Forces braced for more cuts .....
Leon, with respect (and that isn't just a throw away line) the only way that you can change things is to become one of the VSOs that you mention. Change will only happen from top down (unless a Colonel's Coup happens!). Every VSO appointment that has been welcomed in this forum has not produced a change in the downward decline that we are all so painfully aware of. I suspect that the reform (or even scrapping, as HH recommends) of the MOD (and indeed perhaps of the Royal Air Force itself) will only happen as a result of Government action. We are left to the tender mercies of the politicians to lance this boil. It won't be tender at all I'm afraid, but the waste must stop and the Defence of the Realm assured.
In the meantime don't beat yourself up by staying in, thinking that change can come from respectful discussions over sippers. It won't in my view. I took the "coward's way out" by PVRing years ago. I've never regretted it and feel that more can be done from outside anyway.
Sorry to be so blunt, but too many good people have been trampled on by trying to defy these cretins and losing their health and peace of mind as a result.
In the meantime don't beat yourself up by staying in, thinking that change can come from respectful discussions over sippers. It won't in my view. I took the "coward's way out" by PVRing years ago. I've never regretted it and feel that more can be done from outside anyway.
Sorry to be so blunt, but too many good people have been trampled on by trying to defy these cretins and losing their health and peace of mind as a result.
Chug
No offence taken at all and my 'coward' term was more metaphoric.
If we look at the 'marginal gains' mantra then I beg to differ on the thrust of your post. In the past I have managed to reverse some pretty dumb decisions through careful politicking some old bosses at even 4-star level. I haven't won them all, but I like to think that they have made a difference (maybe I'm in denial !!). My litmus test is to consider how much worse it would be if I had not managed to manoeuvre my POV (or a collective one from amongst peers). One of the wins means that we can continue to carry over up to 15 days of leave each year; which came perilously close to being binned ~8 years ago after someone's bright idea. One of the failures was the reversal of the decision to rusticate Group HQ posts to Force HQs - howver, I see that some of the posts have been re-established at HQ Air in a semi-reversal. So was the dissolution of the Inspectorate of Flight Safety - now we have the RAF Safety Centre again then things are improving. The sad thing is, as per my previous post, the OF-2, 3, 4 and 5s as SQEPs could all see that it would was doomed to fail but were powerless to stop the vanity project that became the Defence Aviation Safety Centre (DASC). Now 15 years down the line we have a RAF Safety Centre, Air Clues and even Pilot Officer Prune back.
I also opine that the chances of MOD being scrapped is next to nil, as turkeys don't vote for Christmas!
LJ
No offence taken at all and my 'coward' term was more metaphoric.
If we look at the 'marginal gains' mantra then I beg to differ on the thrust of your post. In the past I have managed to reverse some pretty dumb decisions through careful politicking some old bosses at even 4-star level. I haven't won them all, but I like to think that they have made a difference (maybe I'm in denial !!). My litmus test is to consider how much worse it would be if I had not managed to manoeuvre my POV (or a collective one from amongst peers). One of the wins means that we can continue to carry over up to 15 days of leave each year; which came perilously close to being binned ~8 years ago after someone's bright idea. One of the failures was the reversal of the decision to rusticate Group HQ posts to Force HQs - howver, I see that some of the posts have been re-established at HQ Air in a semi-reversal. So was the dissolution of the Inspectorate of Flight Safety - now we have the RAF Safety Centre again then things are improving. The sad thing is, as per my previous post, the OF-2, 3, 4 and 5s as SQEPs could all see that it would was doomed to fail but were powerless to stop the vanity project that became the Defence Aviation Safety Centre (DASC). Now 15 years down the line we have a RAF Safety Centre, Air Clues and even Pilot Officer Prune back.
I also opine that the chances of MOD being scrapped is next to nil, as turkeys don't vote for Christmas!
LJ
Never say never! The MOD is not known as the Ministry of Waste for nothing. The results of such incompetence are well known and seriously compromise governments of all hues. It is quite likely that the manifesto of a "populist" party will include major surgery of such Departments of State. Everything is possible and the experts seem to be caught out time and time again. Of course the MOD turkey won't go for it, but if a mandate to its reform is in the hands of a new PM then game on.
