JSF first flight
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Edmund Blackadder
Joint Force Harrier (JFH)is the way ahead. Engineering and logs support is already combining - witness a joint IPT to provide old fashioned Support Authority type engineering advice. Logs comes from the DLO which is getting more tri-service and once fleets are combined at Cott/Wit logs will be common. Admin for a/c and squadrons comes from a joint role office at Strike. Personnel admin is by necessity single service at present but as conditions and terms of service come to-gether then so will the admin. They're on the right track - give them a few years.
Joint Force Harrier (JFH)is the way ahead. Engineering and logs support is already combining - witness a joint IPT to provide old fashioned Support Authority type engineering advice. Logs comes from the DLO which is getting more tri-service and once fleets are combined at Cott/Wit logs will be common. Admin for a/c and squadrons comes from a joint role office at Strike. Personnel admin is by necessity single service at present but as conditions and terms of service come to-gether then so will the admin. They're on the right track - give them a few years.
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There are, admitedly, a few savings to be made my "jointery". It is NOT however a new panacea which no one has noticed for the last 80 years!
The requirements of the forces are different. To give examples. The RAF has a log/supply system designed/equipped to track ac spares world-wide in case of AOG. It is gold plated as far as the army is concerned.
The RAF pay/allowances system is designed to try and retain pilots. That is where the pool of money goes in flying pay. The RN system is designed to recompense everyone who goes to sea for long periods. That is where their money goes. There is not enough money for both. Change one or the other and one service will suddenly hear screams and have a retention problem. Having one of anything may be perceived as a saving, but economies of scale mean it cannot be optomised and may not meet the military requirement. It also means a possible single point of failure.
The Chinese tried and the Canadians tried to operate one homogeneous service. It did not work. The USA had their flying done for many years by the USAAF and eventually created the USAF. And, going back to first principals, the RAF was formed from the RFC and RNAS for good practical reasons.
The requirements of the forces are different. To give examples. The RAF has a log/supply system designed/equipped to track ac spares world-wide in case of AOG. It is gold plated as far as the army is concerned.
The RAF pay/allowances system is designed to try and retain pilots. That is where the pool of money goes in flying pay. The RN system is designed to recompense everyone who goes to sea for long periods. That is where their money goes. There is not enough money for both. Change one or the other and one service will suddenly hear screams and have a retention problem. Having one of anything may be perceived as a saving, but economies of scale mean it cannot be optomised and may not meet the military requirement. It also means a possible single point of failure.
The Chinese tried and the Canadians tried to operate one homogeneous service. It did not work. The USA had their flying done for many years by the USAAF and eventually created the USAF. And, going back to first principals, the RAF was formed from the RFC and RNAS for good practical reasons.
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Hey, this forum stuff is really good! Where to begin?
Navalised EF - never IMHO a starter for a CV aircraft. Not enough strong airframe bones to take the stresses of carrier life and the ideas BAE were pushing around for recovery and launch profiles were 'edgy' to say the least.
Sizes of carriers? Try these sound bites (and feel free to disagree)
Air is free and steel is cheap but the engines to push 50,000 tons around aren't. There are good physics that tell you how fast costs go up as ship size goes up. So why do the US build 95,000 ton Nimitzes? Because they can afford to. Larger carriers are more COST EFFECTIVE but by crikey they are not CHEAPER.
Joint Force Harrier (new brand name for JF2000): wholly owned by Strike, so now an RAF asset. Headed up by a joint staff. Logs: well, if you go joint, the logs are joint. These days, almost all ops are joint, so if JF goes on land, the logs will be prob be done by normal AT/Land routes. If JF is at sea, there'll be maritime logs involved. Another soundbite: joint means different services working together to achive the aim. Doesn't mean always giving all of one capability to one service. JFH will take a few years to bed down, I think. But it's the way to go (I think).
Jackonicko, the details of JSF performance are still very close hold. However, the price drive is being achieved as much by new technology as much as trading off performance. JSF vs ANY F-16? No contest, and the reason is probably signature, I'd guess.
Navalised EF - never IMHO a starter for a CV aircraft. Not enough strong airframe bones to take the stresses of carrier life and the ideas BAE were pushing around for recovery and launch profiles were 'edgy' to say the least.
Sizes of carriers? Try these sound bites (and feel free to disagree)
Air is free and steel is cheap but the engines to push 50,000 tons around aren't. There are good physics that tell you how fast costs go up as ship size goes up. So why do the US build 95,000 ton Nimitzes? Because they can afford to. Larger carriers are more COST EFFECTIVE but by crikey they are not CHEAPER.
Joint Force Harrier (new brand name for JF2000): wholly owned by Strike, so now an RAF asset. Headed up by a joint staff. Logs: well, if you go joint, the logs are joint. These days, almost all ops are joint, so if JF goes on land, the logs will be prob be done by normal AT/Land routes. If JF is at sea, there'll be maritime logs involved. Another soundbite: joint means different services working together to achive the aim. Doesn't mean always giving all of one capability to one service. JFH will take a few years to bed down, I think. But it's the way to go (I think).
Jackonicko, the details of JSF performance are still very close hold. However, the price drive is being achieved as much by new technology as much as trading off performance. JSF vs ANY F-16? No contest, and the reason is probably signature, I'd guess.
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"Air is free and steel is cheap but the engines to push 50,000 tons around aren't".
Damn, best tell all the civvies to retire all their supertankers, Bulk Fuel carriers and LPG ships then!! If you decide to go CVN, then the price goes throught the roof - but I was under the impression that, in the present political climate, they are to be conventional.
"These days, almost all ops are joint, so if JF goes on land, the logs will be prob be done by normal AT/Land routes. If JF is at sea, there'll be maritime logs involved"
Ahem, logs for the FI done by the army, shipped by sea. I have a lovely gozzome present made from VV expensive aircraft repair kit.
Ordered as old stock lifed out.
Order into the army.
XXX later stock arrives at docks.
XXX mnoths later stock put on next planned ship to ASI.
XXX months later transhipped to next ship to FI.
Stock arrives as it reaches end of life and is passed on to units to make gozzome presents.
New stock already on order as old stock.....
Jointery is wonderful.
Time does not necessarily rationalise things just because they work together - ask STANAFORLANT.
Now if want standardisation:
New radar head required ASAP in FI to replace one damaged in storm. Decision made to fly it south in Condor (AN124). Panic message back to the UK:
"How do service and turn this thing round?" Reply "Do not worry, it is all NATO standard"
[This message has been edited by ORAC (edited 30 September 2000).]
Damn, best tell all the civvies to retire all their supertankers, Bulk Fuel carriers and LPG ships then!! If you decide to go CVN, then the price goes throught the roof - but I was under the impression that, in the present political climate, they are to be conventional.
"These days, almost all ops are joint, so if JF goes on land, the logs will be prob be done by normal AT/Land routes. If JF is at sea, there'll be maritime logs involved"
Ahem, logs for the FI done by the army, shipped by sea. I have a lovely gozzome present made from VV expensive aircraft repair kit.
