F35 Stitch Up
bobward.
There will be some associated carrier gubbins that adds extra weight that isn't needed on a ground based platform. Things such as stronger landing gear etc. About 3000lbs extra weight if Wikipedia is to be believed.
BV
There will be some associated carrier gubbins that adds extra weight that isn't needed on a ground based platform. Things such as stronger landing gear etc. About 3000lbs extra weight if Wikipedia is to be believed.
BV
The MoD has always been careful to stress that the uptake of 138 is "over the life of the programme". I have also seen it suggested that the plan is for four front line sqns eventually.
I therefore have a suspicion that is has never been the intention to have 138 airframes at any one time - and that a final batch of very late model Bs at the fag end of the programme might replace the initial batch to see the carriers through the latter part of their lives. Hopefully I'm wrong though and in any event things can change.
I'd certainly agree that 70 or so is the minimum needed if we're to come anywhere close to using the carriers to their proper potential.
I therefore have a suspicion that is has never been the intention to have 138 airframes at any one time - and that a final batch of very late model Bs at the fag end of the programme might replace the initial batch to see the carriers through the latter part of their lives. Hopefully I'm wrong though and in any event things can change.
I'd certainly agree that 70 or so is the minimum needed if we're to come anywhere close to using the carriers to their proper potential.
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If I might offer some information on F-35 variant weights and ranges: The latest information out there shows the following empty weights:
F-35A: 28,999 lb
F-35B: 32,442 lb
F-35C: 34,581 lb
So, F-35C is about 5,400 lbs heavier than the A. That cat and trap stuff adds a lot of weight all over the aircraft, especially in the stronger structure required to handle launch and landing loads. The low speed precision approach also demands a larger wing, fins, tails and control surfaces.
However, there's a bit of a surprise in the stated combat radius. Here are the figures, with threshold and objective (target and 'must achieve') figures shown in brackets afterwards:
F-35A: 669 mi (690/590)
F-35B: 505 mi (550/450)
F-35C: 640 mi (730/600)
My guess here is that the F-35C's extra weight and drag has caught up with it, and despite its additional fuel it just burns more to get out there. However, it still (just) meets the objective requirement. On this data, the A model looks like the right one for the RAF, but the AAR issue probably needs to be sorted.
Best regards as ever to all those working the flight test programmes - this is tough and complex stuff.
Engines
F-35A: 28,999 lb
F-35B: 32,442 lb
F-35C: 34,581 lb
So, F-35C is about 5,400 lbs heavier than the A. That cat and trap stuff adds a lot of weight all over the aircraft, especially in the stronger structure required to handle launch and landing loads. The low speed precision approach also demands a larger wing, fins, tails and control surfaces.
However, there's a bit of a surprise in the stated combat radius. Here are the figures, with threshold and objective (target and 'must achieve') figures shown in brackets afterwards:
F-35A: 669 mi (690/590)
F-35B: 505 mi (550/450)
F-35C: 640 mi (730/600)
My guess here is that the F-35C's extra weight and drag has caught up with it, and despite its additional fuel it just burns more to get out there. However, it still (just) meets the objective requirement. On this data, the A model looks like the right one for the RAF, but the AAR issue probably needs to be sorted.
Best regards as ever to all those working the flight test programmes - this is tough and complex stuff.
Engines
Engines,
While I'm sure your figures for numbers of SHars was accurate the picture is not quite that simple for the RN. The FAA struggled for a long time, especially in the latter years to fill those cockpits. What makes you think giving them 70 F-35s would be any different?
While I'm sure your figures for numbers of SHars was accurate the picture is not quite that simple for the RN. The FAA struggled for a long time, especially in the latter years to fill those cockpits. What makes you think giving them 70 F-35s would be any different?
does anyone know if the external fuel tank project for F-35 has been resurected?
i know that the project for an L/O tank got canned many years ago, but surely basic ferry tanks - particulary given the trials with other external stores are at the least, mature - are going to be a must-have before long?
one imagines that the cost of dragging F-35's across the Atlantic/Pacific on internal fuel only will soon enough start to overtake the development cost of a bog-standard tank...
i know that the project for an L/O tank got canned many years ago, but surely basic ferry tanks - particulary given the trials with other external stores are at the least, mature - are going to be a must-have before long?
one imagines that the cost of dragging F-35's across the Atlantic/Pacific on internal fuel only will soon enough start to overtake the development cost of a bog-standard tank...
