Risk of Being Shot Down as Battle of Britain Pilot - Same Odds...?
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Danny42C
Question for you that hopefully you can answer.
I have read before that the Polish got a high number of kills because they
got closer to the enemy before opening fire.
Was / Is this true and was it clearly known at the time that this was why they
got good kill rates, as opposed to history being written after the event ?
Did you ever fly / meet with the Polish fighter pilots ?
Question for you that hopefully you can answer.
I have read before that the Polish got a high number of kills because they
got closer to the enemy before opening fire.
Was / Is this true and was it clearly known at the time that this was why they
got good kill rates, as opposed to history being written after the event ?
Did you ever fly / meet with the Polish fighter pilots ?
Mk 1
That theory doesn't take into account the changes the Germans made
to the weapons used and that they didn't target the fuselage in case they
detonated the bomb load.
In addition, they targeted the wing fuel tanks which it was said caused
an instant fire and or explosion. So those who made it back with a heap
of holes in the wing might have given a distorted view.
But of course they didn't know that.
That theory doesn't take into account the changes the Germans made
to the weapons used and that they didn't target the fuselage in case they
detonated the bomb load.
In addition, they targeted the wing fuel tanks which it was said caused
an instant fire and or explosion. So those who made it back with a heap
of holes in the wing might have given a distorted view.
But of course they didn't know that.
After a search I found this:
During WWII, Allied bomber losses were high, so high that the British Air Ministry undertook a rigorous analysis in hopes of finding a solution. Their engineers set out to examine every bomber they could, gathering data on each bullet hole. After analyzing the results, engineers decided to reinforce the areas that had the highest concentrations of holes with armor plating.
It didn’t work.
Perplexed, the engineers assumed that the extra plating had made the planes too heavy, and that the difficulty in handling the planes was offsetting the protection of the armor plating.
Enter Abraham Wald.
Wald, a mathematician, suggested that they simply put extra armor plating where the bullet holes weren’t. The idea was simple: if the planes are returning with bullet holes, obviously those areas can be struck without causing the planes to crash. The planes that weren’t returning, Wald theorized, are the ones that are getting hit in different areas.
The engineers’ error was so significant, statisticians decided to name it: Survivorship Bias (the tendency to include only successes in statistical analysis).
From: Solving problems of WWII bombers | MacStartup
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Should anyone have an interest in the statistics of pilot and aircraft losses during the conflict I highly recommend Williamson Murray book "Luftwaffe".
Re BoB he says "60% of the British pilots lost were experienced aircrew, while replacements were coming from OTUs. Losses reached the point where aircrew were transferred directly from Bomber Command and cut the OTU course in half in order to get pilots out to the fighter squadrons."
At this distance we have little understanding of the loss rates, which were truly prodigious. German aircraft losses as of initial strength for the period May - September 1940 were,
Single engine fighters 57%
Twin engine fighters x94%
Bombers xxxxxxxxxxxx65%
Dive bombers xxxxxxxx50%
Transport xxxxxxxxxxx43%
Aircrew survival rates for Bomber Command 1939 - 1945 are eye watering, and you can understand their grievances re recognition.
Killed on operations xxxxxxxxxxx51%
Killed in crashes England xxxxxxx9%
Seriously injured in crashes xxxxx3%
Prisoners of war (some injured) 12%
Shot down but evaded capture x1%
Survived unharmed xxxxxxxxxxx24%
Re BoB he says "60% of the British pilots lost were experienced aircrew, while replacements were coming from OTUs. Losses reached the point where aircrew were transferred directly from Bomber Command and cut the OTU course in half in order to get pilots out to the fighter squadrons."
At this distance we have little understanding of the loss rates, which were truly prodigious. German aircraft losses as of initial strength for the period May - September 1940 were,
Single engine fighters 57%
Twin engine fighters x94%
Bombers xxxxxxxxxxxx65%
Dive bombers xxxxxxxx50%
Transport xxxxxxxxxxx43%
Aircrew survival rates for Bomber Command 1939 - 1945 are eye watering, and you can understand their grievances re recognition.
