View Poll Results: Who was the most hopeless Defence Sec?
Duncan \"Manned aircraft are obsolete\" Sandys
14
13.86%
Denis \"TSR2\" Healey
31
30.69%
John \"CVS\" Nott
14
13.86%
Michael \"Ranting Nutter\" Portillo
13
12.87%
Geoff \"Of course we don\'t need FA2\" Hoon
29
28.71%
Voters: 101. This poll is closed
Which Defence Secretary was the worst?
Thread Starter
Which Defence Secretary was the worst?
Well, seeing as no-one likes them, I thought I'd carry out a little experiment. SC proudly presents the Top Five Defence Sec Poll!
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Would the early rise in votes for Sandys be becuase he took the RAF's toys away from them
I read an exceptionally good article on another website as to why Sandys was right in his decisions over the RAF. I shall try and post it here shortly- in a nutshell - army and navy were able to prove themsevles rather useful. RAF was scrabbling round for a role and failing miserably. sounds a lot like the situation today doesn't it
(stands backand takes cover from incoming attacks - led by many jaguar squadrons! )
I read an exceptionally good article on another website as to why Sandys was right in his decisions over the RAF. I shall try and post it here shortly- in a nutshell - army and navy were able to prove themsevles rather useful. RAF was scrabbling round for a role and failing miserably. sounds a lot like the situation today doesn't it
(stands backand takes cover from incoming attacks - led by many jaguar squadrons! )
Would the early rise in votes for Sandys be becuase he took the RAF's toys away from them
Arrrrr Jimlad, I'll see your
and raise you a 
.
Thread Starter
Hmmmm..interesting so far. But does the large vote for both Healey and Hoon reflect their policies or the posters' political preference? It's also a pity we can't post more than 5 options, or I'd have put up more candidates. I will not be voting, as the poster of the poll.
Personally I don't think Hoon is to blame for the Sea Harrier debacle, so I didn't vote for him.
Portillo wasn't in the job long, so didn't votes for him.
Sandys was a LONG time ago, our forces had to be cut due to our reduced role in world affairs.
Can I vote for both Healy and Nott?
Portillo wasn't in the job long, so didn't votes for him.
Sandys was a LONG time ago, our forces had to be cut due to our reduced role in world affairs.
Can I vote for both Healy and Nott?
I agree with WE, Hoon's just doing as he is told by Gordon Brown.
Then again, Healy was just doing as he was told by the Americans.
Could be worse, we might have Byers as Defence Secretary!
Then again, Healy was just doing as he was told by the Americans.
Could be worse, we might have Byers as Defence Secretary!
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Groundgripper. "Healey was just doing what he was told by the Americans"? Bollux. SAC was in trouble with the Convair B58 Hustler and was seriously interested in TSR2. I discovered this at SAC HQ in '72. Command HQs are much more influential in the USAF procurement process than in the RAF's. 
Last edited by Flatus Veteranus; 26th May 2002 at 19:16.
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That article
Ok - got this off an EZboard forum, the guy who wrote it is actually very knowledgable at his subject. I think it raises pertinent questions for today's planners.
As for the bitchfest - why not? Having just spent half an hour in the bar with a bunch of UAS types I am feeling not particularly well dispossesed (sp?) towards my light blue colleagues
(This is done in two parts due to length)
Duncan Sandys is a much-abused figure in British defense mythology yet most of the abuse heaped upon his head is grossly unjustified. In a very real sense he's been made to carry the can for a wide variety of sins that mostly predate his birth let alone his assumption of office.
Before looking at the decisions Sandys took. I think we have to try and look at the problems facing the UK as a whole. These can basically be summed up as "Imperial Overstretch", a term coined by Paul Kennedy and one that has peculiar relevence to the UK. The problem facing the UK defense establishment as a whole was that the functions which they were asked to fulfill far exceeded the resources that the country made available to them. The catch was that the resources that the country was already making to the defense establishment far exceeded its ability to support on a long-term basis. Put another way, the Government was making demands on the armed services that they would not fund and, worse, were grossly overestimating the capability that the funds they were making available would support.
This wasn't new; in essentials this ran back to before the First World War and British defense policy since the start of the 20th century had been to try and square a circle; to support defense commitments that were far out of proportion to the country's ability to fund. This had been done with varying success up to 1939 but post-WW2 had become impossible. In 1948 the Home Fleet was reduced to four destroyers; there were plenty more ships but there were not enough funds to provide them with crews or fuel. In that time-span the Government was selling ships for scrap because they needed the money to pay the daily operating bills for the Government. Just to make matters worse, the Government had inherited a bloated defense infrastructure that was intended to fight WW2. It was huge, expensive and totally obsolete.