Ordered as old stock lifed out.
Order into the army.
XXX later stock arrives at docks.
XXX mnoths later stock put on next planned ship to ASI.
XXX months later transhipped to next ship to FI.
Stock arrives as it reaches end of life and is passed on to units to make gozzome presents.
New stock already on order as old stock.....
Jointery is wonderful.
Time does not necessarily rationalise things just because they work together - ask STANAFORLANT.
Now if want standardisation:
New radar head required ASAP in FI to replace one damaged in storm. Decision made to fly it south in Condor (AN124). Panic message back to the UK:
"How do service and turn this thing round?" Reply "Do not worry, it is all NATO standard"
[This message has been edited by ORAC (edited 30 September 2000).]
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Dear Orac:
The engines needed to push a 50,000 ton carrier around at 30kts (if you want cat launches), slow down to sail with the rest of a fleet, accelerate again to cat launch, turn inside 20 miles, or stop quickly are NOTHING like a VLCC or tanker (I've seen 4 cylinder 2 stroke designs - BIG cylinders), that plod away at high efficiency for days on end.
Joint logistics - yes, I've got a fat book of loggie mishaps- we all have - but the fact is that it's the way to go. Fron the JFH standpoint, the sad fact is that while the Air Force are SUPER at air logs, this is because we have assumed RAF bits loaded on to RAF aircraft at RAF bases in the UK to be flown on an RAF AT to an RAF deployed base guarded by RAF Regt with RAF cooks and..... get the picture? The future really is joint, not that it's easier or even, at this stage better. It's just that us taxpayers don't have to go on paying for 3 separate supply systems.
Back to JSF: anyone in the forum taking bets on the STOVL variants actually flying?
The engines needed to push a 50,000 ton carrier around at 30kts (if you want cat launches), slow down to sail with the rest of a fleet, accelerate again to cat launch, turn inside 20 miles, or stop quickly are NOTHING like a VLCC or tanker (I've seen 4 cylinder 2 stroke designs - BIG cylinders), that plod away at high efficiency for days on end.
Joint logistics - yes, I've got a fat book of loggie mishaps- we all have - but the fact is that it's the way to go. Fron the JFH standpoint, the sad fact is that while the Air Force are SUPER at air logs, this is because we have assumed RAF bits loaded on to RAF aircraft at RAF bases in the UK to be flown on an RAF AT to an RAF deployed base guarded by RAF Regt with RAF cooks and..... get the picture? The future really is joint, not that it's easier or even, at this stage better. It's just that us taxpayers don't have to go on paying for 3 separate supply systems.
Back to JSF: anyone in the forum taking bets on the STOVL variants actually flying?
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Grodge,
Back to concepts. Present CV carriers needed VV quick speeds etc to get up to speed to launch under-powered jets. Now I accept, if you want to make the case for it, that these type of engines are required for these type of jets. But one of the questions I have been asking is why we require VSTOL? If you accept the case we do, we do not need military style engines. You can launch or recover at any speed you like. They have also finally completed the feasibility studies, and have announced the proposed start up of, the high speed trans-atlantic freight service using water jets powered 250,000 tons transports from Europe to the USA at 30 Knots+ normal, not surge, speed. So the engines are there.
The case still stands for separate logs systems. Different needs for different services.
As a personal opinion I would go the opposite direction. Instead of going for a single system we should just have a team/commitee setting information exchange standards and allow every budget holder to buy what he wants. Just, to make a point, like we are talking on the internet. There are PC/UNIX/Mac etc happily exchanging data. There is even a database standard to allow database exchange. Add the crypto... Different organisations/commands are interested in different things. Standardisation puts everything into a strait-jacket.
Look ahead at GCCS/TBMCS/WCCS etc and real-time information exchange and decision making and you realise this about a lot more than a simple supply system. If you want us to have our own GCCS equivalent, I agree, but it is far outside the scope of what we are discussing, has far more profound implications and will be far, far more expensive. The cost would rival that of introducing an aircraft type.
As to JSF STOVL, yes it will fly. The questions is will anyone buy? I have grave suspicions it will get cut in congress once large amounts of money are involved.
All the more reason for being at least CV capable.
[This message has been edited by ORAC (edited 01 October 2000).]
Back to concepts. Present CV carriers needed VV quick speeds etc to get up to speed to launch under-powered jets. Now I accept, if you want to make the case for it, that these type of engines are required for these type of jets. But one of the questions I have been asking is why we require VSTOL? If you accept the case we do, we do not need military style engines. You can launch or recover at any speed you like. They have also finally completed the feasibility studies, and have announced the proposed start up of, the high speed trans-atlantic freight service using water jets powered 250,000 tons transports from Europe to the USA at 30 Knots+ normal, not surge, speed. So the engines are there.
The case still stands for separate logs systems. Different needs for different services.
As a personal opinion I would go the opposite direction. Instead of going for a single system we should just have a team/commitee setting information exchange standards and allow every budget holder to buy what he wants. Just, to make a point, like we are talking on the internet. There are PC/UNIX/Mac etc happily exchanging data. There is even a database standard to allow database exchange. Add the crypto... Different organisations/commands are interested in different things. Standardisation puts everything into a strait-jacket.
Look ahead at GCCS/TBMCS/WCCS etc and real-time information exchange and decision making and you realise this about a lot more than a simple supply system. If you want us to have our own GCCS equivalent, I agree, but it is far outside the scope of what we are discussing, has far more profound implications and will be far, far more expensive. The cost would rival that of introducing an aircraft type.
As to JSF STOVL, yes it will fly. The questions is will anyone buy? I have grave suspicions it will get cut in congress once large amounts of money are involved.
All the more reason for being at least CV capable.
[This message has been edited by ORAC (edited 01 October 2000).]
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Thanks ORAC, and thank you John.
My last line was a bit of a wind up. I've had a little exposure to the US system and I really do believe that the USMC will get their advanced STOVL. They are SERIOUS about expeditionary warfare, not just trying to rebadge their existing systems to join in the game (look at the US Army's efforts). The JSF is a real programme and a lot of people in the MOD are, I belive, waking up from dreams - there are two demonstrators for 5th generation stealth, advanced manufacturing, avionics and engines to DIE for flyiing or about to fly. The US are, right now, in front and we have a choice. Stay behind and be good Europeans or get the kit our pilots deserve.
ORAC, the pysics of getting CTOL aircraft on and off carriers have changed less than anyone wouuld like. If you need to get a largish jet (say 50,000 lbs) up to flying speed with a useful load, you need a cat of a certain length. Likewise, to reliably haul it out of the air to a useful stop, you need a set of arrester gear of a certain size.
What you get to is a deck of around CVN size if you want to operate around 50-60 useful jets with a decent surge cycle. Not my prejudice, and I'm really not patronising, but read some of Norman Freidman's books on carrier design. I've been around this game for years and after reading them I realised there was TONS I didn't know.
I believe it was JF who said it's better to stop and land than land and stop. STOVL is the latest UK contribution to maritime aviation; it gets you more 'air' from a smaller carrier.
