AM Dick Garwood
Self evidently, a Director General must;
a. Direct
b. Lead, by example
What example will AM Garwood lead by? He has a number of choices.
1. That set by now retired senior officers whose policy of waste led to the (unnecessary) “savings at the expense of safety”. Primarily, successive AMSOs from June 1987 (the date of the earliest available correspondence outlining the wasteful policy).
2. That set by the senior officers and Civil Servants (and there is some overlap with the above, particularly in the AMSO/Chief Engineer’s area) who perpetuated the failings by disciplining staffs who sought to make aircraft safe. Primarily, the staffs of the Chief Engineer 1991-96, Director General Air Systems 2 / Executive Director 1 in MoD(PE) and DPA 1996-03, and the Chief of Defence Procurement 1996-03.
3. That set by his immediate predecessor, who steadfastly ignored 2. above, thus protecting those senior staffs and in the process misdirecting MAA resources.
4. Meet his legal obligation.
What direction will he direct his staffs to take? Again, he has choices.
1. Continue supporting the lie published in the Nimrod Review that the systemic failings commenced in 1998, resulting in 3 years of misdirected resources and rewriting regulations which, if implemented, would have prevented Nimrod XV230, Chinook ZD576, C130 XV179, Tornado ZG710 and many more. All while completely ignoring the root cause.
2. Accept the verifiable evidence to the Review, but which Haddon-Cave did not report, that the failings commenced with AMSO’s wasteful policy of June 1987, and continued when the Chief Engineer (a) refused to order that the waste be stopped and (b) ordered instead successive 28% cuts to airworthiness funding. Understanding and accepting these facts is fundamental to being able to Direct properly.
Finally, will he have the common decency to publicly state that Haddon-Cave was wrong to name and shame, especially, General Sir Sam Cowan, who was criticised for implementing 5% per year cuts for 4 years (which had no discernable effect on airworthiness), while ACM Sir Michael Alcock was praised despite 28% cuts over 3 years which directly targeted airworthiness (specifically, Safety Cases).
Will he acknowledge or explain the part played by Alcock and AVM Anthony Bagnall in the systematic refusal to implement the recommendations of the RAF Inspector of Flight Safety or MoD’s Director Internal Audit, both of whom reported on the root cause of the failings? Or that the immediate response to the first such report (in August 1992) was to announce a further 28% cut in airworthiness funding?
Will he acknowledge that Air Cdre George Baber should have inherited a continuous Nimrod “Safety Case task”, as per mandated regulations, instead of having to let one? That act of letting the task (however poorly managed by his staffs and BAeS) demonstrates he went further toward meeting his legal obligations than his predecessors. There was no extant task as a direct result of the above 28% cuts policy.
This is an opportunity, AM Garwood, to right many wrongs. It is time to acknowledge the truth, because only then can MoD move forward. At the moment, extraordinary resources are still expended, and lies being told, to protect those staffs whose actions caused the deaths of so many. The MAA has been party to this deceit since its inception. They cannot claim otherwise, as it is a matter of record they were handed the evidence, in person, by the previous Minister for the Armed Forces (Nick Harvey MP). They took no action; in fact, they ignored the evidence and continued their support of those who failed deceased colleagues. Behaviour that is a disgrace to their uniforms. In my opinion.
a. Direct
b. Lead, by example
What example will AM Garwood lead by? He has a number of choices.
1. That set by now retired senior officers whose policy of waste led to the (unnecessary) “savings at the expense of safety”. Primarily, successive AMSOs from June 1987 (the date of the earliest available correspondence outlining the wasteful policy).
2. That set by the senior officers and Civil Servants (and there is some overlap with the above, particularly in the AMSO/Chief Engineer’s area) who perpetuated the failings by disciplining staffs who sought to make aircraft safe. Primarily, the staffs of the Chief Engineer 1991-96, Director General Air Systems 2 / Executive Director 1 in MoD(PE) and DPA 1996-03, and the Chief of Defence Procurement 1996-03.
3. That set by his immediate predecessor, who steadfastly ignored 2. above, thus protecting those senior staffs and in the process misdirecting MAA resources.
4. Meet his legal obligation.
What direction will he direct his staffs to take? Again, he has choices.
1. Continue supporting the lie published in the Nimrod Review that the systemic failings commenced in 1998, resulting in 3 years of misdirected resources and rewriting regulations which, if implemented, would have prevented Nimrod XV230, Chinook ZD576, C130 XV179, Tornado ZG710 and many more. All while completely ignoring the root cause.
