Morale
Hmmm..As I recall, I.P.Ts morphed from the spambuzz term "Multi-Discipline Groups" around `86....
Even then, there were numerous `career pattern` inserts who had no idea WTF they were expected to talk about and spent most of their staff tours ducking & diving. I recall my branch Wg Cdr saying to me "Well, Mister OMS, I know you have given me a comprehensive brief on all of the issues and I`m sure you are right in your conclusions....However, I am posted next month, so I expect you to keep all the balls in the air till after I`ve gone"
I fear nothing changes much - except there are even fewer at the pointy (bottom) end of the triangle...
Even then, there were numerous `career pattern` inserts who had no idea WTF they were expected to talk about and spent most of their staff tours ducking & diving. I recall my branch Wg Cdr saying to me "Well, Mister OMS, I know you have given me a comprehensive brief on all of the issues and I`m sure you are right in your conclusions....However, I am posted next month, so I expect you to keep all the balls in the air till after I`ve gone"
I fear nothing changes much - except there are even fewer at the pointy (bottom) end of the triangle...
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Possibly worth considering:
I have always thought it strange that no review or study - be it SDSR or a 'value stream analysis' or even dear Courtney rearranging the desks at group (BZ old chap - I'd buy the DVD if there was one) is ever followed by a ticking off of the previous regime.
We always pat someone on the back for having sorted stuff out, made savings, got the depth maintenance working etc etc without then going after the incompetent half-wits who presided over the broken system that we have now fixed.
In one of my (sadly not isolated) moments of putting senior noses somewhat out of kilter I advised on a programme for making the aircrew briefing process on some well known war canoes vaguely fit for purpose. When we (implemented by ludicrously well paid civilians) had achieved the bleeding obvious (that us young fellows had been arguing for for a couple of tours) I enquired politely whether there would be any repercussions for the officers who had overseen the mess from which we had emerged. The answer, naturally was a resounding 'no' (to summarise) as they had been promoted out of the shambles.
I have always thought it strange that no review or study - be it SDSR or a 'value stream analysis' or even dear Courtney rearranging the desks at group (BZ old chap - I'd buy the DVD if there was one) is ever followed by a ticking off of the previous regime.
We always pat someone on the back for having sorted stuff out, made savings, got the depth maintenance working etc etc without then going after the incompetent half-wits who presided over the broken system that we have now fixed.
In one of my (sadly not isolated) moments of putting senior noses somewhat out of kilter I advised on a programme for making the aircrew briefing process on some well known war canoes vaguely fit for purpose. When we (implemented by ludicrously well paid civilians) had achieved the bleeding obvious (that us young fellows had been arguing for for a couple of tours) I enquired politely whether there would be any repercussions for the officers who had overseen the mess from which we had emerged. The answer, naturally was a resounding 'no' (to summarise) as they had been promoted out of the shambles.
Last edited by orca; 24th Aug 2012 at 03:19.
orca
Even though occasionally I may seem slightly critical, this is a difficult one. One seldom knows what boundaries and constraints the previous staffs were working under. With Servicemen usually on 2-3 year tours, it was almost always the civil servants who had this deeper understanding as it was they who provided continuity (and, kept the records/evidence!). This is no longer the case.
Most people act in a way they think best. There is a reluctance to criticise and in general I agree with that. The notable exceptions (in my opinion) are the decisions/policies made with personal gain in mind. The concealing of waste by the unnecessary slashing of airworthiness budgets is the one I always cite. I firmly believe this was carried out by one VSO (AMSO / RAF Chief Engineer in 1991-94) to conceal the incompetence of his AMSO predecessors. This unholy alliance continues to this day, with all of them continuing to protect each others’ backs and support each other; for example, against the MoK pilots who were scapegoated to conceal this incompetence. When considering most of the really major screw ups over the last 20 odd years, you need look no further than the MoK case and the VSOs who stood against the pilots.
These same people are also meant to apply “management oversight” and it is at THAT level we should always look, not some junior Gp Capt or Wg Cdr.
We moan and groan about relatively minor organisational issues, but the real biggies are the many examples of avoidable loss of life, caused by sacrificing safety to make savings, in order to conceal waste. (This last bit, to conceal waste, is what Haddon-Cave omitted; whoever prompted THAT omission is the kind of person you are talking about. And, as the 2i/c of the MAA must have been party to this.......). At 2 Star level and above, Chinook (MoK and Mk3), Nimrod (XV230 and MRA4), Tornado/Patriot, C130 XV179 and others can be narrowed down to THE SAME small cadre. We know their names; they wrote to the press often enough. Very few understand the fact it is only a relative few. Not one has ever been called to account. All you can say is one of them at least had the balls (more likely arrogance!) to post here openly denigrating the MoK pilots; although it will be remembered he never actually answered a question!