Comments anyone?
My last line was a bit of a wind up. I've had a little exposure to the US system and I really do believe that the USMC will get their advanced STOVL. They are SERIOUS about expeditionary warfare, not just trying to rebadge their existing systems to join in the game (look at the US Army's efforts). The JSF is a real programme and a lot of people in the MOD are, I belive, waking up from dreams - there are two demonstrators for 5th generation stealth, advanced manufacturing, avionics and engines to DIE for flyiing or about to fly. The US are, right now, in front and we have a choice. Stay behind and be good Europeans or get the kit our pilots deserve.
ORAC, the pysics of getting CTOL aircraft on and off carriers have changed less than anyone wouuld like. If you need to get a largish jet (say 50,000 lbs) up to flying speed with a useful load, you need a cat of a certain length. Likewise, to reliably haul it out of the air to a useful stop, you need a set of arrester gear of a certain size.
What you get to is a deck of around CVN size if you want to operate around 50-60 useful jets with a decent surge cycle. Not my prejudice, and I'm really not patronising, but read some of Norman Freidman's books on carrier design. I've been around this game for years and after reading them I realised there was TONS I didn't know.
I believe it was JF who said it's better to stop and land than land and stop. STOVL is the latest UK contribution to maritime aviation; it gets you more 'air' from a smaller carrier.
Comments anyone?
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How have the French managed it with the CDG, 36K tons? (Sunday Times reports today it has finally been accepted/commissioned). It cost £1.8 billion. Look at the budget, £2 billion for both!
I enclose the information below for interest:
Regardless, they are going to be built commercially in the UK. Below is the answer given by one of the major bidders:
Examination of Witnesses (Questions 280 - 299)
WEDNESDAY 24 MAY 2000
SIR ROBERT WALMSLEY AND VICE-ADMIRAL SIR JEREMY BLACKHAM
280. I think you have already indicated the answer to the next question but I would like to pursue it just a shade further. Let us suppose on the black downbeat scenario, as it were, that there is a very significant delay after we had selected the JSF: we selected it and after we had committed ourselves to design the carriers appropriately, would it then be the case that if there were a very significant delay of JSF that the carriers would have to be delayed themselves, or would it be in any way practicable to switch to another contender to be an alternative aircraft for the carrier? I suspect the answer is that by this stage it would be too late to switch judging from what you have just said about the way the carriers would have to be designed and tailored to meet the aircraft that we selected.
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) I think it would depend on which version you had chosen. If you had chosen a conventional take-off aircraft then it is not impossible to suppose that one might switch. If you had chosen a vertical take-off version there are not many competitors. It is worth remarking that we are making the choice of aircraft manufacturer later this year and we do not have to decide at that point the form of launch, whether it is a vertical one or a conventional one. We do not have to fix the final design of the carrier until we do that, so we have actually got a bit of time to see the aircraft fly, to monitor the progress of the programme.
281. My final question on this is the one I indicated earlier that I would be asking. Would you please tell us a little bit about some of the other aircraft that are in contention for this contract?
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) The F18 is well known about and Rafale is the French version which will have some carrier experience before we need to use it. There is thought about a marinised version of Eurofighter which we do not currently have in the programme. That involves changes to the structure of the aircraft. There has been some thought given as to whether an advanced Harrier might be designed. None of these aircraft yet exist in carrier form because we have not selected it.
(Sir Robert Walmsley) The number of aircraft that the Royal Navy would require for carrier operations is relatively small and the loading on to the price of production of those aircraft, any significant development costs, really makes it a very unattractive proposition in terms of value for money.
282. What numbers of aircraft are we talking about?
(Sir Robert Walmsley) Perhaps 60.
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) It would probably be slightly more than that because one of the decisions that the SDR made was to replace the Harrier FA2, the naval Harrier, and the Harrier GR7, the RAF model, with the same aircraft, so I would expect the numbers[3] to be a little greater than that. The actual operational fleet combined might not be more than about 60.
Chairman
283. If the MoD selects Thomson-CSF will there be any advantage in going the whole hog and purchasing Rafale to fly off it? Is there any synergy between the French bid and the type of aircraft flying off it?
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) I would not have thought so, not unless it is the right aeroplane. We are talking about the design of the ship and that is an independent thing. It could be closely related to the aircraft but I would not have thought in a commercial sense—
284. You gave a very serious answer to what was meant to be a very provocative question.
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) One I hope I will not have to answer.
Chairman: The next question I very reluctantly hand to my colleague, Mike Gapes, but I might come in. One from Mr Hancock first.
Mr Hancock
285. I am very interested in what you said, I thought your serious comment was to a serious question from the Chairman.
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) I always assume the Chairman asks serious questions.
Chairman: I hope it was not a serious question.
Mr Hancock
286. I thought it was. He does pose the question that you yourself have posed about designing the ship around the aircraft. Are we still on target, or is it the wish of the MoD to go for carriers in excess of 40,000 tonnes which would be capable of taking 30 aircraft or maybe more?
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) I know there is a great fascination with the tonnage of a ship which personally I do not share. The key issue is what is the aircraft going to be and what numbers are we going to deploy. The public position, and I have no reason whatsoever to dissent from it, is that we might want to deploy up to 50 aircraft but we would have to fix the number a bit more clearly than that. Once we have decided on the aircraft we will have to build a carrier to accommodate it. Should it be a conventional take-off and landing aircraft we will need arresting gear and catapults and that will cause the ship to be larger and certainly more expensive than if we do not need it. Depending on the size of the aircraft we will have to consider the size of the flight deck and the size of the hangar arrangements. Different sized aircraft require different amounts of space, you have got to build in a gap between them or they all bang into each other. It does not make sense to determine exactly what the size of the carrier will be until we know what the aircraft is.
287. That goes right back to Julian Lewis' point about the type of aircraft delays in getting a decision on the conventional take-off fighter as opposed to the vertical take-off fighter. What is your timescale now?
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) For?
288. For making a decision on these carriers?
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) The carrier will have to be ordered in about 2005. We are expecting to down select the type of aircraft, the make of aircraft, later this year and we will have to consider the actual version system after that. That will still be well before the decision to design and order the carrier.
(Sir Robert Walmsley) I think I would like to just make a point there. It is absolutely true, of course, that these extra equipments have to be accommodated and designed if we choose a conventional take-off and landing aircraft. A carrier is not a complicated ship, it is basically a big box with a big hangar inside it and a flat deck and a sufficient degree of command and control arrangements to enable the ship to communicate, as it has to. It is not going to have lots of other weapons. It is not full of systems like a destroyer that is stuffed full of the most complicated electronics, etc.. When you go on board a carrier it is basically empty, it is just a box. What is complicated is the aeroplane. I do not want to allow us to create an impression in your minds that the construction of the ship is an immense technological achievement. I have got Mr Baghaei sitting behind me who is the leader of the Integrated Project Team, who I asked to come to hear the Committee's enthusiasm for this programme today. He used to be a production director at Kvaerner on the Clyde. He knows about building ships. He is not going to allow himself to get bogged down in some minutiae as to whether or not it is difficult to accommodate. We will do the ship.
