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Old 14th Jan 2015, 09:06
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ORAC
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Typhoons Need Midair Collision Avoidance System, Safety Officials Say

Typhoons Need Midair Collision Avoidance System, Safety Officials Say

LONDON – Military air safety officials have described as "unsustainable" a decision not to install an airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) on the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) fleet of Eurofighter Typhoons.

In its annual safety report from last August – made public on Jan. 13, the director general of the U.K. Military Aviation Authority (MAA), Air Marshal Richard Garwood, said that an airborne collision warning system for the Typhoon needed to be pursued with "great haste," particularly in light of the MAA’s findings in the midair collision of two Panavia Tornado GR4s in Scotland in July 2012. Three airmen were killed.

The MAA’s report on the crash criticized the U.K. defense ministry for "consistently deferring, reprogramming and reprioritizing the introduction of a collision warning system for the aircraft." The U.K. Tornado fleet is finally getting such a system, but only four years before the type exits service and after the loss of more than 40 lives in midair collisions alone since the Tornado’s introduction to service.

Garwood said that Defense Science and Technology Laboratory studies showed the Typhoon was potentially at a higher risk of midair collision because of its role and performance levels. The report says that the aircraft is perhaps the most likely – though improbable – of the U.K.’s fast jet aircraft to potentially collide with a commercial aircraft, and that under U.K. health and safety rules, any event that killed 50 people or more would have "adverse repercussions for the institution responsible – in this case, the government of the day."

Garwood says that he has informed Secretary of State for Defense Michael Fallon of his concerns, adding "ultimately, the Typhoon will be [in] service for many years and if the MoD [defense ministry] elects not to fit an ACAS, the decision will need to be well documented and the risk held at the highest levels of defense."

In addition, the report raises concerns that the F-35 Lightning II also does not have an ACAS. "We must also be clear on how this capability might be delivered on (F-35) Lightning II, which will provide a whole range of technical and JSF partner-related challenges to any potential program," Garwood writes.

The U.K. Airprox Board, which reports and advises on near misses between aircraft in British airspace, reports there were 14 incidents between U.K. military and commercial aircraft, one of which was reported as posing a real risk of collision.

Responding to the report, the U.K. defense ministry said it was acting on its comments and recommendations and that a concept phase for a collision warning system on the Typhoon was already underway, due for completion in April. "Funding to support full embodiment of the recommended system for the Typhoon is currently being assessed within the ABC [activity-based-costing] 15 financial approvals process," the ministry says, while such a system for the F-35 would be subject to lobbying for inclusion "at a suitable juncture within the JSF program." It adds that such a system would likely be U.K. unique and probably increase the project’s cost.

Major investments in collision avoidance systems for the U.K.’s helicopter fleet are already underway, with much of the front-line helicopter fleet due to be retrofitted by late 2017.

For the second year in a row, Garwood has also warned about the lack of suitably qualified and experienced personnel in aircraft engineering trades. The report also describes a psychological impact of crews coming back from Afghanistan who no longer have to deal with in-theater battlefield threats, but may take flying risks to seek what the report calls "inappropriate stimulation through their flying activities."

The report also alludes to the loss of the Airbus Zephyr pseudo satellite as being the subject of an MAA investigation, but details of when and where the incident occurred have been redacted. The U.K. defense ministry was testing the Zephyr in the winter in the Southern Hemisphere to prove the system’s ability to operate during shorter winter days.
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