Tucano at LOO - no steps required!
Quite. Even the 1500 ft mentioned in the FTS is only great if you happen to be at low key. It's a shame that it takes incidents/accidents to hone the procedures which, with hindsight, should have been obvious.
FTSs often seem to be written in a eye-pleasing flow without any consideration for the traps which can be set for the unwary - the Cranwell wheels-up stemmed from a similar trap. And the fact that the course recommended as a pre-requisite for air testers in the Radley Report (which followed another air test accident) is not available is 'poor'.
Notwithstanding the second guessing, and what would have happened ifs, I don't think the outcome was entirely down to luck, although that played its part. Without doubt there was some fine handling in there as well.
FTSs often seem to be written in a eye-pleasing flow without any consideration for the traps which can be set for the unwary - the Cranwell wheels-up stemmed from a similar trap. And the fact that the course recommended as a pre-requisite for air testers in the Radley Report (which followed another air test accident) is not available is 'poor'.
Notwithstanding the second guessing, and what would have happened ifs, I don't think the outcome was entirely down to luck, although that played its part. Without doubt there was some fine handling in there as well.
As a mere English literature graduate, can anyone please enlighten me as to the meaning of "...proper understanding and sentencing of a potential hazard" and "...the known failure...had not previously been sentenced by operating or engineering authorities"?
This is evidently a new and very esoteric usage which which I am unfamiliar, as indeed is the Oxford English Dictionary.
This is evidently a new and very esoteric usage which which I am unfamiliar, as indeed is the Oxford English Dictionary.
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As a mere English literature graduate, can anyone please enlighten me as to the meaning of "...proper understanding and*"sentencing*"of a potential hazard" and "...the known failure...had not previously been*"sentenced*"by operating or engineering authorities"?*
This is evidently a new and very esoteric usage which which I am unfamiliar, as indeed is the Oxford English Dictionary.
This is evidently a new and very esoteric usage which which I am unfamiliar, as indeed is the Oxford English Dictionary.
You should all be afraid, very afraid.
The recommendations? Mostly mandated policy. Been there before. What has the MAA been doing for 4 years?
The biggest howler? "Admittedly, is is unreasonable to apply the high safety standards of the post Haddon-Cave operating model to historic judgements made by our predecessors."
What absolute balls. The Haddon-Cave "operating model" is what Air Chief Marshal Loader said in his comments in the XV230 BoI report, and what numerous BoI and audit reports have said before. IMPLEMENT MANDATED POLICY.
So, it is unreasonable to expect past staffs to have implemented policy? Well, actually, he's right in a way, because in the early 90s the RAF Chief Engineer's organisation decreed it was an offence to do so. MoD(PE)'s CDP concurred, as did DPA. Today, it is still upheld by Ministers and DE&S policy branch.
When can we expect the MAA to acknowledge these simple facts? Until they do so, safety management is stuck in the Dark Ages. (With, according to this report, no management oversight; which is perfectly true and simply repeats a criticism made of the Nimrod MRA4 and Chinook Mk3 2 Star. A fact that Ministers accepted as true but were quite content with).
The recommendations? Mostly mandated policy. Been there before. What has the MAA been doing for 4 years?
The biggest howler? "Admittedly, is is unreasonable to apply the high safety standards of the post Haddon-Cave operating model to historic judgements made by our predecessors."
What absolute balls. The Haddon-Cave "operating model" is what Air Chief Marshal Loader said in his comments in the XV230 BoI report, and what numerous BoI and audit reports have said before. IMPLEMENT MANDATED POLICY.
So, it is unreasonable to expect past staffs to have implemented policy? Well, actually, he's right in a way, because in the early 90s the RAF Chief Engineer's organisation decreed it was an offence to do so. MoD(PE)'s CDP concurred, as did DPA. Today, it is still upheld by Ministers and DE&S policy branch.
When can we expect the MAA to acknowledge these simple facts? Until they do so, safety management is stuck in the Dark Ages. (With, according to this report, no management oversight; which is perfectly true and simply repeats a criticism made of the Nimrod MRA4 and Chinook Mk3 2 Star. A fact that Ministers accepted as true but were quite content with).
What in the holy name of bureaucracy is the "Tucano Glider Support Authority" as referenced in the report??