I also include the following for background information:
WRITTEN EVIDENCE
Memorandum submitted by the Ministry of Defence on the Major Procurement Projects Survey (10 May 1999)
1. The Committee asked the MoD for separate memoranda on a number of procurement programmes. We were asked to include in each memorandum "a general summary of the equipment and its component parts, the project's history, progress to date and future prospects" and to provide as much as possible of the details required to answer a series of "core questions".
2. Separate memoranda are accordingly being provided to the Committee on:
Future Carriers—CVF
The decision in the Strategic Defence Review to purchase two large aircraft carriers, to replace the three Invincible-class carriers from around 2012, is being taken forward in an Assessment phase. Invitations to tender for Assessment were issued in January, with a view to the award of contracts for the first part of this phase. Analysis of Options, with up to three prime contractors in the autumn. A wide range of design options, to be reviewed alongside the options for the Future Carrier Borne Aircraft, FCBA, see separate memorandum, will be considered.
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT
1. The Strategic Defence Review concluded that the ability to deploy offensive air power will be central to future force projection operations, and that aircraft carriers can provide valuable flexibility in a range of operational circumstances. They can also offer a coercive presence, which may forestall the need for war fighting. The SDR recognised that there is an increasing likelihood of future operations being conducted by forces far from their home bases. In such operations, host-nation support, including access to suitable air bases, cannot be guaranteed, particularly during an evolving regional crisis or the early stages of a conflict. The SDR concluded that there is a continuing need for Britain to have the capability offered by aircraft carriers. Our three Invincible-class carriers were designed for Cold War anti-submarine operations. The intention, announced in the SDR, is to plan to replace these with a new class of larger and more capable carriers, known as the CVF, Carrier Vessel Future, class.
2. Initial Gate approval, utilising the Smart Procurement model, was given in December 1998 for an Assessment phase. Studies to be undertaken in Assessment will examine the Staff Target and develop it, using cost/capability trade-offs to produce an affordable Staff Requirement. The objective is to build a replacement for the current carriers that has an increased emphasis on offensive air operations and is capable of operating the largest possible range of aircraft in the widest possible range of roles.
TRADE-OFFS
3. Trade-offs between cost/capability and time/capability will be integral to the Assessment work.
NUMBERS
4. The original plan was to replace the three Invincible-class carriers with three 20,000 tonne vessels. Operational analysis demonstrated, however, that it would be more cost-effective to procure two large carriers, each capable of carrying up to about 50 aircraft. The SDR also saw advantage in future carriers being capable of carrying more fixed-wing aircraft than the current vessels, in order to be able to contribute more effectively to the support of operations on land and at sea.
STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW
5. The SDR assessed the requirement for aircraft carriers within the overall requirement for an offensive air capability. We concluded that "there is .
. a continuing need for Britain to have the capability offered by aircraft carriers" and the emphasis for replacement carriers should be on "increased offensive air power, and an ability to operate the largest possible range of aircraft in the widest possible range of roles"—The Strategic Defence Review, Supporting Essays, pages 6-6 to 6-8.
MILITARY CAPABILITY
6. The CVR will deploy offensive air power in support of the full spectrum of future operations, including force projection as a central component of the maritime contribution to joint operations.
EQUIPMENT TO BE REPLACED AND IN -SERVICE DATE
7. The planned out of service dates for HMS Invincible, HMS Illustrious and HMS Ark Royal are 2010, 2012 and 2015 respectively. The SDR introduced no changes to this programme of withdrawals from service. The first CVF is scheduled to enter operational service in 2012 and the second in 2015. The in-service date of CVF is defined as the "Operational Data Material Assessment", which is the date at which it will be accepted as fit for entry into the operational fleet.
PROCUREMENT APPROACH
8. The CVF procurement strategy is based on competition and prime contractorship, with clear and unambiguous output requirement specifications. Although we intend that the ships should be built in the UK, prospective prime contractors are from the UK, USA and France.
9. In accordance with the Smart Procurement model, the project will follow a two-stage approval process. An invitation to tender for the Assessment phase was issued in January 1999 to six potential prime contractors—BAe Defence Systems, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Marconi Electronic Systems, Raytheon and Thomson-CSF. On completion of tender evaluation, we aim to award up to three parallel contracts in the autumn.
10. The Assessment phase will comprise two main stages. The first, an Analysis of Options, will involve examination of design options to inform the selection decision, due in late 2000/early 2001, on the type and numbers of aircraft to meet the Future Carrier Borne Aircraft, FCBA requirement. At the end of this stage, two of the three potential prime contractors will be selected to proceed to the second stage. This will involve detailed work to determine the carriers' design parameters and to reduce technological risk, informed by the choice of FCBA. It will culminate at the Main Gate approval decision, planned for 2003, to down-select to one preferred prime contractor to proceed to Demonstration and Manufacture of two carriers. The Demonstration phase will begin with the design of a virtual prototype by the selected prime contractor, using computer-aided technology. The intention is to achieve, so far as possible, a freeze on a mature design before construction begins.
ALTERNATIVE PROCUREMENT OPTIONS
11. During Assessment, a wide range of carrier and aircraft options, including conventional take-off and landing, short take off and vertical landing, and short take off but arrested recovery, will be considered. As part of this work, and following normal practice, the cost of life-extending the three existing carriers, by 10 years, will be assessed to provide a baseline against which all the options can be evaluated.
COLLABORATION
12. It is too early to be specific about the prospects for collaboration. Some informal discussions have taken place with the US, Spanish, French and Italian navys to identify any common ground in carrier replacement programmes or requirements. At present, whole ship collaboration would appear unlikely to be a viable option, but collaborative opportunities will be reviewed during Assessment, especially for equipment and systems.
EXPORT POTENTIAL
13. It is unlikely that this project will lead directly to whole-ship sales, although the commercial marketing of CVF design skills and production technology could benefit UK industry. Much of the ship's equipment could have export potential. Industrial Participation proposals will be invited, as appropriate, for offshore content of the proposed solution.
INDUSTRIAL FACTORS
14. In accordance with government policy for the construction of warships, the CVF will be built in a UK shipyard. Industrial factors will be taken into account in the selection of a contractor.
SMART PROCUREMENT
15. The CVF programme will adopt Smart Procurement techniques. An integrated project team will manage the project. A competition is being held to recruit a leader with appropriate skills. In accordance with Smart Procurement, what would previously have been Feasibility and Project Definition stages have been combined into a single Assessment phase, with increased investment at this stage to achieve early risk reduction. Potential prime contractors are being currently encouraged to be innovative throughout the project.
ACQUISITION PHASES
16. So far only a number of small-scale feasibility studies have been completed. Subsequent acquisition phases were described at paragraph 10. A risk register will be maintained throughout the life of the project as the core of an integrated risk management system. It will contain both MoD and contractor inputs from the Analysis of Options studies undertaken by industry. Operational Effectiveness and Investment Appraisal that will support the Main Gate submission to proceed with Demonstration and Manufacture.
