escaped courts martial and did not face disciplinary action, apparently in order to avoid undermining the euphoria that gripped much of the UK at the end of the war.
A heavily censored summary of the board’s findings was released by the Ministry of Defence in 2006, but the redaction concealed all the board’s key conclusions and criticisms, including the findings of negligence. Also hidden was the board’s warning that there were “critical deficiencies” in the firefighting equipment then aboard type 42 destroyers such as the Sheffield.
Marked “Secret – UK Eyes Bravo”, the full, uncensored report shows:
- Some members of the crew were “bored and a little frustrated by inactivity” and the ship was “not fully prepared” for an attack.
- The anti-air warfare officer had left the ship’s operations room and was having a coffee in the wardroom when the Argentinian navy launched the attack, while his assistant had left “to visit the heads” (relieve himself).
- The radar on board the ship that could have detected incoming Super Étendard fighter aircraft had been blanked out by a transmission being made to another vessel.
- When a nearby ship, HMS Glasgow, did spot the approaching aircraft, the principal warfare officer in the Sheffield’s ops room failed to react, “partly through inexperience, but more importantly from inadequacy”.
- The anti-air warfare officer was recalled to the ops room, but did not believe the Sheffield was within range of Argentina’s Super Étendard aircraft that carried the missiles.
- When the incoming missiles came into view, officers on the bridge were “mesmerised” by the sight and did not broadcast a warning to the ship’s company.
While the ship’s company were aware of the threat posed by Exocet missiles, some appear to have thought the Sheffield was beyond the range of the Super Étendard aircraft, because they were unaware the planes could refuel in mid-air. The board also concluded it was “unfortunate” that the Sheffield’s captain, the submariner Sam Salt, and his second-in-command, a helicopter officer, had “little or no relevant recent surface ship experience”.
In the event, nobody called the captain. His ship did not go to “action stations”, did not fire off any clouds of chaff in an attempt to deflect the Exocets, and did not turn towards the incoming missiles in order to narrow the Sheffield’s profile. Moreover, some of the ship’s weapons were unloaded and unmanned, and no attempt was made to shoot down the incoming missiles.
One of the Exocets slammed into the Sheffield’s starboard side about 8ft (2.4 metres) above the waterline, ripping a hole 4ft high and 15ft long. It penetrated as far as the ship’s galley, where eight cooks are thought to have been killed instantly. Fire erupted within seconds and the ship filled with smoke. Twelve people were thought to have been overcome by fumes, including five who remained on duty in the Sheffield’s computer room until it was too late for them to attempt escape. Some of the wounded suffered serious burns.
The report says the firefighting efforts “lacked cohesion” and were “uncoordinated”, and that although the crew attempted to tackle the blazes, “it was not clear where the command of the ship was located”. The main pipe through which water was pumped for firefighting had been ruptured, while several pumps failed and forward escape hatches were found to be too narrow for people wearing breathing apparatus. The ship’s company were unable to bring the blaze under control and Salt gave the order to abandon it.
The Guardian understands that at the time the board’s findings were suppressed, the British government was attempting to sell type 42 destroyers.
In London on the evening of the attack, 4 May 1982, the defence secretary, John Nott, told the Commons that the Argentinian fighter had probably flown in under the navy’s radar. The next day, the French manufacturer of the Exocets, Aérospatiale, issued a statement describing its missile as infallible. Fleet Street newspapers informed their readers about this “awesome, space-age weapon”, and described it as “a missile that couldn’t miss”. In fact, it appears that later in the Falklands war, some were successfully deflected with chaff.
The fire on board the Sheffield burned for two days. Six days after the attack, according to the official account, the ship sank while being towed. The Guardian has learned that it may have been scuttled. Only one body was recovered from the vessel.
Reporting in July 1982 to the navy’s commander-in-chief, Adm John Fieldhouse, the board of inquiry said it had concluded that the Sheffield’s on-watch principal warfare officer in the ops room had been negligent for failing to react in line with standard doctrine and training. The board also found the anti-air warfare officer had been negligent because his “lengthy absence” from the ops room meant an important air-defence facility was not manned. The report notes that 12 minutes after impact, this officer was still insisting the ship had not been struck by a missile. However, Fieldhouse ruled that the two officers would not face any sanction. In September 1982 he informed the MoD – in a letter that has also been declassified – that although both men had “prima facie demonstrated negligence”, they would not face courts martial, disciplinary action or any form of formal administrative proceedings.