I have always thought it strange that no review or study - be it SDSR or a 'value stream analysis' ...... is ever followed by a ticking off of the previous regime.
Most people act in a way they think best. There is a reluctance to criticise and in general I agree with that. The notable exceptions (in my opinion) are the decisions/policies made with personal gain in mind. The concealing of waste by the unnecessary slashing of airworthiness budgets is the one I always cite. I firmly believe this was carried out by one VSO (AMSO / RAF Chief Engineer in 1991-94) to conceal the incompetence of his AMSO predecessors. This unholy alliance continues to this day, with all of them continuing to protect each others’ backs and support each other; for example, against the MoK pilots who were scapegoated to conceal this incompetence. When considering most of the really major screw ups over the last 20 odd years, you need look no further than the MoK case and the VSOs who stood against the pilots.
These same people are also meant to apply “management oversight” and it is at THAT level we should always look, not some junior Gp Capt or Wg Cdr.
We moan and groan about relatively minor organisational issues, but the real biggies are the many examples of avoidable loss of life, caused by sacrificing safety to make savings, in order to conceal waste. (This last bit, to conceal waste, is what Haddon-Cave omitted; whoever prompted THAT omission is the kind of person you are talking about. And, as the 2i/c of the MAA must have been party to this.......). At 2 Star level and above, Chinook (MoK and Mk3), Nimrod (XV230 and MRA4), Tornado/Patriot, C130 XV179 and others can be narrowed down to THE SAME small cadre. We know their names; they wrote to the press often enough. Very few understand the fact it is only a relative few. Not one has ever been called to account. All you can say is one of them at least had the balls (more likely arrogance!) to post here openly denigrating the MoK pilots; although it will be remembered he never actually answered a question!
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
One, a CS, used to work at the AirSec's department in Adastral House. His job was to process 1369s and 1020 reports. The latter was an aspect he did not like and which worried him. Some 1369s worried him too.
Eventually, when he retired, they discovered in his office lots of reports and indeed whole files, behind cupboards and filing cabinets etc. This explained why some individuals had gone 2 and even 3 tours at some places; they had dropped completely off the radar.
To counter Tuc's arguement, where an SO has behaved in an incompetent or vindictive manner, their nature is often discovered later on and they are then often sidelined or better have their fortune read.
What was never done was to review any 1369s etc by that individual. I was shafted early by an elderly but newly arrived sqn cdr. Subsequently he was posted to a staff job at Epi and short toured by the gp capt. Next up the idiot tree was a right tartar who it turned out was suffering from a brain tumour. In those days the 1369 was confidential and debriefs rarely given; there was no redress.
PN
There is no need to counter my argument. I expressed an opinion and I entirely agree with the point you make in your particular case. It is only natural that we each cite personal experiences.
I believe much of MoD's incompetence stems from poor leadership by the protected species. For example, the RAF Chief Engineer's 1991 decision that all Admin staff shall be treated as senior to any Engineer. Ask any RAF SENGO how his morale would suffer if an Admin Pilot Officer was made his line manager; and that PO had engineering delegation and was allowed to overrule the SENGO on engineering and safety decisions! That is precisely what MoD staff had to deal with in the early 90s. That ruling, while on paper overturned, set a tone that remains to this day. The successors to those early 90s civilian Engineers are mostly competent in their own field, but completely out of their depth when granted, for example, airworthiness delegation. (And worse, being allowed to self delegate). That act is at the root of a number of fatal accidents. Those who condone it should be in gaol, not praised by H-C.
There is a big difference between someone who is incompetent yet does his best, and someone who knowingly commits fraud on a vast scale, then seeks to hide it by slashing other budgets so the overall books "balance". In the case I quote (AMSO's deliberate waste of the late 80s/90s, which is at the root of current deficits), why not simply stop the waste? But that would make public the root problem. A conscious decision was made NOT to stop the waste, and civil servants who tried to were threatened with dismissal. What morale do you think remained after that?
I think we speak from the same page, just from a different perspective.
The worst CS in Air Staffs (in my experience)? The one who, in late 1990, refused to endorse expenditure to get the 3rd Nimrod R flying, because he "hadn't received a letter from the Prime Minister telling (me) we were going to war". I had to let 39 contracts on a handshake, promising to cough up after the event. Every company worked for nothing and delivered on time. He was praised, I was vilified. Rumour has it he was personally decorated by Saddam for his contribution to the war effort. From what you say, there are a lot like him!
Regards
There is no need to counter my argument. I expressed an opinion and I entirely agree with the point you make in your particular case. It is only natural that we each cite personal experiences.