SHAR
I recognise what Engines talks of, although use different terminology. I don't know about the RAF, but the RN broke fleets down into FAE (Front Line Aircraft Establishment), TAE (Training), IUR (In Use Reserve) and IR6 (held at 6 months readiness - some argued 6 weeks). Some fleets had Half-TAE. Each category was allocated an average annual flying rate (say, 300 for FAE, 150 for TAE, and so on) from which one calculated support requirements. As Fleet Manager, Engines will recall numbers better than I, but I do know there was a lot of flex in the SHAR fleet because these Establishments were actually met; whereas, for example, Sea King AEW Mk2 only had FAE and TAE (so were always 6 cabs down; partially corrected by Mk7). The practical difficulty (for me) was that the ratio of FAE to Whole Fleet meant a full fleet fit of all avionics was very expensive, so I'd always use the highest number Active Fleet number the FM could come up with. (His best day in the past year). When the attrition buys were made post-Falklands, we weren't allowed radars for example. The remaining 54 had to do the job of 70 for most of the FRS1's life. A 6 month deployment at sea left precious little ashore. Just different ways of looking at it.
One imagines that the cost of dragging F-35s across the Atlantic/Pacific on internal fuel only will soon enough start to overtake the development cost of a bog-standard tank...
So are external tanks really needed? Organic shipborne AAR for the QE class would seem to pose a problem for blue water ops though, given the constraints of STOVL operations. A single role tanker configured V-22 would seem expensive for such a 'one trick pony' role and could probably only offer around 8000 kg offload from a single centreline hose, but what other options exist?
Last edited by BEagle; 30th Aug 2017 at 14:32.
Engines,
While I'm sure your figures for numbers of SHars was accurate the picture is not quite that simple for the RN. The FAA struggled for a long time, especially in the latter years to fill those cockpits. What makes you think giving them 70 F-35s would be any different?
While I'm sure your figures for numbers of SHars was accurate the picture is not quite that simple for the RN. The FAA struggled for a long time, especially in the latter years to fill those cockpits. What makes you think giving them 70 F-35s would be any different?
Indeed but Engines post #14 mentions operational control of the Bs being passed to the FAA. Doesn't sound very joint to me. So, if you were in a blue suit with lots of braid would you give up operational control of 70 shiney new jets to the FAA knowing that the only way they could operate them is by filling the cockpits with RAF pilots? I'm kinda thinking no!
Drop tanks
Recent F22 transits through Mildenhall etc have had jets with under wing tanks. These look pretty similar to those used by the F15. For routine peacetime deployments wouldn't this kind of kit suffice?
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Perhaps I could respond to a few of the points that have come up in recent posts.
First FAA manning for any F-35 fleet: Flap62 raised some good points. (Note here: I was an engineer, so anything I offer here is based on what I saw happening, not first hand professional expertise). It's quite true that the RN struggled to keep the Sea Harrier fleet manned towards the end. There were a few reasons for that. We lost a number of pilots after the transfer to the RAF and relocation away from familiar stations and the RN/FAA way of doing business. (I left the RN, with a lot of sadness, for the same reasons). There were also problems with the RN's Sea Harrier aircrew training pipeline, which just didn't deliver the numbers that it should have done. To be honest, that one lies firmly at the feet of the more senior RN aircrew in charge of the system. Finally, the RN was suffering the same sorts of issues the RAF was experiencing then, as now, which was high aircrew PVR rates. These were driven by external factors (airline recruiting) as much as internal ones.
However, going forward with a larger fleet of aircraft spread across the two services, using joint support and training where it works, my feeling (and that's all it is here) is that if the RN was given the task of supporting a 70 aircraft F-35B fleet, it could do it. I would assume movement of aircrew between dark and light blue in both directions to help spread best practice and experience.
The operational control bit is, to my mind, important, and is linked to the split between RAF and RN personnel. Operating aircraft from the sea is very different to operating from the land. I'm not talking about the flying tasks of landing and recovering - in the F-35B, the skill levels and currency requirements will probably be less onerous than was the case for legacy aircraft, although still important. The main area I'm looking at is the whole business of planning and executing missions, be they strike, air defence for reconnaissance, from a carrier that is part of a maritime task force. There's not a part of that complex activity that's not affected by being at sea, and to do it successfully and safely needs specialist experience and ability, in enough numbers, all the way up the food chain. Building that experience and those numbers requires an organisation that believes in what it's doing. As I've posted before, I believe that the RAF could, eventually, develop the skill and experience set to do the job from the sea - the problem is that deep down they just don't believe in it as a useful activity. And that (again just my opinion) means that they won't. Example - during SDSR 2010, CAS was asked for his view on the carriers. He replied that 'they were a potentially useful basing option'. And he considered that a strong vote of support.