In 1950-53 the UK had tried to mobilize in order to restructure its armed forces to fight in the Cold War. That mobilization was a disastrous failure that had to be bailed out by Uncle Sam. In the words of the Prophet "Something Had To Be Done". It was time for a radical rethink. This had been attempted three times in the period 1953-1957 but NONE of the efforts had achieved the necessary results. The primary reason was that the Defense Ministers had proved too weak and lacked the leadership to force the necessary changes through over the heads of the service chiefs.
In early 1957 MacMillan issued a new directive that stipulated British defense planning would now take place on a unified basis. Innocuous words but what they really meant was that the services would now be considered as part of a single coordinated defense policy. There would no longer be an Army Policy, an Air Force Policy and a Navy Policy. There would now be a Defense Policy with the execution of varying part of that policy sub-contracted to the service most suited to handling that particular aspect. All the armed services would be have to provide detailed justifications for their various capabilities in the context of the stipulated defense policy. Duncan Sandys was tasked with holding the investigations into that defense policy and making the appropriate policy decisions.
Thats all background. Its intended to show that there was much, much more to the 1957 Defense Review than just a decision to substitute missiles for bombers. That interpretation omits something like 95 percent of the White Paper. For example, a key part of the White Paper was the decision to abolish conscription. This was purely political and taken on the grounds that public pressure was making the retention of conscription in peacetime impossible. It was recognized that the end of conscription would drastically increase the manpower costs of the armed services and that economic constraints meant that this could only be overcome by cutting the manpower strength of the services. That alone was a major driver towards radical changes.
So what were the tasks of the armed services in the new regime? Basically they were:
A) Strategic (nuclear) attack on the USSR and other enemies
B) The Defense of the UK from direct attack
C) The defense of the sea lanes and supply routes of the UK
D) Participation in the NATO defense of Europe
E) The protection of British interests outside NATO
And so we begin.
As for the bitchfest - why not? Having just spent half an hour in the bar with a bunch of UAS types I am feeling not particularly well dispossesed (sp?) towards my light blue colleagues
(This is done in two parts due to length)
Duncan Sandys is a much-abused figure in British defense mythology yet most of the abuse heaped upon his head is grossly unjustified. In a very real sense he's been made to carry the can for a wide variety of sins that mostly predate his birth let alone his assumption of office.
Before looking at the decisions Sandys took. I think we have to try and look at the problems facing the UK as a whole. These can basically be summed up as "Imperial Overstretch", a term coined by Paul Kennedy and one that has peculiar relevence to the UK. The problem facing the UK defense establishment as a whole was that the functions which they were asked to fulfill far exceeded the resources that the country made available to them. The catch was that the resources that the country was already making to the defense establishment far exceeded its ability to support on a long-term basis. Put another way, the Government was making demands on the armed services that they would not fund and, worse, were grossly overestimating the capability that the funds they were making available would support.
This wasn't new; in essentials this ran back to before the First World War and British defense policy since the start of the 20th century had been to try and square a circle; to support defense commitments that were far out of proportion to the country's ability to fund. This had been done with varying success up to 1939 but post-WW2 had become impossible. In 1948 the Home Fleet was reduced to four destroyers; there were plenty more ships but there were not enough funds to provide them with crews or fuel. In that time-span the Government was selling ships for scrap because they needed the money to pay the daily operating bills for the Government. Just to make matters worse, the Government had inherited a bloated defense infrastructure that was intended to fight WW2. It was huge, expensive and totally obsolete.
In 1950-53 the UK had tried to mobilize in order to restructure its armed forces to fight in the Cold War. That mobilization was a disastrous failure that had to be bailed out by Uncle Sam. In the words of the Prophet "Something Had To Be Done". It was time for a radical rethink. This had been attempted three times in the period 1953-1957 but NONE of the efforts had achieved the necessary results. The primary reason was that the Defense Ministers had proved too weak and lacked the leadership to force the necessary changes through over the heads of the service chiefs.
