Why did the RAF give up nuclear weapons...
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RAF nuclear weapons in the Far East
Chugalug:
In my time the bomber Canberra crews of 45 Sqn did Japan and NZ, the Philippines to the East and (thanks to a complete exchange ferry programme) Wroughton and Lyneham to the West. We left Africa to the Cyprus squadrons. In my tour I landed my Canberra at 32 different airfields.
Our parish was the SEATO area, in which we doubtless pinched some of your trade, climbing out towards Brunei or Chiang Mai on a Sunday morning with a VIP or an AOG spare part.
… except (returning to the thread) we had a nuclear weapon. The armourers would wheel it out and we would read check-lists over it, as we might have recited good wishes on a visit to a sick uncle.
Here again the word bizarre came to mind, if we thought about the thing at all. Clearly there was no use for it in SEATO, where we teamed with the Hunter squadron (20 Sqn with FGA9s) to practice conventional interdiction and close air support.
Noone told us why we had the thing. We did no relevant target study. Clearly it was sort–of aimed at China, but China has always been very, very big, while 45 Sqn had eight aircraft on a good day. Best not to think about it.
We did practice the LABS procedure, by which we would have tossed the thing before hurrying away. That was a very precise manoeuvre which others got fatally wrong from time to time. It was lovely to feel completely in control, doing low-level aerobatics on instruments at night and scoring well on the bomb target to boot.
In my time the bomber Canberra crews of 45 Sqn did Japan and NZ, the Philippines to the East and (thanks to a complete exchange ferry programme) Wroughton and Lyneham to the West. We left Africa to the Cyprus squadrons. In my tour I landed my Canberra at 32 different airfields.
Our parish was the SEATO area, in which we doubtless pinched some of your trade, climbing out towards Brunei or Chiang Mai on a Sunday morning with a VIP or an AOG spare part.
… except (returning to the thread) we had a nuclear weapon. The armourers would wheel it out and we would read check-lists over it, as we might have recited good wishes on a visit to a sick uncle.
Here again the word bizarre came to mind, if we thought about the thing at all. Clearly there was no use for it in SEATO, where we teamed with the Hunter squadron (20 Sqn with FGA9s) to practice conventional interdiction and close air support.
Noone told us why we had the thing. We did no relevant target study. Clearly it was sort–of aimed at China, but China has always been very, very big, while 45 Sqn had eight aircraft on a good day. Best not to think about it.
We did practice the LABS procedure, by which we would have tossed the thing before hurrying away. That was a very precise manoeuvre which others got fatally wrong from time to time. It was lovely to feel completely in control, doing low-level aerobatics on instruments at night and scoring well on the bomb target to boot.
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risbutler, interesting. We used to visit Tengah to read the check lists at X-site and then Changhi where we did target study. We had routes and all.
Back in UK we later got nice shinny JARIC folders and again drew up all the routes. Unlike the NATO plans we did not do regular study. The targets were tactical rather than strategic and not as far a China.
Back in UK we later got nice shinny JARIC folders and again drew up all the routes. Unlike the NATO plans we did not do regular study. The targets were tactical rather than strategic and not as far a China.
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PN:
Equally interesting.
I assume that what you say would have been different depending on the time period you describe.
I still hang onto the idea that the weapons were moved into the theatre to help defend a supposedly coherent SEATO from the yellow hordes that so alarmed General Macarthy ten years earlier.
I left 45 Sqn a month after the Gulf of Tonkin. As the Vietnam war hotted up, SEATO would be more actively concerned about China advancing through the supposed dominoes. Does that tie with your attack scenarios ?
I assume you represented the V-force, perhaps Vulcans from Akrotiri. I read now that there were 48 weapons in theatre from 1962, so you chaps must have been written into the stategy from the off.
In my time first Victors and then Vulcans arrived in small packets. We took them to be elements of deterrence for the Indonesians and therefore (surely ?) non-nuclear. We did receive Akrotiri Canberras (who had our nuclear role in Cyprus) in the period, but (as far as I know) they exercised entirely as an extension of our offensive support effort.
Equally interesting.
I assume that what you say would have been different depending on the time period you describe.
