UK Carrirer Qualification for F-35C

[ThinkTanker]

HH,

Look forward to your comments when you've had a chance to read it. As the Trident Alternatives Review showed, the Moscow Criterion is no longer the essence of deterrence. We are quite clear about that - though you could hold St Petersburg, Samra, Kazan, Omsk, Novosibirsk, Rostov-on-Don, Ekaterinburg and Volgograd at risk, which should be plenty to concentrate minds in the Kremlin.

Can you come up with a credible scenario where the UK is taking on the Russians alone, and where the US has explicitly stated that NATO Art V didn't apply (collapsing NATO in the process)?

TTr

[ThinkTanker]

Sandiego89, many thanks for your interest.

I seem to have lost my response to you in the ether somewhere - apologies. Take II:

I would wonder if the B61 is viable for release from US stores, or are you thinking UK built under licence? I am aware of the unique realtionship between the USA and UK, and the previously "shared" programs and the physics pacakges on the Trident, but I wonder if the political climate would be there for such sharing, and for the return to air dropped weapons.

Complete weapons cannot be transferred without breaking the NPT. However, design and non-nuclear components can be transferred, and the weapons would be built at AWE.

If your paper is addressing cost savings as a major factor, perhaps you should address RAF carriage of air dropped stores as well, unless you want this to be a UK Navy show only. RAF has more recent experience with such weapons.

Yes, it would be a role fit for all of the F-35Cs. IOC would first be from Marham (with reactivation of the WS3s in the HAS clutches), and then from the carriers after they had been reconstructed for CATOBAR operations.

Tomahawk may be worth talking about as well (SSN launched).

We've looked at Tomahawk, and it poses a couple of problems. First, there is a nuclear signalling problem - ie, in country X, Tomahawk and Tomahawk-N will look identical on radar. Second, the USN withdrew Tomahawk-N from the fleet in the early 1990s, and are now being withdrawn from use. It's a Block I/II missile, and there are issues about the warhead that do not arise with B61-12.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

ThinkTanker

We've looked at Tomahawk, and it poses a couple of problems. First, there is a nuclear signalling problem - ie, in country X, Tomahawk and Tomahawk-N will look identical on radar. Second, the USN withdrew Tomahawk-N from the fleet in the early 1990s, and are now being withdrawn from use. It's a Block I/II missile, and there are issues about the warhead that do not arise with B61-12.

Surely a nuclear armed F-35 looks the same on radar as a conventionally armed one. No?

Anyway - why do you think it sensible to replace a hardened platform (SSBN) dedicated to the deterrent role, with no ambiguity, with a long range delivery system that provides a very high probability of penetrating defences (SBLM), with gravity weapons dropped by a tactical aircraft?

The discussion here on the same topic may interest you and other readers.

The nuclear deterrent and reasons for its replacement (ARRSE)

[cobalt42]

Yes, it would be a role fit for all of the F-35Cs. IOC would first be from Marham (with reactivation of the WS3s in the HAS clutches), and then from the carriers after they had been reconstructed for CATOBAR operations.

Don't forget that the 'bomb shops' on the RFA's would also require 'significant' modification or a complete rebuild... not cheap.

[ThinkTanker]

Surely a nuclear armed F-35 looks the same on radar as a conventionally armed one. No?

Which is where declaratory policy comes in.

Anyway - why do you think it sensible to replace a hardened platform (SSBN) dedicated to the deterrent role, with no ambiguity, with a long range delivery system that provides a very high probability of penetrating defences (SBLM), with gravity weapons dropped by a tactical aircraft?

Simply, the cost of Successor is vast, and will consume 25-33% of the EP budget each year, every year, for 15 years. At a time when the procurement budget is under immense pressure moving away from single role platforms is good. The point about deterrence is whether it is sufficient to deter a nuclear aggressor - it's not the Moscow Criterion, as the TAR makes clear.

[ThinkTanker]

Not cheap, but not as expensive at Trident successor or through life costs. Would you care to hazard at guess at the cost of the RFA rework, cobalt42?

[cobalt42]

I'm not a Marine Architect... A former colleague in what was once ILS(N) was a Senior Stores Officer on on of them and he described the vaults as being in the same league as the BoE vaults.

Also, the 'Bomb Shops' on the carriers would need to be modified along the same lines...

Two carriers plus six RFA conversions? That's several hundreds of millions, as a guesstimate... for a very dubious tactical, not strategic, capability.

You mentioned the HAS vaults... what about the SSA? ...and the Forward Ops locations, e.g., Lossie...? And the 'Depot', not AWE? And the convoys? You can't send those things 'Next Day' by Yodel! Other distribution agents are available. The costs just keep going up... and up... and up..............

I look forward to having a look at the paper.

[ThinkTanker]

Thanks Cobalt42.

We've been told that the carrier conversion shouldn't be too complex, but won't be cheap (this is a BAES product, after all). How "not cheap" is not clear.

On the SSA, Marham first, and as JSF is now not going to Lossie, it would depend on where a second operating station was located. Marham's HASs actually could hold 100 weapons, and the SSA is said to be in good nick.

No-one is claiming that this will give Trident levels of capability - indeed, that is part of the point in providing a definite step down in line with our NPT obligations. The key driver, though, is to provide budgetary headroom for the conventional forces, which otherwise face a very grim outlook (especially the RN) out beyond 2030 to pay for Successor.

The question is does F-35C/B61-12 provide us with sufficient capability to take on states of concern - Iran, Pakistan (both sovereign UK bases and carrier), North Korea (carrier only) and potentially Saudi as well. We've modelled all of them, and run the rule over a target defended by SA-21/S-400 at brigade level, and like the old days with Chevaline through the Moscow ABM screen, we're confident that at least 1 and probably 2 50kt warheads gets to target under a reasonable worst case.

