How have the French managed it with the CDG, 36K tons? (Sunday Times reports today it has finally been accepted/commissioned). It cost £1.8 billion. Look at the budget, £2 billion for both!
I enclose the information below for interest:
Regardless, they are going to be built commercially in the UK. Below is the answer given by one of the major bidders:
Examination of Witnesses (Questions 280 - 299)
WEDNESDAY 24 MAY 2000
SIR ROBERT WALMSLEY AND VICE-ADMIRAL SIR JEREMY BLACKHAM
280. I think you have already indicated the answer to the next question but I would like to pursue it just a shade further. Let us suppose on the black downbeat scenario, as it were, that there is a very significant delay after we had selected the JSF: we selected it and after we had committed ourselves to design the carriers appropriately, would it then be the case that if there were a very significant delay of JSF that the carriers would have to be delayed themselves, or would it be in any way practicable to switch to another contender to be an alternative aircraft for the carrier? I suspect the answer is that by this stage it would be too late to switch judging from what you have just said about the way the carriers would have to be designed and tailored to meet the aircraft that we selected.
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) I think it would depend on which version you had chosen. If you had chosen a conventional take-off aircraft then it is not impossible to suppose that one might switch. If you had chosen a vertical take-off version there are not many competitors. It is worth remarking that we are making the choice of aircraft manufacturer later this year and we do not have to decide at that point the form of launch, whether it is a vertical one or a conventional one. We do not have to fix the final design of the carrier until we do that, so we have actually got a bit of time to see the aircraft fly, to monitor the progress of the programme.
281. My final question on this is the one I indicated earlier that I would be asking. Would you please tell us a little bit about some of the other aircraft that are in contention for this contract?
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) The F18 is well known about and Rafale is the French version which will have some carrier experience before we need to use it. There is thought about a marinised version of Eurofighter which we do not currently have in the programme. That involves changes to the structure of the aircraft. There has been some thought given as to whether an advanced Harrier might be designed. None of these aircraft yet exist in carrier form because we have not selected it.
(Sir Robert Walmsley) The number of aircraft that the Royal Navy would require for carrier operations is relatively small and the loading on to the price of production of those aircraft, any significant development costs, really makes it a very unattractive proposition in terms of value for money.
282. What numbers of aircraft are we talking about?
(Sir Robert Walmsley) Perhaps 60.
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) It would probably be slightly more than that because one of the decisions that the SDR made was to replace the Harrier FA2, the naval Harrier, and the Harrier GR7, the RAF model, with the same aircraft, so I would expect the numbers[3] to be a little greater than that. The actual operational fleet combined might not be more than about 60.
Chairman
283. If the MoD selects Thomson-CSF will there be any advantage in going the whole hog and purchasing Rafale to fly off it? Is there any synergy between the French bid and the type of aircraft flying off it?
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) I would not have thought so, not unless it is the right aeroplane. We are talking about the design of the ship and that is an independent thing. It could be closely related to the aircraft but I would not have thought in a commercial sense—
284. You gave a very serious answer to what was meant to be a very provocative question.
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) One I hope I will not have to answer.
Chairman: The next question I very reluctantly hand to my colleague, Mike Gapes, but I might come in. One from Mr Hancock first.
Mr Hancock
285. I am very interested in what you said, I thought your serious comment was to a serious question from the Chairman.
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) I always assume the Chairman asks serious questions.
Chairman: I hope it was not a serious question.
Mr Hancock
286. I thought it was. He does pose the question that you yourself have posed about designing the ship around the aircraft. Are we still on target, or is it the wish of the MoD to go for carriers in excess of 40,000 tonnes which would be capable of taking 30 aircraft or maybe more?
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) I know there is a great fascination with the tonnage of a ship which personally I do not share. The key issue is what is the aircraft going to be and what numbers are we going to deploy. The public position, and I have no reason whatsoever to dissent from it, is that we might want to deploy up to 50 aircraft but we would have to fix the number a bit more clearly than that. Once we have decided on the aircraft we will have to build a carrier to accommodate it. Should it be a conventional take-off and landing aircraft we will need arresting gear and catapults and that will cause the ship to be larger and certainly more expensive than if we do not need it. Depending on the size of the aircraft we will have to consider the size of the flight deck and the size of the hangar arrangements. Different sized aircraft require different amounts of space, you have got to build in a gap between them or they all bang into each other. It does not make sense to determine exactly what the size of the carrier will be until we know what the aircraft is.