2. Accept the verifiable evidence to the Review, but which Haddon-Cave did not report, that the failings commenced with AMSO’s wasteful policy of June 1987, and continued when the Chief Engineer (a) refused to order that the waste be stopped and (b) ordered instead successive 28% cuts to airworthiness funding. Understanding and accepting these facts is fundamental to being able to Direct properly.
Finally, will he have the common decency to publicly state that Haddon-Cave was wrong to name and shame, especially, General Sir Sam Cowan, who was criticised for implementing 5% per year cuts for 4 years (which had no discernable effect on airworthiness), while ACM Sir Michael Alcock was praised despite 28% cuts over 3 years which directly targeted airworthiness (specifically, Safety Cases).
Will he acknowledge or explain the part played by Alcock and AVM Anthony Bagnall in the systematic refusal to implement the recommendations of the RAF Inspector of Flight Safety or MoD’s Director Internal Audit, both of whom reported on the root cause of the failings? Or that the immediate response to the first such report (in August 1992) was to announce a further 28% cut in airworthiness funding?
Will he acknowledge that Air Cdre George Baber should have inherited a continuous Nimrod “Safety Case task”, as per mandated regulations, instead of having to let one? That act of letting the task (however poorly managed by his staffs and BAeS) demonstrates he went further toward meeting his legal obligations than his predecessors. There was no extant task as a direct result of the above 28% cuts policy.
This is an opportunity, AM Garwood, to right many wrongs. It is time to acknowledge the truth, because only then can MoD move forward. At the moment, extraordinary resources are still expended, and lies being told, to protect those staffs whose actions caused the deaths of so many. The MAA has been party to this deceit since its inception. They cannot claim otherwise, as it is a matter of record they were handed the evidence, in person, by the previous Minister for the Armed Forces (Nick Harvey MP). They took no action; in fact, they ignored the evidence and continued their support of those who failed deceased colleagues. Behaviour that is a disgrace to their uniforms. In my opinion.
If every new head of department spent his or her time reviewing everything done by his or her predecessors, there wouldn't be much work done. And I think you'll agree that his will be a very busy department right now. His job is to implement ANY measures he sees fit and to ensure that the current work adheres to the law. He has not been put there for any reason other than to ensure airworthiness starting the day he took over.
I know there are lots of rotten bodies in the cupboard, which clearly need sorting, but he is probably not in a position to be diverted to that from his day job.
The investigations and prosecutions need to come from elsewhere.
I know there are lots of rotten bodies in the cupboard, which clearly need sorting, but he is probably not in a position to be diverted to that from his day job.
The investigations and prosecutions need to come from elsewhere.
CM, this isn't going to be put right by being busy, but by being thorough. His predecessor was busy, making sure that the scandal that began in 1987 was never alluded to by the MAA, but the airworthiness system remains as broken as ever. The trouble with aviation is that it never forgives wishful thinking, which seems to be the MAA's present policy. If it isn't then it is even more misguided, as it obviously doesn't understand the problem. Put simply, airworthiness stops happening when you stop providing for it. That happened, and you can't simply recover it by starting over years later, without going back over all the intermediate years when it was neglected. It is a formidable task and a dreadful warning that it must never be allowed to happen again. Despite all the "independent" word bites plastered everywhere, that is precisely what can happen unless the MAA and the MAAIB become truly independent and separate of the MOD and of each other.
ATG, I don't know whether your remark is meant seriously, but unless this scandal is fully addressed the fighting capability of the Royal Air Force will be seriously impaired for decades. I would remind you that it has already lost its Maritime capability. What next?
The purpose of Flight Safety is to maintain combat effectiveness by avoiding avoidable accidents. Unless the RAF's aircraft are airworthy that isn't going to happen, either in war or peace. If AM Garward does nothing else other than to make the RAF High Command accept this situation he would have done his country a great service. This is a thousand mile march. High time we took the first step!
ATG, I don't know whether your remark is meant seriously, but unless this scandal is fully addressed the fighting capability of the Royal Air Force will be seriously impaired for decades. I would remind you that it has already lost its Maritime capability. What next?
