Tornado GR.1 auto-land question...
A few points on issues raised, now I have the time.
A RHAG engagement by an F3 in 1992(?) at 180 kts snapped the cable at the drum. The free end twanged off toward the a/c at what were later calculated to be near supersonic speeds. There were witness marks just aft of the cockpit, which nearly spoiled the crew's whole day. Fortunately most of the energy was absorbed by it striking the fin, which Cat 4'd the a/c. I was both the SFSO for the BoI, and the dumbf#ck knobbled to do the first flight of the a/c once they'd changed the fin. I seem to remember landing "Zulu everything" (and there were 15 Zulu codes). Moral of story - don't exceed RHAG limit speeds in Tornados.
I was appointed Sqn Fatigue Officer when the first FI restrictions came in (1990?). After some beavering around in the books I mentioned to the chaps, amongst other things, that setting wingsweeps to other than the big '3' did not 'count' for FI. Not that I recommended it, oh no; that would be naughty
Strangely, we managed to fly the same aggressive programme that year as previous - lots of Affil and ACT - but with a lower FI count. Bang on what Group had asked for, in fact. Funny old thing. The Sqn Boss was a very happy man.
A RHAG engagement by an F3 in 1992(?) at 180 kts snapped the cable at the drum. The free end twanged off toward the a/c at what were later calculated to be near supersonic speeds. There were witness marks just aft of the cockpit, which nearly spoiled the crew's whole day. Fortunately most of the energy was absorbed by it striking the fin, which Cat 4'd the a/c. I was both the SFSO for the BoI, and the dumbf#ck knobbled to do the first flight of the a/c once they'd changed the fin. I seem to remember landing "Zulu everything" (and there were 15 Zulu codes). Moral of story - don't exceed RHAG limit speeds in Tornados.
I was appointed Sqn Fatigue Officer when the first FI restrictions came in (1990?). After some beavering around in the books I mentioned to the chaps, amongst other things, that setting wingsweeps to other than the big '3' did not 'count' for FI. Not that I recommended it, oh no; that would be naughty
Strangely, we managed to fly the same aggressive programme that year as previous - lots of Affil and ACT - but with a lower FI count. Bang on what Group had asked for, in fact. Funny old thing. The Sqn Boss was a very happy man.
That's a curious attitude towards fatigue m8.
A GR1 took a BAK-12 at Alconbury (I think it was a -12 @ ALC) and stretched the hook.
A/c stopped somewhat quickly.
A GR1 took a BAK-12 at Alconbury (I think it was a -12 @ ALC) and stretched the hook.
A/c stopped somewhat quickly.
some interesting thought here.
is it possible however that it maybe too simplistic to say aws could not have been a factor in preventing the accident described? if aws had been taught to be relied upon unless you were really sure you knew better, then perhaps the selection and accident might not have happened. it'll never be know what the intent of the sweep selection was, but with a more ingrained, trained reliance on aws in most cases, perhaps the selection would not have been made?
ps i really hope fox3 is joking about the squadron approach to fatigue above.
is it possible however that it maybe too simplistic to say aws could not have been a factor in preventing the accident described? if aws had been taught to be relied upon unless you were really sure you knew better, then perhaps the selection and accident might not have happened. it'll never be know what the intent of the sweep selection was, but with a more ingrained, trained reliance on aws in most cases, perhaps the selection would not have been made?
ps i really hope fox3 is joking about the squadron approach to fatigue above.
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Fox 3
I have attended RHAG Engagements above 180 Knots where the cable has not broken. The age and amount of engagements on the cable could be a factor. For example, last year we had a tape and cable snap at 145 Knots but the tape (which snapped first) was 6 weeks away from being reversed which is done at the 2 year point of it's 4 year life and had 32 engagement units out of a maximum of 64. Incidentally the tape connector with about 10 feet of cable (approx 30kg) were found 580 feet away!
The stretched hook at Alconbury was possibly caused by a 1 1/4 inch cable, we use (1 1/8 inch cables for Tornado / Typhoon / F15) and it is probable that the BAK 12 was set for worst case scenario within the aircraft fleet which would have been a fully tooled F111 high speed take off abort.
I have attended RHAG Engagements above 180 Knots where the cable has not broken. The age and amount of engagements on the cable could be a factor. For example, last year we had a tape and cable snap at 145 Knots but the tape (which snapped first) was 6 weeks away from being reversed which is done at the 2 year point of it's 4 year life and had 32 engagement units out of a maximum of 64. Incidentally the tape connector with about 10 feet of cable (approx 30kg) were found 580 feet away!
The stretched hook at Alconbury was possibly caused by a 1 1/4 inch cable, we use (1 1/8 inch cables for Tornado / Typhoon / F15) and it is probable that the BAK 12 was set for worst case scenario within the aircraft fleet which would have been a fully tooled F111 high speed take off abort.