Instead, Fieldhouse decided, he or one of his staff officers would speak to each officer, to “ensure that each fully understands the situation”. The Guardian understands that one was subsequently promoted, reaching the rank of captain, and served in the Royal Navy for a further 20 years.
Woodward added that Fieldhouse had decided there should be no courts martial, “to avoid, he told me, the more doubtful cases creating the wrong atmosphere in the press and souring the general euphoria”.
Even two months after the attack, the board of inquiry was uncertain whether the Exocet’s warhead had detonated. Although crew members were convinced it had detonated, the board’s five members eventually concluded that it had not, and reported that the fire had been caused by the missile’s propellant, only 40% of which had been used during its flight. A fresh MoD reassessment made public in 2015 concluded that the warhead had exploded.
The officers and crew of the Sheffield were always aware there had been serious errors and failings before the sinking of the ship. In 2001, facing accusations of a cover-up, the MoD issued a statement confirming that the anti-air warfare officer had not been in the ops room before the attack warning, but insisted this was because he was not required and was “attending duties elsewhere”. Five years later, after a campaign by ex-service personnel, the MoD released the heavily redacted summary of the board’s report.
The full and unredacted report was cleared for release in 2012, but the MoD delayed its declassification until now.
Absolutely appalling catalogue of failings in a war zone. Do the Navy not have the equivalent of our old-style TACEVALs ......... at least to find out if a man wearing breathing apparatus could get through a hatch?
And now we are putting a lot of eggs in two new baskets. Let us hope [without much hope] that such painful lessons continue to be brought to the attention of those concerned.
And now we are putting a lot of eggs in two new baskets. Let us hope [without much hope] that such painful lessons continue to be brought to the attention of those concerned.
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Langley,
Prior to the Falklands we had, I fear, started to lose the skills learned the hard way during the war. Damage control and fire fighting skills had begun to be treated in an almost light hearted way during BOST and COST work ups, and getting one over the FOSTies by cheating was commonplace. After the Falklands I remember my next ISSC course prior to joining the Illustrious was a real education, with emphasis on how important these skills were and how things could have been different in the Falklands war in terms of minimising losses and potentially saving assets.
Now the FOSTies are treated with healthy respect and training carried out seriously. We learnt, trust me!
Prior to the Falklands we had, I fear, started to lose the skills learned the hard way during the war. Damage control and fire fighting skills had begun to be treated in an almost light hearted way during BOST and COST work ups, and getting one over the FOSTies by cheating was commonplace. After the Falklands I remember my next ISSC course prior to joining the Illustrious was a real education, with emphasis on how important these skills were and how things could have been different in the Falklands war in terms of minimising losses and potentially saving assets.
Now the FOSTies are treated with healthy respect and training carried out seriously. We learnt, trust me!
I'm not sure what the point of this article is. MoD named the AAWO in 2001 (and perhaps before), and he wrote to the press about his actions in 2006. There's nothing new here. Nor does the Guardian refer to a previous piece, which sheds different light on events.
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2000/...alklands.world
I wonder who is pushing the journalit's buttons? What else is going on that MoD wants to divert attention from?
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2000/...alklands.world
I wonder who is pushing the journalit's buttons? What else is going on that MoD wants to divert attention from?
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On the officers it states "that one was subsequently promoted, reaching the rank of captain, and served in the Royal Navy for a further 20 years."
the original report was redacted quite heavily apparently
Tuc - I think the point is the latest report is the real thing - the earlier versions were changed - and reading it I can understand why.
I believe a hard copy of the report is now available in the National Archives in Kew but haven't checked to see if there is a full e-copy available yet
According to another newspaper "The National Archives said the document was only available to view in person at kew"
There's an article in Conrad Waters Naval Review 2017 pg 181 which has a reference to the location of the pdf of the earlier report but when you type it in the Archives says not
found...... Pity they won't put it up so we can all read it TBH
the original report was redacted quite heavily apparently
Tuc - I think the point is the latest report is the real thing - the earlier versions were changed - and reading it I can understand why.
I believe a hard copy of the report is now available in the National Archives in Kew but haven't checked to see if there is a full e-copy available yet
According to another newspaper "The National Archives said the document was only available to view in person at kew"
There's an article in Conrad Waters Naval Review 2017 pg 181 which has a reference to the location of the pdf of the earlier report but when you type it in the Archives says not
found...... Pity they won't put it up so we can all read it TBH
Last edited by Heathrow Harry; 17th Oct 2017 at 17:15.