I believe much of MoD's incompetence stems from poor leadership by the protected species. For example, the RAF Chief Engineer's 1991 decision that all Admin staff shall be treated as senior to any Engineer. Ask any RAF SENGO how his morale would suffer if an Admin Pilot Officer was made his line manager; and that PO had engineering delegation and was allowed to overrule the SENGO on engineering and safety decisions! That is precisely what MoD staff had to deal with in the early 90s. That ruling, while on paper overturned, set a tone that remains to this day. The successors to those early 90s civilian Engineers are mostly competent in their own field, but completely out of their depth when granted, for example, airworthiness delegation. (And worse, being allowed to self delegate). That act is at the root of a number of fatal accidents. Those who condone it should be in gaol, not praised by H-C.
There is a big difference between someone who is incompetent yet does his best, and someone who knowingly commits fraud on a vast scale, then seeks to hide it by slashing other budgets so the overall books "balance". In the case I quote (AMSO's deliberate waste of the late 80s/90s, which is at the root of current deficits), why not simply stop the waste? But that would make public the root problem. A conscious decision was made NOT to stop the waste, and civil servants who tried to were threatened with dismissal. What morale do you think remained after that?
I think we speak from the same page, just from a different perspective.
The worst CS in Air Staffs (in my experience)? The one who, in late 1990, refused to endorse expenditure to get the 3rd Nimrod R flying, because he "hadn't received a letter from the Prime Minister telling (me) we were going to war". I had to let 39 contracts on a handshake, promising to cough up after the event. Every company worked for nothing and delivered on time. He was praised, I was vilified. Rumour has it he was personally decorated by Saddam for his contribution to the war effort. From what you say, there are a lot like him!
Regards
Not understanding how the very top of the RAF works, perhaps someone could help me. I have heard people say that retired 3* and 4* still have influence over the Air Force Board and stick their oars in when it comes to things like selecting the next CAS. Is this just crewroom boll*cks or is there something in it? Sounds plausible given the reluctance of the current leadership to do anything about the issues tuc raises. Perhaps it will need someone brave at the top to tell them all to bugger off, become JPs and join their parish councils to keep themselves busy...
Last edited by Easy Street; 24th Aug 2012 at 19:33.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
ES, surely not.
You would never find current and former VSO together in the RAF Club would you?
You would never find current and former VSO together in the RAF Club would you?
There's a world of difference between drinking with someone and being beholden to them.
I've known and been friendly with predecessors of the tour I've been doing. I've also been interested when they've related stories of their time in post and when they've given me advice. That doesn't mean that I've taken their advice as gospel or that I've felt under obligation to follow it. Why the hell does anyone think it's different for VSOs?
Do people think there's a secret contract you have to sign on promotion, promising to always follow the orders from those who recommended them? Ah well, I suppose it's human nature to love conspiracy theories.
I've known and been friendly with predecessors of the tour I've been doing. I've also been interested when they've related stories of their time in post and when they've given me advice. That doesn't mean that I've taken their advice as gospel or that I've felt under obligation to follow it. Why the hell does anyone think it's different for VSOs?
Do people think there's a secret contract you have to sign on promotion, promising to always follow the orders from those who recommended them? Ah well, I suppose it's human nature to love conspiracy theories.
Easy Street
The events leading up to the MoK announcement last year clearly illustrated the influence of these retired VSOs. Their media interviews, especially with BBC Radio Ulster, were word for word what the MoD (esp D/Air Staffs) later said. Alcock's claims about the CHART report (that it had nothing to do with Chinook Mk2) were repeated word for word in Ministerial briefings; despite the team's Terms of Reference specifically including Mk2 and the report mentioning it no less than 383 times!
As Alcock was one of only two recipients of the report, and had delayed the start of the investigation while the ToRs were diluted, I'll leave you to decide if his was a genuine mistake or something more sinister. You may recall the Team went beyond their ToRs, which specifically prevented them from speaking to MoD's specialist airworthiness staffs - an astonishing constraint. That is to their credit and it did their careers no good at all.
Fox cleverly circumvented their influence by using the Defence Council and in doing so dented their influence. Certainly, these VSOs have been noticeably silent ever since.
The events leading up to the MoK announcement last year clearly illustrated the influence of these retired VSOs. Their media interviews, especially with BBC Radio Ulster, were word for word what the MoD (esp D/Air Staffs) later said. Alcock's claims about the CHART report (that it had nothing to do with Chinook Mk2) were repeated word for word in Ministerial briefings; despite the team's Terms of Reference specifically including Mk2 and the report mentioning it no less than 383 times!
As Alcock was one of only two recipients of the report, and had delayed the start of the investigation while the ToRs were diluted, I'll leave you to decide if his was a genuine mistake or something more sinister. You may recall the Team went beyond their ToRs, which specifically prevented them from speaking to MoD's specialist airworthiness staffs - an astonishing constraint. That is to their credit and it did their careers no good at all.
