Martin Baker to be prosecuted over death of Flt Lt. Sean Cunningham
Roving.
Well said.
A slight variation of this was suggested some years ago, and rejected by MoD. (Surprise). It was also suggested that a Senior AAIB Inspector be a permanent member of the Panel, and his boss sign off the report. This, because MoD has serially misrepresented AAIB evidence. For example, Mull of Kintyre, when the Inspector finally had his say and exposed the truth to Lord Philip in early 2011.
Another reason for reform is that current regulations offer Servicemen who might be criticised the right of reply before the report is published. But, this does not extend to civilians. For example, Sea King ASaC Mk7 (2003), where MoD identified civilian staff to families and blamed them for the (Board's) main contributory factor, despite photographic and written evidence that cleared them. MoD still denies the existence of this evidence (or perhaps thinks it forged - it won't say).
In this XX177 case, a judge familiar with investigative procedures would have immediately exposed MoD's lies about when it was informed of the risk associated with over-tightening the nut. That is, he would have listened to first-hand witness evidence.
Well said.
A slight variation of this was suggested some years ago, and rejected by MoD. (Surprise). It was also suggested that a Senior AAIB Inspector be a permanent member of the Panel, and his boss sign off the report. This, because MoD has serially misrepresented AAIB evidence. For example, Mull of Kintyre, when the Inspector finally had his say and exposed the truth to Lord Philip in early 2011.
Another reason for reform is that current regulations offer Servicemen who might be criticised the right of reply before the report is published. But, this does not extend to civilians. For example, Sea King ASaC Mk7 (2003), where MoD identified civilian staff to families and blamed them for the (Board's) main contributory factor, despite photographic and written evidence that cleared them. MoD still denies the existence of this evidence (or perhaps thinks it forged - it won't say).
In this XX177 case, a judge familiar with investigative procedures would have immediately exposed MoD's lies about when it was informed of the risk associated with over-tightening the nut. That is, he would have listened to first-hand witness evidence.
I would remove the ‘Service Interest’ test from prosecution decisions, leaving ‘Public Interest’ as the sole test used by the SPA.
A small change in words that would a dramatic effect on those in the most senior of positions.
A small change in words that would a dramatic effect on those in the most senior of positions.
Court 1, 11.00 am. Friday 23rd Feb, before The Honourable Mrs Justice Carr DBE
I wonder if she's been reading PPRuNe ?
What would be considered a respectable time interval before the public found that MBA had been guaranteed security of tenure for another few years at Chalgrove ? Or not, as the case may be - "We lied" as they say in all the best conspiracy movies.
Or more politely - "Terrrribly sorry old boy, the Minister was not minded to be persuaded, nothing we could do, it's out of our hands now."
..........
I wonder if she's been reading PPRuNe ?
What would be considered a respectable time interval before the public found that MBA had been guaranteed security of tenure for another few years at Chalgrove ? Or not, as the case may be - "We lied" as they say in all the best conspiracy movies.
Or more politely - "Terrrribly sorry old boy, the Minister was not minded to be persuaded, nothing we could do, it's out of our hands now."
..........
Red Arrows death: Ejection seat firm fined £1.1m - BBC News
MB fined £1.1m
MB fined £1.1m
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As appears from this fine in 2016, the fine in the current case was at the low end.
Star Wars film maker fined £1.6 million for injuring Harrison Ford | Media centre - HSE
Star Wars film maker fined £1.6 million for injuring Harrison Ford | Media centre - HSE
Although on a different scale, this appears to be analogous to the Apollo 1 inquest. North American Aviation had a mountain of documentation that showed NASA were, at least, equally culpable for some of the decisions and processes that led to the fire, not least the high pressure 100% oxygen requirement and inward opening, non-jettisonable, hatch. Lee Atwood, CEO of NAA, effectively made the decision to take it on the chin as proving NASA's part could kill-off Apollo, and would only serve to hurt longer term prospects. He paid the fine, fired a couple of prominent people (Harrison Storms included) and then put it behind them. It worked as well; North American Rockwell got the contract to design and build the Shuttle a few years later. To me, this reads as MB rolling over for the sake of an important reference customer, and not wishing to point the finger at VSOs / high grade CS who will, in time, be making decisions that could effect them, or, worse, start recommending other manufacturers when asked for advice by 3rd parties.