As a mere greenie, one thing intrigues me. The AAWO states that the Super Etendard radar had similar characteristics to that of the Sea Harrier, so there were a lot of false alarms. I thought, perhaps wrongly, that this is why the latter had a war mode. May be irrelevant, but some years later RN SY suddenly switched on to this issue and jumped if it caught an aircraft using the wrong mode.
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http://www.histarmar.com.ar/Malvinas...ritishview.htm gives some exact references at Kew including:-
British official records:
Logs:
HMS Invincible ship log (ADM 53/189407); HMS Hermes ship log (ADM 53/189351); HMS Avenger ship log (ADM 53/190138) y HMS Exeter ship log (ADM 53/189189).
Records of Operations:
Exocet Attack, 25th May (PREM 19/650).
Operation Corporate – Analysis of Exocet firing 30 May 82 (DEFE 58/273).
Op Corporate Falklands Conflict, 820 Naval Air Squadron, HMS Invincible flight report (DEFE 69/838).
HMS Invincible Falklands Islands Campaign Diary (DEFE 69/844).
Op Corporate Falklands Conflict 801 Squadron Operational Diary (DEFE 69/1085).
An examination of Argentine air effort during the Falklands Campaign/Operational Research Branch report (DEFE 58/273).
Report of Captain Salt, Loss of HMS Sheffield, Board of Inquiry. Annex C (Naval Historic Branch).
South Atlantic Presentation Unit (82) 30 (Thatcher MSS -Churchill Archive Centre: THCR 2/6/2/163).
HMS Onyx, Report of Proceedings
HMS Valiant, Report of Proceedings (Naval Service FOI Coordination Cell – request 10-12-2010-101254-002)
All documents on the National Archives británicos (at Kew), unless contrary statement.
British official records:
Logs:
HMS Invincible ship log (ADM 53/189407); HMS Hermes ship log (ADM 53/189351); HMS Avenger ship log (ADM 53/190138) y HMS Exeter ship log (ADM 53/189189).
Records of Operations:
Exocet Attack, 25th May (PREM 19/650).
Operation Corporate – Analysis of Exocet firing 30 May 82 (DEFE 58/273).
Op Corporate Falklands Conflict, 820 Naval Air Squadron, HMS Invincible flight report (DEFE 69/838).
HMS Invincible Falklands Islands Campaign Diary (DEFE 69/844).
Op Corporate Falklands Conflict 801 Squadron Operational Diary (DEFE 69/1085).
An examination of Argentine air effort during the Falklands Campaign/Operational Research Branch report (DEFE 58/273).
Report of Captain Salt, Loss of HMS Sheffield, Board of Inquiry. Annex C (Naval Historic Branch).
South Atlantic Presentation Unit (82) 30 (Thatcher MSS -Churchill Archive Centre: THCR 2/6/2/163).
HMS Onyx, Report of Proceedings
HMS Valiant, Report of Proceedings (Naval Service FOI Coordination Cell – request 10-12-2010-101254-002)
All documents on the National Archives británicos (at Kew), unless contrary statement.
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No Courts Martial could, either back then or now in this day and age inflict a greater punishment than knowing every waking day that you correctly or not bore some not inconsiderable responsibility in the events resulting in the deaths and injuries of your ship mates and subsequent loss of your ship. I imagine nights can, at times be a bit restless too.
I would not wish to be in their shoes with those thoughts.
All said and done though, we were at war and these things do happen. Hopefully lessons were learned and have been remembered.
RIP The Crew of HMS Sheffield, still on station and everyone else who sailed down in the task force and sadly stayed.
I would not wish to be in their shoes with those thoughts.
All said and done though, we were at war and these things do happen. Hopefully lessons were learned and have been remembered.
RIP The Crew of HMS Sheffield, still on station and everyone else who sailed down in the task force and sadly stayed.
Last edited by Always a Sapper; 18th Oct 2017 at 18:09. Reason: edit in italics
A slightly more thoughtful discussion can be found here.
Yes - the need for things like organic AEW and carrierborne air defence was proven beyond doubt. Do you really think the RN did not study it at huge length?
Yes - the need for things like organic AEW and carrierborne air defence was proven beyond doubt. Do you really think the RN did not study it at huge length?
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 21st Oct 2017 at 17:49.
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My old boss, in another Gov department was on the Sheffield that day, and had left the Ops room seconds before the attack. Whether he is one of the two people cited in the article or not, I don't know.