Fox cleverly circumvented their influence by using the Defence Council and in doing so dented their influence. Certainly, these VSOs have been noticeably silent ever since.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
I've known and been friendly with predecessors of the tour I've been doing. I've also been interested when they've related stories of their time in post and when they've given me advice. That doesn't mean that I've taken their advice as gospel or that I've felt under obligation to follow it.
I was in such a situation where I was in a quite new sphere, my predecessor had left a very full bried but in a 4 day hand-over it was inevitable that things were left out.
Until I mastered my brief I was beholden to him for his advice before he left and for a few months afterwards.
I imagine also at the very top there will be a desire to maintain continuity. I think most of us will remember when the top man pushed through his own beliefs - the QNH debacle - and what happened almost the day after he resigned - the return to QFE.
I suspect that maintenance of the aim remains high on their list of 'must do's.'
RLE:
Because certain VSOs post 1987 set in chain the course of events described above by Tuc.
An incredibly stupid policy resulted in a sky rocketing deficit in the Defence Budget.
A further incredibly stupid policy was devised to claw back the deficit by slashing time and money spent on airworthiness provision (as mandated by the Regulations). Engineers with Airworthiness Delegation resisted and even disobeyed illegal orders from VSOs to suborn the Regulations.
A further incredibly stupid policy meant they were replaced by junior administrators.
Despite being urged by Boscombe Down to ground its newly and illegally released to service Chinook HC2s, the RAF instead sent 26 VIPs up in what was then known to be a Grossly Unairworthy aircraft. It crashed killing all 29 on board.
A further incredibly stupid act was to find the two deceased pilots Grossly Negligent with no proof whatsoever. That finding by 2 VSOs was upheld by other VSOs for the next 17 years. The RAF High Command has still not accepted the action of the SoS in overturning that finding, talking still of the pilots flying in cloud below SA into terrain, still with no proof.
That is why VSOs are different, because of incredibly stupid policies and decisions which would discredit them all if it emerged. Their trouble is that it has emerged. They are all discredited. That is what makes them different!
Why the hell does anyone think it's different for VSOs?
An incredibly stupid policy resulted in a sky rocketing deficit in the Defence Budget.
A further incredibly stupid policy was devised to claw back the deficit by slashing time and money spent on airworthiness provision (as mandated by the Regulations). Engineers with Airworthiness Delegation resisted and even disobeyed illegal orders from VSOs to suborn the Regulations.
A further incredibly stupid policy meant they were replaced by junior administrators.
Despite being urged by Boscombe Down to ground its newly and illegally released to service Chinook HC2s, the RAF instead sent 26 VIPs up in what was then known to be a Grossly Unairworthy aircraft. It crashed killing all 29 on board.
A further incredibly stupid act was to find the two deceased pilots Grossly Negligent with no proof whatsoever. That finding by 2 VSOs was upheld by other VSOs for the next 17 years. The RAF High Command has still not accepted the action of the SoS in overturning that finding, talking still of the pilots flying in cloud below SA into terrain, still with no proof.
That is why VSOs are different, because of incredibly stupid policies and decisions which would discredit them all if it emerged. Their trouble is that it has emerged. They are all discredited. That is what makes them different!
PN are you suggesting that it was the idea of QNH that was wrong or the way it was introduced? I would say that we should join the rest of the flying world and bin the idea of QFE . Here in OXON no one has flown into the ground since the changes to our procedures. Not only that but the FJ world seems to manage in KDH and other places.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
vasco, the way it was introduced.
The lesser powers that be had used all their ammunition to try and retain QFE from the ease of training pilot to land when the altimeter read zero, aerobatics and flying displays I suspect, and ignored the fact that in a low level regime you need to fly at a fixed interval above an undulating surface referenced to a plain surface - sea level.
That this resistance was led by the pilot mafia (I presume) and I think the navman at Northolt had something to say too (cost) transcended every command only the man at the top of the tree had the cojones to introduce change.
No single Group could go it alone and the CinC was obviously one of the mafia.
As soon as the top of the tree was ppruned the mafia struck regardless of expense reissuing all those Taps.
Regarding the mafia, and including navman, look how long it took to get Tap books.
The lesser powers that be had used all their ammunition to try and retain QFE from the ease of training pilot to land when the altimeter read zero, aerobatics and flying displays I suspect, and ignored the fact that in a low level regime you need to fly at a fixed interval above an undulating surface referenced to a plain surface - sea level.
That this resistance was led by the pilot mafia (I presume) and I think the navman at Northolt had something to say too (cost) transcended every command only the man at the top of the tree had the cojones to introduce change.
No single Group could go it alone and the CinC was obviously one of the mafia.
As soon as the top of the tree was ppruned the mafia struck regardless of expense reissuing all those Taps.
Regarding the mafia, and including navman, look how long it took to get Tap books.
