Dam Busters: The Race to Smash the German Dams
Ah, but the Soviet Union was no more our gallant ally, helping to crushing the German NAZI threat, it was now a threat to the whole world and to the NATO signatories in particular. In contrast Germany rid of its NAZI regime was now our ally, a fellow NATO member, occupied by the Red Army in the east and threatened with invasion in the west. Events, dear boy, events...
Chugalug2, I think you miss my point. Regardless of who it was, our doctrine was back to where it had ended in 45, but on a far greater scale. It just didn't make any sense.
It wasn’t back where it ended, they were two entirely different strategies. The bomber offensive against Germany was intended to help achieve victory and so end the war as quickly as possible - and it worked. The nuclear deterrent was intended to deter any attack on Western Europe by Warsaw Pact forces - and it worked.
Ok, one last time. The point I am making is that BC was snubbed by the government/ officialdom because it was decided that the policy of area bombing and it's civilian deaths were unpalatable post war. Yet the the government/ officialdom gave BC the tools to potentially do it again on a far greater scale. Hence the snubbing of BC was entirely hypocritical. Reminiscent of Tommy this and Tommy that....
When it could operate by day it could take out precision targets, witness Tirpitz, Bielefeld Viaduct, etc, but with specialised weapons and specially trained crews and with potentially very great risk. There were exceptions of course, Chastise per this thread …..
But I agree with your point entirely, Bomber Command wasn't about pinpoint targeting, it was about taking the war to Festung Deutschland, and in doing so it bottled up a great deal of the Luftwaffe both on the ground and in the air, as well as creating chaos in the Reich. By doing that night after night (and day after day by the USAAF) it kept them bottled up which was an enormous strategic effect in its own right. It was a war of attrition which bled BC dry and in no way secured Air Superiority for us (that was done later, and by day, and by the little friends) but it meant air superiority elsewhere and hence paved the way to ultimate victory. As to a waste of lives, war is always a waste of lives but if it leads to an early victory it saves many others. BC is an easy target to snipe at, rather like the trench warfare of WWI, but both were the art of the possible and both led in the end to victory.
................ and Haig is as little loved as Harris.
Many similarities.
Where would we be without the like?
Speaking German perhaps?
PS Sorry about the BOLLOCKS, one of my studies early in the job [1955] was of the development of forecasting of winds in the war. Unusually, I do know what I am talking about.
Many similarities.
Where would we be without the like?
Speaking German perhaps?
PS Sorry about the BOLLOCKS, one of my studies early in the job [1955] was of the development of forecasting of winds in the war. Unusually, I do know what I am talking about.
No worries LB. 'Guess work' was a cheap shot and you were right to call me out. I was gilding my own lily at the time!
Bomber Command's war against German cities may have represented "the art of the possible" and may have "led in the end to victory", but had all of the resources been devoted to tactical bombing (which actually resulted in real effect, against more than the odd cow), would we have won quicker, and with fewer losses?
Had every Wellington been a pair of Whirlwinds, and every Halifax, Lanc, and Stirling a pair of Bostons, Beaufighters, and Mosquitos I suspect that we'd have done MUCH more damage to the German war machine, with much lower losses.
Had every Wellington been a pair of Whirlwinds, and every Halifax, Lanc, and Stirling a pair of Bostons, Beaufighters, and Mosquitos I suspect that we'd have done MUCH more damage to the German war machine, with much lower losses.
The German's had no appreciable night fighter force, compared to their day fighter numbers, and night fighter production did not really result in any substantial increase (although the technology they employed did). BC hardly bottled any of the Luftwaffe up. AAA was seen as the primary means of defence against airborne attack, particularly against the relatively low flying RAF. It was the withdrawal of day fighters (because that's mainly what they had) from other theatres to counter the daylight bombing offensive that produced the most effect on the Luftwaffe's ability to project force in those areas. The USAAF flew too high for most of the German AAA to be effective, and thus fighters were the only other alternative, even though by that time their performance at those altitudes was inferior to the Allied equipment.