I see your MO now, a thousand mile march and all that. Well, all very good, but I make the point that the success gained can be lost at a stroke, just as airworthiness, IFS, etc was. Somehow the interests of the Services must be paramount. I strongly suggest that they are not under present arrangements. Airworthiness is obviously a pre-requisite of any Air Force, for one that goes to war ridden with unairworthiness is doomed. That is what happened to the RAF, and it was done by RAF VSOs in the MOD. That cannot happen again, it must be prevented from happening again.
That is why we need a Separate and Independent Regulator. That is how Flight Safety is supposed to work, ie find out what went wrong and take action to prevent a recurrence. Not a lesson understood by the MOD or the RAF High Command, I fear.
I see your MO now, a thousand mile march and all that. Well, all very good, but I make the point that the success gained can be lost at a stroke, just as airworthiness, IFS, etc was. Somehow the interests of the Services must be paramount. I strongly suggest that they are not under present arrangements. Airworthiness is obviously a pre-requisite of any Air Force, for one that goes to war ridden with unairworthiness is doomed. That is what happened to the RAF, and it was done by RAF VSOs in the MOD. That cannot happen again, it must be prevented from happening again.
That is why we need a Separate and Independent Regulator. That is how Flight Safety is supposed to work, ie find out what went wrong and take action to prevent a recurrence. Not a lesson understood by the MOD or the RAF High Command, I fear.
We have one of the largest economies in the world and one of the largest Defence budgets in the world: somebody in authority please explain just who is getting all the cash because it sure as hell isn't the front line Services.
>
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The equipment budget was secured, but the personnel and operating budgets weren't. Why?
The cynic would suggest those in authority keeping their friends in industry sweet, and lining up all those nice retirement directorships and consultancies.
And spending on shiny equipment always makes better headlines than spending on fuel, food, clothing, accomodation etc
D68 and Mel,
I think the universal lesson that gear takes far longer to develop and is far more expensive each generation is only superficially understood.
Effectively the military has negative growth (set against rising costs) and the compounding effect of this is ignored (by the MOD, politicians and the military themselves) - it partly comes out in the squeeze on personnel when the budget does not work.
Our response to this is like an untrained glider pilot getting low on final: we pull the stick back a bit and the aircraft (momentarily) appears as if it will make the runway - a short time later the same process is done. If you keep doing this after a while this it all gets much more interesting - quickly!
It is not only us though - one to watch in the future is the USAF. Think what they have bought in the last 20 years - bugger all! Well OK 100 and something F-22s that they could not afford!
Over the next decade they want lots of F-35s, tankers, T-X Trainers, a new bomber and apparently new ICBM's - and want them all now because they should have done all this earlier and the current gear is out of date and expensive to run. Something is going to give. I imagine there is a fair chance they will try to do it all in parallel, bit funding all these programs while trying to maintain current strength - see glider comments above!
I think the universal lesson that gear takes far longer to develop and is far more expensive each generation is only superficially understood.
Effectively the military has negative growth (set against rising costs) and the compounding effect of this is ignored (by the MOD, politicians and the military themselves) - it partly comes out in the squeeze on personnel when the budget does not work.
Our response to this is like an untrained glider pilot getting low on final: we pull the stick back a bit and the aircraft (momentarily) appears as if it will make the runway - a short time later the same process is done. If you keep doing this after a while this it all gets much more interesting - quickly!
It is not only us though - one to watch in the future is the USAF. Think what they have bought in the last 20 years - bugger all! Well OK 100 and something F-22s that they could not afford!
Over the next decade they want lots of F-35s, tankers, T-X Trainers, a new bomber and apparently new ICBM's - and want them all now because they should have done all this earlier and the current gear is out of date and expensive to run. Something is going to give. I imagine there is a fair chance they will try to do it all in parallel, bit funding all these programs while trying to maintain current strength - see glider comments above!
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Having ploughed my way through that lot I have a couple of questions.
Who gets the tommy gun and which five of us get a rifle to carry Captain Mainwaring?