In early 1957 MacMillan issued a new directive that stipulated British defense planning would now take place on a unified basis. Innocuous words but what they really meant was that the services would now be considered as part of a single coordinated defense policy. There would no longer be an Army Policy, an Air Force Policy and a Navy Policy. There would now be a Defense Policy with the execution of varying part of that policy sub-contracted to the service most suited to handling that particular aspect. All the armed services would be have to provide detailed justifications for their various capabilities in the context of the stipulated defense policy. Duncan Sandys was tasked with holding the investigations into that defense policy and making the appropriate policy decisions.
Thats all background. Its intended to show that there was much, much more to the 1957 Defense Review than just a decision to substitute missiles for bombers. That interpretation omits something like 95 percent of the White Paper. For example, a key part of the White Paper was the decision to abolish conscription. This was purely political and taken on the grounds that public pressure was making the retention of conscription in peacetime impossible. It was recognized that the end of conscription would drastically increase the manpower costs of the armed services and that economic constraints meant that this could only be overcome by cutting the manpower strength of the services. That alone was a major driver towards radical changes.
So what were the tasks of the armed services in the new regime? Basically they were:
A) Strategic (nuclear) attack on the USSR and other enemies
B) The Defense of the UK from direct attack
C) The defense of the sea lanes and supply routes of the UK
D) Participation in the NATO defense of Europe
E) The protection of British interests outside NATO
And so we begin.
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The Royal Navy was first on the chopping block. What happened next was undoubtedly Mountbatten's finest hour and what he achieved in late 1956 and early 1957 gains him the honor of being the finest professional head of the Royal Navy of the 20th century. Mountbatten had the wisdom and common sense to realize that times had changes and those who did not go with the tide would be swept away by it. Mountbatten looked through the defense policy, picked out those areas that the Royal Navy could do (and could make a good case should do) and offered to scrap everything else. Those roles were firstly protecting the sealanes to the UK - primarily against submarines but also against long range air attack. The first required frigates, the second carriers. Then he took the "defending UK interests outside NATO. Mountbatten pointed out there were only two ways of doing this. One was station army garrisons at every point of possible contention. the other was to use a mobile mix of carriers and amphibious troops to intervene where trouble threatened. He pointed out that such trouble did not flare up without warning but took time to come to the boil. Therefore good intelligence was also needed. Finally Mountbatten made a grab for the strategic attack role. He started by schmoozing Rickover into handing over details of the US nuclear submarine and Polaris programs. From that he was able to show Duncan Sandys that the stategic strike role could be taken over by nuclear-powered submarines carrying the new Polaris missile. Everything else not needed for this program; the cruisers, the battleships, the huge force of old, ineffective escorts etc etc would be scrapped. The results would be a much smaller, leaner but more effective Royal Navy. Sandys was converted. He had gone into the process bitterly opposed to the RN carrier fleet and naval forces in general. He came out an enthusiastic convert and supporter of the Navy.
Next was the Army. Montgomery was the antithesis of Mountbatten. He had nothing but contempt for Sandys and no regard whatsoever for the new orientation of defense. His contribution was that the Army knew what it had to do, was the way he wanted it, and that was the end of the matter so there. His policy documents made no concession to the political and financial realities that were breaking nor to the requirements of the Cold War. What little strategic vision they possessed was basically that World War III would take up where WW2 had ended. The rest of the Army would go about its business garrisoning various parts of the Empire. The result was the institution of the trip-wire strategy. On the basis of the Army's own submissions, it could not make a reasonable contribution to defending Europe on the basis of the resources available. Therefore its function was cut back to a trip wire that would hold the line just long enough to allow a final attempt to persuade the enemy to abandon the attack or face nuclear weapons. Even that required the legions to return home. There would be no British troops available for far-flung garrisons. What wasn't in Europe would be the UK garrison
That left the RAF. This is the only part of The Way Forward (the official name of the 1957 Sandys White Paper) that gets talked about, primarily due to the effects of the RAF propaganda machine. Again, some background is necessary. There was no doubt that the defense of the UK against air attack would fall to the RAF but how were they best to do that? Here its necessary to remember that the UK aircraft industry had a long history of delivering aircraft that were years late and never performed as well as they were supposed to. Furthermore all the investment made in the aircraft industry since 1945 had been wasted on a clutch of competing prototypes that had always been that little bit too late to be viable. There was no prospect of that changing unless the aircraft industry was totally reorganized. The RAF showed no signs of recognizng these limitations; their proposals rested on more fighters, more bombers. Duncan Sandys had been primed by his meetings with the Navy. He knew the key question to ask. Missiles.
