Camp Bastion attack
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The difference is that when a suicide bomber goes off, usually he has some success in taking others with him.
If the Taliban had many options re taking out AH do you not think they would have tried them in the past?
Heavy machine guns - yes they have some, and yes they might be successful, but they are almost certainly lost in the engagement. We have more AH than they have HMG.
Old SAMs - probably ineffective.
Double digit SAMs - they may have some. They may even have someone capable of using them effectively. Managing to combine the two at the right moment? Unlikely.
Realistically, they are playing into our hands if they try anything other than asymetric.
If the Taliban had many options re taking out AH do you not think they would have tried them in the past?
Heavy machine guns - yes they have some, and yes they might be successful, but they are almost certainly lost in the engagement. We have more AH than they have HMG.
Old SAMs - probably ineffective.
Double digit SAMs - they may have some. They may even have someone capable of using them effectively. Managing to combine the two at the right moment? Unlikely.
Realistically, they are playing into our hands if they try anything other than asymetric.
Last edited by Tourist; 16th Sep 2012 at 17:09.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
The 3:1 I was referring to was that of the attacking force over the defending one. In a simple case, like Bastion as it happens, 3/4 of the defending force are facing the 'wrong' way. Only one quarter of the force is looking toward the front. Of that force potentially 50% will be off duty thus reducing the effective local defence to 1/8th.
As that 1/8 is spread over a wide front then the TB needs only to have 3 times the number of attackers to defenders in a local area. Obviously they achieved local superiority for a time. Ultimately the defending force, which was much larger as a whole, would prevail.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
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Hmmm, I think the elephant in the room is that the combined force of many nations equipped with massively expensive weaponry and tools, are still not enough to decisively defeat 200 guys in flipflops in an area the size of Kent.
Yes we are slowly making inroads, but hats off to those fighters......******* ballsy work from my perspective.
Sure, my AH brethren have killed MANY people, why haven't we won by now?
I'm confused? ;-)
If I wanted to bleed the western worlds coffers white with expenditure, I'd back the Talibs.....much better value for money.
Yes we are slowly making inroads, but hats off to those fighters......******* ballsy work from my perspective.
Sure, my AH brethren have killed MANY people, why haven't we won by now?
I'm confused? ;-)
If I wanted to bleed the western worlds coffers white with expenditure, I'd back the Talibs.....much better value for money.
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My reading of the papers today suggests that the attack took place at the US end of Bastion, a mile or so from Harry. If so, it points to the attack being spuured by the film rather than his presences.
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They will have to use a heavy weapon system to down an Apache... that kind of thing is not easy to hide (particularly after having fired a couple of bursts) - historically when they have tried it the Wing aircraft is the one that spots the tracer or muzzle flash/dust and has destroyed the firing point. Hence they don't try it very often.
As for the comment from SASLess about "I thought the Yanks liked to brag" - it was not a "brag" simply a fact. They don't like AH and are not that stupid that they will try and take us on.
I take it that you have recent operational experience of flying AH in theatre?
Thought not.
As for the comment from SASLess about "I thought the Yanks liked to brag" - it was not a "brag" simply a fact. They don't like AH and are not that stupid that they will try and take us on.
I take it that you have recent operational experience of flying AH in theatre?
Thought not.
Oh dear me....Gun ship drivers do go on!
That at least remains a constant since 1964......in other places!
I don' guess your tactics changed from the original fight the Russkies in Germany version you practiced prior to deploying to the Sand Box ahve t hey?
Scooting and Shooting now are we?
Gone the sneak up behind a hedge and pop off a missile or three....but back to old style gunship work.
The AH community is doing good work....but you are just one part of the puzzle and not the in the Leading Role....that belongs to the guys on the ground....the ones with rifles.....everyone else are just Support Staff.
That at least remains a constant since 1964......in other places!
I don' guess your tactics changed from the original fight the Russkies in Germany version you practiced prior to deploying to the Sand Box ahve t hey?
