Long Range Strike Bomber: "very mature"
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Long Range Strike Bomber: "very mature"
The two proposed Long Range Strike Bombers (LRSB) are reportedly "very mature" so it looks like this program will avoid the concurrent engineering and other problems associated with F-35's sad history. The final down select is due before the end of this month. It'll be interesting to see which contractor team wins. I wonder if and when the public will get to see what each contractor team proposed.
LRS-B Details Emerge: Major Testing, Risk Reduction Complete
LRS-B Details Emerge: Major Testing, Risk Reduction Complete
Based on that story, a truly fascinating development. Smaller than B-2, significantly better RCS, less payload and less range. But at least the requirements are "nailed down." The specifications may be appropriate considering the feasible forward basing, aerial refueling, precision targeting, and potency of smaller bombs.
The use of the RCO points to the unacceptable burden that "normal" defense acquisition procedures and requirements place on a program. These "normal" processes and rules were born from bad management practices of previous programs over the years. It shows the cost of trying "regulate" everything as opposed to insisting on hard-nosed, accountable decision-making, with leadership truly taking responsibility for competent execution of their duties. Kind of old-fashioned, I'm afraid, but something Hap Arnold, Curtis LeMay and Kelly Johnson (among others) would recognize.
I realize that the RCO path may have been chosen more for secrecy than efficiency. Let's hope the secrecy does not equal less accountability and that a "smaller" acquisition office is not over-burdened by the immensity of the program. I hope, too, that Congress does not waste the development costs by failing to amortize them over a significantly large fleet buy. Do the taxpayer a favor this time, unlike the F-22 program.
The use of the RCO points to the unacceptable burden that "normal" defense acquisition procedures and requirements place on a program. These "normal" processes and rules were born from bad management practices of previous programs over the years. It shows the cost of trying "regulate" everything as opposed to insisting on hard-nosed, accountable decision-making, with leadership truly taking responsibility for competent execution of their duties. Kind of old-fashioned, I'm afraid, but something Hap Arnold, Curtis LeMay and Kelly Johnson (among others) would recognize.
I realize that the RCO path may have been chosen more for secrecy than efficiency. Let's hope the secrecy does not equal less accountability and that a "smaller" acquisition office is not over-burdened by the immensity of the program. I hope, too, that Congress does not waste the development costs by failing to amortize them over a significantly large fleet buy. Do the taxpayer a favor this time, unlike the F-22 program.
The RCO approach might work. But it presumes that the normal acquisition system, with its multiple layers of oversight, regular reviews and armies of people, is the problem and not the symptom.
It could be that simpler systems can only work on small, out-of-the-limelight, secret programs - and won't accomplish miracles in the face of massive institutional pressure, from Congress, industry and the customer, to deny problems and prioritize the program's survival over efficient execution.
It could be that simpler systems can only work on small, out-of-the-limelight, secret programs - and won't accomplish miracles in the face of massive institutional pressure, from Congress, industry and the customer, to deny problems and prioritize the program's survival over efficient execution.
From the linked article.
No planes, yet. Until they fly ... I'd offer that 'mature" is a bit of a reach.
On a related note ...
One of these days, I'd like us to return to the mode where these "sources" remembered to STFU.
However, neither design has actually flown, both sources said.
On a related note ...
One of these days, I'd like us to return to the mode where these "sources" remembered to STFU.
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If it goes well hopefully they can replace the B52s and some F15E with them. 21 seems quite few for an entire bomber programme. Then replace the remaining F15 with a joint fighter/striker with the Navy.
"Some observers believed the Air Force might use off-the-shelf commercial tech to help keep the price down, but the RCO has access to existing technologies that most people may never have heard of."
Not sure if serious.
"Some observers believed the Air Force might use off-the-shelf commercial tech to help keep the price down, but the RCO has access to existing technologies that most people may never have heard of."
Not sure if serious.
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When the contract is awarded, it will come in two parts — an EMD contract that is cost-plus incentive free, and an agreement on the first five low-rate initial production lots that is fixed-price incentive free. Those first five lots will cover the production of 21 bombers.
Apparently the buy will be between 80-100.
Perhaps this is what flew over Wichita last year.
The plan is to maintain fleets of B1, B52, B2 and the LRSB for the long term.
Since LRSB is joining AF Global Strike Command, I don't think the Strike Eagles will be directly affected.
Source is behind Janes Paywall
Perhaps this is what flew over Wichita last year.
The plan is to maintain fleets of B1, B52, B2 and the LRSB for the long term.
Since LRSB is joining AF Global Strike Command, I don't think the Strike Eagles will be directly affected.
Source is behind Janes Paywall