Could the fighter defenses proposed fend off ballistic missile attack? No. Could the fighters get off the ground fast enough to avoid being destroyed by ballistic missile attack? No. Could fighters respond fast enough against bombers to prevent them launching long-range supersonic cruise missiles? No. Any good reason why we should build fighters then? Errrrrr - they look nice? Sandys knew that the USSR was investing heavily in ballistic missiles of various types targeted on Europe. He knew that they were building new generations of missile-carrying bombers. The fighters operated by the RAF and those supposed to enetr service were great for fighting the Battle of Britain but that was of no significance. they couldn't protect the UK against the most likely threats so what was the point of having them. On the other hand missiles could. They could respond instantly and offered the chance of defending against missiles. Sandys was well aware of what was going on in the USA and where the fabulous Nike system was going. there was a threat, missiles could meet it, fighters couldn't. Bye-bye fighters. There would, of course be an interim gap so that was filled by an interim fighter. Hello Lightning. A side benefit was that none of the proposed missiles would have been built by the existing aircraft industry (some of the names were the same but the design teams were not). So they didn't have a demonstrated record of failure.
The RAF wanted to keep strategic attack with bombers. Could bombers, existing or planned penetrate the missile-based air defenses of the USSR projected for the late 1960s (assuming they were at least equal to Nike)? No. Bye-bye bombers. Replace them with missiles. If the land-based missiles failed go with the Navy's Polaris. As an interim there was this thing called Skybolt.
So viewed in the context of the times, Sandys had the right answers to the right questions. In reality he did a good job. When he left office in 1959 he had placed Britain's defense forces on a secure strategic, administrative and financial base. If, as the question presumes, his White Paper had been abandoned, the results would almost certainly have been the total collapse of the UK armed forces and the bankruptcy of the UK. The British just couldn't have gone on the way they were where the defense forces were consuming more than 10 percent of GNP (and not getting a proportionate return on that money).
Next was the Army. Montgomery was the antithesis of Mountbatten. He had nothing but contempt for Sandys and no regard whatsoever for the new orientation of defense. His contribution was that the Army knew what it had to do, was the way he wanted it, and that was the end of the matter so there. His policy documents made no concession to the political and financial realities that were breaking nor to the requirements of the Cold War. What little strategic vision they possessed was basically that World War III would take up where WW2 had ended. The rest of the Army would go about its business garrisoning various parts of the Empire. The result was the institution of the trip-wire strategy. On the basis of the Army's own submissions, it could not make a reasonable contribution to defending Europe on the basis of the resources available. Therefore its function was cut back to a trip wire that would hold the line just long enough to allow a final attempt to persuade the enemy to abandon the attack or face nuclear weapons. Even that required the legions to return home. There would be no British troops available for far-flung garrisons. What wasn't in Europe would be the UK garrison
That left the RAF. This is the only part of The Way Forward (the official name of the 1957 Sandys White Paper) that gets talked about, primarily due to the effects of the RAF propaganda machine. Again, some background is necessary. There was no doubt that the defense of the UK against air attack would fall to the RAF but how were they best to do that? Here its necessary to remember that the UK aircraft industry had a long history of delivering aircraft that were years late and never performed as well as they were supposed to. Furthermore all the investment made in the aircraft industry since 1945 had been wasted on a clutch of competing prototypes that had always been that little bit too late to be viable. There was no prospect of that changing unless the aircraft industry was totally reorganized. The RAF showed no signs of recognizng these limitations; their proposals rested on more fighters, more bombers. Duncan Sandys had been primed by his meetings with the Navy. He knew the key question to ask. Missiles.
Could the fighter defenses proposed fend off ballistic missile attack? No. Could the fighters get off the ground fast enough to avoid being destroyed by ballistic missile attack? No. Could fighters respond fast enough against bombers to prevent them launching long-range supersonic cruise missiles? No. Any good reason why we should build fighters then? Errrrrr - they look nice? Sandys knew that the USSR was investing heavily in ballistic missiles of various types targeted on Europe. He knew that they were building new generations of missile-carrying bombers. The fighters operated by the RAF and those supposed to enetr service were great for fighting the Battle of Britain but that was of no significance. they couldn't protect the UK against the most likely threats so what was the point of having them. On the other hand missiles could. They could respond instantly and offered the chance of defending against missiles. Sandys was well aware of what was going on in the USA and where the fabulous Nike system was going. there was a threat, missiles could meet it, fighters couldn't. Bye-bye fighters. There would, of course be an interim gap so that was filled by an interim fighter. Hello Lightning. A side benefit was that none of the proposed missiles would have been built by the existing aircraft industry (some of the names were the same but the design teams were not). So they didn't have a demonstrated record of failure.