Strewth . . . I left in 94 because I'd had enough of the results of rampant bean-counting . . .
Who gets the tommy gun and which five of us get a rifle to carry Captain Mainwaring?
Strewth . . . I left in 94 because I'd had enough of the results of rampant bean-counting . . .
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"The universal lesson that gear takes far longer to develop and is far more expensive each generation is only superficially understood."
But should it? Perhaps 70+ years of peace have led to a lack of drive to bring useful kit into service quickly - there is a strong tendency to spin things out, aim for perfection, test and train for years all of which is eating us alive.
We can all think of systems & kit that was rushed into service in an emergency, peformed reasonably well and then went back into the System for several further years before being finally released for service.
But should it? Perhaps 70+ years of peace have led to a lack of drive to bring useful kit into service quickly - there is a strong tendency to spin things out, aim for perfection, test and train for years all of which is eating us alive.
We can all think of systems & kit that was rushed into service in an emergency, peformed reasonably well and then went back into the System for several further years before being finally released for service.
I think the universal lesson that gear takes far longer to develop and is far more expensive each generation is only superficially understood.
Effectively the military has negative growth (set against rising costs) and the compounding effect of this is ignored (by the MOD, politicians and the military themselves) - it partly comes out in the squeeze on personnel when the budget does not work.
Effectively the military has negative growth (set against rising costs) and the compounding effect of this is ignored (by the MOD, politicians and the military themselves) - it partly comes out in the squeeze on personnel when the budget does not work.
somebody in authority please explain just who is getting all the cash because it sure as hell isn't the front line Services.
I think some here over-estimate the extent to which VSOs (and even the MOD ministers) have control over the really big decisions. So many of the constraints under which they operate originate from the very top levels of Government: Treasury, Cabinet Office and Number 10. Budgeting and procurement rules, manpower caps, politically-sensitive basing decisions and big-ticket investments are just some of the most obvious items over which even the most influential MOD ministers and 4* can struggle to gain any traction against the machinations of the mandarins on the opposite side of Whitehall.
Two examples from the last SDSR - a regular Army of 80,000 and P-8 to Lossiemouth. Neither asked for by the MOD and both insisted upon by the PM. If you really want to change things, you shouldn't aim to become a VSO as you will always be regarded by the key decision-makers as representing a special interest group. Better to be near the top of one of the aforementioned departments, or, sad to say, influencing the political context in which the big decisions are taken by writing agenda-setting pieces as an "independent" journalist, academic or policy wonk. Like it or not, this is how Government seems to work.
Edited to add: this is not to say that VSOs cannot achieve anything. But they often don't have a hand on the tiller and are reduced to attempting to influence those who do, or attempting to influence whichever journalists and academics are in fashion with the Government's inner circle.
Two examples from the last SDSR - a regular Army of 80,000 and P-8 to Lossiemouth. Neither asked for by the MOD and both insisted upon by the PM. If you really want to change things, you shouldn't aim to become a VSO as you will always be regarded by the key decision-makers as representing a special interest group. Better to be near the top of one of the aforementioned departments, or, sad to say, influencing the political context in which the big decisions are taken by writing agenda-setting pieces as an "independent" journalist, academic or policy wonk. Like it or not, this is how Government seems to work.
Edited to add: this is not to say that VSOs cannot achieve anything. But they often don't have a hand on the tiller and are reduced to attempting to influence those who do, or attempting to influence whichever journalists and academics are in fashion with the Government's inner circle.
Last edited by Easy Street; 31st Dec 2016 at 08:15.
Easy Street
In my youth this used to be called Long Term Costings 1st/2nd/3rd Order Assumptions.
1st - Government decrees there will be an Air Force and, as you say, what big ticket platforms it will have, where they will be, what they will do and how many you get to do it. This can seldom be reconciled, so immediately there is a problem.
2nd - What may still be called Resources and Programmes in Main Building push out slightly more detailed requirements, which is mainly making the best sense possible out of the 1sts. Such as, Squadron strengths, what flying rate can be afforded, roles, what kit it aspires to in each aircraft, fit policies, aircraft establishments, etc. DEC, seen as plebs by R&P, will push out Staff Requirements.
