Based on that story, a truly fascinating development. Smaller than B-2, significantly better RCS, less payload and less range. But at least the requirements are "nailed down." The specifications may be appropriate considering the feasible forward basing, aerial refueling, precision targeting, and potency of smaller bombs.
The use of the RCO points to the unacceptable burden that "normal" defense acquisition procedures and requirements place on a program. These "normal" processes and rules were born from bad management practices of previous programs over the years. It shows the cost of trying "regulate" everything as opposed to insisting on hard-nosed, accountable decision-making, with leadership truly taking responsibility for competent execution of their duties. Kind of old-fashioned, I'm afraid, but something Hap Arnold, Curtis LeMay and Kelly Johnson (among others) would recognize.
I realize that the RCO path may have been chosen more for secrecy than efficiency. Let's hope the secrecy does not equal less accountability and that a "smaller" acquisition office is not over-burdened by the immensity of the program. I hope, too, that Congress does not waste the development costs by failing to amortize them over a significantly large fleet buy. Do the taxpayer a favor this time, unlike the F-22 program.