I understand the analogy you make, Evalu8tor, but only up to a point. Other than making money (the point of any business), the whole ethos of MBL is about saving aircrew lives. How does leaving a UK Military Air Safety System still dysfunctional, and likely to remain so thanks to the cover up, help save aircrew lives? Somebody, somewhere, has to decide that this is their problem and to set about solving it. That person is clearly not the MBL CEO, nor any of the other worthies who have failed military aircrew thus far.
Well said, both Evaluator and Chug.
Well, for the first time we now know the details of the charge. The 'quality of design' charge was, indeed, dropped in November. (Everyone was misled by HSE referring back to this allegation at the sentencing hearing, despite having dropped the charge. The judge should have jumped on them). The media continues its sensationalist reporting, referring to this allegation; but not the reason it was dropped - MoD's admitted liability.
So, £1.1M for not providing a technical bulletin in 1990, warning of basic engineering practice that is set down in MoD APs and trade training since (to my personal knowledge) 1970. The trade training AP was provided in evidence. (AP3279, Standard Technical Notes, Section 1, Ch. 4, Para 30 - Usage of Stiffnuts). I'd naturally deviate to this, if only because it uses the correct term for the nut.
The bottom line here is: MoD has claimed that between first adoption of the Scissor/Drogue Shackle design in the late 40s/early 50s, and Flt Lt Cunningham's death in 2011, it knew nothing about the most basic design feature of the parachute release mechanism, or how to maintain it. This is clearly a lie, and I challenge any qualified seat maintainer to put his hand on a bible and say he didn't understand the mechanism. I also challenge ANY maintainer to take a look at the assembly drawing and the paragraph in the AP describing operation, and claim he doesn't know that the nut should not be over-tightened. This is first-month apprenticeship stuff folks. Its akin to an aspiring pilot's first theory of flight lecture, and the bit about lift.
Yes, M-B rolled over, and we need to understand why. More importantly, we need reassurance that the MoD system that was deliberately run down will be resurrected. The MAA have had 8 years, and are still in the starting blocks. And what aircraft are the former seat/Hawk staff now looking after?
Well, for the first time we now know the details of the charge. The 'quality of design' charge was, indeed, dropped in November. (Everyone was misled by HSE referring back to this allegation at the sentencing hearing, despite having dropped the charge. The judge should have jumped on them). The media continues its sensationalist reporting, referring to this allegation; but not the reason it was dropped - MoD's admitted liability.
So, £1.1M for not providing a technical bulletin in 1990, warning of basic engineering practice that is set down in MoD APs and trade training since (to my personal knowledge) 1970. The trade training AP was provided in evidence. (AP3279, Standard Technical Notes, Section 1, Ch. 4, Para 30 - Usage of Stiffnuts). I'd naturally deviate to this, if only because it uses the correct term for the nut.
The bottom line here is: MoD has claimed that between first adoption of the Scissor/Drogue Shackle design in the late 40s/early 50s, and Flt Lt Cunningham's death in 2011, it knew nothing about the most basic design feature of the parachute release mechanism, or how to maintain it. This is clearly a lie, and I challenge any qualified seat maintainer to put his hand on a bible and say he didn't understand the mechanism. I also challenge ANY maintainer to take a look at the assembly drawing and the paragraph in the AP describing operation, and claim he doesn't know that the nut should not be over-tightened. This is first-month apprenticeship stuff folks. Its akin to an aspiring pilot's first theory of flight lecture, and the bit about lift.
Yes, M-B rolled over, and we need to understand why. More importantly, we need reassurance that the MoD system that was deliberately run down will be resurrected. The MAA have had 8 years, and are still in the starting blocks. And what aircraft are the former seat/Hawk staff now looking after?
Well said, both Evaluator and Chug.
Well, for the first time we now know the details of the charge. The 'quality of design' charge was, indeed, dropped in November. (Everyone was misled by HSE referring back to this allegation at the sentencing hearing, despite having dropped the charge. The judge should have jumped on them). The media continues its sensationalist reporting, referring to this allegation; but not the reason it was dropped - MoD's admitted liability.
So, £1.1M for not providing a technical bulletin in 1990, warning of basic engineering practice that is set down in MoD APs and trade training since (to my personal knowledge) 1970. The trade training AP was provided in evidence. (AP3279, Standard Technical Notes, Section 1, Ch. 4, Para 30 - Usage of Stiffnuts). I'd naturally deviate to this, if only because it uses the correct term for the nut.