MILESTONES AND COSTS
17. CVF milestones, as currently planned, are shown in the table below.
Staff Target endorsement and
Initial Gate approval December 1998
Issue ITT January 1999
Start Assessment autumn 1999
FCBA downselection late 2000/early 2001
Staff Requirement endorsement and Main Gate approval late 2003
Order date late 2004
Contract acceptance date 2011
ISDs 2012 and 2015
18. We envisage a total acquisition cost for the two carriers of around £2 billion, including combat system and initial support costs, but excluding the aircraft. The peak years of expenditure are likely to be between 2008 and 2012. Costs incurred so far, including pre-feasibility studies, total just over £2 million.
IN -SERVICE SUPPORT
19. We plan to let a design/build/support-through-life contract. Collaborative support arrangements are unlikely.
20. Manning levels will be based on work by human factors designers, to achieve a balance between automated and manual tasks and by training needs analysis, in accordance with the RN training equipment strategy. The size of ship's complement is planned to be about the same as for the Invincible class. Contractors will be tasked to propose the most efficient manning strategies for their designs, which will be examined during Assessment.
21. All logistic support will be considered as a direct cost to the project, with an emphasis on avoiding expenditure on new infrastructure. The maintenance management system will be required to integrate with other MoD logistic systems and to take account of emerging developments in IT. Innovative support solutions will be examined, using integrated logistic support methodology to minimise costs throughout the ship's life.
22. Contractor Logistic Support, CLS, will be examined for some or all of the maintenance and logistics. The benefits of CLS include a strong focus on reliability for initial designs; better standards of availability, reliability and maintenance; and an incentive to the contractor to design and build systems that minimise support costs. One option to be considered is the adoption of best practice in supply chain techniques, to minimise MoD ownership of spares, by contracting for agreed spares availability from industry. CLS options for up to 30 years will be examined during Assessment.
23. The upkeep cycle of the CVF will reflect the vessels' modern design, and developments in upkeep practice such as "reliability centred maintenance" rather than lengthy and expensive refits. This will enable availability requirements to be met by only two carriers.
FRONT LINE NUMBERS
24. Both CVF will be assigned to the front line.
INTEROPERABILITY
25. The aim is to maximise the interoperability of the CVF with the greatest possible range of UK and allied aircraft and with other carriers, to the extent that this can be achieved cost-effectively. The choice of aircraft as FCBA will be a major factor: a decision to procure JSF would enhance interoperability with the US, whereas a decision to procure a marinised Eurofighter would enhance interoperability with other NATO allies. The issue will be explored further during Assessment.
DISPOSAL OF EQUIPMENT REPLACED
26. Prospects for the sale of the Invincible class to other nations will be explored in due course.
IN -SERVICE LIFE
27. Each CVF is planned to have an in-service life of 30 years.
DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL
28. The CVF programme is closely linked with the FCBA and Future Organic Airborne Early Warning programmes.
----------------------------------------
So,
1. the decision on the aircraft this year or next (read after the election). Followed by the decision of the size, weight etc of the new carriers up to 2-4 years later after design approval. (After the next, next election??)
2. I find there comment about the carriers just being "a box" intriguing, particularily when you look at the budget. When you tie it to the commercial tendering, minimising spares, spares from industry etc you can see why I start to look at the civilian solutions....not the pointed reference to no requirment for a weapon system and the C2 limited to communications. This is to be no JFACC Afloat/JFMHQ. It appears to be more a couple of extra HMS Oceans.
3. Note the comment about the number of aircraft to replace both the SHAR and GR7 being "about" 60 to replace all 3 GR7 squadrons, the OCU and the complete FAA SHAR fleet.
[This message has been edited by ORAC (edited 01 October 2000).]
[This message has been edited by ORAC (edited 01 October 2000).]
I enclose the information below for interest:
Regardless, they are going to be built commercially in the UK. Below is the answer given by one of the major bidders:
Examination of Witnesses (Questions 280 - 299)
WEDNESDAY 24 MAY 2000
SIR ROBERT WALMSLEY AND VICE-ADMIRAL SIR JEREMY BLACKHAM
280. I think you have already indicated the answer to the next question but I would like to pursue it just a shade further. Let us suppose on the black downbeat scenario, as it were, that there is a very significant delay after we had selected the JSF: we selected it and after we had committed ourselves to design the carriers appropriately, would it then be the case that if there were a very significant delay of JSF that the carriers would have to be delayed themselves, or would it be in any way practicable to switch to another contender to be an alternative aircraft for the carrier? I suspect the answer is that by this stage it would be too late to switch judging from what you have just said about the way the carriers would have to be designed and tailored to meet the aircraft that we selected.
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) I think it would depend on which version you had chosen. If you had chosen a conventional take-off aircraft then it is not impossible to suppose that one might switch. If you had chosen a vertical take-off version there are not many competitors. It is worth remarking that we are making the choice of aircraft manufacturer later this year and we do not have to decide at that point the form of launch, whether it is a vertical one or a conventional one. We do not have to fix the final design of the carrier until we do that, so we have actually got a bit of time to see the aircraft fly, to monitor the progress of the programme.
281. My final question on this is the one I indicated earlier that I would be asking. Would you please tell us a little bit about some of the other aircraft that are in contention for this contract?
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) The F18 is well known about and Rafale is the French version which will have some carrier experience before we need to use it. There is thought about a marinised version of Eurofighter which we do not currently have in the programme. That involves changes to the structure of the aircraft. There has been some thought given as to whether an advanced Harrier might be designed. None of these aircraft yet exist in carrier form because we have not selected it.
(Sir Robert Walmsley) The number of aircraft that the Royal Navy would require for carrier operations is relatively small and the loading on to the price of production of those aircraft, any significant development costs, really makes it a very unattractive proposition in terms of value for money.
282. What numbers of aircraft are we talking about?
(Sir Robert Walmsley) Perhaps 60.
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) It would probably be slightly more than that because one of the decisions that the SDR made was to replace the Harrier FA2, the naval Harrier, and the Harrier GR7, the RAF model, with the same aircraft, so I would expect the numbers[3] to be a little greater than that. The actual operational fleet combined might not be more than about 60.
Chairman
283. If the MoD selects Thomson-CSF will there be any advantage in going the whole hog and purchasing Rafale to fly off it? Is there any synergy between the French bid and the type of aircraft flying off it?
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) I would not have thought so, not unless it is the right aeroplane. We are talking about the design of the ship and that is an independent thing. It could be closely related to the aircraft but I would not have thought in a commercial sense—
284. You gave a very serious answer to what was meant to be a very provocative question.
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) One I hope I will not have to answer.
Chairman: The next question I very reluctantly hand to my colleague, Mike Gapes, but I might come in. One from Mr Hancock first.
Mr Hancock
285. I am very interested in what you said, I thought your serious comment was to a serious question from the Chairman.
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) I always assume the Chairman asks serious questions.
Chairman: I hope it was not a serious question.