The purpose of Flight Safety is to maintain combat effectiveness by avoiding avoidable accidents. Unless the RAF's aircraft are airworthy that isn't going to happen, either in war or peace. If AM Garward does nothing else other than to make the RAF High Command accept this situation he would have done his country a great service. This is a thousand mile march. High time we took the first step!
If every new head of department spent his or her time reviewing everything done by his or her predecessors, there wouldn't be much work done.
In the 3 years since it was formed the MAA has not taken a single step toward correcting the mistakes that caused the systemic failings.
Much work has been done producing reams of new regulations but how many in the MAA truly understand the starting point? If you don't know that, how can you validate the output? If the leader does not understand his raison d'etre, especially in a new organisation, then it is simply the blind leading the blind.
I know for certain the hierarchy have been informed as to the root causes, but have made a conscious decision not to go there. Shameful, but entirely predictable (and predicted, here on pprune). Already, after only 3 years, it seems a posting to the MAA (for this hierarchy) is something to get out of the way as quickly and painlessly as possible. Their ethos defaults to the MoD's long standing risk management policy - Wait until something happens and hope you've shipped out by the time it does. When something happens on aircraft, people die.
Having identified the root cause one must ask why MAA/MoD refuses to address it. Such questioning behaviour does not sit well within a service organisation, yet the obligation to question is a fundamental of good safety management. This is made worse by the fact the first thing necessary is to very publicly rescind the policies, and outlaw the practices, of those who caused the failings; primarily senior RAF officers, aided and abetted by a few senior Civil Servants. May I suggest that to do so, one needs to be free from fear or censure. We already know the attitude of a recent CAS (Dalton) to this subject - he publicly supported the very officers who caused the problem. That message was loud and clear to those with aspirations. The MAA DG has no authority to order this change; however, he does have an obligation to stand in front of the Secy of State and tell it as it is. If he doesn't, and given he has no authority in the matter, then he is surplus to requirements.
I see what you're saying. We may be at cross purposes here. I agree he will want to put the ship in order and correct the deficiencies, my point (which I think may have been misunderstood) is that it's not for AM Garwood to go looking for people to blame or to point the finger. Of course I would expect that he'll be wanting to put in place as much good practice as he can.
To my way of thinking there are two distinct issues here.
First, to design and implement processes and procedures which meet the current and future requirements for military aviation safety, including establishing true autonomy..
Second, the faults and failings of the past and the consequences of the legacy, have to be investigated.
Air Marshal Garwood is charged with the former and a truly independent team should be tasked to deal with the latter - I would suggest Jan Smuts, as he made a decent fist of the last study we gave him, but he is no longer available but people of the stature of General John de Castilan (Spelling???) are required and soon.
Old Duffer
First, to design and implement processes and procedures which meet the current and future requirements for military aviation safety, including establishing true autonomy..
Second, the faults and failings of the past and the consequences of the legacy, have to be investigated.
Air Marshal Garwood is charged with the former and a truly independent team should be tasked to deal with the latter - I would suggest Jan Smuts, as he made a decent fist of the last study we gave him, but he is no longer available but people of the stature of General John de Castilan (Spelling???) are required and soon.
Old Duffer
CM & O-D
Thank you. I agree.
I would say, however, that while it is not AM Garwood's place to apportion blame, it is incumbent upon him (along with any other honourable officer or civil servant) to make it known to their bosses, including Ministers, that those who were blamed (Cowan, Pledger, Baber, Eagles etc) were ENTIRELY innocent of the accusations made against them by Haddon-Cave; although one or two were square pegs in round holes and manifestly unsuitable for their job.
Haddon-Cave knew the truth, as did numerous VSOs, Civil Servants and various Ministers, yet they said nothing. Nor did the recent MAA hierarchy, for example at their joint RAeS/MAA conference last October.
Understanding and openly accepting this simple fact will enable the MAA to better direct its efforts. At the moment, their direction is dictated by a lie, which does nobody any good at all; except of course the guilty.
Here's a question..... How will the MAA operate within a GOCO procurement system? Will the GOCO companies, say Westland, be forced to follow MAA rules, or will they insist on implementing tried and tested regs and procedures? Doing the latter, against the will of MoD, is what has saved so many lives in MoD until now (if only they knew). Will the practice of "parallel programming" continue, whereby the prime contractor's contract is ignored, and a parallel process established with another company to quietly implement actual regulations? On one major aircraft programme I managed that was the ONLY way to generate a valid Safety Case, given the SC task had been waived by non-engineering bosses to save money in the prime contract. How many in the MAA can begin to comprehend how such events can occur, or how to manage them? Perhaps this will be AM Garwood's main task as DG. Oh to be a fly on the wall at the negotiations.