The bottom line here is: MoD has claimed that between first adoption of the Scissor/Drogue Shackle design in the late 40s/early 50s, and Flt Lt Cunningham's death in 2011, it knew nothing about the most basic design feature of the parachute release mechanism, or how to maintain it. This is clearly a lie, and I challenge any qualified seat maintainer to put his hand on a bible and say he didn't understand the mechanism. I also challenge ANY maintainer to take a look at the assembly drawing and the paragraph in the AP describing operation, and claim he doesn't know that the nut should not be over-tightened. This is first-month apprenticeship stuff folks. Its akin to an aspiring pilot's first theory of flight lecture, and the bit about lift.
Yes, M-B rolled over, and we need to understand why. More importantly, we need reassurance that the MoD system that was deliberately run down will be resurrected. The MAA have had 8 years, and are still in the starting blocks. And what aircraft are the former seat/Hawk staff now looking after?
Well, for the first time we now know the details of the charge. The 'quality of design' charge was, indeed, dropped in November. (Everyone was misled by HSE referring back to this allegation at the sentencing hearing, despite having dropped the charge. The judge should have jumped on them). The media continues its sensationalist reporting, referring to this allegation; but not the reason it was dropped - MoD's admitted liability.
So, £1.1M for not providing a technical bulletin in 1990, warning of basic engineering practice that is set down in MoD APs and trade training since (to my personal knowledge) 1970. The trade training AP was provided in evidence. (AP3279, Standard Technical Notes, Section 1, Ch. 4, Para 30 - Usage of Stiffnuts). I'd naturally deviate to this, if only because it uses the correct term for the nut.
The bottom line here is: MoD has claimed that between first adoption of the Scissor/Drogue Shackle design in the late 40s/early 50s, and Flt Lt Cunningham's death in 2011, it knew nothing about the most basic design feature of the parachute release mechanism, or how to maintain it. This is clearly a lie, and I challenge any qualified seat maintainer to put his hand on a bible and say he didn't understand the mechanism. I also challenge ANY maintainer to take a look at the assembly drawing and the paragraph in the AP describing operation, and claim he doesn't know that the nut should not be over-tightened. This is first-month apprenticeship stuff folks. Its akin to an aspiring pilot's first theory of flight lecture, and the bit about lift.
Yes, M-B rolled over, and we need to understand why. More importantly, we need reassurance that the MoD system that was deliberately run down will be resurrected. The MAA have had 8 years, and are still in the starting blocks. And what aircraft are the former seat/Hawk staff now looking after?
The seat Support Authority was headed up by a Supply Branch Wing Cdr as early as the 90s (during the charge to cut costs), Nothing wrong with Supply branch officers of course but you get my point? Airworthiness responsibility was being driven down to low levels (Flt Lt) even then.
Its (seat office) responsibility is probably now "Chairs, Arm, domestic, UAV pilots for the use of"
The seat Support Authority was headed up by a Supply Branch Wing Cdr as early as the 90s (during the charge to cut costs)
That was as a result of DGSM (an AVM) issuing an edict that, henceforth, any admin staff (Service or civilian) were to be regarded a senior to any engineer. A young lady supplier, 3 grades my junior, was appointed as my line manager. Much to her horror. Sylvia, I hope you are well. We won that battle, but the ethos remains.
Hey ho, I expect it was cost effective and there were probably too many Gp Capts anyway.....
Chug,
I agree. I guess that MB feel that if they pressed the issue and MoD copped a load of blame, their business could suffer. If they went out of business, would their rivals carry the same underlying ethos into the future? There are several rotten apples in the MoD/CS - many still hiding behind pernicious rules and intimidatory practices....
I agree. I guess that MB feel that if they pressed the issue and MoD copped a load of blame, their business could suffer. If they went out of business, would their rivals carry the same underlying ethos into the future? There are several rotten apples in the MoD/CS - many still hiding behind pernicious rules and intimidatory practices....
Judge's remarks make for 17 pages of interesting reading. Time after time she rejects HSE's position. In fact, if you knew nothing else about the case, at page 9 you'd be thinking, she's recognised this charge is a crock and is going to dismiss. But the guilty plea gave her nowhere to go.