My views here are based on what best for the country's defence capability. The RAF is an amazingly professional air force that really does know how to do air power from land bases. We should give them the kit they need to get on and do that. The RN has an equally proud and strong record of delivering airborne effect (call it what you want) from the sea. We should give them the kit they need to get on and do that. Both services have worked with each other closely for many years, and can, with good will and imagination, do these jobs to good effect at best cost.
A couple of points on drop tanks. Surprisingly, there was never a stated requirement for them. There was a study carried out by LM in about 2003 into external tanks, but they weren't LO. I did see mention of an Israeli study into LO tanks, but not much since then. The tanks in the original study were quite large and specially shaped to allow use with external stores. At some stage, they were removed from the programme, and I've not seen them resurrected since.
Hope this helps promote discussion and exchanges of views - that's the point of a forum, after all.
Best Regards as ever to all those working the issues where it really matters - at the coal face
Engines
First FAA manning for any F-35 fleet: Flap62 raised some good points. (Note here: I was an engineer, so anything I offer here is based on what I saw happening, not first hand professional expertise). It's quite true that the RN struggled to keep the Sea Harrier fleet manned towards the end. There were a few reasons for that. We lost a number of pilots after the transfer to the RAF and relocation away from familiar stations and the RN/FAA way of doing business. (I left the RN, with a lot of sadness, for the same reasons). There were also problems with the RN's Sea Harrier aircrew training pipeline, which just didn't deliver the numbers that it should have done. To be honest, that one lies firmly at the feet of the more senior RN aircrew in charge of the system. Finally, the RN was suffering the same sorts of issues the RAF was experiencing then, as now, which was high aircrew PVR rates. These were driven by external factors (airline recruiting) as much as internal ones.
However, going forward with a larger fleet of aircraft spread across the two services, using joint support and training where it works, my feeling (and that's all it is here) is that if the RN was given the task of supporting a 70 aircraft F-35B fleet, it could do it. I would assume movement of aircrew between dark and light blue in both directions to help spread best practice and experience.
The operational control bit is, to my mind, important, and is linked to the split between RAF and RN personnel. Operating aircraft from the sea is very different to operating from the land. I'm not talking about the flying tasks of landing and recovering - in the F-35B, the skill levels and currency requirements will probably be less onerous than was the case for legacy aircraft, although still important. The main area I'm looking at is the whole business of planning and executing missions, be they strike, air defence for reconnaissance, from a carrier that is part of a maritime task force. There's not a part of that complex activity that's not affected by being at sea, and to do it successfully and safely needs specialist experience and ability, in enough numbers, all the way up the food chain. Building that experience and those numbers requires an organisation that believes in what it's doing. As I've posted before, I believe that the RAF could, eventually, develop the skill and experience set to do the job from the sea - the problem is that deep down they just don't believe in it as a useful activity. And that (again just my opinion) means that they won't. Example - during SDSR 2010, CAS was asked for his view on the carriers. He replied that 'they were a potentially useful basing option'. And he considered that a strong vote of support.
My views here are based on what best for the country's defence capability. The RAF is an amazingly professional air force that really does know how to do air power from land bases. We should give them the kit they need to get on and do that. The RN has an equally proud and strong record of delivering airborne effect (call it what you want) from the sea. We should give them the kit they need to get on and do that. Both services have worked with each other closely for many years, and can, with good will and imagination, do these jobs to good effect at best cost.
A couple of points on drop tanks. Surprisingly, there was never a stated requirement for them. There was a study carried out by LM in about 2003 into external tanks, but they weren't LO. I did see mention of an Israeli study into LO tanks, but not much since then. The tanks in the original study were quite large and specially shaped to allow use with external stores. At some stage, they were removed from the programme, and I've not seen them resurrected since.
Hope this helps promote discussion and exchanges of views - that's the point of a forum, after all.
Best Regards as ever to all those working the issues where it really matters - at the coal face
Engines
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Using open source figures for the F-35B internal fuel and guessing at the transit burn rate, fuel onload rate and refuelling burn rate, I had a go at a trail plan using Autumn 75% stat met to trail 3 x F-35B from Halifax to Marham at FL270. The system reckoned it would need 5 brackets and a total offload of 33.4 tonnes for the 5:45 hr flight on the Northern Route - with abort aerodromes at Gander, Narsarsuaq, Keflavik, Prestwick and Leeming. For the tanker type assumed, 78% stat met was the absolute limit for 3 x F-35B, but if only 2 were trailed the normal 85% stat met planning assumption was do-able
So are external tanks really needed? Organic shipborne AAR for the QE class would seem to pose a problem for blue water ops though, given the constraints of STOVL operations. A single role tanker configured V-22 would seem expensive for such a 'one trick pony' role and could probably only offer around 8000 kg offload from a single centreline hose, but what other options exist?