The RAF wanted to keep strategic attack with bombers. Could bombers, existing or planned penetrate the missile-based air defenses of the USSR projected for the late 1960s (assuming they were at least equal to Nike)? No. Bye-bye bombers. Replace them with missiles. If the land-based missiles failed go with the Navy's Polaris. As an interim there was this thing called Skybolt.
So viewed in the context of the times, Sandys had the right answers to the right questions. In reality he did a good job. When he left office in 1959 he had placed Britain's defense forces on a secure strategic, administrative and financial base. If, as the question presumes, his White Paper had been abandoned, the results would almost certainly have been the total collapse of the UK armed forces and the bankruptcy of the UK. The British just couldn't have gone on the way they were where the defense forces were consuming more than 10 percent of GNP (and not getting a proportionate return on that money).
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But did he not forget one or two little thingies? Like in peacetime if you pick up a strange plot on radar and cannot identify it, you cannot just blast off a missile or 6. The airlines and their passengers might get upset. And when the Sov massed armour comes at you, you cannot just nuke them (unless you want to get it back in spades!) You have first to try to deal with them at a conventional level. And in 50s/60s technology missiles were toally incapable against mobile targets. So, having disbanded "N" Hunter FGA squadrons they had to be expensively reprovided with Jaguars and, later, Harriers. Meanwhile, the Ark was commissioned, served out her life without doing anything useful (except making an amusing film and hosting endless cocktail parties) and was eventually paid off and her aircraft disembarked and put to work. Sandys was dazzled by that idiot Mountbatten. "Everyone loves a Lord".
I have not the gall to announce myself as an "expert on air warfare". But by Gosh I have more tax-paying time in than most Ppruners. And I will not willingly pay for a new Imperial role, which damaged our economy from the 1870s onwards, nor the trappings that go with it. And carriers and their associated hangers-on head that category.
I have not the gall to announce myself as an "expert on air warfare". But by Gosh I have more tax-paying time in than most Ppruners. And I will not willingly pay for a new Imperial role, which damaged our economy from the 1870s onwards, nor the trappings that go with it. And carriers and their associated hangers-on head that category.
Wot - no Fred Mulley in the list?!
Oh, and those who voted for (against?) Denis Healey might like to heed the views of the senior military officers who led the campaign in Borneo against the Indonesian expansionists. A campaign in which the UK and her allies were completely successful (victorious is such a non-PC word - as well as excessively redolent of the grey funnel line...). So far as aforementioned SMOs were concerned, they could not have wished for a more competent, knowledgeable Defence Minister.
Oh, and those who voted for (against?) Denis Healey might like to heed the views of the senior military officers who led the campaign in Borneo against the Indonesian expansionists. A campaign in which the UK and her allies were completely successful (victorious is such a non-PC word - as well as excessively redolent of the grey funnel line...). So far as aforementioned SMOs were concerned, they could not have wished for a more competent, knowledgeable Defence Minister.
....haven't you forgotten Fred Mulley...well I guess he was pretty forgettable.
....wasn't he the one that fell asleep whilst sat next to HRH at an RAF Flypast (forget which one now)
(Bollox, T_and_B just beat me to it!!)
....wasn't he the one that fell asleep whilst sat next to HRH at an RAF Flypast (forget which one now)
(Bollox, T_and_B just beat me to it!!)
Last edited by Wycombe; 26th May 2002 at 20:10.
Sorry, but that article is simplistic and wrong-headed tosh.
The solution to 'Imperial Overstretch' which you applaud was to disband UK AD squadrons and the fast jet FGA units (mainly Venoms and Hunters) facing the Bloc in Germany, (arguably the most relevant Cold War capabilities) and to cancel all future manned fighter and bomber aircraft programmes after the Lightning (TSR2 squeaked through) while leaving a bloated Navy virtually unscathed.
Top decision!
And another example of frantic money saving efforts disguised as sensible military policy.....