3rd - Service HQ staff (now called Requirements Managers - who are required to be engineers) try to make sense of the 2nds, do the detailed work on equipment specs (tarting up the SRs), quantify, cost it up (nope, procurers don't do that at this point), make the financial provision (bids in the next LTC round) and generally staff the requirement through LTC screening rounds. They compile the "shopping list" for procurers. I'm a civilian, and this is something you do before being promoted into procurement, but I admit I always considered it a higher level job; so always had sympathy for OR/DEC.
Then, and only then, do procurers find out what they have to buy; although they'll have an idea if they've stuck their noses in earlier, or been given the heads up. Then reality kicks in.
Different structure today, but from a procurer's viewpoint the end result is still the same. In my experience, the last time any Service actually quantified a requirement was 1993. (The FAA, and only then, on SK sonics). To cost, one must first quantify. Every project I managed after that, the requirement was only traceable to my own opinion on what they needed. That makes any such project a high priority target for Treasury cuts, and you seem to send half your time defending programmes on behalf of the Services. I imagine many in DE&S will still recognise this. Many will recall Bernard Gray's report for the last Labour government, before he became Chief of Defence Materiel under the Coalition. I'm not sure how many twigged that he actually recommended a return to this system, although I suspect he didn't actually realise he was quoting what, in theory, is still a mandated policy. (During his tenure, he developed a habit of resurrecting old policies and proposing them in his own name - GOCO for example - but I'd guess that this was actually his young thrusters digging through the rejected suggestions file).
In my youth this used to be called Long Term Costings 1st/2nd/3rd Order Assumptions.
1st - Government decrees there will be an Air Force and, as you say, what big ticket platforms it will have, where they will be, what they will do and how many you get to do it. This can seldom be reconciled, so immediately there is a problem.
2nd - What may still be called Resources and Programmes in Main Building push out slightly more detailed requirements, which is mainly making the best sense possible out of the 1sts. Such as, Squadron strengths, what flying rate can be afforded, roles, what kit it aspires to in each aircraft, fit policies, aircraft establishments, etc. DEC, seen as plebs by R&P, will push out Staff Requirements.
3rd - Service HQ staff (now called Requirements Managers - who are required to be engineers) try to make sense of the 2nds, do the detailed work on equipment specs (tarting up the SRs), quantify, cost it up (nope, procurers don't do that at this point), make the financial provision (bids in the next LTC round) and generally staff the requirement through LTC screening rounds. They compile the "shopping list" for procurers. I'm a civilian, and this is something you do before being promoted into procurement, but I admit I always considered it a higher level job; so always had sympathy for OR/DEC.
Then, and only then, do procurers find out what they have to buy; although they'll have an idea if they've stuck their noses in earlier, or been given the heads up. Then reality kicks in.
Different structure today, but from a procurer's viewpoint the end result is still the same. In my experience, the last time any Service actually quantified a requirement was 1993. (The FAA, and only then, on SK sonics). To cost, one must first quantify. Every project I managed after that, the requirement was only traceable to my own opinion on what they needed. That makes any such project a high priority target for Treasury cuts, and you seem to send half your time defending programmes on behalf of the Services. I imagine many in DE&S will still recognise this. Many will recall Bernard Gray's report for the last Labour government, before he became Chief of Defence Materiel under the Coalition. I'm not sure how many twigged that he actually recommended a return to this system, although I suspect he didn't actually realise he was quoting what, in theory, is still a mandated policy. (During his tenure, he developed a habit of resurrecting old policies and proposing them in his own name - GOCO for example - but I'd guess that this was actually his young thrusters digging through the rejected suggestions file).
https://www.gov.uk/government/people/jon-thompson--3
It's non-entities like this who are actually in charge. This thread makes me weep.
WWW
It's non-entities like this who are actually in charge. This thread makes me weep.