So are external tanks really needed? Organic shipborne AAR for the QE class would seem to pose a problem for blue water ops though, given the constraints of STOVL operations. A single role tanker configured V-22 would seem expensive for such a 'one trick pony' role and could probably only offer around 8000 kg offload from a single centreline hose, but what other options exist?
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Some good discussion going on here and so far avoiding partisan opinions. Re the generation of FW pilots. This was a problem in the past for several reasons. Engines has mentioned some but in addition there was the issue of the RN relying on an RAF led training system, which, as a result of various SDRs was in decline. Add to this the internecine warfare that surrounded the drawdown of embarked aviation with the Harrier and the result was rapid decline in RN FW numbers.
It was at this stage that the RN approached the USN and asked for help. Basically the USN opened its training pipeline up to the RN (in return for a 3yr ROS in the AV8B or F18). Pipeline aircrew also went to Canada and (I think) France. The result is that the RN have a healthy cadre of FW aircrew with embarked, battle, experience which is feeding directly into the F35 programme.
It was at this stage that the RN approached the USN and asked for help. Basically the USN opened its training pipeline up to the RN (in return for a 3yr ROS in the AV8B or F18). Pipeline aircrew also went to Canada and (I think) France. The result is that the RN have a healthy cadre of FW aircrew with embarked, battle, experience which is feeding directly into the F35 programme.
Bismarck
I agree with all you said but feel I should correct one point you made. The RN students that went to Canada joined the RCAF (they were not on exchange) because the RN made them redundant. The fact that some of them subsequently returned can hardly be attributed to the RNs masterful planning.
BV
I agree with all you said but feel I should correct one point you made. The RN students that went to Canada joined the RCAF (they were not on exchange) because the RN made them redundant. The fact that some of them subsequently returned can hardly be attributed to the RNs masterful planning.
BV
SpazSinbad, that route does seem to go rather a long way north and 10 hr is a loooong time to be in a FJ cockpit...
My route from CYHZ was via YQY YQX ALLRY 52N50W 55N40W 57N30W 58N20W 58N10W BEN then 'Refueler East' to LUK, with a Split Point at LEE before the landing at EGYM. Total Great Circle distance of 2607 nm. I also assumed that the formation would fly at FL270 / 320KIAS decelerating to 290KIAS for AAR, but that was just a WAG.
My route from CYHZ was via YQY YQX ALLRY 52N50W 55N40W 57N30W 58N20W 58N10W BEN then 'Refueler East' to LUK, with a Split Point at LEE before the landing at EGYM. Total Great Circle distance of 2607 nm. I also assumed that the formation would fly at FL270 / 320KIAS decelerating to 290KIAS for AAR, but that was just a WAG.
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SpazSinbad, that route does seem to go rather a long way north and 10 hr is a loooong time to be in a FJ cockpit...
My route from CYHZ was via YQY YQX ALLRY 52N50W 55N40W 57N30W 58N20W 58N10W BEN then 'Refueler East' to LUK, with a Split Point at LEE before the landing at EGYM. Total Great Circle distance of 2607 nm. I also assumed that the formation would fly at FL270 / 320KIAS decelerating to 290KIAS for AAR, but that was just a WAG.
My route from CYHZ was via YQY YQX ALLRY 52N50W 55N40W 57N30W 58N20W 58N10W BEN then 'Refueler East' to LUK, with a Split Point at LEE before the landing at EGYM. Total Great Circle distance of 2607 nm. I also assumed that the formation would fly at FL270 / 320KIAS decelerating to 290KIAS for AAR, but that was just a WAG.
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Further to Engines' comments:
One document I have seen describes A and C mission profiles as "hi-med-med-hi" and the B as HHH. That was old and may have changed, and nobody as far as I know has disclosed how much time in combat with A/B is included.
The published reason for ditching the tanks on the A (around 2008) was that the radius increase was small. A 2007 brief for Norway put it at 55nm on an all-high-alt surveillance mission.
The shorter range of the C is not all that surprising. It has more fuel (because of the deletion of the gun and ammo as much as/if not more than the larger wing) but the larger OEW means that the fuel fraction is a bit smaller.
One document I have seen describes A and C mission profiles as "hi-med-med-hi" and the B as HHH. That was old and may have changed, and nobody as far as I know has disclosed how much time in combat with A/B is included.
The published reason for ditching the tanks on the A (around 2008) was that the radius increase was small. A 2007 brief for Norway put it at 55nm on an all-high-alt surveillance mission.
The shorter range of the C is not all that surprising. It has more fuel (because of the deletion of the gun and ammo as much as/if not more than the larger wing) but the larger OEW means that the fuel fraction is a bit smaller.