The solution to 'Imperial Overstretch' which you applaud was to disband UK AD squadrons and the fast jet FGA units (mainly Venoms and Hunters) facing the Bloc in Germany, (arguably the most relevant Cold War capabilities) and to cancel all future manned fighter and bomber aircraft programmes after the Lightning (TSR2 squeaked through) while leaving a bloated Navy virtually unscathed.
Top decision!
And another example of frantic money saving efforts disguised as sensible military policy.....
Wycombe
It was at HM Quoons silver jumbilee flypast at Finningly in 1975, I was the no 3 Vulcan, and still bear the scars.
Nothing matters very much, most things don't matter at all.
It was at HM Quoons silver jumbilee flypast at Finningly in 1975, I was the no 3 Vulcan, and still bear the scars.
Nothing matters very much, most things don't matter at all.
I am annoyed that this thread has turned into another light blue versus dark blue bitching contest. Jimlad, you should know better!
The reason why Duncan Sandys is criticised so much is that he predicted the end of manned aircraft, cancelling scores of aircraft projects (not all of them RAF ones) and left the UK without a decent fighter aircraft for decades. He had similar effects on other aircraft types too.
Remember, this is primarily an aviation forum.
The reason why Duncan Sandys is criticised so much is that he predicted the end of manned aircraft, cancelling scores of aircraft projects (not all of them RAF ones) and left the UK without a decent fighter aircraft for decades. He had similar effects on other aircraft types too.
Remember, this is primarily an aviation forum.
Webf,
You're partly right. The real problem with Sandys was that he attempted to bring about the end of manned combat aircraft when the technology of the day was inadequate to provide any replacement (let alone a viable one).
He was also completely oblivious to the need to retain conventional war-fighting capabilities, and slashed conventional forces in the UK and Europe to an extent that made trip-wire the only possible doctrine. Pre Sandys, there were sufficient fighter bombers in RAFG to make the idea of a conventional conflict bearable, afterwards, nukes were the only possible response to any Warpac push.
He was also completely in thrall to Mountbatten and a group of highly partial advisers who ensured that the force reductions made were unbalanced and unhelpful.
The contention that "the UK aircraft industry had a long history of delivering aircraft that were years late and never performed as well as they were supposed to." and that "Furthermore all the investment made in the aircraft industry since 1945 had been wasted on a clutch of competing prototypes that had always been that little bit too late to be viable." is risible. In the Venom, for example, the RAF had a better ground attack fighter than the F-84 (and an aircraft which bettered the MiG-17 and Sabre in some regimes) while the Hunter, Canberra and Vulcan were all 'world beaters', which all gave an excellent return on the investment made in them. In a previous thread I was taken to task for 'dissing' the Javelin, which was apparently a very much better aircraft than has often been said.
The contentions about the inadequacy and vulnerability of manned fighters are also well off-base.
But I'm sorry the UAS mates upset you, Jimlad, perhaps they could have helped you spell the word 'disposed' and explained the difference between it and 'disposessed'?
Flatus
Concisely put, mate, and 'bang on'.
You're partly right. The real problem with Sandys was that he attempted to bring about the end of manned combat aircraft when the technology of the day was inadequate to provide any replacement (let alone a viable one).
He was also completely oblivious to the need to retain conventional war-fighting capabilities, and slashed conventional forces in the UK and Europe to an extent that made trip-wire the only possible doctrine. Pre Sandys, there were sufficient fighter bombers in RAFG to make the idea of a conventional conflict bearable, afterwards, nukes were the only possible response to any Warpac push.
He was also completely in thrall to Mountbatten and a group of highly partial advisers who ensured that the force reductions made were unbalanced and unhelpful.
The contention that "the UK aircraft industry had a long history of delivering aircraft that were years late and never performed as well as they were supposed to." and that "Furthermore all the investment made in the aircraft industry since 1945 had been wasted on a clutch of competing prototypes that had always been that little bit too late to be viable." is risible. In the Venom, for example, the RAF had a better ground attack fighter than the F-84 (and an aircraft which bettered the MiG-17 and Sabre in some regimes) while the Hunter, Canberra and Vulcan were all 'world beaters', which all gave an excellent return on the investment made in them. In a previous thread I was taken to task for 'dissing' the Javelin, which was apparently a very much better aircraft than has often been said.
The contentions about the inadequacy and vulnerability of manned fighters are also well off-base.
But I'm sorry the UAS mates upset you, Jimlad, perhaps they could have helped you spell the word 'disposed' and explained the difference between it and 'disposessed'?
