Nimrod MR4 vs P8

[tucumseh]

PDR1

Do you have any evidence of that? I ask because at the time of the 2010 SDSR the first three aeroplanes were on the point of handover to the RAF (they would have entered servive within 90 days) and the RTS was ready for signing.

Hansard, 3 February 2014, during an exchange between Mr Kevan Jones MP (Labour) and Mr Philip Hammond, Secretary of State for Defence. The latter stated:

“It is a bit rich for him to say that the gap in maritime patrol cover was created by this Government. What this Government did was to recognise the reality that his Government had been investing in aircraft that would never fly, would never be certified and would never be able to deliver a capability”

.

Yet, two years before, Mr Hammond had repeated the MoD claim that the decision was purely a savings measure: “Scrapping the Nimrod MRA4 was one of many tough but necessary decisions we had to take to deal with an equipment programme that was out of control”.

Hammond has not yet apologised for misleading Parliament, nor the MoD for lying to him in a briefing.

There may have been a Release to Service document prepared, but no-one signed it. There have been many examples of an RTS being signed prematurely, and it is likely ACAS stopped short on MRA4 because his predecessors had been caught out during, for example, the Nimrod and Mull of Kintyre Reviews.

[engineer(retard)]

And in some some aircraft, the commonality is surprisingly large. You are focusing on R&O as opposed to brand new spares which is generally the larger parts count. For R&O, there is a standard T&C clause that does not allow the MoD to use secondhand parts without express permission. In EASA and European fleets the pool is often shared with lifing factors applied. Additionally, civil support tends towards power by the hour agreements which focuses on maximising availability not minimising financial loss.

[PDR1]

Originally Posted by tucumseh

Hansard, 3 February 2014, during an exchange between Mr Kevan Jones MP (Labour) and Mr Philip Hammond, Secretary of State for Defence. The latter stated: .

“It is a bit rich for him to say that the gap in maritime patrol cover was created by this Government. What this Government did was to recognise the reality that his Government had been investing in aircraft that would never fly, would never be certified and would never be able to deliver a capability”.

I can't really accept that as an authoritative source when in the same breath he claims the aeroplanes never flew. I don't have the number to hand, but the fleet had accumulated flying hours that were certainly in the hundreds and I'm fairly sure were in the thousands. As I said - three were about to be delivered when the SDSR announcement waws made. I was in the building when the "Stop all work" order invoking the cancellation clause in the contract came in. That clause actually said something aloing the lines of:

"you will continue working to contract for up to 90 days while the cancellation terms are agreed".

This caused much ribald amusement as BAES responded with "OK, so we're delivering three aircraft in those 90 days - where do you want them?"...

PDR

[tucumseh]

PDR1

A more accurate phrase by Hammond would have been "...never fly in-service". One must allow him leeway. After all, what would he know about the rules pre-RTS aircraft fly under? He didn't make the statement up - it was briefed to him by MoD; at the time, probably the MAA. Are they an "authoritative source"?

[tucumseh]

Serving military on the trials teams were allowed a great deal of insight into the project and it was not unusual for project teams to ask for advice. On the large projects, the trials team often joined the project at the beginning.

I agree. On my last programme, the first thing I did was speak to the Service Appointer and arrange (at least) double tours. What was eventually the trials team, at least for the major mission systems, also sat in on original bid assessment and spec writing.

[PDR1]

I don't know. I do know that the first aeroplane was days away from delivery at the time of the announcement, and was to be followed by a further two over the next few weeks. There was no suggestion at the time that the RAF had no intention of NOT flying them (quite the reverse).

I also remember a couple of weeks after that we had the Aldershot MP (defence specialist) visit the Harrier Team at Farnborough who explained that one of the reasons the Harrier had been dumped in the SDSR was that it couldn't carry <a particular weapon>. When challenged, he checked his notes and confirmed that he had been explicitly brief this fact by the MoD (I think he named the Perm Sec, but I'm not certain). One of the audience then went to his filing cabinet and produced his copy of the <weapon> 555 conference report and <EA signed> release documentation for that weapon integration on the GR9/9A showing that it not only *could* carry it, but had been formally cleared by the RAF EA to do so.