Killed on operations xxxxxxxxxxx51%
Killed in crashes England xxxxxxx9%
Seriously injured in crashes xxxxx3%
Prisoners of war (some injured) 12%
Shot down but evaded capture x1%
Survived unharmed xxxxxxxxxxx24%
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brian finally some figures that show the incredible carnage of it all.
you need at least one more statistic to make the figures useful.
what was the death rate during training?
you need both ab initio training as a figure and subsequent operational preparation training as a figure.
as a historical perspective my uncle was a wellington bomber pilot. had a few successful missions under the belt in and around the italian campaign.
when the brits went all out to kill the U-boat menace in the atlantic the wellington crews practised night intercepts off europa point gibralta against a naval pinnace. evidently the searchlight in the wellie nose was controlled by a morse key on the glare shield. uncle was one of the first pilots in this training and one night in the practise attack run, leaning forward to key the light he unknowingly applied forward control pressure and in the darkness flew the wellie into the sea. all but the two rear crew were killed on impact.
deaths during training was a horrendous figure. that needs to be bought to light as well because the ww2 lessons still colour flight training today.
you need at least one more statistic to make the figures useful.
what was the death rate during training?
you need both ab initio training as a figure and subsequent operational preparation training as a figure.
as a historical perspective my uncle was a wellington bomber pilot. had a few successful missions under the belt in and around the italian campaign.
when the brits went all out to kill the U-boat menace in the atlantic the wellington crews practised night intercepts off europa point gibralta against a naval pinnace. evidently the searchlight in the wellie nose was controlled by a morse key on the glare shield. uncle was one of the first pilots in this training and one night in the practise attack run, leaning forward to key the light he unknowingly applied forward control pressure and in the darkness flew the wellie into the sea. all but the two rear crew were killed on impact.
deaths during training was a horrendous figure. that needs to be bought to light as well because the ww2 lessons still colour flight training today.
Last edited by dubbleyew eight; 27th Aug 2013 at 01:36.
what was the death rate during training?
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Our deputy course commander put the lost rate at 50% and he was right too. One of the first to go was in a Vulcan.
Leon, not as many Lanc hours as you but still had three near misses - out the astrodome, fuel starvation, and pilot error. To some extent all 3 were pilot error - same pilot.
Last edited by Pontius Navigator; 27th Aug 2013 at 18:01.
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In the days of the Sea Vixen it was reckoned that an FAA squadron would lose two crews per commission of the embarked carrier (two years). Naval aviation was a pretty high-risk career choice in the 50s and 60s.
A girlfriend of mine had lost her father to a Sea Vixen crash in the early 60s. When she told her mum she was stepping out with a baby pilot it was made clear that she was not to see me again. She married a seaman officer who made flag rank
A girlfriend of mine had lost her father to a Sea Vixen crash in the early 60s. When she told her mum she was stepping out with a baby pilot it was made clear that she was not to see me again. She married a seaman officer who made flag rank
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500N,
Sorry for delay in reply, broadband trouble. I never had any fighter experience, being posted out East in '42 (where there were no Spits) straight from 57 (Spit) OTU, Hawarden (things like that happened a lot then).
Obviously, the closer the range, the better your chances of hits - provided your prey would stay still and let you ! I would suppose that he would be taking violent evasive action as you came in close, whereas you might catch him less reactive if you opened fire at 250 yds, as I think we were taught.
("Screwball" Beurling attributed his many successes to "think what deflection you need, then double it"). This was really good advice !
There is also the point that extra time spent in closing the range was more time for your attacker to be drawing a bead on you.
I met a lot of Polish pilots during the war and after (for many stayed on in the RAF): they were splendid chaps, but only flew with the odd one who turned up on a RAF unit. For myself, I would tend to doubt that there was much overall difference between the score-rates of various nationalities. Luck paid such an overwhelming part, in any case.
Cheers, Danny.
Sorry for delay in reply, broadband trouble. I never had any fighter experience, being posted out East in '42 (where there were no Spits) straight from 57 (Spit) OTU, Hawarden (things like that happened a lot then).
Obviously, the closer the range, the better your chances of hits - provided your prey would stay still and let you ! I would suppose that he would be taking violent evasive action as you came in close, whereas you might catch him less reactive if you opened fire at 250 yds, as I think we were taught.