Scooting and Shooting now are we?
Gone the sneak up behind a hedge and pop off a missile or three....but back to old style gunship work.
The AH community is doing good work....but you are just one part of the puzzle and not the in the Leading Role....that belongs to the guys on the ground....the ones with rifles.....everyone else are just Support Staff.
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SASless
You are being silly.
All arms are needed, and the most courage is required by the boots on the ground, but to say the aircraft are merely support staff is as bad as the RAF idea that aircraft are all that is needed.
One thing for sure is that the aircraft could fly over Afghan killing bad guys without boots on the ground.
Without aircraft in the overhead ready to "support" we would not risk boots on the ground for a day.
You are being silly.
All arms are needed, and the most courage is required by the boots on the ground, but to say the aircraft are merely support staff is as bad as the RAF idea that aircraft are all that is needed.
One thing for sure is that the aircraft could fly over Afghan killing bad guys without boots on the ground.
Without aircraft in the overhead ready to "support" we would not risk boots on the ground for a day.
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Ralphmalph,
Wrt the elephant in the room; it's a good point, and one with a subtle answer, IMHO. Here are my thoughts on it, designed to prompt thought and provide another angle, not to patronise or denigrate in any way, just to set the tone of my post.
The problem lies in interpreting the situation correctly, which we have failed to do entirely.
We (NATO/allies) think that we are in a fight with men. Men who wear flip flops, and identify themselves as a Taliban fighter. They fight asymmetrically, but despite their numbers, this fact is what makes it difficult to defeat them militarily, because they normally exploit surprise on us, making us reactive, and can blend in with the natives. Couple that with tactics like ieds where they are hard to find and fix, and there you have it. A tough campaign, where we can keep going until the politicians pull us out, job done, or not, basically we'll call it a day in 2014. Then will come the reflection, from the comfort of watching the nation unfold. At the moment though, it's easy to convince ourselves we're doing all we can, in the best manner, in a very difficult situation.
The Russians went through this, and the lessons they learnt the hard way, we will learn. Too late, granted, but the similarities exist.
I would propose that one of the lessons the Russians identified from making the same mistake that we now make, is that the 'Taliban' is not an organised bunch of troops, but is merely an idea. This ideal provides an avenue of activity which appeals to the motivational values of young men in that culture, one of achieving an identity, in a way that they would say is honourable.
So the real mistake is not to acknowledge this fact, and make efforts to offer an alternative to this ideal. We offer little in the way of alternative. It isn't easy to do so either. But I think that so many people who don't see it as necessary to do so are often those who wonder why the military might of the Western world has trouble stuffing a few hundred flip-flop wearers.
In trying to generate an Army there, we have a problem of identity. Here you go Afghans, have a democracy and an Army. Identity and honour sorted, yes? Well, no, actually. There are many in Afghanistan (as we call it) who have no regard for the borders that were drawn up, which often lie across tribal areas. Some individuals do not see themselves as 'Afghani' or from 'Afghanistan'. Again, we miss this point a lot of the time. So unfortunately, we now reap the problems of history and this will be very difficult to unpick. Ergo, train flip-flop wearers to become boot and beret wearers, take minimum risk for the final 2 years to drop the casualty numbers so the press lose interest, and we can say we now have the security situation totally under our control (no-one at home will know otherwise). Then declare victory in 2014 and hot foot it out of there. Hence the hitler YouTube spoofs of the 45 slide conop just to go outside the wire...
Sorry for the long post, hope it provides an alternative angle. It's all just my opinion personally of course, and I don't expect or need agreement, I just hope that after all of this, our gov't can engage brain before engaging in battle.
Wrt the elephant in the room; it's a good point, and one with a subtle answer, IMHO. Here are my thoughts on it, designed to prompt thought and provide another angle, not to patronise or denigrate in any way, just to set the tone of my post.
The problem lies in interpreting the situation correctly, which we have failed to do entirely.