Flatus
Concisely put, mate, and 'bang on'.
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None of the wonder solutions involved in Borneo though, was there Thud_and_Blunder? Ghurkas storm in on Blackburn Beverleys. The grey funnel line turns up with a clapped out WWII carrier converted to commando ship and fill the sky with Westland Whirlwinds, the RAF turn up with Hunter FGAs firing 30mm Adens and all the while the RN museum ship HMS Cavalier was moored out in Brunei Bay serving as command centre for the whole operation. Yet despite the lack of any proper weaponry or equipment, everything still went wonderfully well. Oh and never forget the Royal Marines making a 'seaborne' landing at Limbang after converting a gravel lighter into a landing craft. Heavy casualties but they hacked it. Of course. I suppose it must have had something to do with the quality of the manpower rather than the quality of the equipment we were made to do it with, thanks to Mr. Plonker the Defence Sectretary.
No, Duncan Sandys it has to be - for his services, not only to all three of the Armed (?) Forces but to the British aircraft industry in general. Instead of his acres of hi-tech wonder rockets the RAF staggered on with the poor old V force and its prehistoric bombing system, the radar core of which had seen actual service over the Third Reich, right up to the Falklands conflict. I'm amazed we ever managed to find the bloody Belgrano let alone sink it.
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Through difficulties to the cinema
No, Duncan Sandys it has to be - for his services, not only to all three of the Armed (?) Forces but to the British aircraft industry in general. Instead of his acres of hi-tech wonder rockets the RAF staggered on with the poor old V force and its prehistoric bombing system, the radar core of which had seen actual service over the Third Reich, right up to the Falklands conflict. I'm amazed we ever managed to find the bloody Belgrano let alone sink it.
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dispossed/ dispossed - its all the same to me after a few pints
RN - it was heavily cut post Sandys, they lost most of the trash that had been hanging round after the war, all the reserve units went, the battleships went and frankly a lot of the hangers on went. To say that the RN was left bloated is frankly untrue - it suffered major cuts. It seems to me that people are more jealous that mountbatten got his case together than any rational reason, judging by some of the comments against him.
The problem on this board is that some people seem to nurse an irrational hatred of all things carrier related and that is something I fail to understand. In my simple matelot like mind I see carriers as nothing more than a floating airbase pure and simple. Yes they carry a lot of crew but thats a generational thing - they were designed inthe 1960's so reflect the practices of the times. If you look at modern warship design crew numbers have been cut considerably since the war- the new Type 45 class will have a crew of 150- 180.
Secondly Carriers are great to provide air defence for the fleet - not just themselves. Yes theoretically the RAF could provide assests for A/D but it would take a massive effort to constantly keep an A/D CAP over the fleet + AEW + tanker support. I'd hazard a guess that if we were doing another falklands style op then it would tie up most of our resources just to provide a two plane CAP 24/7 with AEW cover. Carriers allow you to go away and do that self sufficiently - we don't need outside support as we take it with us, we can do AEw so your precious sentrys can stay at Waddington and we can handle our own air defence. The best bit is that we can get GR7/9's oboard for bombing as well.
Yes I'm sure the Jaguar could deploy easily, but that assumes that a base will always be available. In my opinion the events post 9/11 show that bases won't always be there and that investing in carriers will ensure a decent power projection capability that is not tied to a foreign airfield. Its far more flexible as the enemy don't know where it is and it can move close to other hot spots while the Jag force is waiting for political clearance to go to another country.
Don't get me wrong - carriers are not the be all / end all of aviation but they perfrom a very useful fire fighting role by getting a complete air package to an area very quickly without reference to foreign powers. They can hold the line till the Jags / Tornadoes turn up.
The sooner some of the dinosaurs on this board realise carriers are here to stay and that they are a joint force asset the better.
RN - it was heavily cut post Sandys, they lost most of the trash that had been hanging round after the war, all the reserve units went, the battleships went and frankly a lot of the hangers on went. To say that the RN was left bloated is frankly untrue - it suffered major cuts. It seems to me that people are more jealous that mountbatten got his case together than any rational reason, judging by some of the comments against him.
The problem on this board is that some people seem to nurse an irrational hatred of all things carrier related and that is something I fail to understand. In my simple matelot like mind I see carriers as nothing more than a floating airbase pure and simple. Yes they carry a lot of crew but thats a generational thing - they were designed inthe 1960's so reflect the practices of the times. If you look at modern warship design crew numbers have been cut considerably since the war- the new Type 45 class will have a crew of 150- 180.