I still hang onto the idea that the weapons were moved into the theatre to help defend a supposedly coherent SEATO from the yellow hordes that so alarmed General Macarthy ten years earlier.
I left 45 Sqn a month after the Gulf of Tonkin. As the Vietnam war hotted up, SEATO would be more actively concerned about China advancing through the supposed dominoes. Does that tie with your attack scenarios ?
I assume you represented the V-force, perhaps Vulcans from Akrotiri. I read now that there were 48 weapons in theatre from 1962, so you chaps must have been written into the stategy from the off.
In my time first Victors and then Vulcans arrived in small packets. We took them to be elements of deterrence for the Indonesians and therefore (surely ?) non-nuclear. We did receive Akrotiri Canberras (who had our nuclear role in Cyprus) in the period, but (as far as I know) they exercised entirely as an extension of our offensive support effort.
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SEATO targeting. This is in public domain, from:
M.S.Navias,Nuclear Weapons & Bitish Strategic Planning 1955-58, Clarendon, 1991, P.40; R.Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, Palgrave, 2010, P214; K.Stoddart, Losing an Empire & Finding a Role, Palgrave, 2012, P232:
20 targets in SEATO Plan 4, 11/63-13/2/70: “interdiction upon (PRC+NVA) invading columns”, “targets in Burma, adjacent parts of (PRC)”.
Tengah (RAF/RN Holding Unit) SSA opened, 8/62; base to Sing.ADC, 9/71.
FEAF: Tengah 45 Sqn. 8xCanberra B.15/Red Beard, cleared, LABS release 11/63-13/2/70. SEATO-Secondary Declared: 8/12/63-3/2/69, 32 Sqdn/NEAF, 8xCanberra B.15/Red Beard.
For (almost) all this period an RN Strike carrier was on FE Station with 8-ish Scimitar/Buccaneer S.1/S.2/Red Beard.
11/61-8/71 a Vulcan B.2 Sqn. was Secondary SEATO-Tasked, (probably) HE to 9/66: then -25/2/69 held by 9/35 Sqds/Cottesmore as Matterhorn, then by Waddington Wing (e.g:101 Sqd., 8 a/c Tengah, 1-2/70), with WE177B.
M.S.Navias,Nuclear Weapons & Bitish Strategic Planning 1955-58, Clarendon, 1991, P.40; R.Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, Palgrave, 2010, P214; K.Stoddart, Losing an Empire & Finding a Role, Palgrave, 2012, P232:
20 targets in SEATO Plan 4, 11/63-13/2/70: “interdiction upon (PRC+NVA) invading columns”, “targets in Burma, adjacent parts of (PRC)”.
Tengah (RAF/RN Holding Unit) SSA opened, 8/62; base to Sing.ADC, 9/71.
FEAF: Tengah 45 Sqn. 8xCanberra B.15/Red Beard, cleared, LABS release 11/63-13/2/70. SEATO-Secondary Declared: 8/12/63-3/2/69, 32 Sqdn/NEAF, 8xCanberra B.15/Red Beard.
For (almost) all this period an RN Strike carrier was on FE Station with 8-ish Scimitar/Buccaneer S.1/S.2/Red Beard.
11/61-8/71 a Vulcan B.2 Sqn. was Secondary SEATO-Tasked, (probably) HE to 9/66: then -25/2/69 held by 9/35 Sqds/Cottesmore as Matterhorn, then by Waddington Wing (e.g:101 Sqd., 8 a/c Tengah, 1-2/70), with WE177B.
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Torn, on the last paragraph, we were dual capable with the same tactical target set as above. We were initially planned to use RB. Tengah also had two purpose built 8-ac Sqn buildings for the V-Force. The accommodation was rather better than the make-do in UK.
