End looms for US Air Force's 'Warthog' ground-attack jet
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Even at the USAF's most optimistic F-35A plans, there were still always going to be fewer F-35As than F-16s+A-10s.
So if retiring the A-10s meant being able to hang on to more F-16s, then there would still be no need for any "empty squadrons".
So if retiring the A-10s meant being able to hang on to more F-16s, then there would still be no need for any "empty squadrons".
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Originally Posted by typerated
If I remember correctly the USAF was keen on getting a batch of B models for CAS - seems that plan got dropped.
Almost a decade ago I saw a proposal (from a think-tank, I believe, or maybe some congresscritter - not the USAF) for the USAF to buy F-35Bs to replace the A-10s, to provide the capability to operate from austere/damaged airfields.
This was immediately "shot down" by the USAF headquarters - and I haven't heard anyone with any real influence even mention the scheme in over 6 years.
Thanks GK,
I just found this - USAF: F-35B cannot generate enough sorties to replace A-10 - 5/16/2012 - Flight Global
interesting to read the comments about sortie rate WRT the B and A models
also found this from the marine corps times - 2004
The Air Force will buy some of the Marine Corps variant of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighters that are able to take off and land on short and rough airfields, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. John Jumper announced Thursday at the Air Force Association?s Air Warfare Symposium at Lake Buena Vista, Fla.
Jumper said the decision to buy the short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing variant of the JSF was made as a result of the continued need to provide close-air support to the Army.
Jumper noted that some airfields in Iraq and Afghanistan are often in too rough to support jets such as the F-16 and the other variant of the Joint Strike Fighter that the Air Force will buy, the conventional-takeoff-and-landing version.
The Marine version, the STOVL JSF, can land and take off on roads or rough landing strips.
Jumper said it is yet to be decided how many the STOVL F-35s Air Force will buy and that the Air Force will continue to buy the conventional takeoff and landing JSF.
Development of training and tactics for the STOVL version of the JSF will be in conjunction with the Marine Corps, Jumper said.
I just found this - USAF: F-35B cannot generate enough sorties to replace A-10 - 5/16/2012 - Flight Global
interesting to read the comments about sortie rate WRT the B and A models
also found this from the marine corps times - 2004
The Air Force will buy some of the Marine Corps variant of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighters that are able to take off and land on short and rough airfields, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. John Jumper announced Thursday at the Air Force Association?s Air Warfare Symposium at Lake Buena Vista, Fla.
Jumper said the decision to buy the short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing variant of the JSF was made as a result of the continued need to provide close-air support to the Army.
Jumper noted that some airfields in Iraq and Afghanistan are often in too rough to support jets such as the F-16 and the other variant of the Joint Strike Fighter that the Air Force will buy, the conventional-takeoff-and-landing version.
The Marine version, the STOVL JSF, can land and take off on roads or rough landing strips.
Jumper said it is yet to be decided how many the STOVL F-35s Air Force will buy and that the Air Force will continue to buy the conventional takeoff and landing JSF.
Development of training and tactics for the STOVL version of the JSF will be in conjunction with the Marine Corps, Jumper said.
So, Gen. Jumper gets the job of announcing STOVL developments.
Is this an extreme case of nominative determinism, or does the USAF top brass have a sense of humour after all?
Will the later reduction of the F-35 buy be announced by Gen. Shafted, or Gen. Thank-F#ck-For-That ?
Is this an extreme case of nominative determinism, or does the USAF top brass have a sense of humour after all?
Will the later reduction of the F-35 buy be announced by Gen. Shafted, or Gen. Thank-F#ck-For-That ?
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A-10 Fire Hog
What of the alternate application for the A-10, proposed a few years ago, as air tankers for fire fighting?
Hardly a technically competent summary, but an overview:A10 Firehog
Hardly a technically competent summary, but an overview:A10 Firehog
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Thanks for that, typerated - it seems that there was a more welcoming attitude by the USAF than I had remembered.
Within the first article we find:
So the remaining question is - when did they drop the idea?
By at least 2009 the USAF was back to "F-35A only", as shown in this May 2009 CBO study:
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/fil...hterforces.pdf
Within the first article we find:
But while the USAF had at one time considered the variant as a potential replacement for the A-10, given the fiscal constraints the services faces and the need to generate more sorties, the USAF will not buy the F-35B, he says.
By at least 2009 the USAF was back to "F-35A only", as shown in this May 2009 CBO study:
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/fil...hterforces.pdf
I think it hovered somewhere between an intention and a definite plan.
I wonder if the USAF really wanted them or there was a bit of pressure to help out the Marine buy? If the USAF had gone ahead you would assume they would have been at the expense of the A-10? At least in the long term.
I do think the USAF is heading for a procurement train crash as it will need lots of finance to buy a large quantity of F-35s along with KC-135 and T-38 replacements in the next few years. Money that seems not to be there. Irrespective of if they keep A-10s or not.