WWW
WWW
You'll have your reasons for pointing to one man. I notice he was a previous DG (Finance) (a 2 Star). I recall, in 1996, one of his predecessors telling us at a course, where he was a speaker, that AbbeyWood (due to be occupied that year) didn't need much car parking because "It's being built by 3000 Irish navvies and they don't need cars". The Irish among us jumped, but his gormless platitudes were typical I'm afraid. A few years later, in 2002, one of his underlings, Director Finance in AbbeyWood, told me she'd just endorsed about £12M to further fund the Integration Authority so it could employ 63 more staff and undertake a 3 year study to find out what this new thing called "systems integration" was. I started to tell her that aircraft didn't fly without systems integration, so someone must know, but it was a waste of time. Her initiative had raised her profile, so she was off to the office of #10. No, you can't make this up.
You'll have your reasons for pointing to one man. I notice he was a previous DG (Finance) (a 2 Star). I recall, in 1996, one of his predecessors telling us at a course, where he was a speaker, that AbbeyWood (due to be occupied that year) didn't need much car parking because "It's being built by 3000 Irish navvies and they don't need cars". The Irish among us jumped, but his gormless platitudes were typical I'm afraid. A few years later, in 2002, one of his underlings, Director Finance in AbbeyWood, told me she'd just endorsed about £12M to further fund the Integration Authority so it could employ 63 more staff and undertake a 3 year study to find out what this new thing called "systems integration" was. I started to tell her that aircraft didn't fly without systems integration, so someone must know, but it was a waste of time. Her initiative had raised her profile, so she was off to the office of #10. No, you can't make this up.
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Tucs story is a great example of where it all goes wrong and where the $$$ disapear into a black hole
No-one would ever know about it outside the immediate group involved and since there was no "product" it wouldn't bother anyone either. The cheerful 63 staff were paid, the DF got her promotion and all is well with the world - no nasty headlines, no-one in danger just the drip, drip, drip, drip of taxpayers money going down the drain
Until we find a way of holding people to account it will go on and on....................
No-one would ever know about it outside the immediate group involved and since there was no "product" it wouldn't bother anyone either. The cheerful 63 staff were paid, the DF got her promotion and all is well with the world - no nasty headlines, no-one in danger just the drip, drip, drip, drip of taxpayers money going down the drain
Until we find a way of holding people to account it will go on and on....................
When I was a lad I served a term
As office boy to an Attorney's firm.
I cleaned the windows and I swept the floor,
And I polished up the handle of the big front door.......................
I polished up that handle so carefullee
That now I am the Ruler of the Queen's Navee!
No change since G & S then.
As office boy to an Attorney's firm.
I cleaned the windows and I swept the floor,
And I polished up the handle of the big front door.......................
I polished up that handle so carefullee
That now I am the Ruler of the Queen's Navee!
No change since G & S then.
no-one in danger just the drip, drip, drip, drip
Tuc
To digress, the loss of ZG710 wasn't just Mode 4 IFF, it was classic Prof Reason's "Swiss Cheese". If I recall correctly the Patriot identified the Tornado as an Anti Radiation Missile and that the IFF probably never worked properly for the whole flight but no-one was checking it. The Inquiry reported:
I have many operational flying hours using the very same Mode 4 IFF without issue. However, I knew that the Mode 4 codes could be dropped and so would always ask for a positive check of it from the AWACS, Aegis class ship or GCI station before going 'sausage side'. Also, I would get a positive check of it before returning back through the Patriot arcs. This was something many of us were doing nearly 10 years before this tragic accident. Quite why this practice was allowed to fall by the wayside is one of the questions I asked at the time. I suspect it was complacency that crept in and sadly cost a crew their lives. Was the Mode 4 'fit for purpose'? I believe it was if you knew it's limitations, but it could have been better - but then so could most things if we had an infinate pot of money! The Mode 4 did have a means of checking it was functioning, you just had to ask someone!