One key issue. Examples of aircraft manufacturers applying their own standards to the Martin-Baker assembly instructions, which practically assured the risk of jamming would occur eventually. If M-B are at fault at all, it is in not telling them all to F*** right off. Instead, it seems they tried to satisfy different regulations in different countries, which goes a long way to explaining why some had certain instructions, and others not.
But what is omitted is the boundary of responsibility between M-B and BAeS for issuing in-situ servicing instructions; and the fact that neither had responsibility in 1990. HSE and MoD knew this but (surprise) omitted it.
She does confirm she received the evidence of all this, but did not read it. Instead, sending it to HSE for comment. Not that the prosecution would write back and admit they'd ran an investigation worthy of Fred Karno's Army.
One key issue. Examples of aircraft manufacturers applying their own standards to the Martin-Baker assembly instructions, which practically assured the risk of jamming would occur eventually. If M-B are at fault at all, it is in not telling them all to F*** right off. Instead, it seems they tried to satisfy different regulations in different countries, which goes a long way to explaining why some had certain instructions, and others not.
But what is omitted is the boundary of responsibility between M-B and BAeS for issuing in-situ servicing instructions; and the fact that neither had responsibility in 1990. HSE and MoD knew this but (surprise) omitted it.
She does confirm she received the evidence of all this, but did not read it. Instead, sending it to HSE for comment. Not that the prosecution would write back and admit they'd ran an investigation worthy of Fred Karno's Army.
I see no reason why they should go out of business, Evalu8tor. They have a unique UK product and expertise. The MOD won't cop a load of blame anyway. If HSE pointed the finger at them, yet more SO/JO goats would be offered up for sacrifice. That is no reason for MB to plead guilty and some other reason must be behind it. I am inclined to the Chalgrove theory offered by others. Blackmail is an ugly word, this whole affair is an ugly business but just a normal day at the office for MOD. All the more reason to extricate UK Military Air Regulation and Accident Investigation from its maw.
omq:-
I doubt you do OMQ. That is the sorry irony of "Savings at the Cost of Safety", any savings were very short lived and the cost in blood and treasure continues relentlessly, unless and until airworthiness and accident investigation reform occurs.
omq:-
I expect it was cost effective
I can't find the judge's comments online - but this link will take you to a digitised copy of the paper version that I received at Lincoln Crown Court yesterday. (Thanks to tuc)
https://we.tl/XXuk31tYZM
airsound
https://we.tl/XXuk31tYZM
airsound
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Thanks airsound. I assume in due course the transcript will appear on the Judiciary website.
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk
I see the Judge accepted the Defence's proposition that MB was entitled to assume that RAF Engineers would use common sense, which seemingly they did not.
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk
I see the Judge accepted the Defence's proposition that MB was entitled to assume that RAF Engineers would use common sense, which seemingly they did not.
I see no reason why they should go out of business, Evalu8tor. They have a unique UK product and expertise. The MOD won't cop a load of blame anyway. If HSE pointed the finger at them, yet more SO/JO goats would be offered up for sacrifice. That is no reason for MB to plead guilty and some other reason must be behind it. I am inclined to the Chalgrove theory offered by others. Blackmail is an ugly word, this whole affair is an ugly business but just a normal day at the office for MOD. All the more reason to extricate UK Military Air Regulation and Accident Investigation from its maw.
I doubt you do OMQ. That is the sorry irony of "Savings at the Cost of Safety", any savings were very short lived and the cost in blood and treasure continues relentlessly, unless and until airworthiness and accident investigation reform occurs.
I doubt you do OMQ. That is the sorry irony of "Savings at the Cost of Safety", any savings were very short lived and the cost in blood and treasure continues relentlessly, unless and until airworthiness and accident investigation reform occurs.
But, in the long run, you get what you pay for I guess. So sad so many lives have been lost needlessly during that run.
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well on Monday morning I presume all we'll hear is vast sigh of relief from inside the MoD and the hum of shredders...... and box loads of documents heading for Kew with "Do Not Open for 50 years" stencilled on the outside
MB will sign a cheque, tell everyone to say nothing and "slightly" increase prices for 2019 & 2020
A classic British outcome............ but hardly "justice"
MB will sign a cheque, tell everyone to say nothing and "slightly" increase prices for 2019 & 2020
A classic British outcome............ but hardly "justice"