Secondly Carriers are great to provide air defence for the fleet - not just themselves. Yes theoretically the RAF could provide assests for A/D but it would take a massive effort to constantly keep an A/D CAP over the fleet + AEW + tanker support. I'd hazard a guess that if we were doing another falklands style op then it would tie up most of our resources just to provide a two plane CAP 24/7 with AEW cover. Carriers allow you to go away and do that self sufficiently - we don't need outside support as we take it with us, we can do AEw so your precious sentrys can stay at Waddington and we can handle our own air defence. The best bit is that we can get GR7/9's oboard for bombing as well.
Yes I'm sure the Jaguar could deploy easily, but that assumes that a base will always be available. In my opinion the events post 9/11 show that bases won't always be there and that investing in carriers will ensure a decent power projection capability that is not tied to a foreign airfield. Its far more flexible as the enemy don't know where it is and it can move close to other hot spots while the Jag force is waiting for political clearance to go to another country.
Don't get me wrong - carriers are not the be all / end all of aviation but they perfrom a very useful fire fighting role by getting a complete air package to an area very quickly without reference to foreign powers. They can hold the line till the Jags / Tornadoes turn up.
The sooner some of the dinosaurs on this board realise carriers are here to stay and that they are a joint force asset the better.
Sandys was inconsistent. Retaining the carriers was not in keeping with his ideas on defence. In fact, his decisions set the Navy up for Healy's decision in 1966 to scrap the big carriers.
Keep "Carriers are great" comments on the relevent threads please!
Blacksheep, you are right. I once read a book about cancelled aircraft projects, and Sandys scrapped more than most. We lead the world, and our politicians threw it away. Shame on them!!
Keep "Carriers are great" comments on the relevent threads please!
Blacksheep, you are right. I once read a book about cancelled aircraft projects, and Sandys scrapped more than most. We lead the world, and our politicians threw it away. Shame on them!!
Sandys cuts got rid of 'most of the trash that had been hanging round after the war' - so not really painful, and the Battleships (didn't PoW and Repulse and Renown show that the day of the Battleship was well and truly dead, anyway?) and the reserves. The RN was left leaner than before, probably more efficient, and with a committment to its future. As you argue, Mountbatten turned the 57 Defence WP to the RN's advantage.
By bloated, I was referring to the scores of frigates and destroyers which were necessary only to support an Empire role which was clearly disappearing. The Navy in '57 was larger than its Cold War responsibilities and commitments required.
The Air Force was left much smaller, and has never, since 57, been more than a token force, capable of doing no more than buying time before inevitable nuclear escalation in the Cold War, and of delivering Armageddon to a handful of Soviet cities.
If money was no object, and were we spending 6% of GDP on defence I'd be an enthusiastic supporter of carriers. I might even admit that a European carrier force might be a useful tool, if spreading the costs that way would work. But in these times of extreme budgetary pressure, they just do not cut it as a cost effective solution. Moreover, in these times, when military operations require political and international supports, the basing flexibility they appear to offer is often illusory. If you can't get basing in a neighbouring nation, you probably can't conduct the op anyway. If you want to keep SHar and carriers you need to come up with an alternative 'big ticket' cut - like Trident or all UK armour or all fixed wing land-based offensive support and attack FJs.
By bloated, I was referring to the scores of frigates and destroyers which were necessary only to support an Empire role which was clearly disappearing. The Navy in '57 was larger than its Cold War responsibilities and commitments required.
The Air Force was left much smaller, and has never, since 57, been more than a token force, capable of doing no more than buying time before inevitable nuclear escalation in the Cold War, and of delivering Armageddon to a handful of Soviet cities.
If money was no object, and were we spending 6% of GDP on defence I'd be an enthusiastic supporter of carriers. I might even admit that a European carrier force might be a useful tool, if spreading the costs that way would work. But in these times of extreme budgetary pressure, they just do not cut it as a cost effective solution. Moreover, in these times, when military operations require political and international supports, the basing flexibility they appear to offer is often illusory. If you can't get basing in a neighbouring nation, you probably can't conduct the op anyway. If you want to keep SHar and carriers you need to come up with an alternative 'big ticket' cut - like Trident or all UK armour or all fixed wing land-based offensive support and attack FJs.