I wonder if the USAF really wanted them or there was a bit of pressure to help out the Marine buy? If the USAF had gone ahead you would assume they would have been at the expense of the A-10? At least in the long term.
I do think the USAF is heading for a procurement train crash as it will need lots of finance to buy a large quantity of F-35s along with KC-135 and T-38 replacements in the next few years. Money that seems not to be there. Irrespective of if they keep A-10s or not.
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The House approved a Fiscal 2015 defense authorization bill of more than $590 billion on Thursday that largely ignores White House concerns, with a vote of 325-98.
The House bill moves funds from operations and maintenance accounts to keep the A-10s flying.
However, White House officials said they would recommend President Barack Obama veto the legislation if it continued to reject proposed cuts and reductions such as divestiture of USAF’s A-10 fleet.
The Senate is now marking up its version of the legislation.
It will be interesting to see how this pans out.
Bob C
The House bill moves funds from operations and maintenance accounts to keep the A-10s flying.
However, White House officials said they would recommend President Barack Obama veto the legislation if it continued to reject proposed cuts and reductions such as divestiture of USAF’s A-10 fleet.
The Senate is now marking up its version of the legislation.
It will be interesting to see how this pans out.
Bob C
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Hmmm... large but "hollow" (reduced maintenance/training/supply/operations) military - or slightly smaller but "robust" (properly maintained/trained/supplied/operational) military?
I know which one I'd rather have - the smaller one with the excess equipment properly "mothballed" for quick re-activation.
I know which one I'd rather have - the smaller one with the excess equipment properly "mothballed" for quick re-activation.
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Today, there are two arguments for cutting the A-10.
The first argument from the Air Force is that in an era of shrinking budgets and pared-down ambitions, the military needs a more flexible, multi-role aircraft to do more jobs—not an airplane that's perfect for a smaller number of them. But The F-35 doesn't have the capability to linger over a battlefield for a substantial time, nor does it have the ability to take ground-fire yet stay airborne. The A-10 is capable of flying with half a wing, one tail fin, one elevator, and one engine torn off. It’s also cheaper to fly and can fly more frequent missions than the aircraft that the Air Force proposes to replace it with: the F-35. It's a classic case of a dedicated tool versus a jack-of-all-trades tool; for any specific job, a dedicated tool is better. The main theoretical advantage of a jack-of-all-trades tool is cost savings, but when the marginal cost of an F-35 is ten times the marginal cost of an A-10, that argument goes out the window.
The second argument against the A-10 is that the close air support mission, once provided almost exclusively by manned aircraft like the Warthog, can now be served more effectively by drones like the MQ-9 Reaper and the Army’s MQ-1C Grey Eagle. Drones can stay on station for 14 hours or more with a full load of weapons—the Reaper can carry up to 3,000 pounds of missiles and laser-guided bombs. While the A-10 can carry more than four times that payload in addition to over a thousand rounds of 30-millimeter ammunition, it can only loiter overhead for about two hours before it needs to refuel. Drones fill in some of the gaps left by the F-35 in terms of capabilities, but they don’t begin to match what the Air Force currently gets from the A-10. That appears to be a shortfall that the military leadership is willing to live with in order to keep the F-35 program alive.
Besides, drones aren't exactly the end all be all. They are fairly easy to shoot down if they are close enough to provide CAS and because they are so popular, best believe everyone is working on tech to shoot them down easily.
14 hours of time on target with weapons means nothing if you are shot down in the first 30 minutes.
Anything that can do CAS (Close Air Support) competently is, by its nature, vulnerable to SAM's and air defense-- A-10's, Apaches or Super Tucanos. The things that make a plane resistant to air defenses also make them bad for CAS. That is not an argument for giving up on CAS; that is a demonstration of the importance of coordinated strikes. That's what top cover and SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) is for.
CAS is one thing that a set of human eyeballs on the scene is good for, for precise aiming and responding to situations without the lag or limited perspective of remote sensors. While I agree a lot of it can be done with drones, the part that cannot be is precisely the part that the F-35 can't do either.
CAS – the immediate, extremely accurate and persistent fire support and observation for troops directly engaged in combat-is the most effective way air power can impact the land battle and therefore the war. Also known as "MAS" (Maneuver Air Support), its most important characteristic is at the "people" level: Air and ground commanders--at all levels--must want it to occur, and the air and ground operators performing CAS must "live among each other's armpits" in order to understand each other's tactical needs, achieve split second implicit communication and innovate ever new and increasingly powerful ways of combining air and ground assets. Wherever cooperation this close has occurred, CAS has been overwhelmingly successful in saving the lives of troops in contact with the enemy, greatly reducing the "friendly fire" events that devastate units at the moral, mental and physical levels, and achieving operational victory.
