Erosion of Basic Piloting Skills
Herk
The goal obviously is to get to the destination safely. The greatest chance of that happening is now. How that comes about, be it from technology, training or sourcing of crews is fodder for discussion. That the safety record is where it is should be the focus.
The goal obviously is to get to the destination safely. The greatest chance of that happening is now. How that comes about, be it from technology, training or sourcing of crews is fodder for discussion. That the safety record is where it is should be the focus.
Herk
I challenge your assertion that the vast majority of airline Captains are from the mil background. I am airline and I commute offline weekly to and from work. I'd say it's around even on the breakdown. Some have more (SWA) some less (USAIR, especially the westies).
I challenge your assertion that the vast majority of airline Captains are from the mil background. I am airline and I commute offline weekly to and from work. I'd say it's around even on the breakdown. Some have more (SWA) some less (USAIR, especially the westies).
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I think you'll find I'm generally in agreement with most of what you say. What I go to great pains to point out is that the sim is not the aircraft. I object greatly to the concept that you can replace flying hours with sim hours.
Flying is expensive. Flight training is expensive too. I was an instructor at a military flight training squadron and the folks coming through had a largely simulator-based background. I argued with my commander, and won, to add a syllabus sortie dedicated to basic handling! The sim degrades skills ONLY because it is being used to replace flight hours rather than enhance them. The same can be said for virtually all cockpit automation. I saw every level of student suffer from a lack of basic handling skills, from co-pilot through to instructor.
At the end of the day, the best automation cannot hone skills, it erodes skills. Flight skills are perishable, else we wouldn't have training requirements. Automation does make things easier and, often, better. But unlike the advent of calculators where generations of students have lost the ability to do simple tasks such as long division without the little plastic brain, losing the stick and rudder skills, airmanship, and general SA when it all goes pear-shaped in a complex way has dire consequences if the crew is not of the highest caliber.
What will the next generation of pilots do when something like the Sioux City, Iowa scenario unfolds? Or the Hudson River landing scenario? The ability to make decisions comes from making decisions, not having a computer make them for you most of the time.
I'm a cautious supporter of all things that make my life easier. However, I always ask, 'what is the cost?' 'what am I giving up?' - the human mind still processes things in a distinct manner, different than computers and often better. Crashes such as the AF tragedy point out problems with both training and automation, IMO.
Flying is expensive. Flight training is expensive too. I was an instructor at a military flight training squadron and the folks coming through had a largely simulator-based background. I argued with my commander, and won, to add a syllabus sortie dedicated to basic handling! The sim degrades skills ONLY because it is being used to replace flight hours rather than enhance them. The same can be said for virtually all cockpit automation. I saw every level of student suffer from a lack of basic handling skills, from co-pilot through to instructor.
At the end of the day, the best automation cannot hone skills, it erodes skills. Flight skills are perishable, else we wouldn't have training requirements. Automation does make things easier and, often, better. But unlike the advent of calculators where generations of students have lost the ability to do simple tasks such as long division without the little plastic brain, losing the stick and rudder skills, airmanship, and general SA when it all goes pear-shaped in a complex way has dire consequences if the crew is not of the highest caliber.
What will the next generation of pilots do when something like the Sioux City, Iowa scenario unfolds? Or the Hudson River landing scenario? The ability to make decisions comes from making decisions, not having a computer make them for you most of the time.
I'm a cautious supporter of all things that make my life easier. However, I always ask, 'what is the cost?' 'what am I giving up?' - the human mind still processes things in a distinct manner, different than computers and often better. Crashes such as the AF tragedy point out problems with both training and automation, IMO.
In large part I find myself nodding yes, I just try to keep the larger picture as my primary focus. The equal an opposite reaction to the increase in automation is atrophy to stick and rudder skills, troubling but what's the realistic alternative? Less automation and more hull losses I would suggest.
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West Coast, how funny you should see it from such a "black or white" perspective. There may be some generational issues related to a view that instructional standards have dropped...and this may well be measurable. Various national authorities certainly seem to be taking action on it so it's not just us talking here.