Bomber Command's war against German cities may have represented "the art of the possible" and may have "led in the end to victory", but had all of the resources been devoted to tactical bombing (which actually resulted in real effect, against more than the odd cow), would we have won quicker, and with fewer losses?
Had every Wellington been a pair of Whirlwinds, and every Halifax, Lanc, and Stirling a pair of Bostons, Beaufighters, and Mosquitos I suspect that we'd have done MUCH more damage to the German war machine, with much lower losses.
Had every Wellington been a pair of Whirlwinds, and every Halifax, Lanc, and Stirling a pair of Bostons, Beaufighters, and Mosquitos I suspect that we'd have done MUCH more damage to the German war machine, with much lower losses.
Granted, this is all with the benefit of 20-20 hindsight. I don't doubt that those in command thought what they were doing was the best way to win the war. A better analogy might be the old saying that if all you have is a hammer, the whole world looks like a nail.
I don't know about that.
There were plenty of people urging greater investment in the kind of things that 2 Group was doing with its Bostons, etc.
Operation Oyster (the raid on the Philips plant at Eindhoven) showed what was possible - major damage was inflicted with great accuracy, relatively light collateral damage and (apart from the Venturas) with relatively light losses.
But too many senior officers wanted more obvious 'headline' results, even though they clearly lacked the tools to achieve them.
Harris was supremely indifferent and uninterested in anything that he saw as a sideshow, and 'tactical' bombing fell into exactly that category for him.
There were plenty of people urging greater investment in the kind of things that 2 Group was doing with its Bostons, etc.
Operation Oyster (the raid on the Philips plant at Eindhoven) showed what was possible - major damage was inflicted with great accuracy, relatively light collateral damage and (apart from the Venturas) with relatively light losses.
But too many senior officers wanted more obvious 'headline' results, even though they clearly lacked the tools to achieve them.
Harris was supremely indifferent and uninterested in anything that he saw as a sideshow, and 'tactical' bombing fell into exactly that category for him.
The nature of night fighter tactics creates a force that is bound to be numerically smaller than a day fighter one. Much of the infrastructure is ground based, witness the Kammhuber Line and the associated ground radars. The airborne Lichtenstein taking over only for the final interception. The system was clunky and easily overwhelmed by using the single bomber stream to do so. Thereafter it was measure and countermeasure by both sides, even resorting to day fighters (Wilde Sau) and upward firing cannon in the night fighters (Schrage Musik). But numbers involved were always less than the daytime interceptions. One was a precise choreography, the other a swarm. To infer it was an insignificant drain on Luftwaffe resources (which also provided the flak batteries of course) is misleading.
Would medium bombers have better disrupted Germany's ability to conduct the war rather than BC's heavies? I can't see how. The Luftwaffe had only medium bombers and the answer to them in the East was to withdraw the targets outside of their radius of action. I've no doubt that if the RAF had switched to medium bombers the targets would have been moved accordingly. It was the ability to follow them that gave the Allies the upper hand in the bombing offensive. In the end we would have had an enormous fleet of twin engine bombers and a paucity of targets for them to strike.
Would medium bombers have better disrupted Germany's ability to conduct the war rather than BC's heavies? I can't see how. The Luftwaffe had only medium bombers and the answer to them in the East was to withdraw the targets outside of their radius of action. I've no doubt that if the RAF had switched to medium bombers the targets would have been moved accordingly. It was the ability to follow them that gave the Allies the upper hand in the bombing offensive. In the end we would have had an enormous fleet of twin engine bombers and a paucity of targets for them to strike.
Chugalug,
The problem is that for most of the War, the night bombers went out, night after night, and failed to hit their targets, and indeed to inflict damage and/or casualties that came anywhere close to outweighing losses. Occasionally, and more often from 1944 on, they caused massive civilian casualties and disrupted industrial production.
Did German bombing cause a collapse of UK civilian morale? No. Do you think allied bombing did anything different?
Did Allied bombing actually force dispersal and more efficient production methods?