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Valiant targeting
(Wynn's Official History, P.571 matches weapons to platforms: he has US Mk.15/39 Mod 0 & 2 on Valiant; he does not match Red Beard to Vulcan 1 or 2)
Wynn,P.260 has Memorandum of Understanding 8/8/57 on target co-ordination, Bomber Command+USAF/SAC (whose Reflex Action began in UK 8/1/58, c.66 B-47E on Alert TDY/Bombs on Board: deconfliction was an evident necessity); target
integrated wef 1/7/58: discussion had shown that "every BC target was also on SAC's list". P.275. P274 has 106 BC targets (MBF+SMF Thor), 69 cities, 17 Sov. bomber and 20 Sov Air Defence bases. They have not been published in detail.
Last of 104 RAF Valiant delivered 27/8/57. Moore/Illusion, P.112 has Blue Danube Mk.3 CA Release, 7/57; all 24 to RAF by 3/58(Walker/RUSI Jnl.10/11,Note 3). So all bomber Valiants were HE to c.3/58. US Bombs were deployed in BC wef 1/10/58. So:
- BC targets integrated with SAC (wef 1/4/61: USAF/USN/RAF SIOP):
138 Sqd/Wittering: 8: by 3/58-(Blue Danube, 8/60; Red Beard -) 25/6/61
49 Sqd/Wittering: 8: 21/10/58-(BD, 8/60; RB-) 25/6/61
7 Sqd/Wittering: 8 RB, 1/9/60-30/9/62
148/207 Sqdns./Marham: sharing 8 BD: by 3/58-30/6/58
148 Sqdn/Marham: 8 Mk.5, (by 31/12/58)*-12/7/61
207 Sqdn/Marham: 8 Mk.5, (by 31/12/58)*-31/12/59
7 Sqdn/Honington: 8 Mk.5, 1/10/58-7/60
(If Wynn is correct on Mk.15/39 {yield 3.4/3.8Mt!): 90 Sqdn/Honington: 12/58-30/6/61).
(*: I.Clark,Nuclear Diplomacy & the Special Relationship,Clarendon,1994,P.146 has Marham "stocked" with Mk.5 "by 1/1/59".)
Saceur's Tactical Bomber Force Canberra B.6/Mk.7 became Valiant. His Scheduled Strike Program has not been published in detail, but we might now term it as SEADS:
207 Sqd/Marham: 1/1/60-12/7/61: 8 Mk.5; 13/7/61-31/3/63: 8x2Mk.28; 1/4/63 -9/12/64: 8x2 B-43
49 Sqd/Marham: 13/7/61-31/3/63: 8x2 Mk.28; 1/4/63 -9/12/64: 8x2 B-43
148 Sqd/Marham: 13/7/61-31/3/63: 8x2 Mk.28; 1/4/63 -9/12/64: 8x2 B-43.
(214 Sqdn/Marham was dual-tasked to 30/6/61, refuelling "pioneer" which "occupied the major portion of Sqdn. effort", 12/57-11/59 Wynn,P.165. It had access to 8 Mk.5s, 1/10/58-30/6/61; then in TBF solely K).
Wynn,P.260 has Memorandum of Understanding 8/8/57 on target co-ordination, Bomber Command+USAF/SAC (whose Reflex Action began in UK 8/1/58, c.66 B-47E on Alert TDY/Bombs on Board: deconfliction was an evident necessity); target
integrated wef 1/7/58: discussion had shown that "every BC target was also on SAC's list". P.275. P274 has 106 BC targets (MBF+SMF Thor), 69 cities, 17 Sov. bomber and 20 Sov Air Defence bases. They have not been published in detail.
Last of 104 RAF Valiant delivered 27/8/57. Moore/Illusion, P.112 has Blue Danube Mk.3 CA Release, 7/57; all 24 to RAF by 3/58(Walker/RUSI Jnl.10/11,Note 3). So all bomber Valiants were HE to c.3/58. US Bombs were deployed in BC wef 1/10/58. So:
- BC targets integrated with SAC (wef 1/4/61: USAF/USN/RAF SIOP):
138 Sqd/Wittering: 8: by 3/58-(Blue Danube, 8/60; Red Beard -) 25/6/61
49 Sqd/Wittering: 8: 21/10/58-(BD, 8/60; RB-) 25/6/61
7 Sqd/Wittering: 8 RB, 1/9/60-30/9/62
148/207 Sqdns./Marham: sharing 8 BD: by 3/58-30/6/58
148 Sqdn/Marham: 8 Mk.5, (by 31/12/58)*-12/7/61
207 Sqdn/Marham: 8 Mk.5, (by 31/12/58)*-31/12/59
7 Sqdn/Honington: 8 Mk.5, 1/10/58-7/60
(If Wynn is correct on Mk.15/39 {yield 3.4/3.8Mt!): 90 Sqdn/Honington: 12/58-30/6/61).