But even using your perspective, the proper answer is to make things less black and white by allowing modern safety measures and automatics to stay in full use, whilst also getting all professional pilots to maintain basic handling skills. If flying is to be even more safe with even fewer hull losses, everyone should want all professional pilots to be able to fly their aeroplanes when the systems and automatics are not giving them the right answers. We certainly do not want people claiming to be professional pilots captaining aeroplanes they can't actually fly.
But even using your perspective, the proper answer is to make things less black and white by allowing modern safety measures and automatics to stay in full use, whilst also getting all professional pilots to maintain basic handling skills. If flying is to be even more safe with even fewer hull losses, everyone should want all professional pilots to be able to fly their aeroplanes when the systems and automatics are not giving them the right answers. We certainly do not want people claiming to be professional pilots captaining aeroplanes they can't actually fly.
When someone says generational, I view that as a comparison to something. Been in aviation for 27 years between the military and civilian world, so I let you decide whether it's generational or not.
To the crux of your arguement, I do see it as a black and white issue, but with a lot of detail and nuance. As challenges arise, military, manufacturers, industry and regulatory agencies answer. Just as CFIT was a major challenge a number of years ago, technology and training evolved to address it. Not saying by any means it's eliminated however. If the perception of eroding stick and rudder skills is somehow recognized as systemic and not isolated (and it appears to be the former) then the same process will play out.
I'll admit it's a very clinical view devoid of the emotive pictures of a burning hulk and grieving relatives that accompany accidents. If you choose to fault me there, then guilty as charged. I've simply come to recognize the difference between waxing poetic about the loss of stick and rudder skills and what triggers actual change.
Cheers
To the crux of your arguement, I do see it as a black and white issue, but with a lot of detail and nuance. As challenges arise, military, manufacturers, industry and regulatory agencies answer. Just as CFIT was a major challenge a number of years ago, technology and training evolved to address it. Not saying by any means it's eliminated however. If the perception of eroding stick and rudder skills is somehow recognized as systemic and not isolated (and it appears to be the former) then the same process will play out.
I'll admit it's a very clinical view devoid of the emotive pictures of a burning hulk and grieving relatives that accompany accidents. If you choose to fault me there, then guilty as charged. I've simply come to recognize the difference between waxing poetic about the loss of stick and rudder skills and what triggers actual change.
Cheers
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West Coast said on 18 Oct 2012
That's how I'll define "generational" for the purposes of this discussion. Older people thinking things are not as good as they once were. So we have a point of agreement here.
Talking about safety, 29 Oct 2012 West Coast said
Another point of agreement.
Humble apologies if you thought I was implying something else about different generations, and congratulations on your career to date, West Coast. Hope it has all gone well and continues to do so. In the fodder of this discussion, my point has been made here and is built on what you have said
Further, I withdraw my comment/query about you seeing things in black and white. Now that I know more about you as one who sees issues as black or white, albeit with a lot of detail and nuance (black and white with grey areas?) it seems we are more in agreement than in discussion. Good day to you.
Besides, what generation of pilot hasn't lamented that pilots today weren't what they were when he or she came up. They were at one time the object of some senior pilots lament.
Talking about safety, 29 Oct 2012 West Coast said
How that comes about, be it from technology, training or sourcing of crews is fodder for discussion.
Humble apologies if you thought I was implying something else about different generations, and congratulations on your career to date, West Coast. Hope it has all gone well and continues to do so. In the fodder of this discussion, my point has been made here and is built on what you have said
If flying is to be even more safe with even fewer hull losses, everyone should want all professional pilots to be able to fly their aeroplanes when the systems and automatics are not giving them the right answers. We certainly do not want people claiming to be professional pilots captaining aeroplanes they can't actually fly.
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Originally Posted by West Coast
In large part I find myself nodding yes, I just try to keep the larger picture as my primary focus. The equal an opposite reaction to the increase in automation is atrophy to stick and rudder skills, troubling but what's the realistic alternative? Less automation and more hull losses I would suggest.
The FAA recognizes this: In the wake of the Colgan crash, they have just released a change to how we should teach stall recovery. Gone is the emphasis on approach to stall training with its over-emphasis on minimizing altitude loss and a refocus on actual recovery procedures recognizing that there may have to be altitude loss in order to reduce AOA sufficiently to break the stall.
I'm not certain if you're apathetic or not about the whole issue though. You seem to want to do nothing since our safety record is good. Yet you acknowledge most of the points made by others. Or, perhaps it's not that you don't want to do anything, rather, you don't think there's anything to be done, or will be done? Not meant as an attack, just curious...
