The lesson that we keep failing to learn is that regular ground forces quickly overstay their welcome and become part of the problem, not the solution - this has been true in any number of 'limited' conflicts over the ages. Once they become a target, political sensitivity to losses means that defending themselves occupies the vast majority of their time and effort. Without needing to do any detailed maths, I suggest that the vast majority of expenditure on operations in Afghanistan right now is on keeping NATO personnel and western civilians alive; the amount being spent on the campaign aims must surely pale by comparison.
We got it right in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2003 - we had SF on the ground, working with the Northern Alliance ground forces, with Western air support. Some commentators in the US are suggesting that the US's strategic goals were all achieved by early 2002 (although some will argue 2003). It's only become a disastrous mess since large-scale regular troop deployments took place thereafter.
Say what you like about post-Ghadaffi Libya - but the fact remains that the NATO campaign there was highly succesful, using SF on the ground, working with anti-Ghadaffi ground forces, with NATO (and UAE/Qatar) air support. Anyone see any similarities? The main point is that the majority of the troops are locals, who care passionately for their cause, and whose people are willing to take combat losses in pursuit of their aim. Which is not the case for us; a regular infantry whose first concern is to avoid losses is immediately fighting with one arm tied behind its back.
I hear a lot of regular Army acquaintances saying that a large regular army is needed to have a big enough pool to choose SF from. I call BS on that (the SBS seem to do pretty well choosing from 1 brigade) and anticipate major cuts to regular forces in the next SDSR.
Last edited by Easy Street; 16th September 2012 at 20:43.