Thank you. I agree.
I would say, however, that while it is not AM Garwood's place to apportion blame, it is incumbent upon him (along with any other honourable officer or civil servant) to make it known to their bosses, including Ministers, that those who were blamed (Cowan, Pledger, Baber, Eagles etc) were ENTIRELY innocent of the accusations made against them by Haddon-Cave; although one or two were square pegs in round holes and manifestly unsuitable for their job.
Haddon-Cave knew the truth, as did numerous VSOs, Civil Servants and various Ministers, yet they said nothing. Nor did the recent MAA hierarchy, for example at their joint RAeS/MAA conference last October.
Understanding and openly accepting this simple fact will enable the MAA to better direct its efforts. At the moment, their direction is dictated by a lie, which does nobody any good at all; except of course the guilty.
Here's a question..... How will the MAA operate within a GOCO procurement system? Will the GOCO companies, say Westland, be forced to follow MAA rules, or will they insist on implementing tried and tested regs and procedures? Doing the latter, against the will of MoD, is what has saved so many lives in MoD until now (if only they knew). Will the practice of "parallel programming" continue, whereby the prime contractor's contract is ignored, and a parallel process established with another company to quietly implement actual regulations? On one major aircraft programme I managed that was the ONLY way to generate a valid Safety Case, given the SC task had been waived by non-engineering bosses to save money in the prime contract. How many in the MAA can begin to comprehend how such events can occur, or how to manage them? Perhaps this will be AM Garwood's main task as DG. Oh to be a fly on the wall at the negotiations.
Last edited by tucumseh; 7th May 2013 at 10:25.
OD, I quite agree that it is not the role of the DG MAA to conduct an inquiry into alleged illegal acts. That, I would have thought, is the business of the SIB, but it seems that I might be greatly in error in that assumption. Suffice it to say that if nothing is done it will bring the Service into disrepute and it is for the RAF High Command to decide which to protect, the reputation of the Royal Air Force or that of certain VSO's.
What is the role of the DG is to ensure the airworthiness of the military airfleet. Given what has been revealed in this forum, a very great deal needs doing before he can succeed in that, the great bulk of which will require a retrospective audit of every single airframe and system from inception, going back over some 35 years. There are enough examples of the various problems to look out for in the various fatal accident threads over the years that alone accounted for a death toll of 62. Things like
1. FADEC malcoded and released to service, contrary to regulations.
2. Control jams in 1,2, or all 3 axis and released to service, contrary to regulations.
3. Fuel line couplings in a supposed drybay containing its own source of ignition, contrary to regulations.
4. Anti-collision lights swapped for HISL's without proper testing (they blinded their pilots in poor vis so were switched off), contrary to regulations.
5. IFF's that failed to warn of failure, contrary to regulations. (testimony given here that Group had to sign this off, as no-one else would!)
All of these are airworthiness failures, not servicing ones. The various aircraft types involved had been cleared for service in these configs. The DG MAA needs to ask why, and how, and who, for every single such anomaly discovered, in addition to those above. It is a monumental task, and it will be a very long time before any type can eventually be declared airworthy, if ever. The risk in the meantime will be unknown but inevitable, but at least now it will be a known unknown, particularly for the people who have to fly the aircraft. What is totally unacceptable would be to confer such failings with Grandfather Rights, shrug one's shoulders, and mutter "Well, what else can you do?".
Personally I can't see how any serving VSO DG can do all that. Unless and until the MAA and MAAIB are autonomous authorities, vested with complete independence from the MOD and its subsidiary Services, they will be mired by the unwelcome interventions suffered in the past.
This is a serious threat to the very viability of the Royal Air Force. If it cannot depend upon its aircraft it is as nought. That it has been reduced to this state by its own Commanders is a monumental scandal. I agree, OD, it needs a General Smuts. Someone with his status and resolve is required. Someone who cannot be intimidated by the Men from the Ministry, nor tempted by the awards of titles or baubles. More important still, it requires someone who puts duty above all else in order to appoint such a man. You have a proposal for the former. Who would you suggest for the latter? I can think of no-one.