If the Air Force succeeds in "divesting" the A-10 fleet, the existing cadre of dedicated, highly skilled CAS experts will be dispersed, leaving only partially trained multi-mission pilots with weak ties to the ground forces: that is to say, pilots who will see CAS as a secondary mission and who will necessarily perform it from inappropriate altitudes and distances, at inappropriate speeds, from inappropriate aircraft. Because of their inherent vulnerability, maneuverability and other limitations, the helicopters in the Army and Marine Corps, the Short Take Off and Vertical Landing jets of the Marines Corps and "fast mover" fighters and bombers of the Air Force cannot replicate the capabilities of the A-10. In particular, the Air Force's and the Marines' new multi-role jet, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, cannot match the A-10 on virtually any the primary characteristics of an effective close air support aircraft; for CAS it is a major step backward.
Bob C
The first argument from the Air Force is that in an era of shrinking budgets and pared-down ambitions, the military needs a more flexible, multi-role aircraft to do more jobs—not an airplane that's perfect for a smaller number of them. But The F-35 doesn't have the capability to linger over a battlefield for a substantial time, nor does it have the ability to take ground-fire yet stay airborne. The A-10 is capable of flying with half a wing, one tail fin, one elevator, and one engine torn off. It’s also cheaper to fly and can fly more frequent missions than the aircraft that the Air Force proposes to replace it with: the F-35. It's a classic case of a dedicated tool versus a jack-of-all-trades tool; for any specific job, a dedicated tool is better. The main theoretical advantage of a jack-of-all-trades tool is cost savings, but when the marginal cost of an F-35 is ten times the marginal cost of an A-10, that argument goes out the window.
The second argument against the A-10 is that the close air support mission, once provided almost exclusively by manned aircraft like the Warthog, can now be served more effectively by drones like the MQ-9 Reaper and the Army’s MQ-1C Grey Eagle. Drones can stay on station for 14 hours or more with a full load of weapons—the Reaper can carry up to 3,000 pounds of missiles and laser-guided bombs. While the A-10 can carry more than four times that payload in addition to over a thousand rounds of 30-millimeter ammunition, it can only loiter overhead for about two hours before it needs to refuel. Drones fill in some of the gaps left by the F-35 in terms of capabilities, but they don’t begin to match what the Air Force currently gets from the A-10. That appears to be a shortfall that the military leadership is willing to live with in order to keep the F-35 program alive.
Besides, drones aren't exactly the end all be all. They are fairly easy to shoot down if they are close enough to provide CAS and because they are so popular, best believe everyone is working on tech to shoot them down easily.
14 hours of time on target with weapons means nothing if you are shot down in the first 30 minutes.
Anything that can do CAS (Close Air Support) competently is, by its nature, vulnerable to SAM's and air defense-- A-10's, Apaches or Super Tucanos. The things that make a plane resistant to air defenses also make them bad for CAS. That is not an argument for giving up on CAS; that is a demonstration of the importance of coordinated strikes. That's what top cover and SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) is for.
CAS is one thing that a set of human eyeballs on the scene is good for, for precise aiming and responding to situations without the lag or limited perspective of remote sensors. While I agree a lot of it can be done with drones, the part that cannot be is precisely the part that the F-35 can't do either.
CAS – the immediate, extremely accurate and persistent fire support and observation for troops directly engaged in combat-is the most effective way air power can impact the land battle and therefore the war. Also known as "MAS" (Maneuver Air Support), its most important characteristic is at the "people" level: Air and ground commanders--at all levels--must want it to occur, and the air and ground operators performing CAS must "live among each other's armpits" in order to understand each other's tactical needs, achieve split second implicit communication and innovate ever new and increasingly powerful ways of combining air and ground assets. Wherever cooperation this close has occurred, CAS has been overwhelmingly successful in saving the lives of troops in contact with the enemy, greatly reducing the "friendly fire" events that devastate units at the moral, mental and physical levels, and achieving operational victory.
If the Air Force succeeds in "divesting" the A-10 fleet, the existing cadre of dedicated, highly skilled CAS experts will be dispersed, leaving only partially trained multi-mission pilots with weak ties to the ground forces: that is to say, pilots who will see CAS as a secondary mission and who will necessarily perform it from inappropriate altitudes and distances, at inappropriate speeds, from inappropriate aircraft. Because of their inherent vulnerability, maneuverability and other limitations, the helicopters in the Army and Marine Corps, the Short Take Off and Vertical Landing jets of the Marines Corps and "fast mover" fighters and bombers of the Air Force cannot replicate the capabilities of the A-10. In particular, the Air Force's and the Marines' new multi-role jet, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, cannot match the A-10 on virtually any the primary characteristics of an effective close air support aircraft; for CAS it is a major step backward.
Bob C
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well said - it's a pity but few Air Force SO's (of any country) think like that - its all "per ardua ad astra" stuff - eyes to the clear skies not scruffing around just above the trenches............
