Perhaps I could respond to a few of the points that have come up in recent posts.
First FAA manning for any F-35 fleet: Flap62 raised some good points. (Note here: I was an engineer, so anything I offer here is based on what I saw happening, not first hand professional expertise). It's quite true that the RN struggled to keep the Sea Harrier fleet manned towards the end. There were a few reasons for that. We lost a number of pilots after the transfer to the RAF and relocation away from familiar stations and the RN/FAA way of doing business. (I left the RN, with a lot of sadness, for the same reasons). There were also problems with the RN's Sea Harrier aircrew training pipeline, which just didn't deliver the numbers that it should have done. To be honest, that one lies firmly at the feet of the more senior RN aircrew in charge of the system. Finally, the RN was suffering the same sorts of issues the RAF was experiencing then, as now, which was high aircrew PVR rates. These were driven by external factors (airline recruiting) as much as internal ones.
However, going forward with a larger fleet of aircraft spread across the two services, using joint support and training where it works, my feeling (and that's all it is here) is that if the RN was given the task of supporting a 70 aircraft F-35B fleet, it could do it. I would assume movement of aircrew between dark and light blue in both directions to help spread best practice and experience.
The operational control bit is, to my mind, important, and is linked to the split between RAF and RN personnel. Operating aircraft from the sea is very different to operating from the land. I'm not talking about the flying tasks of landing and recovering - in the F-35B, the skill levels and currency requirements will probably be less onerous than was the case for legacy aircraft, although still important. The main area I'm looking at is the whole business of planning and executing missions, be they strike, air defence for reconnaissance, from a carrier that is part of a maritime task force. There's not a part of that complex activity that's not affected by being at sea, and to do it successfully and safely needs specialist experience and ability, in enough numbers, all the way up the food chain. Building that experience and those numbers requires an organisation that believes in what it's doing. As I've posted before, I believe that the RAF could, eventually, develop the skill and experience set to do the job from the sea - the problem is that deep down they just don't believe in it as a useful activity. And that (again just my opinion) means that they won't. Example - during SDSR 2010, CAS was asked for his view on the carriers. He replied that 'they were a potentially useful basing option'. And he considered that a strong vote of support.
My views here are based on what best for the country's defence capability. The RAF is an amazingly professional air force that really does know how to do air power from land bases. We should give them the kit they need to get on and do that. The RN has an equally proud and strong record of delivering airborne effect (call it what you want) from the sea. We should give them the kit they need to get on and do that. Both services have worked with each other closely for many years, and can, with good will and imagination, do these jobs to good effect at best cost.
A couple of points on drop tanks. Surprisingly, there was never a stated requirement for them. There was a study carried out by LM in about 2003 into external tanks, but they weren't LO. I did see mention of an Israeli study into LO tanks, but not much since then. The tanks in the original study were quite large and specially shaped to allow use with external stores. At some stage, they were removed from the programme, and I've not seen them resurrected since.
Hope this helps promote discussion and exchanges of views - that's the point of a forum, after all.
Best Regards as ever to all those working the issues where it really matters - at the coal face
Engines