Thanks again,

TTr

[Archimedes]

TTr - under that model, how many weapons don't get to the target? And is it one weapon per aircraft?

[Not_a_boffin]

Are you or have you ever been a member of either UKIP or the Phoenix Think Tank? I ask because this looks exactly like a pop-quiz answer to the question "how are you going to pay for all the extra regiments, ships and aircraft that you're going to save / buy in your super-duper defence policy?" Not entirely convinced by the 25-33% of EP line for 15 years either. At current profile that would be £2.5-3Bn per year for a total of £37-45Bn, which is a tad over the programme costs I've seen.

Incidentally, the TAR does not make any statement about the "Moscow criteria" that I can find. It merely uses a methodology to compare alternatives, primarily because the cost of meeting the same capability for any other delivery system would skew the comparison from the off.

Your list of potential target states is all very well, but I can't quite see the UK taking any of them on alone. However the UK deterrent (as the TAR clearly says) is declared to NATO and adds to the uncertainty facing a potential foe. Given the life span of the system and the way intentions and capabilities can be seen (demonstrably) to change, that's a big gamble.

[ThinkTanker]

Archimedes,

TTr - under that model, how many weapons don't get to the target? And is it one weapon per aircraft?

78 or 79 of the 80 launched, with one or two weapons per aircraft, and assuming double targeting of each weapon by missiles with a Pk of 85%. No assumption is made on using an EMP to blind the radars- this is a conservative model, so all are assumed to airburst at 3900ft AGL to maximise the area of the 5psi pressure wave.

The RCS of the B61-12 is obviously not in the open source, so it is assumed that it is picked up by the GRAVESTONE at the time of launch. (This may well be wrong, but if it is, the benefit will likely be in favour of the attacker.)

N-a-B

Are you or have you ever been a member of either UKIP or the Phoenix Think Tank?

Ouch. Neither, Liberal Democrats and CentreForum.

For a total of £37-45Bn, which is a tad over the programme costs I've seen

I should be clearer on the numbers. A fuller explanation is here: We're deriving the capital costs from the £15-20bn (2005 prices) plus optimism bias based on the overruns of the first batch of Astute (+30.4%) for a range of £24.8 – 33.1 in 2014 prices.


HTH, happy to discuss.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Originally Posted by TT

Which is where declaratory policy comes in.

A what? Please explain?

[ThinkTanker]

WEBF,

A what? Please explain?

Telling people in advance how and when you'd use the nuclear force. Here's a RUSI paper on it: https://www.rusi.org/publications/wh...4BFD56421A39C/

Cheers,

TTr

[LowObservable]

Interesting. Have you run an alternative of Shornet/Growler + Storm Shadow-N?

Or ASMP-A, even?

[ThinkTanker]

LO,

Interesting. Have you run an alternative of Shornet/Growler + Storm Shadow-N?

Or ASMP-A, even?

Interesting question. In short, no, we haven't.

Tbh, the reason was cost, though data was also an issue with the Storm Shadow-N (e.g., the TAR tells us that a new cruise warhead would take 24 years, allegedly (TAR para 18 p. 6) but it isn't clear if this is SS-ER-N, a new weapon or something else.)

We wanted to leverage existing investments (F-35, B61-12) wherever possible to maximise the savings (ie, SHornet/Growler as well as JSF/Dave would be much more expensive). By using the existing investments, we also wanted to enhance the conventional force in the process (i.e., CATOBAR CVF, E-2D, C-2, 5 x Astute, 8 x MPA (P-8 costed) could be argued to be required for carrier nuclear strike, but would transform CVF conventional power projection).

Cheers,

TTr

[LowObservable]

Gotcha. In that instance F-35C is nuke-wired for B61-12, whereas I don't think Shornet is wired for anything.

[ThinkTanker]

Indeed, LO.

But at the moment neither Dave-A or Dave-C is wired for the nuclear mission either but the NATO DCA mission means that Dave-A will have to be. We've budgeted the full amount estimated for Dave-A conversion ($350m) for Dave-C avionics conversion to support B61-12 in case it doesn't happen, though this will probably be shared with NATO.

It would also provide a freebie to the USN if they wanted a B61-12 option on their Dave-Cs.

Cheers,

TTr

[Archimedes]

TTr, thanks for your reply; I should also have asked: how many aircraft are lost under the model?

[ThinkTanker]

Archimedes wrote:

TTr, thanks for your reply; I should also have asked: how many aircraft are lost under the model?

All have a viable route out, but I'm expecting a 25% loss rate. In policy terms as a one-off mission against an existential threat (and remember, this is against the most capable IADS without making assumptions about effect EW or defence suppression) UK declaratory policy would accept a 50% loss rate. How many V-Force crews actually expected to come back? Sobering stuff.

TTr

[Not_a_boffin]

As the Trident Alternatives Review showed, the Moscow Criterion is no longer the essence of deterrence. We are quite clear about that - though you could hold St Petersburg, Samra, Kazan, Omsk, Novosibirsk, Rostov-on-Don, Ekaterinburg and Volgograd at risk, which should be plenty to concentrate minds in the Kremlin.

I don't believe the TAR showed any such thing - as mentioned previously it did not compare actual capability, because the answer would have been a foregone conclusion. That is not the same as dropping the Moscow criterion. At least half those targets on your list would involve launching from the Baltic, E Med or Persian Gulf. Declaratory policy nonsense or not you don't think a potential nuclear launch platform would go unmolested do you? That's why carriers are not part of a strategic delivery capability.

Would it be fair to say that despite having been given the TAR as price of coalition, you guys really didn't like the answer and so have decided to change the question?