So I remain sceptical. I believe the reality is what Hammond originally said - it was a short-term cost savings measure. I believe he changed his subsequent position when it became clear that he would have to spend public money to fill the capability gap he had created by cancelling MRA4, and that he would have to spend substantially more filling the gap than he saved in the cancellation.

That he'd be spending money with a foreign contractor rather than a domestic one merely takes a gross abuse of public money and adds a charge of treason. I honestly believe it's time we returned to the proven, traditional people-performance measures in times like this. A few months being toirtured in the Tower followed by public (televised) hanging, drawing and quartering might have encouraged higher standards of decision making in his successors...

YMMV,

PDR

[Bing]

The Military requirement is different - the loss of a mission can mean people die and wars are lost, so no amount of money will fix it.

Must be why we have all those aircraft with 100% serviceability rates...

[downsizer]

PDR1,

What weapon?

[PDR1]

Originally Posted by downsizer

PDR1,

What weapon?

I'd love to say that was obfuscated for a reason and sound all sneaky-beaky & important, but the reality is that it's just my CRS kicking in again.

PDR

[5aday]

I was also on the AEW Trials Team from the start of the Tials Team Comet for about 2.5 years. The early Nimrod 3 airframes (DB1 , 2, AND 3?) were in New Assembly being chopped up to accommodate the scanners and we were in Flight Sheds on the other side of the field. (sometimes quite a hostile place if you were non union which by and large we were not.
As far as I was concerned my remit was A.E.W. Trials Planning involving RSRE Bedford, RAF Boulmer, Buchan, and the R.N. Fast Training Boats out of Hull.
When I arrived the system seemed to be set up for Co Prime Contractors between M.E.A.S.L. and BAe. At no stage in the time I was there was M.O.D. involved in anything and I don't even think we ever had any M.O.D. representatives flying on board the Comet. In fact I'm not even sure we would have had a spare seat on the trials that I was involved with.
Things may have changed when the DB1 e.t.c. were flying in terms of who was on board but I doubt Marconi or BAe would have accepted any M.O.D. interference into who was in charge. It was always a BAe flight deck and Nav, two radiation monitors (BAe again) and the Trials Team (at the time all recruited from G.E.C. and transferred to M.E.A.S.L)

ps M.E.A.S.L. =Marconi Elliot Avionic Systems Limited.

5aday

[Wander00]

I recall being on the Joint Services PR Course at Sunningdale when the cancellation of the AEW 3 was announced. Watching the TV with us was DPR(RAF), a well known senior officer and sheep farmer. Throughout the item (may have been a Panorama, cannot recall) the then Air Cdre was commenting such as "They followed that trail then", "Did not tell them that", etc, all highly illuminating

[tucumseh]

PDR1

There was no suggestion at the time that the RAF had no intention of flying them (quite the reverse).

This is the nub of the issue. While ACAS probably had every intention of signing the RTS, and the RAF of flying the aircraft, the Mull of Kintyre Review forcefully reminded both that they were not permitted to if the Aircraft Project Director said they couldn't. In old speak, the CA/MA Release was mandated upon them. This is what went wrong on Chinook - CA said "no fly", ACAS ignored him and signed an illegal RTS; and the rest is history.

(Edited to clarify that the evidence accepted by the MoK Review had been submitted and accepted some time beforehand. The actual report just confirmed this).

As for which Hammond version is true, I think it unlikely he would admit another airworthiness fiasco if untrue. Lack of approval to spend money is always the final reason (which is not the same as lack of money), but it is not the cause.

[PDR1]

Typing in a hurry and not checking meant that I didn't quite say what I meant. When I typed:

Originally Posted by PDR1

There was no suggestion at the time that the RAF had no intention of flying them (quite the reverse).

What I actually meant to say was:

Originally Posted by PDR1

There was no suggestion at the time that the RAF had no intention of NOT flying them (quite the reverse).

A small change that only changes the meaning slightly, but I felt it important to set the record straight.

Apols,

PDR

[EAP86]

Tuc,

I can honestly say that the reason for the inability to certificate the MR4 was not made clear to many of those in industry close to the process. I suspect that the fledgling MAA may have been involved in part.