("Screwball" Beurling attributed his many successes to "think what deflection you need, then double it"). This was really good advice !
There is also the point that extra time spent in closing the range was more time for your attacker to be drawing a bead on you.
I met a lot of Polish pilots during the war and after (for many stayed on in the RAF): they were splendid chaps, but only flew with the odd one who turned up on a RAF unit. For myself, I would tend to doubt that there was much overall difference between the score-rates of various nationalities. Luck paid such an overwhelming part, in any case.
Cheers, Danny.
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Danny
"("Screwball" Beurling attributed his many successes to "think what deflection you need, then double it"). This was really good advice !"
I use the same theory when shooting ducks and Geese,
that always look like they are flying sower than they are !
Which brings me to another question, more to do with Bomber gunners.
I have heard a couple of times that an Australian taught Aerial gunnery
to Bomber gunners during WWII and he used the "Black Duck theory
of shooting (or gunnery",
This equates to his history of shooting Black ducks and having to
give them plenty of lead like you mentioned deflection.
I have never found a reference to it so just thought I'd ask if you
- or anyone else on this thread - had heard of it.
Anyway, thanks for your time.
"("Screwball" Beurling attributed his many successes to "think what deflection you need, then double it"). This was really good advice !"
I use the same theory when shooting ducks and Geese,
that always look like they are flying sower than they are !
Which brings me to another question, more to do with Bomber gunners.
I have heard a couple of times that an Australian taught Aerial gunnery
to Bomber gunners during WWII and he used the "Black Duck theory
of shooting (or gunnery",
This equates to his history of shooting Black ducks and having to
give them plenty of lead like you mentioned deflection.
I have never found a reference to it so just thought I'd ask if you
- or anyone else on this thread - had heard of it.
Anyway, thanks for your time.
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I can recall reading somewhere(possibly in an RAF Airpower article) that 10000 aircrew were killed as a result of non combat causes during the war.
When you say 10,000 it's a number. I have the telegrams and associated stuff that go with it, every one of them was a personal loss.
Stalin said something along the lines of 'The loss of a million men is a statistic, the loss of one man is a tragedy.'
In 1942 some data was calculated of the percentage chance of survival of one and two tours on various types of RAF aircraft.
Best rate was the Catalina 77% one tour and 60% two tours
Worst torpedo bomber 17% and 3%
For heavy and medium bombers the %'s were 44% and 19%
Best rate was the Catalina 77% one tour and 60% two tours
Worst torpedo bomber 17% and 3%
For heavy and medium bombers the %'s were 44% and 19%
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Unusually thoughtful for a man who is thought to have been responsible for the deaths of between 4 and 10 'statistics
Kill 100 men and you're a mass muderer.
Kill a million men and you're a great leader.
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thing:
What Stalin actually said - according to Stephen Goranson who has researched this quote - when talking about a famine in the Ukraine was;
"If only one man dies of hunger that is a tragedy. If millions die, that's only statistics."
As Simeon Strunsky so astutely observed;
"Famous remarks are very seldom quoted correctly."
What Stalin actually said - according to Stephen Goranson who has researched this quote - when talking about a famine in the Ukraine was;
"If only one man dies of hunger that is a tragedy. If millions die, that's only statistics."
As Simeon Strunsky so astutely observed;
"Famous remarks are very seldom quoted correctly."
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Aircrew survival rates for Bomber Command 1939 - 1945 are eye watering, and you can understand their grievances re recognition.
Killed on operations xxxxxxxxxxx51%
Killed in crashes England xxxxxxx9%
Seriously injured in crashes xxxxx3%
Prisoners of war (some injured) 12%
Shot down but evaded capture x1%
Survived unharmed xxxxxxxxxxx24%
Killed on operations xxxxxxxxxxx51%
Killed in crashes England xxxxxxx9%
Seriously injured in crashes xxxxx3%
Prisoners of war (some injured) 12%
Shot down but evaded capture x1%
Survived unharmed xxxxxxxxxxx24%
The Most Dangerous Enemy by Stephen Bungay has excellent research into the causes of aircraft losses on both sides during the first phase of the battle and gives good insight into the problems that Fighter Command had in the later phases (I haven't got my copy to hand, but here are some of the conclusions from memory).