Mr Hancock
286. I thought it was. He does pose the question that you yourself have posed about designing the ship around the aircraft. Are we still on target, or is it the wish of the MoD to go for carriers in excess of 40,000 tonnes which would be capable of taking 30 aircraft or maybe more?
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) I know there is a great fascination with the tonnage of a ship which personally I do not share. The key issue is what is the aircraft going to be and what numbers are we going to deploy. The public position, and I have no reason whatsoever to dissent from it, is that we might want to deploy up to 50 aircraft but we would have to fix the number a bit more clearly than that. Once we have decided on the aircraft we will have to build a carrier to accommodate it. Should it be a conventional take-off and landing aircraft we will need arresting gear and catapults and that will cause the ship to be larger and certainly more expensive than if we do not need it. Depending on the size of the aircraft we will have to consider the size of the flight deck and the size of the hangar arrangements. Different sized aircraft require different amounts of space, you have got to build in a gap between them or they all bang into each other. It does not make sense to determine exactly what the size of the carrier will be until we know what the aircraft is.
287. That goes right back to Julian Lewis' point about the type of aircraft delays in getting a decision on the conventional take-off fighter as opposed to the vertical take-off fighter. What is your timescale now?
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) For?
288. For making a decision on these carriers?
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) The carrier will have to be ordered in about 2005. We are expecting to down select the type of aircraft, the make of aircraft, later this year and we will have to consider the actual version system after that. That will still be well before the decision to design and order the carrier.
(Sir Robert Walmsley) I think I would like to just make a point there. It is absolutely true, of course, that these extra equipments have to be accommodated and designed if we choose a conventional take-off and landing aircraft. A carrier is not a complicated ship, it is basically a big box with a big hangar inside it and a flat deck and a sufficient degree of command and control arrangements to enable the ship to communicate, as it has to. It is not going to have lots of other weapons. It is not full of systems like a destroyer that is stuffed full of the most complicated electronics, etc.. When you go on board a carrier it is basically empty, it is just a box. What is complicated is the aeroplane. I do not want to allow us to create an impression in your minds that the construction of the ship is an immense technological achievement. I have got Mr Baghaei sitting behind me who is the leader of the Integrated Project Team, who I asked to come to hear the Committee's enthusiasm for this programme today. He used to be a production director at Kvaerner on the Clyde. He knows about building ships. He is not going to allow himself to get bogged down in some minutiae as to whether or not it is difficult to accommodate. We will do the ship.
I also include the following for background information:
WRITTEN EVIDENCE
Memorandum submitted by the Ministry of Defence on the Major Procurement Projects Survey (10 May 1999)
1. The Committee asked the MoD for separate memoranda on a number of procurement programmes. We were asked to include in each memorandum "a general summary of the equipment and its component parts, the project's history, progress to date and future prospects" and to provide as much as possible of the details required to answer a series of "core questions".
2. Separate memoranda are accordingly being provided to the Committee on:
Future Carriers—CVF
The decision in the Strategic Defence Review to purchase two large aircraft carriers, to replace the three Invincible-class carriers from around 2012, is being taken forward in an Assessment phase. Invitations to tender for Assessment were issued in January, with a view to the award of contracts for the first part of this phase. Analysis of Options, with up to three prime contractors in the autumn. A wide range of design options, to be reviewed alongside the options for the Future Carrier Borne Aircraft, FCBA, see separate memorandum, will be considered.
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT
1. The Strategic Defence Review concluded that the ability to deploy offensive air power will be central to future force projection operations, and that aircraft carriers can provide valuable flexibility in a range of operational circumstances. They can also offer a coercive presence, which may forestall the need for war fighting. The SDR recognised that there is an increasing likelihood of future operations being conducted by forces far from their home bases. In such operations, host-nation support, including access to suitable air bases, cannot be guaranteed, particularly during an evolving regional crisis or the early stages of a conflict. The SDR concluded that there is a continuing need for Britain to have the capability offered by aircraft carriers. Our three Invincible-class carriers were designed for Cold War anti-submarine operations. The intention, announced in the SDR, is to plan to replace these with a new class of larger and more capable carriers, known as the CVF, Carrier Vessel Future, class.
2. Initial Gate approval, utilising the Smart Procurement model, was given in December 1998 for an Assessment phase. Studies to be undertaken in Assessment will examine the Staff Target and develop it, using cost/capability trade-offs to produce an affordable Staff Requirement. The objective is to build a replacement for the current carriers that has an increased emphasis on offensive air operations and is capable of operating the largest possible range of aircraft in the widest possible range of roles.
TRADE-OFFS
3. Trade-offs between cost/capability and time/capability will be integral to the Assessment work.
NUMBERS
4. The original plan was to replace the three Invincible-class carriers with three 20,000 tonne vessels. Operational analysis demonstrated, however, that it would be more cost-effective to procure two large carriers, each capable of carrying up to about 50 aircraft. The SDR also saw advantage in future carriers being capable of carrying more fixed-wing aircraft than the current vessels, in order to be able to contribute more effectively to the support of operations on land and at sea.
STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW
5. The SDR assessed the requirement for aircraft carriers within the overall requirement for an offensive air capability. We concluded that "there is .
. a continuing need for Britain to have the capability offered by aircraft carriers" and the emphasis for replacement carriers should be on "increased offensive air power, and an ability to operate the largest possible range of aircraft in the widest possible range of roles"—The Strategic Defence Review, Supporting Essays, pages 6-6 to 6-8.
MILITARY CAPABILITY
6. The CVR will deploy offensive air power in support of the full spectrum of future operations, including force projection as a central component of the maritime contribution to joint operations.
EQUIPMENT TO BE REPLACED AND IN -SERVICE DATE
7. The planned out of service dates for HMS Invincible, HMS Illustrious and HMS Ark Royal are 2010, 2012 and 2015 respectively. The SDR introduced no changes to this programme of withdrawals from service. The first CVF is scheduled to enter operational service in 2012 and the second in 2015. The in-service date of CVF is defined as the "Operational Data Material Assessment", which is the date at which it will be accepted as fit for entry into the operational fleet.
PROCUREMENT APPROACH
8. The CVF procurement strategy is based on competition and prime contractorship, with clear and unambiguous output requirement specifications. Although we intend that the ships should be built in the UK, prospective prime contractors are from the UK, USA and France.
9. In accordance with the Smart Procurement model, the project will follow a two-stage approval process. An invitation to tender for the Assessment phase was issued in January 1999 to six potential prime contractors—BAe Defence Systems, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Marconi Electronic Systems, Raytheon and Thomson-CSF. On completion of tender evaluation, we aim to award up to three parallel contracts in the autumn.
10. The Assessment phase will comprise two main stages. The first, an Analysis of Options, will involve examination of design options to inform the selection decision, due in late 2000/early 2001, on the type and numbers of aircraft to meet the Future Carrier Borne Aircraft, FCBA requirement. At the end of this stage, two of the three potential prime contractors will be selected to proceed to the second stage. This will involve detailed work to determine the carriers' design parameters and to reduce technological risk, informed by the choice of FCBA. It will culminate at the Main Gate approval decision, planned for 2003, to down-select to one preferred prime contractor to proceed to Demonstration and Manufacture of two carriers. The Demonstration phase will begin with the design of a virtual prototype by the selected prime contractor, using computer-aided technology. The intention is to achieve, so far as possible, a freeze on a mature design before construction begins.