We (NATO/allies) think that we are in a fight with men. Men who wear flip flops, and identify themselves as a Taliban fighter. They fight asymmetrically, but despite their numbers, this fact is what makes it difficult to defeat them militarily, because they normally exploit surprise on us, making us reactive, and can blend in with the natives. Couple that with tactics like ieds where they are hard to find and fix, and there you have it. A tough campaign, where we can keep going until the politicians pull us out, job done, or not, basically we'll call it a day in 2014. Then will come the reflection, from the comfort of watching the nation unfold. At the moment though, it's easy to convince ourselves we're doing all we can, in the best manner, in a very difficult situation.
The Russians went through this, and the lessons they learnt the hard way, we will learn. Too late, granted, but the similarities exist.
I would propose that one of the lessons the Russians identified from making the same mistake that we now make, is that the 'Taliban' is not an organised bunch of troops, but is merely an idea. This ideal provides an avenue of activity which appeals to the motivational values of young men in that culture, one of achieving an identity, in a way that they would say is honourable.
So the real mistake is not to acknowledge this fact, and make efforts to offer an alternative to this ideal. We offer little in the way of alternative. It isn't easy to do so either. But I think that so many people who don't see it as necessary to do so are often those who wonder why the military might of the Western world has trouble stuffing a few hundred flip-flop wearers.
In trying to generate an Army there, we have a problem of identity. Here you go Afghans, have a democracy and an Army. Identity and honour sorted, yes? Well, no, actually. There are many in Afghanistan (as we call it) who have no regard for the borders that were drawn up, which often lie across tribal areas. Some individuals do not see themselves as 'Afghani' or from 'Afghanistan'. Again, we miss this point a lot of the time. So unfortunately, we now reap the problems of history and this will be very difficult to unpick. Ergo, train flip-flop wearers to become boot and beret wearers, take minimum risk for the final 2 years to drop the casualty numbers so the press lose interest, and we can say we now have the security situation totally under our control (no-one at home will know otherwise). Then declare victory in 2014 and hot foot it out of there. Hence the hitler YouTube spoofs of the 45 slide conop just to go outside the wire...
Sorry for the long post, hope it provides an alternative angle. It's all just my opinion personally of course, and I don't expect or need agreement, I just hope that after all of this, our gov't can engage brain before engaging in battle.
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Re HMG, wasn't one used on the Apache in the book by Ed Macy
which got destroyed and didn't he comment that the intel was that
someone from another country had come in to operate it ?
.
which got destroyed and didn't he comment that the intel was that
someone from another country had come in to operate it ?
.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
take minimum risk for the final 2 years to drop the casualty numbers so the press lose interest, and we can say we now have the security situation totally under our control (no-one at home will know otherwise). Then declare victory in 2014 and hot foot it out of there.
Historically is has never worked that way.
Any defeat, withdrawal, handover, whatever you call it, has always been helped with a surge in hostile activities.
Without aircraft in the overhead ready to "support" we would not risk boots on the ground for a day.
Air Power cannot occupy, hold, or secure ground....it takes the plain ol' Infantry Soldier with a rifle and (in the old days) a fixed Bayonet to do that. We own what is controlled by that guy on the ground.
As controlling a specified bit of dirt is always the central focus of warfare....anything else is secondary.
We Aviators, as much as it pains us at times....must remember that.
We can go off hunting with our airborne guns,rockets, and bombs....but in the final analysis....unless we send in the Grunts....as soon as we leave the opposite side just comes back, polices up the debris, and sets up shop once again.
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Ralphmalph, thanks, no worries.
Pontius, quite possibly so, we'll have to see how it pans out. I do violently agree with you that the other side would do exactly the same, but our fickle media having lost interest might not report the situation, thus hiding the reality of it. That has happened before, and seems to correlate with a story that wouldn't help sell papers.