Last edited by US Herk; 30th Oct 2012 at 11:33.
Doing nothing is the last course of action I advocate. We collectively and individually should drive towards the goal of increasing safety with every flight, every sim session and every hangar debrief.
Within the narrow point of automation, I challenge anyone to prove that automation hasn't improved aviation safety(not implying that you have). Can to much of a good thing can be bad for you, yeah. Have we reached the point where the pendulum has swung a bit too far, perhaps.
Not that I would expect that industry and/or the military would erase gains in safety by emphasizing basic handling skills at the expense of automation, any "correction" in the training pipeline must complement and not replace what has proven to work.
Within the narrow point of automation, I challenge anyone to prove that automation hasn't improved aviation safety(not implying that you have). Can to much of a good thing can be bad for you, yeah. Have we reached the point where the pendulum has swung a bit too far, perhaps.
Not that I would expect that industry and/or the military would erase gains in safety by emphasizing basic handling skills at the expense of automation, any "correction" in the training pipeline must complement and not replace what has proven to work.
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Originally Posted by West Coast
Within the narrow point of automation, I challenge anyone to prove that automation hasn't improved aviation safety(not implying that you have).
So, no, I can't prove automation hasn't improved safety...nor can I prove it has. I can agree with you that we have some of the safest skies ever. What's the reason? Automation? If so, remove the human element altogether and get rid of pilots. What's that? You don't want to do that? No surprise there either.
Semi-sarcastic retorts aren't an argument, so I concede. I can, however, point to the apparent lack of stick and rudder skills that decline at the same rate the arcane functions of the FMS are discovered. (sorry, more sophomoric sarcasm)
I remember as my grandfather regaled me with how easy I had it now that we had VORs. Why, back in his day, they had lit towers and A-N beacons....and then ADFs made navigation easy for everyone. But VORs, that was almost cheating! Of course, he also thought the T37 was blisteringly fast when he test flew it in the mid-60s when the Army was thinking about getting them as observation planes. Said I'd need to be on my toes to keep up with it as I headed off to pilot training. He was also aghast that I didn't have to roll out on a precise heading when I told him about my spin training in the mighty T37...
So, perhaps you're right, it's just a generational bemoaning of nostalgia for lost arts. I don't think any of the navigators missed their sextants though.
I'd just like to see guys know how to use rudders, that's all...
Last edited by US Herk; 31st Oct 2012 at 11:58.
Some airlines acknowledge the erosion of basic flying skills and lack of situation awareness of the simulator-trained generation. Look at the example of the unfortunate Air France A330 out of Rio, where there was a complete loss of the picture by everyone on the flightdeck.
The successful resolution of QF32 A380 out of Singapore is also a good example. After catastrophic uncontained #2 engine failure, which then progressively took out most systems, the captain (aided by several check captains who were on board and helped analyse the emergency captions) relied on his basic military flying skills and awareness to attempt diagnosing what systems remained and successfully getting it back on the ground.
The successful resolution of QF32 A380 out of Singapore is also a good example. After catastrophic uncontained #2 engine failure, which then progressively took out most systems, the captain (aided by several check captains who were on board and helped analyse the emergency captions) relied on his basic military flying skills and awareness to attempt diagnosing what systems remained and successfully getting it back on the ground.
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QF322 @ Singapore
Received this from Australia:
One has to wonder how this flight would have terminated had the extra crew not been there to provide major assistance.
Description of problems sounds like one-arm paper hangar.
A Check and Training Captain would normally have exceptional systems knowledge as he works with problems all day long every work day. I doubt the operating captain took any offense at the check captain helping out.
Here are just SOME of the problems Richard had in Singapore last week aboard
QF32.... I won't bother mentioning the engine explosion!.... oops... mentioned the engine explosion, sorry.....
