Operation Mikado
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Operation Mikado
I was 15 at the time - reading about this now and trying to understand why a greater effort was not mounted to destroy A-4 and Etendard bases on the mainland as a prelude, particularly using air-power.
There were 38 SHARS and GR3s deployed (if I have numbers right).
I assume:
*More sensible to keep large capital assets like Harrier capable ships at the limit of Argentine air-forces' loiter range, and let the FAA bring the fight out to the islands, than take the fight to them.
*Harrier combat radius would dictate a coming to within at least 600 miles of the coast to launch
*Mobile air search radar on the mainland would have given ample warning of attacks - end result - no surprise - mass Argentine scramble by upwards of 100 fast jets, and a turkey shoot.
*Perceptions of attacks on Argentine mainland (even if just military targets) might have escalated the conflict further drawing in Peru and Venezuela.
Hence the Entebbe-style plan...
It is sobering to look back and see how the numbers were tilted against Operation Corporate.
No criticism intended or implied - just curious.
There were 38 SHARS and GR3s deployed (if I have numbers right).
I assume:
*More sensible to keep large capital assets like Harrier capable ships at the limit of Argentine air-forces' loiter range, and let the FAA bring the fight out to the islands, than take the fight to them.
*Harrier combat radius would dictate a coming to within at least 600 miles of the coast to launch
*Mobile air search radar on the mainland would have given ample warning of attacks - end result - no surprise - mass Argentine scramble by upwards of 100 fast jets, and a turkey shoot.
*Perceptions of attacks on Argentine mainland (even if just military targets) might have escalated the conflict further drawing in Peru and Venezuela.
Hence the Entebbe-style plan...
It is sobering to look back and see how the numbers were tilted against Operation Corporate.
No criticism intended or implied - just curious.
Last edited by tartare; 21st Dec 2016 at 03:23.
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An attack against invading forces is one thing - an attack directly on that country raises the political stakes somewhat. The threat of air strikes against the Argentinian mainland was enough for Argentina to keep its air defence forces firmly defending the home-land - especially after the Vulcan "Black Buck" raids earlier in the War. This kept the environment over the Falklands a little easier for the Harriers to operate.
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Remember there had been plans for a Special Forces assault but while the benefits of success would have been worthwhile the probability of success was assessed as low, the risk of annihilation of the SF and the loss of its delivery aircraft near certain.
Wensleydale will also confirm that there was a 'serious' question asked of 8 Sqn on whether it could reach the FIEZ and how long it could remain on task. Once off task the plan was to ditch near the TF. While this might have given a useful, albeit very short, time on task the best that could be achieved was 4 or 5 shots before writing off the sqn.
With hindsight, for we were told nothing else, the question might have been in relation to either the initial Black Buck raid or of the initial landings on East Falklands rather than guessing when to launch. Under that assumption the question was not as daft as it seemed. Certainly there was pressure within light blue on trying to get a piece of the action.
Wensleydale will also confirm that there was a 'serious' question asked of 8 Sqn on whether it could reach the FIEZ and how long it could remain on task. Once off task the plan was to ditch near the TF. While this might have given a useful, albeit very short, time on task the best that could be achieved was 4 or 5 shots before writing off the sqn.
With hindsight, for we were told nothing else, the question might have been in relation to either the initial Black Buck raid or of the initial landings on East Falklands rather than guessing when to launch. Under that assumption the question was not as daft as it seemed. Certainly there was pressure within light blue on trying to get a piece of the action.
Interesting subject, your first two assumptions of keeping the carriers well to the east seems to be the major driver of ruling out a Harrier/Sea Harrier strike on the mainland. Plans with Sea Harrier navigation systems being suited for the task of leading a mixed air group were drawn up but never executed. I would add to the list that these aircraft were precious for air defense of the task force, so losses had to be kept to a minimum. Not so sure it would have been a turkey shoot against the (Sea) Harriers. They could have come in at ultra low level. I believe the airbase at Rio Gallegos had hardened aircraft shelters, and Rio Grande had revetments likely minimizing damage.
Invincible did one dash to the west and launched a Sea Harrier (Sharkey) that approached the mainland. I seem to recall from his book he reported seeing the glow of lights or factory IR on a pop-up.
Invincible did one dash to the west and launched a Sea Harrier (Sharkey) that approached the mainland. I seem to recall from his book he reported seeing the glow of lights or factory IR on a pop-up.
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If you read 'Soldier I' there was similar plans done for an attack at Port Stanley with a C130 loaded with SF and equipment to crash onto the runway and wreak havoc. It was canned fairly early on I seem to recall as a virtual suicide mission.