Weighed against that I can't see how medium bombers could have done any worse, and they would most likely have done much better. Bear in mind that every Lancaster and its seven aircrew could have been two Mosquitos. How many targets could the Mosquito not reach? How many more targets could a Mosquito have accurately bombed than a single Lancaster? How many Mosquitos and crews would have survived? And that's if you just chose to hit the same target sets.
They could have been making life impossible for German forces in France and the other occupied countries. They could have made it impossible to complete coastal defences, and could have disrupted the supply of ammunition, supplies and food to the German defenders. D-Day might have been a lot easier. They could have remorselessly hit the German airfields and V-weapon launch sites.
The problem is that for most of the War, the night bombers went out, night after night, and failed to hit their targets, and indeed to inflict damage and/or casualties that came anywhere close to outweighing losses. Occasionally, and more often from 1944 on, they caused massive civilian casualties and disrupted industrial production.
Did German bombing cause a collapse of UK civilian morale? No. Do you think allied bombing did anything different?
Did Allied bombing actually force dispersal and more efficient production methods?
Weighed against that I can't see how medium bombers could have done any worse, and they would most likely have done much better. Bear in mind that every Lancaster and its seven aircrew could have been two Mosquitos. How many targets could the Mosquito not reach? How many more targets could a Mosquito have accurately bombed than a single Lancaster? How many Mosquitos and crews would have survived? And that's if you just chose to hit the same target sets.
They could have been making life impossible for German forces in France and the other occupied countries. They could have made it impossible to complete coastal defences, and could have disrupted the supply of ammunition, supplies and food to the German defenders. D-Day might have been a lot easier. They could have remorselessly hit the German airfields and V-weapon launch sites.
We can go on bandying what ifs forever, and all to little point. My contention is that the Allied Bombing Offensive by day and by night disrupted Germany's ability to conduct the war even more aggressively, particularly in the forced withdrawal to the Reich of Luftwaffe capability that could have been hampering, preventing maybe, advancing land forces on the major fronts that were converging on the Reich. Yes, day fighters of course, but the immense numbers of flak batteries and their crews as well. The latter as previously pointed out were there to deal mainly with the night bombing. The effect of releasing them to the Eastern Front (in particular the 88s) could have been devastating against the T34s of the Red Army. The Night Bombing Campaign was in effect the second front that Stalin demanded long before D-Day. It was his forces that progressively drove the Wehrmacht back from whence it came.
Civilian Morale if anything hardened as a result of city bombing. Even if it hadn't the population had little opportunity to do anything other than do as it was told and keep its mouths shut, agreed. But the night bombing had a great effect on production and man power resources. Even if it hadn't the chaos it created diverted even more resources to dealing with each and every raid. If the effort had moved away from the Reich then resources could have been switched elsewhere and in particular to the Russian front. We had no quibble about laying waste to German cities, then at least, but taking out targets in occupied cities was another thing entirely. They would have to be bombed by day, they would be better defended if this was now where the threat was. The success against such targets during BC's actual campaign was because the Luftwaffe was in the main defending the Reich. I repeat, the main effect of the Allied Bombing Offensive was to cede air superiority outside of the Reich. That led to Kursk, Italy, and Normandy, and the driving back of the Wehrmacht in those theatres
Civilian Morale if anything hardened as a result of city bombing. Even if it hadn't the population had little opportunity to do anything other than do as it was told and keep its mouths shut, agreed. But the night bombing had a great effect on production and man power resources. Even if it hadn't the chaos it created diverted even more resources to dealing with each and every raid. If the effort had moved away from the Reich then resources could have been switched elsewhere and in particular to the Russian front. We had no quibble about laying waste to German cities, then at least, but taking out targets in occupied cities was another thing entirely. They would have to be bombed by day, they would be better defended if this was now where the threat was. The success against such targets during BC's actual campaign was because the Luftwaffe was in the main defending the Reich. I repeat, the main effect of the Allied Bombing Offensive was to cede air superiority outside of the Reich. That led to Kursk, Italy, and Normandy, and the driving back of the Wehrmacht in those theatres