You were more likely to survive if you were flying a Spitfire than a Hurricane, the main reason for this (besides the Spitfire's better performance), was the fact that a shell from low muzzle velocity cannon on the Bf 109E tended to explode on contact with the skin of the Spitfire fuselage and would not normally kill the pilot, while on the Hurricane, it would penetrate all the way to the armoured plate behind the pilot where it would explode and the armour wouldn't always save the pilot. The other problem the Hurricane had was it very easily caught fire due to its method of construction and the location of the wing fuel tanks. What would be a few random holes in a Spitfire would result in the loss of the airframe if it was a Hurricane. The only thing that the Hurricane had in its favour was the majority of the Luftwaffe fighter pilots had great distain for the aircraft and got careless when engaging them, normally then to suffer when the Hurricane pilots got the better of them in a turning fight.
In the first month of the battle, the biggest cause of lost RAF fighter airframes and fatal aircrew losses was flying accidents (around 25%), one of the major reasons for this was Dowding's attempt to build up a night fighting capability in the command using single engine fighters.
The major problem in late August through to mid September was caused by Dowding having to rotate Squadrons into 11 Group to replace units that were burnt out and required a break. Dowding left it to the Group commanders to sort out who went where and in the case of the Squadrons from 10 and 13 Groups, Saul and Brand sent Squadron that had some knowledge of what was happening in 11 Group's area and they got good kill / loss ratios. The Squadrons sent by 12 Group, totally different story, they still used close formation Vic's and Area Fighting tactics and suffered heavy losses to bounces by Bf 109's for very few kills (66 Sqn's first day of combat on 7th September 1940 resulted in five lost aircraft for zero kills. Likewise 616 Squadron lost half their strength in a few days for very few kills). It was during this period (first two weeks of September) that the Luftwaffe got some of their best kill loss ratios.
The 303 Squadron boys are a special case, as technically they were the most combat experienced unit to enter the battle when they did. Most of the Squadron's officers had been Squadron or flight commanders in the Polish Air Force pre war, they had seen combat against the Luftwaffe in Sept 1939 and May/June 1940 and thus knew what worked and what didn't (i.e. Area Fighting tactics) before they entered the battle in late Aug 1940.
You were more likely to survive if you were flying a Spitfire than a Hurricane, the main reason for this (besides the Spitfire's better performance), was the fact that a shell from low muzzle velocity cannon on the Bf 109E tended to explode on contact with the skin of the Spitfire fuselage and would not normally kill the pilot, while on the Hurricane, it would penetrate all the way to the armoured plate behind the pilot where it would explode and the armour wouldn't always save the pilot. The other problem the Hurricane had was it very easily caught fire due to its method of construction and the location of the wing fuel tanks. What would be a few random holes in a Spitfire would result in the loss of the airframe if it was a Hurricane. The only thing that the Hurricane had in its favour was the majority of the Luftwaffe fighter pilots had great distain for the aircraft and got careless when engaging them, normally then to suffer when the Hurricane pilots got the better of them in a turning fight.
In the first month of the battle, the biggest cause of lost RAF fighter airframes and fatal aircrew losses was flying accidents (around 25%), one of the major reasons for this was Dowding's attempt to build up a night fighting capability in the command using single engine fighters.
The major problem in late August through to mid September was caused by Dowding having to rotate Squadrons into 11 Group to replace units that were burnt out and required a break. Dowding left it to the Group commanders to sort out who went where and in the case of the Squadrons from 10 and 13 Groups, Saul and Brand sent Squadron that had some knowledge of what was happening in 11 Group's area and they got good kill / loss ratios. The Squadrons sent by 12 Group, totally different story, they still used close formation Vic's and Area Fighting tactics and suffered heavy losses to bounces by Bf 109's for very few kills (66 Sqn's first day of combat on 7th September 1940 resulted in five lost aircraft for zero kills. Likewise 616 Squadron lost half their strength in a few days for very few kills). It was during this period (first two weeks of September) that the Luftwaffe got some of their best kill loss ratios.