Similar missions against Argentine airfield targets would probably have had devasting results on the parked aircraft and facilities (like Pebble Island) but the suicidal nature of the assault would have meant heavy casualties and also as previously mentioned the ratcheting up of the political stakes............ our position would have had to have been incredibly precarious for this type of mission to be actually launched.
Planning them is one thing - Execution quite another...........
Arc
Similar missions against Argentine airfield targets would probably have had devasting results on the parked aircraft and facilities (like Pebble Island) but the suicidal nature of the assault would have meant heavy casualties and also as previously mentioned the ratcheting up of the political stakes............ our position would have had to have been incredibly precarious for this type of mission to be actually launched.
Planning them is one thing - Execution quite another...........
Arc
PEI 4721: That was Operation PLUM DUFF, a recce for MIKADO.
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What was the point of the single Sea Harrier launch against the Mainland and putting the Invincible in harm's way?
Show we could do it?
I would have thought the Argie Air Planners could see we could do it.
Show we could do it?
I would have thought the Argie Air Planners could see we could do it.
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I strongly recommend to read "Exocet Falklands" by Ewen Southby Tailyour, about SF ops to destroy the SuE / Exocet.
There was three DA missions ordered:
Plum Duff, a DA / Recce mission against Rio Grande. It was aborted early.
Mikado, a DA mission against Rio Grande. Plum Duff was prerequisite of Mikado, so Mikado never started.
Kettledrum, a DA mission against Puerto Deseado.
Also, a recce mission, called Shutter was executed. The idea is boots on the ground to report departures from Comodoro Rivadavia, Rio Gallegos and Rio Grande.
I´ve never heard about a strike from the carriers to the mainland. It was a risky mission, putting in jeopardy the entire operation (lost a carrier and Corporate was off). However, recently desclassified files shows Vulcan missions against the mainland were analyzed and prepared.
Regards!
There was three DA missions ordered:
Plum Duff, a DA / Recce mission against Rio Grande. It was aborted early.
Mikado, a DA mission against Rio Grande. Plum Duff was prerequisite of Mikado, so Mikado never started.
Kettledrum, a DA mission against Puerto Deseado.
Also, a recce mission, called Shutter was executed. The idea is boots on the ground to report departures from Comodoro Rivadavia, Rio Gallegos and Rio Grande.
I´ve never heard about a strike from the carriers to the mainland. It was a risky mission, putting in jeopardy the entire operation (lost a carrier and Corporate was off). However, recently desclassified files shows Vulcan missions against the mainland were analyzed and prepared.
Regards!
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Wensleydale will also confirm that there was a 'serious' question asked of 8 Sqn on whether it could reach the FIEZ and how long it could remain on task. Once off task the plan was to ditch near the TF. While this might have given a useful, albeit very short, time on task the best that could be achieved was 4 or 5 shots before writing off the sqn.
Another rumour (!) was that there was also a feasability study done on fitting AAR kit to the Shacks. It was going quite well until it was pointed out there were no Avgas tankers!!
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W, not heard about the post-conflict deployment. I know we looked briefly at a west coast deployment but, as you say, range was the problem.
Shackman, concur.
Shackman, concur.
Shack, shouldn`t have been a problem with 28k fuel in the tankers fuselage tanks...just need to not transfer to wing tanks....
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Marcantilan - any links to those Vulcan papers? I'll read your recommended books.
I visited Buenos Aires in 2000 - fascinating city.
These replies are very interesting guys - have got a copy of the infamous Sharkey's Sea Harrier over the Falklands, but had forgotten he was sent within range of the mainland.
Keen to hear any other insights or information that can now surface with the passing of time.
Very relevant today given it is the largest air-sea battle since WW2.
I visited Buenos Aires in 2000 - fascinating city.
These replies are very interesting guys - have got a copy of the infamous Sharkey's Sea Harrier over the Falklands, but had forgotten he was sent within range of the mainland.
Keen to hear any other insights or information that can now surface with the passing of time.
Very relevant today given it is the largest air-sea battle since WW2.
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Another problem with tanking a Shackleton was to find a tanker that was slow enough to give the fuel, even if capable of AVGAS!! If I remember, range speed was about 160 kts? (Friday afternoon cruise was 180 kts with endurance at 140 kts). Flying into a headwind, we were regularly overtaken by trains on the East Coast line.
Shack Vne was normally 300kts, which was achievable with take off power and straight and level. During an (internal) noise trial at Boscombe Down I achieved 330kts with water meth as well, and the noise meters proved it was very noisy (and quite uncomfortable) and used a LOT of fuel. It also surprised the Harvard which tried to catch us!