ALTERNATIVE PROCUREMENT OPTIONS
11. During Assessment, a wide range of carrier and aircraft options, including conventional take-off and landing, short take off and vertical landing, and short take off but arrested recovery, will be considered. As part of this work, and following normal practice, the cost of life-extending the three existing carriers, by 10 years, will be assessed to provide a baseline against which all the options can be evaluated.
COLLABORATION
12. It is too early to be specific about the prospects for collaboration. Some informal discussions have taken place with the US, Spanish, French and Italian navys to identify any common ground in carrier replacement programmes or requirements. At present, whole ship collaboration would appear unlikely to be a viable option, but collaborative opportunities will be reviewed during Assessment, especially for equipment and systems.
EXPORT POTENTIAL
13. It is unlikely that this project will lead directly to whole-ship sales, although the commercial marketing of CVF design skills and production technology could benefit UK industry. Much of the ship's equipment could have export potential. Industrial Participation proposals will be invited, as appropriate, for offshore content of the proposed solution.
INDUSTRIAL FACTORS
14. In accordance with government policy for the construction of warships, the CVF will be built in a UK shipyard. Industrial factors will be taken into account in the selection of a contractor.
SMART PROCUREMENT
15. The CVF programme will adopt Smart Procurement techniques. An integrated project team will manage the project. A competition is being held to recruit a leader with appropriate skills. In accordance with Smart Procurement, what would previously have been Feasibility and Project Definition stages have been combined into a single Assessment phase, with increased investment at this stage to achieve early risk reduction. Potential prime contractors are being currently encouraged to be innovative throughout the project.
ACQUISITION PHASES
16. So far only a number of small-scale feasibility studies have been completed. Subsequent acquisition phases were described at paragraph 10. A risk register will be maintained throughout the life of the project as the core of an integrated risk management system. It will contain both MoD and contractor inputs from the Analysis of Options studies undertaken by industry. Operational Effectiveness and Investment Appraisal that will support the Main Gate submission to proceed with Demonstration and Manufacture.
MILESTONES AND COSTS
17. CVF milestones, as currently planned, are shown in the table below.
Staff Target endorsement and
Initial Gate approval December 1998
Issue ITT January 1999
Start Assessment autumn 1999
FCBA downselection late 2000/early 2001
Staff Requirement endorsement and Main Gate approval late 2003
Order date late 2004
Contract acceptance date 2011
ISDs 2012 and 2015
18. We envisage a total acquisition cost for the two carriers of around £2 billion, including combat system and initial support costs, but excluding the aircraft. The peak years of expenditure are likely to be between 2008 and 2012. Costs incurred so far, including pre-feasibility studies, total just over £2 million.
IN -SERVICE SUPPORT
19. We plan to let a design/build/support-through-life contract. Collaborative support arrangements are unlikely.
20. Manning levels will be based on work by human factors designers, to achieve a balance between automated and manual tasks and by training needs analysis, in accordance with the RN training equipment strategy. The size of ship's complement is planned to be about the same as for the Invincible class. Contractors will be tasked to propose the most efficient manning strategies for their designs, which will be examined during Assessment.
21. All logistic support will be considered as a direct cost to the project, with an emphasis on avoiding expenditure on new infrastructure. The maintenance management system will be required to integrate with other MoD logistic systems and to take account of emerging developments in IT. Innovative support solutions will be examined, using integrated logistic support methodology to minimise costs throughout the ship's life.
22. Contractor Logistic Support, CLS, will be examined for some or all of the maintenance and logistics. The benefits of CLS include a strong focus on reliability for initial designs; better standards of availability, reliability and maintenance; and an incentive to the contractor to design and build systems that minimise support costs. One option to be considered is the adoption of best practice in supply chain techniques, to minimise MoD ownership of spares, by contracting for agreed spares availability from industry. CLS options for up to 30 years will be examined during Assessment.
23. The upkeep cycle of the CVF will reflect the vessels' modern design, and developments in upkeep practice such as "reliability centred maintenance" rather than lengthy and expensive refits. This will enable availability requirements to be met by only two carriers.
FRONT LINE NUMBERS
24. Both CVF will be assigned to the front line.
INTEROPERABILITY
25. The aim is to maximise the interoperability of the CVF with the greatest possible range of UK and allied aircraft and with other carriers, to the extent that this can be achieved cost-effectively. The choice of aircraft as FCBA will be a major factor: a decision to procure JSF would enhance interoperability with the US, whereas a decision to procure a marinised Eurofighter would enhance interoperability with other NATO allies. The issue will be explored further during Assessment.
DISPOSAL OF EQUIPMENT REPLACED
26. Prospects for the sale of the Invincible class to other nations will be explored in due course.
IN -SERVICE LIFE
27. Each CVF is planned to have an in-service life of 30 years.
DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL
28. The CVF programme is closely linked with the FCBA and Future Organic Airborne Early Warning programmes.
----------------------------------------
So,
1. the decision on the aircraft this year or next (read after the election). Followed by the decision of the size, weight etc of the new carriers up to 2-4 years later after design approval. (After the next, next election??)
2. I find there comment about the carriers just being "a box" intriguing, particularily when you look at the budget. When you tie it to the commercial tendering, minimising spares, spares from industry etc you can see why I start to look at the civilian solutions....not the pointed reference to no requirment for a weapon system and the C2 limited to communications. This is to be no JFACC Afloat/JFMHQ. It appears to be more a couple of extra HMS Oceans.
3. Note the comment about the number of aircraft to replace both the SHAR and GR7 being "about" 60 to replace all 3 GR7 squadrons, the OCU and the complete FAA SHAR fleet.
[This message has been edited by ORAC (edited 01 October 2000).]
[This message has been edited by ORAC (edited 01 October 2000).]
Guest
Posts: n/a
STOBAR seems to do exactly the same - get's more 'Air' from a given length of carrier deck, allowing Su-33s and MiG-29s to operate in numbers from very small ships.
Gorshkov, for instance, will be able to take 30 MiG-29s, and to operate waves of 12 of the bleedin' things. And it's a minnow of a ship, at 44,000 tonnes and 932 ft long - smaller than Ark Royal!
Gorshkov, for instance, will be able to take 30 MiG-29s, and to operate waves of 12 of the bleedin' things. And it's a minnow of a ship, at 44,000 tonnes and 932 ft long - smaller than Ark Royal!
Guest
Posts: n/a
Orac, Jackonico:
First, STOBAR. Let's actually see what the Gorshkov can do. The US did plenty of STOBAR related work in the 70s and 80s and came to the conclusion that ramp launches of CTOL aircraft (even using a short catapult as well on the flat bits) gave useful improvements at low weights but ran out of go at mission weights. STOBAR gives you the worst of both worlds: you lose lots of deck to the takeoff run and still need the space to get the things back on.