What is the role of the DG is to ensure the airworthiness of the military airfleet. Given what has been revealed in this forum, a very great deal needs doing before he can succeed in that, the great bulk of which will require a retrospective audit of every single airframe and system from inception, going back over some 35 years. There are enough examples of the various problems to look out for in the various fatal accident threads over the years that alone accounted for a death toll of 62. Things like
1. FADEC malcoded and released to service, contrary to regulations.
2. Control jams in 1,2, or all 3 axis and released to service, contrary to regulations.
3. Fuel line couplings in a supposed drybay containing its own source of ignition, contrary to regulations.
4. Anti-collision lights swapped for HISL's without proper testing (they blinded their pilots in poor vis so were switched off), contrary to regulations.
5. IFF's that failed to warn of failure, contrary to regulations. (testimony given here that Group had to sign this off, as no-one else would!)
All of these are airworthiness failures, not servicing ones. The various aircraft types involved had been cleared for service in these configs. The DG MAA needs to ask why, and how, and who, for every single such anomaly discovered, in addition to those above. It is a monumental task, and it will be a very long time before any type can eventually be declared airworthy, if ever. The risk in the meantime will be unknown but inevitable, but at least now it will be a known unknown, particularly for the people who have to fly the aircraft. What is totally unacceptable would be to confer such failings with Grandfather Rights, shrug one's shoulders, and mutter "Well, what else can you do?".
Personally I can't see how any serving VSO DG can do all that. Unless and until the MAA and MAAIB are autonomous authorities, vested with complete independence from the MOD and its subsidiary Services, they will be mired by the unwelcome interventions suffered in the past.
This is a serious threat to the very viability of the Royal Air Force. If it cannot depend upon its aircraft it is as nought. That it has been reduced to this state by its own Commanders is a monumental scandal. I agree, OD, it needs a General Smuts. Someone with his status and resolve is required. Someone who cannot be intimidated by the Men from the Ministry, nor tempted by the awards of titles or baubles. More important still, it requires someone who puts duty above all else in order to appoint such a man. You have a proposal for the former. Who would you suggest for the latter? I can think of no-one.
Last edited by Chugalug2; 7th May 2013 at 21:57.
It makes the RAF look ridiculous.
Ladies & Gents,
No matter what your opinion is on whether wings of any description should be awarded to a UAS Pilot, please have some thought for the gentlemen photographed. I am sure it was not their idea to be publically displayed, and the comments on this and other threads are disgraceful and unwarranted.
These guys were selected, trained, and have accomplished a standard defined by the powers to be, in the same way as those powers have defined the requirement for any other brevet/wings award, or a blunty competence certificate.
They are doing a great job, in more difficult circumstances than most would appreciate, and whether you agree with them receiving wings or not, they are doing a tremendous job. Unless you have been to Creech and seen first hand what these guys and girls do, irrespective of your prejudice, you will not understand the difficulties of flying and operating an aircraft that does nothing until a few seconds after you demand it.
Nuff said.
No matter what your opinion is on whether wings of any description should be awarded to a UAS Pilot, please have some thought for the gentlemen photographed. I am sure it was not their idea to be publically displayed, and the comments on this and other threads are disgraceful and unwarranted.
These guys were selected, trained, and have accomplished a standard defined by the powers to be, in the same way as those powers have defined the requirement for any other brevet/wings award, or a blunty competence certificate.
They are doing a great job, in more difficult circumstances than most would appreciate, and whether you agree with them receiving wings or not, they are doing a tremendous job. Unless you have been to Creech and seen first hand what these guys and girls do, irrespective of your prejudice, you will not understand the difficulties of flying and operating an aircraft that does nothing until a few seconds after you demand it.
Nuff said.
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Chaps ... See here the original RPAS Wings thread 
http://www.pprune.org/military-aircr...ded-wings.html
Coff.
http://www.pprune.org/military-aircr...ded-wings.html
Coff.
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"Why did Baz North not take up post? "
Rumour has it that Timo's decision was quite late in the day and the succession chain plans had to be reworked.
Rumour has it that Timo's decision was quite late in the day and the succession chain plans had to be reworked.
http://www.pprune.org/military-aircr...ference-9.html
At post #165 it was suggested;
I wonder.............
At post #165 it was suggested;
If there is anyone from the MAA reading this thread, could they please print off the last two pages and present them to the DG, while expressing their deep concern and asking for his considered opinion?