A letter detailing around 10 failures​ to comply with DS 00-970 came from the PTL. The response to all of them was pretty much "true, and the PT was told at the time and given the reason why they were thought to be acceptable." While the letter came from the PTL, it seems likely that the MAA was the real source. Remember the MAA was relatively new to the certification process.

FWIW Leon J has already mentioned the only two real issues I recall.

EAP

[tucumseh]

The benefit of one’s local MP being a Minister, is that the MoD Minister must reply to his questions, not some lowly pleb. I was given this by my MP, a statement by Minister for the Armed Forces:

"The design and manufacturing flaws in the Nimrod MRA4 were, in the main, discovered shortly before and immediately after the first aircraft had been delivered and while work was under way to prepare for eventual release to service. The issue with the design of the fuel system, which resulted in the immediate grounding of both complete Nimrod MRA4 aircraft, was discovered during the course of work to verify the BAE Systems aircraft safety case."

One might argue about the timing – MoD was very concerned to assure Minister it didn’t have prior knowledge of these defects, which merely revealed poor implementation of its safety management system. The reply implies that the MRA4 had a completely new fuel system design (which I can’t comment on) and that MoD played no part in mandated design reviews of the previous decade or so (which I can comment on, as staff are permitted to make a false declaration that they have been held successfully, when they have actually been waived). This last has been upheld so many times by Ministers, I’ve lost count!


On 13 October 2010, close to cancellation, an internal MoD report listed examples of the “design quality concerns”. I only have the unclassified part, so presumably there are worse examples than: Bomb Bay doors, Aileron Feel and Trim Unit, Ram Air Turbine, Icing Clearance, Inability to correlate finite element modelling and wing fatigue tests, Hot air pipe in forward intake zone, Inadequate drainage in forward intake zone, HP8 hot air pipe clamp, Nose landing gear, Engine bay firewall, “several hundred” Defence Standard non-compliances. This extract lists only two issues that have been resolved – aerodynamic design and flap hinge failure. Whoever in MOD was faced with the decision would not have got a warm feeling, and it is fairly easy to see why he cancelled. I of course appreciate that this is a one-sided document, but I’m sure MoD would have discussed the content with BAE during the 90 day notice period mentioned earlier.

[tucumseh]

EAP86

Thanks, I'm afraid I posted the last before seeing your post. I wouldn't change what I said, but you highlight an important point; that of agreeing deviations from mandated Standards, and recording that decision. My obvious question, which MoD has been reluctant to answer in other cases, is: What Production Permits and/or Concessions were signed to support these deviations? The company may offer a reason, but if not supported by a Permit or Concession, their opinion or claim is meaningless (regardless of how valid it is).

[Davef68]

Originally Posted by Leon Jabachjabicz

The Avro 776 was the Trident-based offering to rival the maritime VC-10:

HS800 was the designation given to the 1964 studies, Avro 776 was the AST 357 designation in 1963

[Davef68]

Re MRA4, I beleive the question asked was, in essence, 'How much will it cost to certify as safe, and how long will it take?' to which the answer was essentially 'We don't know' at which point the pen, red was deployed.

The P8 is not designed to do hard manouvering at low level, the USN envisages letting drones and weapons take that strain .

[tucumseh]

'How much will it cost to certify as safe, and how long will it take?'

Was that MoD asking BAe, BAe asking MoD, or Ministers asking MoD? Could be any or all!

[EAP86]

Tuc,
a very interesting list indeed. I recognise some of these but many not as particularly severe issues. It looks a bit like post decision justification if you see what I mean. In general I believe DS non-compliances would have been dealt with as contractual or project management issues with appropriate documentation. Production Permits or Concessions ​are used to document build deviations not design issues so wouldn't be used.

In its early days the MAA tended to regard the Def Stan as equivalent to a civil Certification Specification but anyone familiar with it knows that it didn't develop in that way and trying to use it as an absolute requirement would lead to madness. As it happens, the baseline standard for the Nimrod design was civil BCARs so deviations are almost guaranteed. Interestingly the MAA wanted the Typhoon design to be validated against the Def Stan despite the fact that it wasn't designed to its requirements. I'm sure it was worth the cost.

EAP