He died some years later, from a particularly aggressive Cancer, from diagnosis to dead in a fortnight. His funeral was held in a large church, packed to the doors with people from the 4 corners of the globe, a well respected man.
He died some years later, from a particularly aggressive Cancer, from diagnosis to dead in a fortnight. His funeral was held in a large church, packed to the doors with people from the 4 corners of the globe, a well respected man.
What angers/upsets me with this thread and the Guardian article is the way they try to represent it as all being down to the failings of one or two men, as opposed to being the result of a series of events, including:
-No organic AEW
-Limited air defence assets
-Lack of experience in using aircraft as task force assets
-Type 42s having old 965 radar (excessive beamwidth = clutter and ground wave reflections - mentioned in the BOI report)
-The Argentines having two Type 42s of their own so they could develop tactics and techniques like lobe pecking
-South Atlantic weather playing havoc with radars and false returns
...and so on.
-No organic AEW
-Limited air defence assets
-Lack of experience in using aircraft as task force assets
-Type 42s having old 965 radar (excessive beamwidth = clutter and ground wave reflections - mentioned in the BOI report)
-The Argentines having two Type 42s of their own so they could develop tactics and techniques like lobe pecking
-South Atlantic weather playing havoc with radars and false returns
...and so on.
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Absolutely appalling catalogue of failings in a war zone. Do the Navy not have the equivalent of our old-style TACEVALs ......... at least to find out if a man wearing breathing apparatus could get through a hatch?
And now we are putting a lot of eggs in two new baskets. Let us hope [without much hope] that such painful lessons continue to be brought to the attention of those concerned.
And now we are putting a lot of eggs in two new baskets. Let us hope [without much hope] that such painful lessons continue to be brought to the attention of those concerned.
Indeed, just think how things could have been with an angled flight deck and cat n trap...
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What angers/upsets me with this thread and the Guardian article is the way they try to represent it as all being down to the failings of one or two men, as opposed to being the result of a series of events, including:
-No organic AEW
-Limited air defence assets
-Lack of experience in using aircraft as task force assets
-Type 42s having old 965 radar (excessive beamwidth = clutter and ground wave reflections - mentioned in the BOI report)
-The Argentines having two Type 42s of their own so they could develop tactics and techniques like lobe pecking
-South Atlantic weather playing havoc with radars and false returns
...and so on.
-No organic AEW
-Limited air defence assets
-Lack of experience in using aircraft as task force assets
-Type 42s having old 965 radar (excessive beamwidth = clutter and ground wave reflections - mentioned in the BOI report)
-The Argentines having two Type 42s of their own so they could develop tactics and techniques like lobe pecking
-South Atlantic weather playing havoc with radars and false returns
...and so on.
Just a comment about enquiries, BOIs etc.
If someone is going to ask a question, then don’t be upset\outraged if you don’t get the answer you want.
If there is a legal process/reason for holding these then they should be published publicly, to prevent rumours, lies and using today’s buzz word, fake news.
Taking into account OSA.
If someone is going to ask a question, then don’t be upset\outraged if you don’t get the answer you want.
If there is a legal process/reason for holding these then they should be published publicly, to prevent rumours, lies and using today’s buzz word, fake news.
Taking into account OSA.
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WEBF - you are of course correct - the Type 42's were clearly vunerable - although I've never seen anyone suggest that there was anything said by anyone at the time they were despatched. And puttung them out as radar pickets was a fairly hairy decision given USN experience in WW2 in the Pacific.
However other ships were out there and weren't destroyed - it's clear there was a problem with the personnel (not just the two fingered in the report) on Sheffield - they never went to action stations, no-one called the cCaptain and the officers on the bridge were "mesmerised" and no action was taken to try and shoot it down.. etc etc
I really don't think it's "an agenda" to recognise that, in this case, there were serious failures by individuals and we really need to learn from these.
There are many other cases in the FI War that show what your average naval personnel (not just exceptional ones) acheived under fire.
However other ships were out there and weren't destroyed - it's clear there was a problem with the personnel (not just the two fingered in the report) on Sheffield - they never went to action stations, no-one called the cCaptain and the officers on the bridge were "mesmerised" and no action was taken to try and shoot it down.. etc etc
I really don't think it's "an agenda" to recognise that, in this case, there were serious failures by individuals and we really need to learn from these.
There are many other cases in the FI War that show what your average naval personnel (not just exceptional ones) acheived under fire.