287. That goes right back to Julian Lewis' point about the type of aircraft delays in getting a decision on the conventional take-off fighter as opposed to the vertical take-off fighter. What is your timescale now?
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) For?
288. For making a decision on these carriers?
(Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham) The carrier will have to be ordered in about 2005. We are expecting to down select the type of aircraft, the make of aircraft, later this year and we will have to consider the actual version system after that. That will still be well before the decision to design and order the carrier.
(Sir Robert Walmsley) I think I would like to just make a point there. It is absolutely true, of course, that these extra equipments have to be accommodated and designed if we choose a conventional take-off and landing aircraft. A carrier is not a complicated ship, it is basically a big box with a big hangar inside it and a flat deck and a sufficient degree of command and control arrangements to enable the ship to communicate, as it has to. It is not going to have lots of other weapons. It is not full of systems like a destroyer that is stuffed full of the most complicated electronics, etc.. When you go on board a carrier it is basically empty, it is just a box. What is complicated is the aeroplane. I do not want to allow us to create an impression in your minds that the construction of the ship is an immense technological achievement. I have got Mr Baghaei sitting behind me who is the leader of the Integrated Project Team, who I asked to come to hear the Committee's enthusiasm for this programme today. He used to be a production director at Kvaerner on the Clyde. He knows about building ships. He is not going to allow himself to get bogged down in some minutiae as to whether or not it is difficult to accommodate. We will do the ship.
I also include the following for background information:
WRITTEN EVIDENCE
Memorandum submitted by the Ministry of Defence on the Major Procurement Projects Survey (10 May 1999)
1. The Committee asked the MoD for separate memoranda on a number of procurement programmes. We were asked to include in each memorandum "a general summary of the equipment and its component parts, the project's history, progress to date and future prospects" and to provide as much as possible of the details required to answer a series of "core questions".
2. Separate memoranda are accordingly being provided to the Committee on:
Future Carriers—CVF
The decision in the Strategic Defence Review to purchase two large aircraft carriers, to replace the three Invincible-class carriers from around 2012, is being taken forward in an Assessment phase. Invitations to tender for Assessment were issued in January, with a view to the award of contracts for the first part of this phase. Analysis of Options, with up to three prime contractors in the autumn. A wide range of design options, to be reviewed alongside the options for the Future Carrier Borne Aircraft, FCBA, see separate memorandum, will be considered.
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT
1. The Strategic Defence Review concluded that the ability to deploy offensive air power will be central to future force projection operations, and that aircraft carriers can provide valuable flexibility in a range of operational circumstances. They can also offer a coercive presence, which may forestall the need for war fighting. The SDR recognised that there is an increasing likelihood of future operations being conducted by forces far from their home bases. In such operations, host-nation support, including access to suitable air bases, cannot be guaranteed, particularly during an evolving regional crisis or the early stages of a conflict. The SDR concluded that there is a continuing need for Britain to have the capability offered by aircraft carriers. Our three Invincible-class carriers were designed for Cold War anti-submarine operations. The intention, announced in the SDR, is to plan to replace these with a new class of larger and more capable carriers, known as the CVF, Carrier Vessel Future, class.
2. Initial Gate approval, utilising the Smart Procurement model, was given in December 1998 for an Assessment phase. Studies to be undertaken in Assessment will examine the Staff Target and develop it, using cost/capability trade-offs to produce an affordable Staff Requirement. The objective is to build a replacement for the current carriers that has an increased emphasis on offensive air operations and is capable of operating the largest possible range of aircraft in the widest possible range of roles.
TRADE-OFFS
3. Trade-offs between cost/capability and time/capability will be integral to the Assessment work.
NUMBERS
4. The original plan was to replace the three Invincible-class carriers with three 20,000 tonne vessels. Operational analysis demonstrated, however, that it would be more cost-effective to procure two large carriers, each capable of carrying up to about 50 aircraft. The SDR also saw advantage in future carriers being capable of carrying more fixed-wing aircraft than the current vessels, in order to be able to contribute more effectively to the support of operations on land and at sea.
STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW
5. The SDR assessed the requirement for aircraft carriers within the overall requirement for an offensive air capability. We concluded that "there is .
. a continuing need for Britain to have the capability offered by aircraft carriers" and the emphasis for replacement carriers should be on "increased offensive air power, and an ability to operate the largest possible range of aircraft in the widest possible range of roles"—The Strategic Defence Review, Supporting Essays, pages 6-6 to 6-8.
MILITARY CAPABILITY
6. The CVR will deploy offensive air power in support of the full spectrum of future operations, including force projection as a central component of the maritime contribution to joint operations.
EQUIPMENT TO BE REPLACED AND IN -SERVICE DATE
7. The planned out of service dates for HMS Invincible, HMS Illustrious and HMS Ark Royal are 2010, 2012 and 2015 respectively. The SDR introduced no changes to this programme of withdrawals from service. The first CVF is scheduled to enter operational service in 2012 and the second in 2015. The in-service date of CVF is defined as the "Operational Data Material Assessment", which is the date at which it will be accepted as fit for entry into the operational fleet.
PROCUREMENT APPROACH
8. The CVF procurement strategy is based on competition and prime contractorship, with clear and unambiguous output requirement specifications. Although we intend that the ships should be built in the UK, prospective prime contractors are from the UK, USA and France.
9. In accordance with the Smart Procurement model, the project will follow a two-stage approval process. An invitation to tender for the Assessment phase was issued in January 1999 to six potential prime contractors—BAe Defence Systems, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Marconi Electronic Systems, Raytheon and Thomson-CSF. On completion of tender evaluation, we aim to award up to three parallel contracts in the autumn.
10. The Assessment phase will comprise two main stages. The first, an Analysis of Options, will involve examination of design options to inform the selection decision, due in late 2000/early 2001, on the type and numbers of aircraft to meet the Future Carrier Borne Aircraft, FCBA requirement. At the end of this stage, two of the three potential prime contractors will be selected to proceed to the second stage. This will involve detailed work to determine the carriers' design parameters and to reduce technological risk, informed by the choice of FCBA. It will culminate at the Main Gate approval decision, planned for 2003, to down-select to one preferred prime contractor to proceed to Demonstration and Manufacture of two carriers. The Demonstration phase will begin with the design of a virtual prototype by the selected prime contractor, using computer-aided technology. The intention is to achieve, so far as possible, a freeze on a mature design before construction begins.
ALTERNATIVE PROCUREMENT OPTIONS
11. During Assessment, a wide range of carrier and aircraft options, including conventional take-off and landing, short take off and vertical landing, and short take off but arrested recovery, will be considered. As part of this work, and following normal practice, the cost of life-extending the three existing carriers, by 10 years, will be assessed to provide a baseline against which all the options can be evaluated.
COLLABORATION
12. It is too early to be specific about the prospects for collaboration. Some informal discussions have taken place with the US, Spanish, French and Italian navys to identify any common ground in carrier replacement programmes or requirements. At present, whole ship collaboration would appear unlikely to be a viable option, but collaborative opportunities will be reviewed during Assessment, especially for equipment and systems.
EXPORT POTENTIAL
13. It is unlikely that this project will lead directly to whole-ship sales, although the commercial marketing of CVF design skills and production technology could benefit UK industry. Much of the ship's equipment could have export potential. Industrial Participation proposals will be invited, as appropriate, for offshore content of the proposed solution.
INDUSTRIAL FACTORS
14. In accordance with government policy for the construction of warships, the CVF will be built in a UK shipyard. Industrial factors will be taken into account in the selection of a contractor.
SMART PROCUREMENT
15. The CVF programme will adopt Smart Procurement techniques. An integrated project team will manage the project. A competition is being held to recruit a leader with appropriate skills. In accordance with Smart Procurement, what would previously have been Feasibility and Project Definition stages have been combined into a single Assessment phase, with increased investment at this stage to achieve early risk reduction. Potential prime contractors are being currently encouraged to be innovative throughout the project.