(*: I.Clark,Nuclear Diplomacy & the Special Relationship,Clarendon,1994,P.146 has Marham "stocked" with Mk.5 "by 1/1/59".)
Saceur's Tactical Bomber Force Canberra B.6/Mk.7 became Valiant. His Scheduled Strike Program has not been published in detail, but we might now term it as SEADS:
207 Sqd/Marham: 1/1/60-12/7/61: 8 Mk.5; 13/7/61-31/3/63: 8x2Mk.28; 1/4/63 -9/12/64: 8x2 B-43
49 Sqd/Marham: 13/7/61-31/3/63: 8x2 Mk.28; 1/4/63 -9/12/64: 8x2 B-43
148 Sqd/Marham: 13/7/61-31/3/63: 8x2 Mk.28; 1/4/63 -9/12/64: 8x2 B-43.
(214 Sqdn/Marham was dual-tasked to 30/6/61, refuelling "pioneer" which "occupied the major portion of Sqdn. effort", 12/57-11/59 Wynn,P.165. It had access to 8 Mk.5s, 1/10/58-30/6/61; then in TBF solely K).
Last edited by tornadoken; 20th Sep 2016 at 18:24.
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Dr Strangelove was the primary reason.
Supermac commissioned Polaris ICBM from HM Submarines, and everybody probably thought it was the best thing he ever thought of, especially after watching Dr Strangelove... its still a fantastic film, and must have killed off any chance of the RAF ever hanging on to nuclear weapons, the more people saw it and subsequently got into politics.
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Hangarshmuffle, please remind us when Dr Strangeglove was released, when the V-Force disbanded, the RAF relinquished nuclear weapons, and for good measure, Hunt for the Red October just so we have the chronoly right.
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Chugalug:
In my time the bomber Canberra crews of 45 Sqn did Japan and NZ, the Philippines to the East and (thanks to a complete exchange ferry programme) Wroughton and Lyneham to the West. We left Africa to the Cyprus squadrons. In my tour I landed my Canberra at 32 different airfields.
Our parish was the SEATO area, in which we doubtless pinched some of your trade, climbing out towards Brunei or Chiang Mai on a Sunday morning with a VIP or an AOG spare part.
… except (returning to the thread) we had a nuclear weapon. The armourers would wheel it out and we would read check-lists over it, as we might have recited good wishes on a visit to a sick uncle.
Here again the word bizarre came to mind, if we thought about the thing at all. Clearly there was no use for it in SEATO, where we teamed with the Hunter squadron (20 Sqn with FGA9s) to practice conventional interdiction and close air support.
Noone told us why we had the thing. We did no relevant target study. Clearly it was sort–of aimed at China, but China has always been very, very big, while 45 Sqn had eight aircraft on a good day. Best not to think about it.
We did practice the LABS procedure, by which we would have tossed the thing before hurrying away. That was a very precise manoeuvre which others got fatally wrong from time to time. It was lovely to feel completely in control, doing low-level aerobatics on instruments at night and scoring well on the bomb target to boot.
In my time the bomber Canberra crews of 45 Sqn did Japan and NZ, the Philippines to the East and (thanks to a complete exchange ferry programme) Wroughton and Lyneham to the West. We left Africa to the Cyprus squadrons. In my tour I landed my Canberra at 32 different airfields.
Our parish was the SEATO area, in which we doubtless pinched some of your trade, climbing out towards Brunei or Chiang Mai on a Sunday morning with a VIP or an AOG spare part.
… except (returning to the thread) we had a nuclear weapon. The armourers would wheel it out and we would read check-lists over it, as we might have recited good wishes on a visit to a sick uncle.