* massive fuel leak in the left mid fuel tank (the beast has 11 tanks,
including in the horizontal stabiliser on the
tail)
* massive fuel leak in the left inner fuel tank
* a hole on the flap canoe/fairing that you could fit your upper body
through
* the aft gallery in the fuel system failed, preventing many fuel transfer
functions
* fuel jettison had problems due to the previous problem above
* bloody great hole in the upper wing surface
* partial failure of leading edge slats
* partial failure of speed brakes/ground spoilers
* shrapnel damage to the flaps
* TOTAL loss of all hydraulic fluid in the Green System (beast has 2 x
5,000 PSI systems, Green and Yellow)
* manual extension of landing gear
* loss of 1 generator and associated systems
* loss of brake anti-skid system
* unable to shutdown adjacent #1 engine using normal method after landing
due to major damage to systems
* unable to shutdown adjacent #1 engine using using the fire switch!!!!!!!!
Therefore, no fire protection was available for that engine after the
explosion in #2
* ECAM warnings about major fuel imbalance because of fuel leaks on left
side, that were UNABLE to be fixed with cross-feeding
* fuel trapped in Trim Tank (in the tail). Therefore, possible major CofG
out-of-balance condition for landing Yikes!
* and much more to come.........
Richard was in the left seat, FO in the right), SO in the 2nd obs seat
(right rear, also with his own Radio Management Panel, so he probably did
most of the coordination with the ground), Capt Dave Evans in the 1st obs
seat (middle). He is a Check & Training Captain who was training Harry
Wubbin to be one also. Harry was in the 3rd obs seat (left rear).
All 5 guys were FLAT OUT, especially the FO who would have been processing
complicated 'ECAM' messages and procedures that were seemingly never-ending!
Farrrrrrrrrrrrrrrkkkkkk!!!
One has to wonder how this flight would have terminated had the extra crew not been there to provide major assistance.
Description of problems sounds like one-arm paper hangar.
A Check and Training Captain would normally have exceptional systems knowledge as he works with problems all day long every work day. I doubt the operating captain took any offense at the check captain helping out.
Here are just SOME of the problems Richard had in Singapore last week aboard
QF32.... I won't bother mentioning the engine explosion!.... oops... mentioned the engine explosion, sorry.....
* massive fuel leak in the left mid fuel tank (the beast has 11 tanks,
including in the horizontal stabiliser on the
tail)
* massive fuel leak in the left inner fuel tank
* a hole on the flap canoe/fairing that you could fit your upper body
through
* the aft gallery in the fuel system failed, preventing many fuel transfer
functions
* fuel jettison had problems due to the previous problem above
* bloody great hole in the upper wing surface
* partial failure of leading edge slats
* partial failure of speed brakes/ground spoilers
* shrapnel damage to the flaps
* TOTAL loss of all hydraulic fluid in the Green System (beast has 2 x
5,000 PSI systems, Green and Yellow)
* manual extension of landing gear
* loss of 1 generator and associated systems
* loss of brake anti-skid system
* unable to shutdown adjacent #1 engine using normal method after landing
due to major damage to systems
* unable to shutdown adjacent #1 engine using using the fire switch!!!!!!!!
Therefore, no fire protection was available for that engine after the
explosion in #2
* ECAM warnings about major fuel imbalance because of fuel leaks on left
side, that were UNABLE to be fixed with cross-feeding
* fuel trapped in Trim Tank (in the tail). Therefore, possible major CofG
out-of-balance condition for landing Yikes!
* and much more to come.........
Richard was in the left seat, FO in the right), SO in the 2nd obs seat
(right rear, also with his own Radio Management Panel, so he probably did
most of the coordination with the ground), Capt Dave Evans in the 1st obs
seat (middle). He is a Check & Training Captain who was training Harry
Wubbin to be one also. Harry was in the 3rd obs seat (left rear).
All 5 guys were FLAT OUT, especially the FO who would have been processing
complicated 'ECAM' messages and procedures that were seemingly never-ending!
Farrrrrrrrrrrrrrrkkkkkk!!!
Last edited by Baron 58P; 31st Oct 2012 at 12:10.
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A great deal of this discussion is more realistically about mode confusion ' what's it doing now stuff'. The posters should keep this in mind when advocating solutions. Manual flying skills are important but they are not the only issue.
Different subject: the Qantas 380 was handled well in spite of having more than one Captain on board - can be a problem - who is in charge? A very good example of allocating tasks - great CRM.
Different subject: the Qantas 380 was handled well in spite of having more than one Captain on board - can be a problem - who is in charge? A very good example of allocating tasks - great CRM.