Pontius, quite possibly so, we'll have to see how it pans out. I do violently agree with you that the other side would do exactly the same, but our fickle media having lost interest might not report the situation, thus hiding the reality of it. That has happened before, and seems to correlate with a story that wouldn't help sell papers.
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Sasless, I'd suggest 'grunts' or not, that last scenario is one we might end up facing. Arguably, the difference made by the presence of ground troops would appear to be little other than home casualties, sadly.
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SASLess,
I'm not sure where in my previous posts that I think AH are "taking the lead" or indeed what your Cold War references were all about but they came across as both condescending and vitriolic.
I've been involved in All Arms operations for the last 24 years so I don't need you to tell me I'm there to support the guy on the ground. In fact I've been doing just that for 5 months of this year.
I have also been the guy on the ground - have you?
I'm not sure where in my previous posts that I think AH are "taking the lead" or indeed what your Cold War references were all about but they came across as both condescending and vitriolic.
I've been involved in All Arms operations for the last 24 years so I don't need you to tell me I'm there to support the guy on the ground. In fact I've been doing just that for 5 months of this year.
I have also been the guy on the ground - have you?
I have "walked" the walk Crypt....got the bullet wound and other scars to prove it. My sense of timing and getting the zag confused with the zig gave me those. Granted, having 40,000 pounds of aluminum and cast iron strapped to my Butt did slow me down a bit.
Do not think my remarks are directed exactly at you individually....as they are not.
Do not think my remarks are directed exactly at you individually....as they are not.
The lesson that we keep failing to learn is that regular ground forces quickly overstay their welcome and become part of the problem, not the solution - this has been true in any number of 'limited' conflicts over the ages. Once they become a target, political sensitivity to losses means that defending themselves occupies the vast majority of their time and effort. Without needing to do any detailed maths, I suggest that the vast majority of expenditure on operations in Afghanistan right now is on keeping NATO personnel and western civilians alive; the amount being spent on the campaign aims must surely pale by comparison.
We got it right in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2003 - we had SF on the ground, working with the Northern Alliance ground forces, with Western air support. Some commentators in the US are suggesting that the US's strategic goals were all achieved by early 2002 (although some will argue 2003). It's only become a disastrous mess since large-scale regular troop deployments took place thereafter.
Say what you like about post-Ghadaffi Libya - but the fact remains that the NATO campaign there was highly succesful, using SF on the ground, working with anti-Ghadaffi ground forces, with NATO (and UAE/Qatar) air support. Anyone see any similarities? The main point is that the majority of the troops are locals, who care passionately for their cause, and whose people are willing to take combat losses in pursuit of their aim. Which is not the case for us; a regular infantry whose first concern is to avoid losses is immediately fighting with one arm tied behind its back.
I hear a lot of regular Army acquaintances saying that a large regular army is needed to have a big enough pool to choose SF from. I call BS on that (the SBS seem to do pretty well choosing from 1 brigade) and anticipate major cuts to regular forces in the next SDSR.
We got it right in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2003 - we had SF on the ground, working with the Northern Alliance ground forces, with Western air support. Some commentators in the US are suggesting that the US's strategic goals were all achieved by early 2002 (although some will argue 2003). It's only become a disastrous mess since large-scale regular troop deployments took place thereafter.
Say what you like about post-Ghadaffi Libya - but the fact remains that the NATO campaign there was highly succesful, using SF on the ground, working with anti-Ghadaffi ground forces, with NATO (and UAE/Qatar) air support. Anyone see any similarities? The main point is that the majority of the troops are locals, who care passionately for their cause, and whose people are willing to take combat losses in pursuit of their aim. Which is not the case for us; a regular infantry whose first concern is to avoid losses is immediately fighting with one arm tied behind its back.
I hear a lot of regular Army acquaintances saying that a large regular army is needed to have a big enough pool to choose SF from. I call BS on that (the SBS seem to do pretty well choosing from 1 brigade) and anticipate major cuts to regular forces in the next SDSR.
Last edited by Easy Street; 16th Sep 2012 at 20:43.