LJ
To digress, the loss of ZG710 wasn't just Mode 4 IFF, it was classic Prof Reason's "Swiss Cheese". If I recall correctly the Patriot identified the Tornado as an Anti Radiation Missile and that the IFF probably never worked properly for the whole flight but no-one was checking it. The Inquiry reported:
The Board concluded that the following were contributory factors: Patriot Anti-Radiation Missile classification criteria; Patriot Anti-Radiation Missile Rules Of Engagement; Patriot firing doctrine and crew training; Autonomous Patriot battery operation; Patriot IFF procedures; ZG710’s IFF serviceability; aircraft routing and airspace control measures, and Orders and Instructions.
LJ
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just read this weeks Flight - the German airforce are going to take 3 years to test their newly delivered helicopters which are pretty much identical to ones in service elsewhere
and up to 100 hours of testing required!
with 2 airframes that averages 15 hours A YEAR.... obviously we're not the only ones with drip, drip, drip issues
and up to 100 hours of testing required!
with 2 airframes that averages 15 hours A YEAR.... obviously we're not the only ones with drip, drip, drip issues
Leon
What you say is of course correct. One could write a book, but my point is that the senior RO said the accident would have been avoided had the IFF integration been implemented correctly, and senior staff were demonstrably forewarned. Had this defence been intact, then the holes wouldn't have lined up. (That the other holes were enlarged is another matter - I chose to use IFF as an example as I was indirectly involved). No defence is 100% effective, which is why the ones you list are provided/required. But these defences are not there to compensate for 2 Stars giving the big FO to staff who point out flat refusal to ensure functional safety, and that others have made false declarations that it has been achieved - as staff were instructed to do by the 2 Star's colleague, XD1.
What I'd like to know, and MoD won't address, is why it took the senior RO to identify the detailed failings. Why did the Board and other ROs fail to? And what end-to-end testing took place? Sir Brian didn't mention the precise phrase, but that is what he meant. Was the correct 1st line test equipment available? The report mentions an ad hoc approach by Rapier Batteries, and a ground test which is definitely not end-to-end, and cleary didn't test failure modes.
What you say is of course correct. One could write a book, but my point is that the senior RO said the accident would have been avoided had the IFF integration been implemented correctly, and senior staff were demonstrably forewarned. Had this defence been intact, then the holes wouldn't have lined up. (That the other holes were enlarged is another matter - I chose to use IFF as an example as I was indirectly involved). No defence is 100% effective, which is why the ones you list are provided/required. But these defences are not there to compensate for 2 Stars giving the big FO to staff who point out flat refusal to ensure functional safety, and that others have made false declarations that it has been achieved - as staff were instructed to do by the 2 Star's colleague, XD1.
What I'd like to know, and MoD won't address, is why it took the senior RO to identify the detailed failings. Why did the Board and other ROs fail to? And what end-to-end testing took place? Sir Brian didn't mention the precise phrase, but that is what he meant. Was the correct 1st line test equipment available? The report mentions an ad hoc approach by Rapier Batteries, and a ground test which is definitely not end-to-end, and cleary didn't test failure modes.
Tuc
I agree and if I recall correctly the Mode 4 was originally an UOR fitment for GRANBY some 12 years previous. Also, if I recall correctly Successor IFF (SIFF) with Mode S and Modes 1-4 did have this failure mode embodied shortly after the accident. As you say, some holes in the cheese were bigger than others!
I think you hint at a valid point that Suitably Qualified and Experience Personnel (SQEP) is what we need accross the board to bung up some of the holes in the cheese. Unfortunately, this comes around to the start of the thread - we have more and more SQeP and SQP personnel in posts with life-or-death responsibilities and so things won't get any better until we "drain that swamp" and start investing in our people again.
HNY
LJ
I agree and if I recall correctly the Mode 4 was originally an UOR fitment for GRANBY some 12 years previous. Also, if I recall correctly Successor IFF (SIFF) with Mode S and Modes 1-4 did have this failure mode embodied shortly after the accident. As you say, some holes in the cheese were bigger than others!
I think you hint at a valid point that Suitably Qualified and Experience Personnel (SQEP) is what we need accross the board to bung up some of the holes in the cheese. Unfortunately, this comes around to the start of the thread - we have more and more SQeP and SQP personnel in posts with life-or-death responsibilities and so things won't get any better until we "drain that swamp" and start investing in our people again.
HNY
LJ