ACQUISITION PHASES
16. So far only a number of small-scale feasibility studies have been completed. Subsequent acquisition phases were described at paragraph 10. A risk register will be maintained throughout the life of the project as the core of an integrated risk management system. It will contain both MoD and contractor inputs from the Analysis of Options studies undertaken by industry. Operational Effectiveness and Investment Appraisal that will support the Main Gate submission to proceed with Demonstration and Manufacture.
MILESTONES AND COSTS
17. CVF milestones, as currently planned, are shown in the table below.
Staff Target endorsement and
Initial Gate approval December 1998
Issue ITT January 1999
Start Assessment autumn 1999
FCBA downselection late 2000/early 2001
Staff Requirement endorsement and Main Gate approval late 2003
Order date late 2004
Contract acceptance date 2011
ISDs 2012 and 2015
18. We envisage a total acquisition cost for the two carriers of around £2 billion, including combat system and initial support costs, but excluding the aircraft. The peak years of expenditure are likely to be between 2008 and 2012. Costs incurred so far, including pre-feasibility studies, total just over £2 million.
IN -SERVICE SUPPORT
19. We plan to let a design/build/support-through-life contract. Collaborative support arrangements are unlikely.
20. Manning levels will be based on work by human factors designers, to achieve a balance between automated and manual tasks and by training needs analysis, in accordance with the RN training equipment strategy. The size of ship's complement is planned to be about the same as for the Invincible class. Contractors will be tasked to propose the most efficient manning strategies for their designs, which will be examined during Assessment.
21. All logistic support will be considered as a direct cost to the project, with an emphasis on avoiding expenditure on new infrastructure. The maintenance management system will be required to integrate with other MoD logistic systems and to take account of emerging developments in IT. Innovative support solutions will be examined, using integrated logistic support methodology to minimise costs throughout the ship's life.
22. Contractor Logistic Support, CLS, will be examined for some or all of the maintenance and logistics. The benefits of CLS include a strong focus on reliability for initial designs; better standards of availability, reliability and maintenance; and an incentive to the contractor to design and build systems that minimise support costs. One option to be considered is the adoption of best practice in supply chain techniques, to minimise MoD ownership of spares, by contracting for agreed spares availability from industry. CLS options for up to 30 years will be examined during Assessment.
23. The upkeep cycle of the CVF will reflect the vessels' modern design, and developments in upkeep practice such as "reliability centred maintenance" rather than lengthy and expensive refits. This will enable availability requirements to be met by only two carriers.
FRONT LINE NUMBERS
24. Both CVF will be assigned to the front line.
INTEROPERABILITY
25. The aim is to maximise the interoperability of the CVF with the greatest possible range of UK and allied aircraft and with other carriers, to the extent that this can be achieved cost-effectively. The choice of aircraft as FCBA will be a major factor: a decision to procure JSF would enhance interoperability with the US, whereas a decision to procure a marinised Eurofighter would enhance interoperability with other NATO allies. The issue will be explored further during Assessment.
DISPOSAL OF EQUIPMENT REPLACED
26. Prospects for the sale of the Invincible class to other nations will be explored in due course.
IN -SERVICE LIFE
27. Each CVF is planned to have an in-service life of 30 years.
DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL
28. The CVF programme is closely linked with the FCBA and Future Organic Airborne Early Warning programmes.
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So,
1. the decision on the aircraft this year or next (read after the election). Followed by the decision of the size, weight etc of the new carriers up to 2-4 years later after design approval. (After the next, next election??)
2. I find there comment about the carriers just being "a box" intriguing, particularily when you look at the budget. When you tie it to the commercial tendering, minimising spares, spares from industry etc you can see why I start to look at the civilian solutions....not the pointed reference to no requirment for a weapon system and the C2 limited to communications. This is to be no JFACC Afloat/JFMHQ. It appears to be more a couple of extra HMS Oceans.
3. Note the comment about the number of aircraft to replace both the SHAR and GR7 being "about" 60 to replace all 3 GR7 squadrons, the OCU and the complete FAA SHAR fleet.
[This message has been edited by ORAC (edited 01 October 2000).]
[This message has been edited by ORAC (edited 01 October 2000).]