Orac, I confess that when Walmesley starts saying that 'carriers are basically a big box', my heart sinks. They can get VERY complicated. and are regarded as a severe test of design competence. The UK hasn't designed and built a large carrier since the 40s. There's risk here. That said, we can get a lot from the civilian sector, but that should not be a surprise: the most successful UK carriers ever were the Light Fleets (Melbourne, 25th May, etc.) that were built to commercial standards.
As for CDG and the French: I belive that they'll run into the same size trap the US avoided. Let's see what their launch rate from the thing is.
Ain't this fun? Now, who's for a bet on STOVL first flight dates? My shots: March 01 for Boeing, Sept 01 for Lockheed.
First, STOBAR. Let's actually see what the Gorshkov can do. The US did plenty of STOBAR related work in the 70s and 80s and came to the conclusion that ramp launches of CTOL aircraft (even using a short catapult as well on the flat bits) gave useful improvements at low weights but ran out of go at mission weights. STOBAR gives you the worst of both worlds: you lose lots of deck to the takeoff run and still need the space to get the things back on.
Orac, I confess that when Walmesley starts saying that 'carriers are basically a big box', my heart sinks. They can get VERY complicated. and are regarded as a severe test of design competence. The UK hasn't designed and built a large carrier since the 40s. There's risk here. That said, we can get a lot from the civilian sector, but that should not be a surprise: the most successful UK carriers ever were the Light Fleets (Melbourne, 25th May, etc.) that were built to commercial standards.
As for CDG and the French: I belive that they'll run into the same size trap the US avoided. Let's see what their launch rate from the thing is.
Ain't this fun? Now, who's for a bet on STOVL first flight dates? My shots: March 01 for Boeing, Sept 01 for Lockheed.
Guest
Posts: n/a
OK, time to bring you chaps back to reality.
CdG cost approx. GBP1.9bn, for a country which has been operating similarly-sized, indigenous carriers since the 1960's. The RN hasn't operated 'real' CV's since the 1970's and hasn't built any since the 1950's. Does anyone believe we can build TWO similar ships for only GBP2bn?
{BTW, arguing that CdG is more expensive 'cos it's a nuke is a non-starter -the reactors were already developed for the French SSBN programme and think of the fuel savings.}
Factor in the additional costs of FCBA and FOAEW, add a considerable amount for delays, cost overruns etc. Factor in the running costs in fuel, spares, crew, escorts, RFA's, etc.
A firm commitment to CVF is easy for this government to make because no real money will have to be spent on the project until 2005 or so and, incidentally, the promise of CVF made the otherwise swingeing cuts of SDR palatable.
However, come 2005 and the decision whether or not to proceed with CVF (and FCBA, FOAEW, supporting escorts & RFA's), which by then will be having a serious impact on future budgetary planning, and, well, I think you get the picture...
Oh well, maybe then the UK will come to a realistic appraisal about its place in the world (but then again, such things haven't shattered our delusuions of grandeur in the last 50 years or so).
CdG cost approx. GBP1.9bn, for a country which has been operating similarly-sized, indigenous carriers since the 1960's. The RN hasn't operated 'real' CV's since the 1970's and hasn't built any since the 1950's. Does anyone believe we can build TWO similar ships for only GBP2bn?
{BTW, arguing that CdG is more expensive 'cos it's a nuke is a non-starter -the reactors were already developed for the French SSBN programme and think of the fuel savings.}
Factor in the additional costs of FCBA and FOAEW, add a considerable amount for delays, cost overruns etc. Factor in the running costs in fuel, spares, crew, escorts, RFA's, etc.
A firm commitment to CVF is easy for this government to make because no real money will have to be spent on the project until 2005 or so and, incidentally, the promise of CVF made the otherwise swingeing cuts of SDR palatable.
However, come 2005 and the decision whether or not to proceed with CVF (and FCBA, FOAEW, supporting escorts & RFA's), which by then will be having a serious impact on future budgetary planning, and, well, I think you get the picture...
Oh well, maybe then the UK will come to a realistic appraisal about its place in the world (but then again, such things haven't shattered our delusuions of grandeur in the last 50 years or so).
Guest
Posts: n/a
I have to agree with Grodge re STOBAR. For a take off you need upwards velocity (either from lift or a ramp) and control.
With a high thrust to weight (.9 or more) the distance needed to accelerate to a speed where a 15 deg ramp will really work and provide loads of upward velocity (and hence time in the sky so that you can continue to accelerate to flying speed before gravity brings you back down close to the sea again) is quite modest – 80 kts say – but control of attitude after leaving the ramp at that speed is a problem.
Control at low speed comes free with a vertical lander but a conventional design may not have enough to be able to use a significant ramp effect. It happens that the Su-27 and MiG-29 families are unusually controllable at high alphas and low speeds so they can use STOBAR to a degree. But that ability is not a given with all designs.
JF
[This message has been edited by John Farley (edited 02 October 2000).]
With a high thrust to weight (.9 or more) the distance needed to accelerate to a speed where a 15 deg ramp will really work and provide loads of upward velocity (and hence time in the sky so that you can continue to accelerate to flying speed before gravity brings you back down close to the sea again) is quite modest – 80 kts say – but control of attitude after leaving the ramp at that speed is a problem.
Control at low speed comes free with a vertical lander but a conventional design may not have enough to be able to use a significant ramp effect. It happens that the Su-27 and MiG-29 families are unusually controllable at high alphas and low speeds so they can use STOBAR to a degree. But that ability is not a given with all designs.
JF
[This message has been edited by John Farley (edited 02 October 2000).]
Guest
Posts: n/a
Can we get the carriers built for the currently quoted prices? Well, let's say it's a severe challenge. That said, if we want to do it (and this lot say they do) the money will come. By the way, with EF at around 15bn pounds so far, the carriers don't look so bad.
The best way to get the carriers is to aim at what we can achieve. They WILL get cut back in size (all our carriers have) and a 35,000 tonner would make a good STOVL ship but a rotten CTOL design.
John Farley, thank you for your comments, glad to talk on email if you wish. Thoroughly agree that STOBAR looks good if you don't worry about control and also if you don't want to carry very much. Most estimates I have heard of EF STOBAR performance seem to assume a 'flying display' configuration. Add a few bombs and those T/W ratios drop away quickly.
Come on then: bets on STOVL JSF first flights? Boeing next March, LM around Sept 01 I reckon.
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The best way to get the carriers is to aim at what we can achieve. They WILL get cut back in size (all our carriers have) and a 35,000 tonner would make a good STOVL ship but a rotten CTOL design.
John Farley, thank you for your comments, glad to talk on email if you wish. Thoroughly agree that STOBAR looks good if you don't worry about control and also if you don't want to carry very much. Most estimates I have heard of EF STOBAR performance seem to assume a 'flying display' configuration. Add a few bombs and those T/W ratios drop away quickly.
Come on then: bets on STOVL JSF first flights? Boeing next March, LM around Sept 01 I reckon.
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