The 303 Squadron boys are a special case, as technically they were the most combat experienced unit to enter the battle when they did. Most of the Squadron's officers had been Squadron or flight commanders in the Polish Air Force pre war, they had seen combat against the Luftwaffe in Sept 1939 and May/June 1940 and thus knew what worked and what didn't (i.e. Area Fighting tactics) before they entered the battle in late Aug 1940.
Last edited by MAINJAFAD; 30th Aug 2013 at 23:57.
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caiman27, the figures given are for the entire duration of the war. As you say the loss rates varied from time to time, and particular raids. One night good, the very next horrendous. You can draw your own conclusions from the tables produced by the Air Ministry War Room (Statistical Section) in PRO AIR 22/203, War Room Manual of Bomber Command Ops 1939 - 1945.
The first figure is the number of aircraft present for duty on frontline squadrons as of January for the particular year, and the figure in parenthesis is the number written off for that year.
xxxxxxxxxxxx1941 xxxx1942xxxxxxx 1943xxxxxxx 1944
Wellington 275 (463) 374 (743) x 186 (328) x 15 xx (22)
Mosquito xxxxxxxxxxxxx 5 x(30) xx 34 x (62) x116 x(223)
Stirling xxxxx 7 x(51) x 52 (228) x 93 x (411) 134 xx (77)
Halifax xxxxxx3 x(38) xx46 (249) 195 xx(838) 307 x (902)
Lancaster xxxxxxxxxxxx 20 (202) 256 (1,112) 652 (1,978)
The first figure is the number of aircraft present for duty on frontline squadrons as of January for the particular year, and the figure in parenthesis is the number written off for that year.
xxxxxxxxxxxx1941 xxxx1942xxxxxxx 1943xxxxxxx 1944
Wellington 275 (463) 374 (743) x 186 (328) x 15 xx (22)
Mosquito xxxxxxxxxxxxx 5 x(30) xx 34 x (62) x116 x(223)
Stirling xxxxx 7 x(51) x 52 (228) x 93 x (411) 134 xx (77)
Halifax xxxxxx3 x(38) xx46 (249) 195 xx(838) 307 x (902)
Lancaster xxxxxxxxxxxx 20 (202) 256 (1,112) 652 (1,978)
Statistics like photo’s never lie. Please forgive the throw away comment. Loss rates and scores are all relative to numerous variables. The theatre of ops, the time of ops, the time of development. As such in total agreement with dubblyeyew eight.
BOB. As all were newbies at the start, apart from the BOF boys who were very war weary at this time, and given the poor development of tactics at the start everyone was in with the same chances. Give it a few plus weeks with tactics developed and expanded SA your chances of survival rose. Give it another few plus weeks and the continual tempo and fatigue setting in your chances dropped. Not quite as low as the newbie but only because when you got yourself in place were you shouldn’t have been you had the experience to get out.
The Corsair had an 11.1 kill ratio. Entered ops at the time that was the pivotal point for Japan. What was the kill ratio in 1943 and what was it in 1945. Although stat’s are stat’s would this have been the case if only ops in 1943 were used?
To many variables to consider overall statistics for the war to be an accurate representation. How many did Bomber Command loose in 1940 compared to 1942 or 1943?
BOB. As all were newbies at the start, apart from the BOF boys who were very war weary at this time, and given the poor development of tactics at the start everyone was in with the same chances. Give it a few plus weeks with tactics developed and expanded SA your chances of survival rose. Give it another few plus weeks and the continual tempo and fatigue setting in your chances dropped. Not quite as low as the newbie but only because when you got yourself in place were you shouldn’t have been you had the experience to get out.
The Corsair had an 11.1 kill ratio. Entered ops at the time that was the pivotal point for Japan. What was the kill ratio in 1943 and what was it in 1945. Although stat’s are stat’s would this have been the case if only ops in 1943 were used?
To many variables to consider overall statistics for the war to be an accurate representation. How many did Bomber Command loose in 1940 compared to 1942 or 1943?
Originally Posted by 500N
I have read before that the Polish got a high number of kills because they
got closer to the enemy before opening fire.
got closer to the enemy before opening fire.