I took the approach end at Marham mid-90s just after a new RHAG had been installed. It didn't go quite to plan as it just paid out with no retardation until a rather dramatic stop. The cable didn't break but in places it looked more like wire wool and according to the tower there were some rather impressive catherine-wheel like sparks.
It was all a bit of a surprise in the cockpit as one of us had just muttered 'guess we missed it' before the sudden 'ugghhh' moment and the abrupt lift and descent of the nosewheel.
The aircraft was fine and the hook looked fine too but they changed it anyway after advice from the DA.
It was all a bit of a surprise in the cockpit as one of us had just muttered 'guess we missed it' before the sudden 'ugghhh' moment and the abrupt lift and descent of the nosewheel.
The aircraft was fine and the hook looked fine too but they changed it anyway after advice from the DA.
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Just this once
I never heard of that one but I would guess that there was no water in the Brake Units because if it had been a mechanical failure on one side you would have departed the runway in pretty spectacular fashion!
I never heard of that one but I would guess that there was no water in the Brake Units because if it had been a mechanical failure on one side you would have departed the runway in pretty spectacular fashion!
F3 fatigue. It's a long time ago now, so memory may fail me at points.
The intial calcs were based on FI counter readings, sortie code and sortie length. My job was to summarise these for Joe Bloggs aircrew and offer 'advice' on how FI could be managed. The calcs were rather crude, so for example one could suffer a high FI coding by doing ACT and landing after 20 mins, but less by landing after 30 mins. The advice thus consisted of stuff like "Do a practice emergency such as a SE PAR at the end to ensure landing after 30 mins".
Were we 'cooking the books?'. Well, by ensuring we didn't fall foul of the highest FI 'penalties', our average FI would have been lower than the boffins perhaps intended.
I did not fly ACT in 35 wing. I don't think anybody did. Some may have flown routine PIs in 35 wing.
I didn't lie about sortie code. A small minority may have done so occasionally.
I did not sharp or soft pencil any sortie lengths. I was probably in a minority here, but that had been going on for ages beforehand to meet other Group targets before FI ever arrived.
I did ensure my sortie codes and sortie lengths minimised the FI usage. Were those practice emergencies unnecessary? Who knows. I know that when I experienced real emergencies like SE & hydraulic failures etc, these passed off without incident and the practice would have had something to do with that.
Did we overuse the 'real' FI which caused the subsequent restrictions? Probably, a bit. Did the Sqn maintain operational effectiveness better than by obeying the FI 'rules' would have allowed? My Sqn execs though so, and we were at war 6 months later - everybody was bloody glad of the 'extra' LL Affil and ACT training at that point.
Lastly, could the 'correct' FI have been calculated after the fact by analysing the Sqn auth sheets/log books with a better model? Yes. There was nothing dishonest here. I regard it as the same as avoiding 'unnecessary' tax.
The intial calcs were based on FI counter readings, sortie code and sortie length. My job was to summarise these for Joe Bloggs aircrew and offer 'advice' on how FI could be managed. The calcs were rather crude, so for example one could suffer a high FI coding by doing ACT and landing after 20 mins, but less by landing after 30 mins. The advice thus consisted of stuff like "Do a practice emergency such as a SE PAR at the end to ensure landing after 30 mins".
Were we 'cooking the books?'. Well, by ensuring we didn't fall foul of the highest FI 'penalties', our average FI would have been lower than the boffins perhaps intended.
I did not fly ACT in 35 wing. I don't think anybody did. Some may have flown routine PIs in 35 wing.
I didn't lie about sortie code. A small minority may have done so occasionally.
I did not sharp or soft pencil any sortie lengths. I was probably in a minority here, but that had been going on for ages beforehand to meet other Group targets before FI ever arrived.
I did ensure my sortie codes and sortie lengths minimised the FI usage. Were those practice emergencies unnecessary? Who knows. I know that when I experienced real emergencies like SE & hydraulic failures etc, these passed off without incident and the practice would have had something to do with that.
Did we overuse the 'real' FI which caused the subsequent restrictions? Probably, a bit. Did the Sqn maintain operational effectiveness better than by obeying the FI 'rules' would have allowed? My Sqn execs though so, and we were at war 6 months later - everybody was bloody glad of the 'extra' LL Affil and ACT training at that point.
Lastly, could the 'correct' FI have been calculated after the fact by analysing the Sqn auth sheets/log books with a better model? Yes. There was nothing dishonest here. I regard it as the same as avoiding 'unnecessary' tax.
Last edited by Fox3WheresMyBanana; 3rd Nov 2013 at 13:20.