Here again the word bizarre came to mind, if we thought about the thing at all. Clearly there was no use for it in SEATO, where we teamed with the Hunter squadron (20 Sqn with FGA9s) to practice conventional interdiction and close air support.
Noone told us why we had the thing. We did no relevant target study. Clearly it was sort–of aimed at China, but China has always been very, very big, while 45 Sqn had eight aircraft on a good day. Best not to think about it.
We did practice the LABS procedure, by which we would have tossed the thing before hurrying away. That was a very precise manoeuvre which others got fatally wrong from time to time. It was lovely to feel completely in control, doing low-level aerobatics on instruments at night and scoring well on the bomb target to boot.
Hangarshmuffle, please remind us when Dr Strangeglove was released, when the V-Force disbanded, the RAF relinquished nuclear weapons, and for good measure, Hunt for the Red October just so we have the chronoly right. - PN
Not to mention the spelling.....
Sorry,PN - couldn't resist, and after all Supermac needed a reasonable leadtime after the Nassau Agreement, which preceded the film, and all before RESO's first patrol in June 68!
Jack
Not to mention the spelling.....
Sorry,PN - couldn't resist, and after all Supermac needed a reasonable leadtime after the Nassau Agreement, which preceded the film, and all before RESO's first patrol in June 68!Jack
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
UJ, mini keyboard. In the absence of HS' s popular chronology, how about:
1962 Nassau
1964 Film
1968 SSBNs
1984 V-Force
1998 Tornado
On personalities like General Jack Ripper, the RAF had no personal reliability programme. Individuals were simply picked to do the job. Those that didn't come up to scratch were reassigned. There were at least two station commanders however that broke under the pressure. I am told these were in 1Gp and that 3Gp did not suffer that way.
Was the pressure the simple one of the nuclear weapons or the pressure brought on from the need to maintain QRA at 15 minutes, generate the main force with the first aircraft ready within 2 hrs and most within 4-5 hrs, all the time being watched by the C in C?
1962 Nassau
1964 Film
1968 SSBNs
1984 V-Force
1998 Tornado
On personalities like General Jack Ripper, the RAF had no personal reliability programme. Individuals were simply picked to do the job. Those that didn't come up to scratch were reassigned. There were at least two station commanders however that broke under the pressure. I am told these were in 1Gp and that 3Gp did not suffer that way.
Was the pressure the simple one of the nuclear weapons or the pressure brought on from the need to maintain QRA at 15 minutes, generate the main force with the first aircraft ready within 2 hrs and most within 4-5 hrs, all the time being watched by the C in C?
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Sad to see that the French Armée de l'air still has a solid airborne component, manned by Rafale and Mirage 2000N, with the ASMP missile (Mach 3, 100 km range, 100 m terminal accuracy... for 300 kT) under total national control (as the manufacture of it)
recceguy,
Excellent, if you want to deter Belgium...
Excellent, if you want to deter Belgium...
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recceguy,
Is it? Really?
How
Is it? Really?
How
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Proone, why are you denigrating the French?
I am just curious when provocative but unsupported statements are made.
I am just curious when provocative but unsupported statements are made.
I'm not denigrating the French as such, I just do not see the point in this day and age in short range tactical nuclear weapons.
Imagine if the UK DID have such an ability still, and say two GR4 squadrons had some sort of WE177 replacement, powered or unpowered, and were dedicated as such.
What difference would that make to the current UK or RAF capability other than making a number of aircraft unavailable for their current tasking?
Imagine if the UK DID have such an ability still, and say two GR4 squadrons had some sort of WE177 replacement, powered or unpowered, and were dedicated as such.
What difference would that make to the current UK or RAF capability other than making a number of aircraft unavailable for their current tasking?
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prOOne, thank you. The answer was mooted recently, in recently released documents but I can't recall where, that the French represented a wild card in the US/UK v USSR scenario and I suspect that that idea persists in today's reality too.
However I cannot envisage even small tactical first use and I am not convinced that Russia would either.
Of course the had, have?, a triad of systems.
However I cannot envisage even small tactical first use and I am not convinced that Russia would either.
Of course the had, have?, a triad of systems.